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APART WE PRAY? 
THE STRUGGLE OF SOUTH AFRICA’S REFORMED CHURCHES 
TO UNITE A DIVIDED NATION 
 
MARTHE HESSELMANS 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2016 
Major Advisor: Frank J. Korom, Ph.D., Professor of Religion and Anthropology 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation analyzes the prolonged transition of South Africa’s Reformed churches 
from bastions of apartheid towards protagonists of racial reconciliation. At the center is 
the unification process of the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) and the Uniting Reformed 
Church of Southern Africa. The two institutions are rooted in the same tradition, with 
broadly similar doctrines, yet they worship separately in the old racial categories of 
apartheid. This is not for lack of effort. After 1994, the DRC shifted from proclaiming 
divine divisions between races, nations and ethnicities to urging inclusivity in the name 
of Jesus Christ. The limited success so far to integrate the long divided churches reveals 
an intricate story of religious actors trying to reframe identities and adjust normative 
frameworks. The story mirrors South Africa’s greater struggle to transcend its past. Part I 
of this dissertation considers the nationalist civil religion with which the churches 
bolstered segregation, and its legacy in contemporary South Africa. By drawing 
comparisons with other religious-nationalist movements, the study shows the impact of 
 x	
religion in sustaining ethnic conflicts with its everyday structures of separation. Through 
a qualitative study of South Africa’s Reformed churches, Part II investigates what 
happens with such structures after a conflict dissipates. To what extent have the churches 
been able to untangle their attachments to particular ethnic and racial identities? An 
assessment of their unity discourse and its implementation among five communities in 
the Free State and Western Cape displays a complex role of religious ideas and practices 
in deepening and mitigating social divisions. At stake here are recently adopted beliefs in 
inclusivity along with the pressure to adapt to a rapidly pluralizing religious landscape in 
which the churches’ authority is no longer a given. They have to cooperate across the 
color line if they wish to retain relevance in society. This study thus highlights dynamics 
of principles and pragmatism, and of reconciliation and justice. Where historically white 
congregations are gradually coming to terms with the need to partner with their black 
neighbors, the latter now prioritize economic equality over reconciliation. This has not 
made the churches’ search for unity any easier. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Problem statement 
 
“We believe that the Lord demands from us to heal the old divisions as soon as possible 
and come together as the entire family of churches into one church association… We are 
afraid to say it, but we judge that failure to do so will not only mean we have failed the 
Lord, but also our South African society, and perhaps especially the children and youth.”1  
 
In 2004, the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) 2  thus reaffirmed its unequivocal 
denouncement of the racial and ethnic divisions it once so fervently supported. The 
statement exemplifies the DRC’s tortuous turnabout from being the religious pillar of 
South Africa’s apartheid regime to proclaiming itself as advocate of the new rainbow 
nation. In 1990, the church had already admitted it made a mistake in endorsing the 
political system of segregation “too uncritically.”3 Since then, the DRC has struggled to 
																																																								
1 DRC 2004, General Synod. Besluite. [Decisions]. 2. 
2 The Dutch Reformed Church is the English translation that will be used in this dissertation for the 
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) in South Africa. The church was established in 1652 and over 
time set up separate churches for different racial and ethnic communities. The historically segregated Dutch 
Reformed churches and their successors are today referred to under the umbrella term of Reformed Church 
family or family of Reformed churches in South Africa. See for more details on this history, chapter 3 in 
this dissertation. According to the latest full count of religions in South Africa in 2001, the family still 
constituted one of the largest single denominations in the country with 6.7% of the population as compared 
to 11.1% Zionist Christians, 7.6% Pentecostal/Charismatic and 7.1% Catholics. See: Census 2001. Primary 
Tables South Africa. Statistics South Africa, 2004, 24-28.  
3 Church and Society 1990: A Testimony of the Dutch Reformed Church (ned Geref Kerk). Bloemfontein: 
General Synodical Commission, 1991. Paragraph 282. 
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catch up with the country’s transformation. Black and white communities have after 
decades of rigid separation gradually begun to integrate, whether at work, schools or 
sport clubs. They however remain far apart from each other in spaces of worship. The 
DRC and its associated Reformed churches continue, despite their urge for unity, to be 
organized on the basis of race or ethnicity. And they are not alone. Across 
denominations, South Africa’s abundant churches are often said to form last bastions of 
apartheid. Here on Sundays, people withdraw in their respective communities, 
comfortable and safe from the diversity and its many challenges confronting them every 
other day of the week. 
Why are the churches lagging behind in their country’s post-apartheid 
transformation and how far behind really are they? Taking a careful look at the DRC and 
its family of Reformed churches, we see a much more complex story. Indeed, 11 a.m. on 
Sunday is still the most segregated hour of the week.4 But applying the Rev. Dr. Martin 
Luther King’s famous statement to the South African context overlooks the numerous 
efforts churches have been undertaking towards reconciling and integrating their diverse 
communities. It also discards the intricate dynamics underlying the lack of progress and 
the question of how to define such progress in the first place. This dissertation 
investigates how Reformed church communities engage with South Africa’s processes of 
vast social change and reconstruction since the end of apartheid. It specifically aims to 
																																																								
4 Eddy van der Borght has written an insightful article on this topic for his inauguration speech at the Free 
University of Amsterdam, see: Eddy van der Borght, Sunday Morning - the Most Segregated Hour: On 
Racial Reconciliation As Unfinished Business for Theology in South Africa and Beyond (Amsterdam: 
Faculty of Theology, VU University, 2009).  
 
3	
	
uncover the varied capacities with which these religious actors seek to overcome the 
country’s group divisions, and what inhibits them.  
 
Central to this research is a qualitative study of five communities in the Western Cape 
and Free State regions of South Africa, their attempts of and resistance to the racial 
reconciliation their church leaders now decree. The very term reconciliation is contested 
here. It implies hope for more cohesion among communities torn by an apartheid past and 
disparate present. More concretely, it has become associated with the visible unification 
of the black, white, colored and Indian sections by which the Reformed churches have 
remained to this day de facto separated.5 The past two decades reveal an extensive 
trajectory through which these churches pursue their structural merger into one 
multiracial institution, thus far with little success. The churches are still subdivided 
between the DRC and its predominantly white congregations on the one hand, and the 
mixed black and colored Uniting Reformed Church in Southern Africa (URCSA), the 
black African Dutch Reformed Church in Africa (DRCA), and Indian Reformed Church 
in Africa (RCA) on the other hand. Who are the drivers of what looks like an improbable 
unification process, and what drives their efforts, or hinders them? With a critical 
analysis of both religious discourse and practice, I assess the churches’ effectiveness in 																																																								
5 These contentious terms reflect the racial categories of South Africa’s apartheid regime. African and black 
remain prevalent terms to indicate its indigenous African population groups whereas white refers to 
European heritage, colored to communities with mixed African, European and Asian backgrounds, and 
Indian or Asian to those with origins in especially India. The terms are still commonly used in South Africa 
to describe one’s own and others’ group identities. Their employment in a study like this is problematic and 
can contribute to further stigmatization, as will be addressed in section 2.2. It should be clear that wherever 
used in this dissertation, the terms are considered as complex social and political constructs that are neither 
fixed nor static. None capture South Africa’s immense diversity or the hybrid forms of identification that 
have evolved over time. 
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breaking entrenched patterns of separateness. Significantly, the study looks at what the 
churches’ avowed embrace of integration implies for the everyday life inside religious 
communities long accused of nourishing divisions. 
These unusual suspects in South Africa’s transition story exhibit all too familiar 
challenges with racial and ethnic diversity, and sometimes surprising responses. They 
wrestle, as communities throughout the country do, with the pressure to adapt to the new 
norm of integration, while trying to maintain specific languages, traditions and communal 
solidarity. The broader intricacies of South Africa’s struggle to come to terms with its 
apartheid legacy hence form a key context to this dissertation. How to build a new sense 
of common belonging across communities alienated from each other by history? How to 
address the vast income differences among them today, not to speak of the deeply 
contrasting narratives of a traumatic past? Persistent beliefs in the existence of and 
necessity to preserve distinct identities constitute major obstacles to the churches’ 
unification process. They remain equally problematic in efforts to build social cohesion 
in the country at large.  
Twenty-one years since Nelson Mandela became the first openly elected black 
president, South Africans still perceive themselves and others largely in terms of essential 
ethnic groups, and often despise the fact that they do. It contributes to increasing 
disillusion with the rainbow nation Bishop Desmond Tutu envisaged in 1994. Promises 
of reconciliation, justice and equity have faltered on skyrocketing disparities, outbursts of 
xenophobia and crises of unemployment, crime and sexual violence. None of these 
difficulties can be grasped without considering their deep intertwining with racial and 
 
5	
	
ethnic identities as well as their roots in the apartheid era. An in-depth analysis into the 
efforts of one major protagonist of the old system to change course will offer another 
piece of the puzzle that constitutes South Africa’s enduring transformation towards 
greater unity.  
 
Context 
 
Investigating the above questions in the particular case of South Africa, this dissertation 
aims to contribute to debates about global changes in religious identity. Worldwide, we 
see a persistent tendency among religious traditions to form around one distinct national 
or ethnic group.6 This is nothing new. But it is increasingly difficult to sustain exclusivity 
in societies that are becoming more diverse as a result of globalizing economies, rapid 
urbanization and mass migration. It raises dilemmas for faith communities that see the 
need to open up, but that also fear the loss of their identity. These dilemmas are further 
complicated by the shift scholars discern from the United States to Lebanon to Guatemala 
towards increasingly individualized faith experiences. Religion, as Peter Berger and José  
Casanova have noted amongst others, no longer comprises one dominant worldview that 
people grow up with, or that is imposed through religious or political authorities.7 Rather, 
people increasingly choose their beliefs amidst numerous options. The religious 																																																								
6 Peter Beyer usefully discusses this tendency and how it is currently under pressure by forces of 
globalization. See: Peter Beyer, Religion and Globalization (London, U.K: Sage Publications, 1994).  
7 Peter Berger, “Secularization and De-Secularization.” In Religions in the Modern World: Traditions and 
Transformations, edited by Linda Woodhead, 336-347. London: Routledge, 2002; José Casanova, 
“Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective,” Hedgehog Review 8 (2006): 7-22. 
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pluralization these authors note triggers divergent responses. Where some faith 
communities seek to engage with different worldviews and traditions in order to broaden 
their base, others withdraw further into exclusivity. This last response is especially 
problematic. Scholars such as Mark Juergensmeyer and Catarina Kinnvall perceive a rise 
of religious-nationalist movements that resist, with at times extreme aggression, any form 
of diversity in their midst.8 Instead of choice, such movements emphasize the absolute 
truth of their tradition and its unique bond with one particular group that should be kept 
untainted by outside influences. 
 Current debates about religious-nationalism as well as pluralization tend to focus 
on how religious actors react to vast social change. What requires more attention though 
is the often contrasting ways in which these actors seek to engender change themselves. 
How do religious communities actively try to reshape their own identities to fit better 
with their new circumstances? What resources might they employ to disentangle 
increasingly obsolete nationalist or racial attachments? South Africa’s Dutch Reformed 
Church presents a highly relevant case in point. Throughout much of the twentieth 
century the DRC developed and sustained an ideology that closely tied its Reformed 
tradition with a particular community, the white Afrikaner nation.9 Its major purpose was 
to advance Afrikaners’ position in society and protect their religion, culture and language 
																																																								
8 M. Juergensmeyer, “The Worldwide Rise of Religious Nationalism,” Journal of International Affairs 
Columbia University 50.1 (1996): 1-20; Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, 
Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security,” Political Psychology Vol. 25, No. 5 (Oct., 2004): 741-
767. 
9 T. D. Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1975); Charles Bloomberg and Saul Dubow, Christian Nationalism and the 
Rise of the Afrikaner Broederbond in South Africa, 1918-48 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1989). 
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against external influences, be they British, black or communist. Diversity and cultural 
mixing had to be avoided at all costs. Claiming separate development of each race group 
as a core value, the DRC set up different churches for non-white communities. This type 
of institutional segregation became a model for the Afrikaner apartheid regime and its 
systematic suppression of South Africa’s black population during its forty-year reign. In 
1997, however, the DRC leadership officially condemned all forms of apartheid. In the 
next decades, the church not only renounced its obsession with Afrikaner identity as 
idolatry, but also embarked on the mentioned trajectory of unification with the black, 
colored and Indian Reformed churches. Religion, racial and national identities were to be 
disentangled. 
A range of historic studies show the DRC’s transition occurred far from 
smoothly.10 Matthias Gensicke has, in his extensive analysis of this transition in the 
1990s, pointed at the understudied gap between the church’s new official discourse and 
the persistently segregated reality of its congregations in the current post-apartheid South 
Africa.11 As their country continues to open up to the world, congregations appear to turn 
inward, cherishing their now exposed communities not as part of apartheid policy, but as 
a personal choice. The modern freedom to choose reinforces similar niche religious 
communities worldwide. What prompts their choices and how should we interpret them? 
																																																								
10 See for instance: Tracy Kuperus, State, Civil Society, and Apartheid in South Africa: An Examination of 
Dutch Reformed Church-State Relations (New York, N.Y: St. Martin's Press, 1999); Peter Walshe, 
Prophetic Christianity and the Liberation Movement in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster 
Publications, 1995).  
11 Matthias Gensicke, Zwischen Beharrung Und Veränderung: Die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Im 
Umbruchsprozess Südafrikas (1990-1999) [Between Persistence and Change: The Dutch Reformed Church 
in South Africa’s Transition Process (1990-1999)] (Munster: Waxmann, 2007). 
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To what extent do sociocultural factors such as class, race and language shape 
churchgoers’ decisions on where they go on Sundays? How can their churches offer 
refuge and simultaneously help members engage with the multiple identities facing them 
outside the sanctuary? These individual and local questions must be understood alongside 
the national and political ones. 
 
Ultimately, this dissertation seeks to highlight the concurrent sites at which religion is 
employed towards deepening and mitigating social divisions. South Africa’s Reformed 
churches serve to illuminate this inherent paradox. They expose the coinciding of both 
exclusion and inclusion as religious responses to increasingly diverse surroundings. The 
churches’ recent history also shows the need to deepen debates about religious-
nationalism with analyses on the changing position of religion in current societies. The 
sharpening and revisiting of group divisions we see today cannot be seen independently 
from the dilemmas facing religious communities. They have to navigate a widening 
availability of different worldviews and lifestyles through the Internet or in highly diverse 
megacities, in addition to a quickly individualizing religious landscape. In South Africa, 
this is confronting churches with a perhaps greater challenge than apartheid ever did. 
Many of their communities appear at a crossroads: will they allow more diversity and risk 
undermining their own supposedly distinct identity, or withdraw further into this identity 
and risk losing it entirely? Is there a middle road?  
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Dissertation structure 
 
With a combination of ethnographic field research, historic studies, theories of religious 
change and religious-nationalism, this research is decidedly interdisciplinary. It has to be. 
Investigating South Africa’s church struggles with racial diversity requires a close look at 
what is happening inside the congregations, how churchgoers balance big questions about 
unity and disparity with small-scale coping strategies, from joint prayer meetings to ad 
hoc church partnerships. Their predicaments are rooted in the convoluted history of the 
churches with apartheid, of the country’s colonial past, and their communities’ distinct 
roles in this past. They are also affected by global dynamics confronting religious groups 
today. Across South Africa, communities grapple with emptying churches, the rise of 
alternative spirituality, Pentecostalism and mass popular culture. Churches themselves 
partake in religious and ethnic identity politics as response to these changes. The aim of 
the following chapters is to exhibit the constant intertwining of religious, political and 
social-economic interests and motivations on matters of belonging. What this research 
will not do is explore theological arguments concerning South Africa’s national 
reconciliation process. Neither does it offer a comprehensive overview of church 
institutional change nor a detailed investigation into the journey of one single 
congregation. Coupling a number of short case studies to the bigger transition story of 
South Africa and its Reformed churches, it is rather meant to show the deep intersections 
between the local, the national and the global.  
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 For this purpose, the dissertation is divided into two parts, of which the first 
begins with the national context of a country still in the midst of its post-apartheid 
transformation. Chapter one first outlines what has been described as the Afrikaner civil 
religion that helped build, consolidate and sustain apartheid. Central to this historic 
discussion is the extensive reach of a religious-nationalist doctrine of segregation in 20th 
century South Africa and its remarkable unraveling towards the end. It draws a pivotal 
backdrop to the vast challenges the country faces in the present century. No longer 
segregated by law, the second part of this chapter deliberates, South African society 
remains partitioned by class, culture and race. These interwoven cleavages derive from 
old and new failures to deal with the country’s immense diversity. Bringing together the 
officially recognized eleven different language communities, four population groups and 
their countless divergences in customs, interests, memories of the past and visions of the 
future, is hard enough in areas of education or labor. At a space as intimate as the church, 
it appears almost impossible. The first chapter hence lays out the main pieces of the 
conundrum this dissertation seeks to decipher. Where and how does religion enter the 
playing field of South Africa’s post-apartheid reconstruction, especially considering its 
long detrimental influence in reinforcing the country’s divisions? 
 Crucial tools in construing this puzzle can be found in two theoretical 
perspectives of global religious change and religious-nationalism. Chapter two takes the 
reader through current debates in these respective fields and assesses their value for the 
study at hand. It briefly charts the social scientific approach to religion informing this 
study. From this basis, I will turn to questions about how religious experience has been 
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changing in our modern day and age and what this entails for faith communities on the 
ground. It will be important to tease out the intricate ways in which today’s believers tend 
to forge increasingly individual identities amidst numerous religious and secular 
worldviews. This forces us to think differently about the impact traditional religious 
institutions such as South Africa’s Reformed churches have on their communities, and 
society at large. Concomitant with such religious change is the upsurge of religious 
nationalism. The presence of various options on top of other societal disruptions was 
noted earlier as posing significant challenges to communities that seek to preserve 
particular religious traditions. Beyond links between faith and nation, scholars like 
Kinnval and Roger Friedland have in this respect addressed entanglements between 
religion and a certain ethnic or racial group. 12 At stake here is the absolutization of group 
identities and their fortification through religious beliefs, rituals and organization in 
response to conflict or rapid social change. To illustrate this dynamic, chapter two makes 
a brief detour into the conflict of Northern Ireland. The case is relevant to show the 
power of religion in bolstering group divisions through its everyday structures of 
separation. It markedly reminds of the South African story and helps understand religion 
as a source of fabric that thickens otherwise thin ethnic identities. The churches in 
Northern Ireland have historically given substance to often vaguely understood 
differences. They enabled communities to maintain their separate ways well after the 
conflict died down. What does it take for these religious-ethnic affiliations to dissipate? 																																																								
12 Roger Friedland, “Religious Nationalism and the Problem of Collective Representation,” Annual Review 
of Sociology 27 (2001): 125-152; Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism.” 
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Part two tackles this question by moving further into South Africa’s Reformed churches 
and the struggle to unwind their own Christian-nationalist belief system. It concentrates 
on contemporary efforts of unifying the two largest churches, including the still 
predominantly white DRC and the largely black and colored URCSA. To understand 
what motivates, and complicates, these efforts necessitates an elaboration of the 
churches’ history. As chapter three discusses, the pursuit of unity far predates South 
Africa’s break with apartheid. It emerged throughout the previous century as the strictly 
segregated churches each in their own way sought to balance dilemmas of belonging, 
solidarity and independence. Powerful narratives were at play here. The white churches 
historically presented the Reformed family as spiritually one, but segregated in its 
worldly organization. It was considered the best way to sustain cultural differences and 
allow for the now notorious claim on separate but equal development. Black and colored 
Reformed churches conversely challenged this claim and its far from equal implications 
in reality. They urged the uniting of segregated church structures, albeit with significant 
ambiguity. Despised as the segregation system was, it also offered opportunities for these 
churches to foster distinct identities and a certain level of autonomy from the dominant 
white minority. The churches constituted one of the few safe havens where suppressed 
communities felt relatively secure from the long arm of the apartheid regime. Striving for 
the integration of white and black churches thus presented at once an act of resistance to 
the regime, and a threat to internal solidarity.  
 This conundrum still pervades debates on church unification today, the central 
topic of chapter four. The chapter closely follows discourse inside the Reformed family 
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about its position in contemporary South Africa. It looks at leadership and popular 
discussions in both the DRC and URCSA to discern what it means to break with a 
religious-nationalist past and how church actors are setting out their argumentation on 
matters of racial reconciliation and unity. These notions remain deeply controversial. We 
will see heated debates between proponents and critics of structurally merging the 
churches into one multiracial institution. They touch on problems within congregations 
seeking to adapt to the vast social and political transformations around them, as well as 
national tensions about the direction in which South Africa is heading. Religious 
arguments clash into pragmatic concerns regarding language and resources, and into 
politicized disagreements on the perceived successes or failures of the current 
government. A red thread comprises the churches’ divergent perspectives on their 
history. Culminating in debates about a Reformed statement of faith, the Belhar 
Confession, they show deeply embedded notions of victimhood that continue to inform 
self-perceptions on either side of the contentious color line. They turn every talk of 
integration into conflicts over who bears responsibility for the past and how justice 
should be done, making the topic of church unity into a source of division itself. 
 What happens with this talk in the daily practice of church communities will be 
addressed in the fifth chapter of this dissertation. It investigates tangible attempts to 
integrate congregations, church structures and organizations. What and who instigated 
these attempts and what has hampered their implementation? Vast contrasts become 
visible here between the expectations of the so-called white, colored and black churches 
regarding a future unity and whether it could advance their own respective struggles for 
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survival. Even more apparent are the at times sharply diverging attitudes among religious 
leaders and members about how to foster such unity with either planned or ad hoc 
activities. The perhaps greatest tension still pertains to the matching of the churches’ 
fairly recently embraced unity ideal with a persistent reality of segregation and disparity. 
Critics and opponents of an official church merger, elites and ordinary churchgoers, DRC 
and URCSA, tend to agree these days on the integral value of racial unity in the eyes of 
God. Difficulties emerge when they have to find consensus on its real life implications in 
the current South African context. Chapter five explores these implications on the basis 
of five communities in Stellenbosch, Wynberg, Bloemfontein, Ladybrand and 
Philippolis. Each of these sites comprise DRC and URCSA congregations that have been 
engaged in racial integration efforts, some intentional, some unintentional, and most with 
little visible success. Their stories show alternative routes towards the untangling of once 
rigid religious-ethnic and racial identities, each with their own challenges for the 
communities involved. The chapter furthermore exposes the intriguing perspective of 
church related social organizations. Operating on the threshold between the churches and 
the non-profit world, these organizations have become increasingly active in forging 
intergroup collaborations towards common societal goals of poverty relief, HIV AIDS 
awareness or youth employment. They point at the potential of such collaborations to 
build trust within and between communities, but also signal the immense difficulty of 
overcoming entrenched patterns of paternalism and dependency.  
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Throughout these various efforts to foster unity, profound resistance hence appears 
inevitable. Church discourse shows controversies about the dangers of unification for 
each church’s individual identity. A sense of belonging to one’s own community still 
matters highly. Local initiatives towards integration falter on lack of commitment and 
resources while joint social programs collapse in the face of organizational differences. 
Power and how it is exercised in these local religious struggles mirrors South Africa’s 
larger struggle to transcend its divided past. Underneath the presenting issues linger deep 
mutual suspicions, contrasting memories and concerns about the country’s future. How 
such diverging narratives are inhibiting unity processes is a central question throughout 
this dissertation. Focus is given to key motivations of church actors confronting these 
challenges and their effectiveness in facilitating integration. What drives unification 
efforts against so many odds? Faith in a God of unity and reconciliation in Christ are 
reoccurring themes among supporters of unity on all sides. Are these beliefs, so lately 
adapted to the changing world, strong enough to overcome both the divisions of the past 
and the challenges of today? Can they help put into effect the remarkable transition these 
churches embarked on in the 1990s from evading to engaging with difference? 
 
Methodology 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the dissertation presented here builds on an ongoing 
conversation between different disciplines. What began with a historian’s outlook on the 
Reformed churches and apartheid, mixed with experiences as trainer in informal conflict 
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resolution, further evolved with the help of theoretical perspectives from religious studies 
and sociology as well as anthropological methods of qualitative research. Two aspects, 
discourse and congregational practice, are central in this qualitative approach and will be 
expounded here.  
 With regard to discourse, I have concentrated on written documents contributing 
to both formal and informal discussions about a future unification of the Reformed 
churches in South Africa. Sources range from minutes of meetings by the churches’ 
respective leaderships, their reports and statements, to the official church magazines, the 
DRC’s Kerkbode and URCSA’s URCSA News. Also included are debates in various 
social media outlets. Through blogs, Facebook pages, church related websites, forums as 
well as national newspaper sites, church actors have been expressing their opinions on 
matters of unity. Besides this obvious search term and derivatives such as unification and 
reunification, I looked for articles on reconciliation, ethnic or Afrikaner identity, Belhar, 
restorative justice, restitution, integration, apartheid, rainbow nation, nation and 
nationalism. Focus was given to discourse after 2006 as this year constituted a major 
breakthrough in national church debates about a possible merger between the DRC and 
URCSA. The search terms and limited time period generated a specific pool of articles 
from which I selected those that most specifically dealt with the unity debates, and those 
that were representative of broader discussions about the churches’ transformation after 
apartheid. To gain insight into the long-term of this trajectory, I furthermore researched 
documents written prior to 2006. These comprised major statements the churches made in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s about the need to break with apartheid. The Belhar 
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Confession and its Accompanying Letter of 1982 are prime among them. Also important 
are the DRC’s Church and Society documents, Journey with Apartheid as well as 
URCSA’s submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
 Nvivo data software was used to organize, code and analyze the over three 
hundred gathered documents. It helped draw out returning threads in the discourse as well 
as omissions. Prominent for instance were the intense and constantly reoccurring debates 
about the identity of the churches in South Africa today, especially in terms of social 
engagement. Church actors across the various communities indicated the tremendous 
importance of outreach for their religious identity. Opinions differed though on how far 
the churches should reach and who deserved priority, the immediate congregation or 
people from other communities or even other countries. Notably little attention was paid 
to notions of Afrikaner ethnicity or ethnicity in general. Language meanwhile, especially 
Afrikaans language, figured high in almost any debate on church unification. It signaled 
something I was warned about during my field research. Public debates on church 
unification, however hostile they appear, tend to disguise some of the real concerns inside 
the communities as contributors are mindful of the need to be politically correct and 
refrain from any direct references to race or Afrikaner identity. To detect sentiments 
concerning these matters, it was helpful to watch some of the more general discussions 
about South Africa’s post-apartheid transition.13 Here, anger about persistent white 																																																								
13 For more on implicit biases in especially leadership discourse, see sections 4.1 and 4.2 in this 
dissertation, and for instance in the literature: Deborah De Fina, Deborah Schiffrin and Michael G. W. 
Bamberg, Discourse and Identity (Cambridge. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Teun van 
Dijk, Discourse and Power (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 2008); Ruth 
Wodak and Teun A. Dijk, Racism at the Top: Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European 
States (Klagenfurt: Drava Verlag. 2000).  
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domination or reverse black on white racism, was often expressed in much sharper terms 
than in church unity talks, especially when the latter talks involved religious elites. 
 The judiciousness with which many inside the Reformed churches approached 
topics of unification also affected my research among church communities in South 
Africa. During two visits in 2012 and 2014, I conducted a total of ninety-six 
conversations with church members, ministers and theologians across the various 
communities and with the staff of several non-profit organizations. Of those 
conversations, twenty-eight were recorded as semi-structured interviews with prior 
consent of the interviewees, usually on condition of anonymity. The other sixty-eight 
conversations took place in informal settings, after church service, during lunch breaks at 
seminars of the Stellenbosch or Free State theology faculties, or at the kitchen table at 
people’s homes. Some conversations involved public church actors who were 
comfortable to have their names mentioned in the dissertation. Many others preferred to 
remain anonymous but agreed with note taking during the conversation and the use of 
these notes towards this study. References in the dissertation distinguish between 
conversations and interviews, and mention, depending on the level of anonymity 
preferred by the participant, his or her name, church affiliation and position in the church. 
In addition to these interactions, I incorporated field notes from my visits with twenty 
Reformed congregations across the country. This participatory observation included 
regular Sunday services as well as special events such as church bazaars, evening 
gatherings during Pentecost or even a full Passion Play at one of the URCSA 
congregations in the Free State. All were crucial to gain a better understanding of the 
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main concerns and changes inside these congregations, their demography and social-
economic circumstances. The casual conversations during these visits were especially 
important to learn about the often deep-seated tensions underlying unification efforts and 
how they tie into greater questions about religious, ethnic and national belonging in South 
Africa today.  
 The field research as well as follow-up conversations I conducted by Skype or 
email were informed through perspectives of grounded theory and oral history.14 This 
meant above all that I took the participants and their stories as the starting point. Often 
times, I first asked what overall concerns a member or minister had regarding the 
congregation at stake and from this basis moved into further questions about unity and 
dealing with the apartheid past. This not only allowed for different questions and 
dilemmas to emerge than were listed on my initial interview guideline. It significantly 
enabled me to distinguish between issues which most concerned churchgoers, and those 
of less immediate relevance. Organizing these issues in an excel sheet by congregation, 
church affiliation and position in the church gave a perhaps rough but captivating 
overview of how various actors in the Reformed family differently perceived their 
churches’ post-apartheid transition. 15  It for instance exhibited profoundly negative 
attitudes among ministers in both URCSA and the DRC when it came to efforts to merge 
the two churches’ organizational structures. Members were generally skeptic about such 																																																								
14 See for instance: Juliet M. Corbin and Anselm Strauss, “Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, 
Canons, and Evaluative Criteria,” Qualitative Sociology. 13.1 (1990): 3-21; Patricia Leavy, Oral History  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Jan Vansina, Oral Tradition As History  (Madison, Wis: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide 
Through Qualitative Analysis  (London: Sage Publications, 2006).  
15 See the Appendix for an overview of the main outcomes of this data exercise. 
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efforts as well but still held some esteem for their national leaderships’ official unity 
talks. Church elites, top leaders and academics, meanwhile indicated close to zero interest 
in the bottom-up exchanges most ordinary members tended to prefer as first step in any 
integration process. Such insights led me to pay more attention throughout the further 
development of my dissertation to divergences between leaders and members. The data 
exercise also pointed at a remarkable consensus across the different congregations, and 
regardless of people’s position in the church, on the value of unity for God and the 
nation. Former religious-nationalist notions appeared to be recycled here, this time to 
bolster ideals of integration rather than segregation.  
An excel sheet with numbers indicating different attitudes gives perhaps a good 
picture of what participants thought themselves about the issues this dissertation seeks to 
grapple with. It is insufficient to comprehend to complex dynamics in play here. Nor can 
it be seen as representative of the entire Reformed Church family. Ultimately, I opted for 
a few in-depth case studies of Reformed communities that broadly reflected some of the 
main trends apparent in the wider family towards on the one hand structural unification, 
and on the other hand ad hoc and often unintentional collaboration. The selected case 
studies furthermore exhibit typical differences between urban and rural communities and 
between the wealthier region of the Western Cape and the struggling Free State. Their 
stories are evidently unique and cannot be taken outside of their specific contexts. They 
do not stand on their own though. Many of the integration problems emerging in 
Stellenbosch or Bloemfontein or Philippolis paralleled those I encountered during my 
visits with other communities. The stories of the social works mentioned in chapter five 
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also found resonance among the experience of various actors I met with. It has led me to 
draw conclusions beyond the distinct case studies about the larger trajectory of the 
churches with post-apartheid reconstruction.  
Limitations nonetheless remain. Significantly, I encountered difficulties in 
adequately incorporating the perspective of black African churches. Most of the examples 
I discuss involve congregations with largely white, colored or slightly mixed 
memberships. A relatively straightforward explanation can be found in the fact that so 
few black African Reformed congregations are currently involved in interactions with 
white churches beyond traditional charity initiatives.16 There certainly exist cases in 
which black and colored communities have begun to form alliances, as will be discussed 
in section 5.3 on the Free State. For this study however, I was most interested in learning 
about situations in which white congregations engaged with unity attempts, as they 
historically resisted such attempts far more strongly than colored and black 
congregations. A more complex account of the choices I made here relates to my own 
background as white researcher speaking a language, Dutch, with great affinity to 
Afrikaans. This background facilitated access to white churches and colored communities 
with Afrikaans as mother tongue. Among the latter it was often even more significant that 
I could communicate in Afrikaans than in the higher educated white communities where 
members were also comfortable with English. Conversely, in black communities I not 
only did not speak the languages, but also required more time to build relations, and time 
surely constituted another limitation in this dissertation research. The conversations I had 
																																																								
16 See also in this dissertation the introduction to Chapter 5 and section 5.2.  
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in these communities have been essential in gaining deeper understanding of the many 
layers of South Africa’s prolonged transformation. That does not take away this dearth in 
my research though, something that, to say the least, calls for further reflection. 
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PART I. FROM DIVINE DIVISIONS… 
CHAPTER 1. The South African context: A torn (hi)story 
 
“I sometimes ask myself when I’m alone, why did God make me black when a lot can 
happen in a good way when you’re otherwise?”17 With this quote the documentary 
Luister [listen] commences its account of racism experienced by students at the 
prestigious University of Stellenbosch. Within weeks after its release in August 2015, the 
documentary triggered a storm of protests, culminating in a parliamentary meeting asking 
the rector of the university to explain the allegations. The students railed against the 
Afrikaans language still prevalent at Stellenbosch, but even more so against the failure of 
the new South Africa to bring equality. Their actions comprise only the most recent 
episode in the country’s ongoing struggle to come to terms with the racial divisions of 
both the past and the present. It returns to the violently crushed Soweto Uprising in 1976 
in which students protested against the Afrikaans language imposed on their schools, and 
connects to a long string of civil protests and infinite public discussions about the legacy 
of apartheid. Twenty-one years since the first open elections in 1994, this struggle has 
become exceedingly complex. Black leaders rule the country and official segregation has 
long been abolished. Yet, the lion’s share of South Africa’s black population continues to 
live in poverty, far removed from the well-established white elites and a slight black 
																																																								
17 Quoted in Greg Nelson, “Luister: the viral film exposing South Africa's ongoing racism problem,” The 
Guardian,  7 September 2015. Accessed 10 September 2-15, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/luister-south-africa-film-racism-stellenbosch.  
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upper class. The Constitution proclaims unity in the country’s diversity, but many of its 
citizens appear to have withdrawn in communal enclaves, apart from each other.   
That this present is inextricably linked with the past is not surprising. What traces 
the apartheid era left behind in contemporary South Africa however, remains a subject of 
contention, and a relevant topic when studying one of the major pillars of this era, the 
Dutch Reformed Church. Today’s persistent segregation of neighborhoods, social-
economic disparities and white privilege are often attributed to the policies of the former 
regime. Those critical of the current government rather point at the incompetence of ANC 
politicians to properly dismantle these policies. In either narrative, emphasis tends to be 
put on the acute situation then and now, but rarely on which belief framework the old 
system rested on, and what happened to it. A closer look at the premises of South 
Africa’s civil religion of apartheid, the first section of this chapter, is crucial for a better 
understanding of what seems to be a relentless tendency among South Africans towards 
communalism and cultural essentialism. This tendency can also hardly be separated from 
the vast economic, social and political transitions of the past two decades, as will be 
addressed in the second section. The recent Stellenbosch controversy has everything to 
do with South Africa’s enduring racialization, reinforced through a deep unemployment 
crisis and ethnic mobilization by leaders across the political spectrum. It points at a 
convoluted context in which South Africans, their political, educational and religious 
institutions, have to balance between traumas of the past, dreams of unity and a reality of 
discord.   
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1.1. Afrikaner civil religion and the road to and from apartheid 
 
Few doubt that religion played a part in the emergence and consolidation of South 
Africa’s apartheid regime in 1948. The churches, above all the Dutch Reformed Church, 
crucially helped justify its system of racial segregation as the will of God. But religion 
did more than justification alone. T. Dunbar Moodie famously described the DRC 
endorsed apartheid doctrine as a Christian-nationalist civil religion that came to dominate 
the country throughout much of the 20th century.18 Its carriers not only comprised the 
church, but also the policy makers of the ruling National Party as well as the secretive 
and highly influential association of the Afrikaner Broederbond. Together, they made 
sure that apartheid ideology, its theological legitimation and practical implementation, 
permeated nearly every aspect of South African life for close to four decades. By 1994 it 
nonetheless turned out to be unsustainable. In the face of mounting national and 
international critique, internal divisions, protests and violence, the three major carriers 
each in their own way chose to leave apartheid’s sinking ship. How can we understand 
the Afrikaner civil religion of Christian-nationalism and its role in making and ultimately 
breaking the former regime? 
 
 	  
																																																								
18 Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom. 
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A Christian-nationalist alliance: Church, party and Broederbond 
 
Robert Bellah famously described the term civil religion within the American context as 
a “collection of beliefs, symbols, and rituals with respect to sacred things and 
institutionalized in a collectivity.”19 Unlike the church, civil religion would be decidedly 
public and geared towards national self-understanding. It shapes individual and collective 
views of oneself and of the nation. Importantly, Bellah discussed the potential advantages 
as well as dangers of abusing civil religion. While it might serve to build common 
understanding and bolster universal values, civil religion is also often manipulated in the 
interest of power politics, to further imperialist expansion and, to quote Bellah, employed 
as a “cloak for petty interests and ugly passions.”20  This last description appears 
particularly apt for the Afrikaner version of civil religion as discussed by T. Dunbar 
Moodie in The Rise of Afrikanerdom.21 Deeply influenced by Bellah’s essay, Moodie was 
among the first scholars to employ the term civil religion in the South African context. 
While later studies by for instance Charles Bloomberg, Rebecca Davies and Johann 
Kinghorn rather employ the notion of Christian-nationalism,22 civil religion is still widely 
held as an appropriate term to describe the belief system shaping Afrikaner society for 
much of the twentieth century. 
																																																								
19 Robert Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus. 96 (Winter 1967), 8. 
20 Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” 19. 
21 Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom. 
22 Bloomberg and Dubow, Christian Nationalism; Rebecca Davies, Afrikaners in the New South Africa: 
Identity Politics in a Globalised Economy  (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009); Johann Kinghorn, 
“Modernization and Apartheid: The Afrikaner Churches,” in: Richard Elphick and T R. H. Davenport. 
Christianity in South Africa: A Political, Social, and Cultural History. Perspectives on Southern Africa 
(Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1997), 135-154.  
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Across the board, these scholars agree on several key features. First among them 
was a deep sense of nationhood. The white Afrikaans speaking communities that 
descended from European immigrants to South Africa would belong to an exclusive 
Afrikaner nation, with its own history, language and culture. A central element of this 
history constituted farming. Afrikaners long described themselves above all as Boers or 
“farmers” with a markedly rural lifestyle and devout commitment to their main church, 
the Dutch Reformed Church. They notably distinguished themselves from the English 
speaking whites who had dominated South Africa since 1806 and were thought of as an 
oppressing colonial force. In addition to the sense of a unique Afrikaner nationhood, the 
belief in a sacred Afrikaner mission to bring Christianity to South Africa comprised 
another key feature of the civil religion. God had elected the Afrikaners to civilize the 
country. One aspect of this civilization was the separation of different communities 
according to race and ethnicity. The intermingling of communities was considered a sin 
against God’s explicit will to preserve distinct cultures, particularly the Afrikaner one. In 
this respect Christian-nationalists moreover claimed God to be authoritarian and opposed 
to an egalitarian treatment of different communities. Racial hierarchy, with whites on top, 
would be divinely ordained and help foster peace and security in South Africa. Besides 
these fundamental doctrines, Afrikaner civil religion has been characterized by its highly 
public presence. Civil rituals, imagery and liturgy propagating Christian-nationalist ideals 
dominated sectors across South African society. They returned in schools, at work and 
during political campaigns and most of all shaped Afrikaners’ extensive church life.  
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Central to the latter was the Dutch Reformed Church. The DRC not merely fostered 
Christian-nationalist beliefs, but also sustained them with crucial theological resources. 
Most importantly perhaps, the DRC presented itself as the volkskerk or People’s23 church 
of the Afrikaner nation, with Reformed Christianity as the nation’s primary belief system. 
In Moodie’s words this entailed a “sophisticated theological interpretation of God’s acts 
in Afrikaner history with an explicitly republican eschatology [and] a generalized feeling 
of ‘Afrikanerness.’”24 As a volkskerk the DRC became intrinsically tied to the Afrikaner 
people. It implied a profound engagement with every aspect of life, from education to 
care for the poor to politics, and all for one purpose: the preservation and further 
advancement of a united Afrikanerdom. 
Besides the DRC, Christian-nationalist ideology was ardently propagated by the 
Afrikaner Broederbond, or Brother Bond. A secret all male Protestant society, the 
Broederbond had been established in the 1920s solely to foster Afrikaners’ ethnic 
identity. As its chief secretary claimed: “The Afrikaner nation was planned by God’s 
hand in this country and is destined to continue existing as a nation with its own character 
and calling.”25 Over time, the Bond developed a vast professional network to which 
membership appeared almost inevitable for anyone who wished to accomplish something 
																																																								
23 The Afrikaans term volk literally translates to “people” but is according to Moodie best understood as 
“People” with its capitalization indicating the crucial value attached to the notion in the context of 
Christian-nationalism. Nation and volk were often intertwined in this context, both referring to the belief in 
Afrikaners as a distinct ethnic group. Throughout this essay I will be employing the term “People” 
whenever the term volk or volks would have been used in Afrikaans. See also: Moodie, The Rise of 
Afrikanerdom, xi. 
24 Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom, 79. 
25 Text by I.M. Lombard, secretary of the Afrikaner Broederbond, in Die Transvaler, December 1944-
January 1945. Quoted in Bloomberg and Dubow, Christian Nationalism and the Rise of the Afrikaner 
Broederbond in South Africa, 1918-48, 41. 
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within the Afrikaner community or society at large. It sustained powerful ties with both 
the church and the government, particularly the governing National Party. Broederbond 
members employed Reformed theology to bolster their nationalist ideals and did not shy 
from using their elite connections to pressure local authorities, educators or businesses 
into policies favoring Afrikaner culture, language and corporate interests.    
With the National Party (NP) we arrive at a third major carrier of Christian-
nationalism. Founded in 1914 shortly after the establishment of the Union of South 
Africa, the NP advocated a rigorous ethno-nationalist agenda. Its major aim was to 
overcome Afrikaners’ social, cultural and economic marginalization by strengthening 
their common identity. Key to this identity was first and foremost the Afrikaans 
language. It not only symbolized Afrikaners’ culture and history, but also presented a 
crucial tool for the latter to distinguish themselves from English speakers and carve out 
their own place in South Africa away from despised British influences. Throughout the 
early 20th century the National Party increasingly incorporated religious elements in its 
nationalist program. Similar to the Broederbond, it justified the need to preserve and 
foster the nation by stressing Afrikaner’s special mission to serve as God’s instruments in 
South Africa. By 1934 the party had formally adopted Christian-nationalism, stating in 
the first article of its Constitution that “all black people must be kept ‘under the Christian 
trusteeship of the European race.’”26 
 
																																																								
26 Quoted in Bloomberg, Christian Nationalism, xxiii. 
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Together, the DRC, Broederbond and National Party shaped Christian-nationalism into 
an influential, pervasive civil religion that formed the basis for the apartheid regime 
formally established after the National Party’s 1948 election victory. The party had won 
the elections with an unambiguous racial outlook. It proclaimed to once and for all 
establish the white Afrikaner nation and defend it against both the English and black 
population.27 This victory did not appear out of thin air. What allowed the Afrikaner civil 
religion to gain such popularity and how did it evolve into the notorious system of racial 
segregation South Africa ultimately became known for? 
 
From a movement for unity to a system of separation 
 
Considering its successes later on, Afrikaner Christian-nationalism started out as a rather 
marginal movement. It focused primarily on language issues and still had to invent much 
of the Afrikanerdom it would come to propagate so vehemently. Both the National Party 
and the Broederbond built their initial programs around the common effort to bolster 
Afrikaans as opposed to English speaking in schools, public institutions and at home. 
This language battle soon appeared rather a means to an end though. Central for both 
actors became the rehabilitation of their key constituency, the Afrikaners, after the 
devastating South African or “Anglo-Boer” wars.28 Interestingly, the term Afrikaner was 
																																																								
27 Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom, 251. 
28 The South African or Anglo-Boer wars took place from 1880 to 1881 and again from 1899 to 1902, and 
involved an often gruesome power struggle between Boer communities and the ruling British. The Boers 
suffered vast losses in what they considered an epic battle for independence, not in the least through the 
notorious concentration camps in which mostly women and children were placed. Among Afrikaner 
communities, the wars thus became associated with both heroism and victimhood. Often overlooked is the 
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still quite new at the time. Even today, its meaning remains contentious. According to 
Hermann Giliomee, the term only came into use by the late 1800’s in strong competition 
with other modes of identification such as Boer or Burgher, “citizen.” While “Afrikaner” 
generally referred to white Afrikaans speakers with European ancestry, efforts have 
throughout history been made to include white English and more recently, colored 
Afrikaans speakers.29  For the Christian-nationalists however, it comprised a highly 
exclusive ethno-national and racial identity that had to be protected against external 
influences, whether English, black, liberal or communist. 
Support for this position appeared limited at first. The unique Afrikaner 
community that the Broederbond and National Party sought to speak to was far from 
homogeneous at the beginning of the 20th century. Many shared membership to the 
Dutch Reformed Church. Other than that they encompassed a highly diverse mix of 
backgrounds though, with different European ancestries and a wide variety of dialects, 
local customs and trades. Few perceived themselves in terms of one common identity, let 
alone as a unique nation. By 1938 this had changed drastically. In this year the hundredth 
anniversary took place of what was presented as the Great Trek, or the long journey of 
the Afrikaner pioneers, the so-called Voortrekkers, who halfway through the 19th century 
traveled from the coast into South Africa’s mainland in search of autonomy from the 
British. It entailed a mystic narrative in which the Voortrekkers were portrayed as the 																																																																																																																																																																					
contribution of black South Africans who fought and lost lives especially on the side of the Boers. The term 
“South African wars” tends to be considered more appropriate to indicate their broader impact on the entire 
South African population and not only the Boer and English communities, and will therefore be used 
throughout this dissertation. 
29 Hermann B. Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 2003), xix. 
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heroes of the Afrikaner people. In December 1838, the legend told, they conquered the 
indigenous population with help from God and established free republics in the 
Northeast. On the eve of the battle, the Voortrekkers were said to have made a vow for 
establishing a new Reformed church should they win. This vow became known as the 
Covenant between God and the Afrikaners as a divinely chosen nation destined to bring 
Christianity to South Africa. Drawing vast crowds of people, the centenary of this 
Covenant and the so-called Blood River Battle became a historic feat in itself, a perfect 
symbol of the Christian-nationalist myth of Afrikanerdom, its sacred mission and ethnic 
unity.30 Reverend J. D. Vorster during the centenary explained the mission as such: “In 
answer to prayer and covenant, God Almighty confirmed on 16 December 1838 that it is 
his will that the Afrikaner volk shall live... And on December 16 the Almighty gave his 
approval to the volk’s direction and our fathers bound us with a holy, unimpeachable 
covenant never to be untrue to the Volk and God.”31 
 
What drew Afrikaans speaking communities to this myth? At stake here was above all the 
search for a common unifying identity to help stave off what appeared to be a 
conglomeration of social-economic and political crises. The search for Afrikaner unity 
first emerged in the 19th century primarily as an expression of anger over British 
domination. The Boers staunchly resented the British colonization of what they 
considered as their lands. After the Great Trek, they had finally founded their 																																																								
30 Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom, 175-196. 
31 1938 Text by Rev. J.D. Vorster. Quoted in Anton Ehlers, “Desegregating History in South Africa: The 
Case of the Covenant and the Battle of Blood River/Ncome,” Conference on Desegregating History. Cape 
Town. 5-9 July 2000. 9. Accessed at 12 October 2015, 
http://sun025.sun.ac.za/portal/page/portal/Arts/Departemente1/geskiedenis/docs/desegregating_history.pdf. 
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independent Boer Republics, only to lose much of their autonomy by the end of the South 
African wars a few decades later. Giliomee closely relates the wars’ tremendous impact 
on Afrikaans speaking whites to their rising urge for a common identity. Women and 
children had died en masse in concentration camps, communities had been uprooted and 
farmlands burned and lost. Only in unity, it was believed, could the deeply impoverished 
population survive and strengthen their position versus the English.32 Simultaneously, the 
country was changing significantly. As elsewhere in the world, South Africa experienced 
the emergence of industries, an expansion of its cities and the impact of global politics 
and commerce. Together, these developments roused a profound sense of calamity. 
Already a minority among a vast black population, Afrikaans speakers feared the 
undermining of their farmer lifestyle as much as the loss of control over their own 
communities and lands due to urbanization. Unity also amidst these tribulations became 
imperative. 
Nevertheless, the so-called Afrikaner communities had still to be convinced of 
what actually tied them together. For this purpose, the Broederbond, in joint effort with 
DRC clergy and National Party members, launched an extensive campaign to spread its 
ideas. As Davies argues, this occurred in quite a pragmatic manner.33 Rather than 
converting people to its Christian-nationalist ideology, the Broederbond primarily sought 
to build consensus among Afrikaans speakers and convince them of the need to stick 
together and help advance their own nation. Along with the church, it developed 
extensive development programs meant to uplift the Afrikaner from deprivation. Key 																																																								
32 Giliomee, The Afrikaner, 355-364. 
33 Davies, Afrikaners in the New South Africa, 20-26. 
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activities included networking events, poverty relief and education. Most importantly, 
such activities helped institutionalize Christian-nationalism as a civil religion, with its 
belief in a sacred Afrikanerdom increasingly entrenched in Afrikaner institutions, 
schools, hearts and minds.  
For the hearts and minds, Christian-nationalists claimed more than the pragmatic 
urge for unity and survival. They crucially appealed to already present sentiments about 
race as shaped through complex historic relationships between the Boers and black South 
Africans, and, notably, through the Dutch Reformed Church. Bloomberg refers to the 
early days of the Afrikaans speaking farmer communities and their struggle to maintain a 
strict racial hierarchy.34 The sense of inequality between the races and the need for whites 
to rule over blacks was in the author’s view deeply engrained in the farmers’ psyche. The 
enslavement of black and colored population groups had formed a vital part of their 
economy and way of life for centuries. Its abolishment in the coastal areas in 1834 would 
have driven many of the Voortrekkers to move further inland and establish autonomous 
republics in which they did not have to comply with the changing rules. It should be 
noted that the Afrikaans speaking farmer communities shared the preference for 
hierarchal race relations with many of their white contemporaries. The farmers however 
received significant encouragement for their position from one of the country’s main 
churches, the DRC. In practice as well as through its beliefs, the DRC developed 
throughout the nineteenth century an extensive system of racial segregation in the church. 
It ensured separate worship services for black and white communities and motivated this 
																																																								
34 Bloomberg, Christian Nationalism, 204, 228. 
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with theological discourse about the need to preserve the racial and cultural diversity God 
created. With this discourse, the church did not so much design apartheid, according to 
Saul Dubow.35 Rather, the DRC tuned in with existing attitudes and offered important 
rationale to help sustain practical measures already in place. 
The DRC however did not limit itself to the initially rather haphazard Bible 
statements endorsing common practices. As the Christian-nationalist movement picked 
up steam in the 1920s, it proceeded towards an actual doctrine on divinely ordered group 
distinctions that in turn came to define the movement and its Afrikaner civil religion. 
Essential here were neo-Calvinist ideas on ‘pluriformity’ and the order of creation.36 
According to Abraham Kuyper, an early 20th century theologian and statesman from the 
Netherlands, God had not only divided humanity into different nations. The various 
nations were also meant to retain their sovereignty. God’s desired world was a pluriform 
one, in which every community should be allowed to set its own rules and protect its 
distinct traditions. Equally important was the belief in God’s presence in the totality of a 
nation’s life as well as politics. The South African Dutch Reformed philosopher H.G. 
Stoker further developed this belief as the Skeppingsidee, or Idea of Creation. All of 
creation in his view had the obligation to follow divine laws. These were first and 
foremost geared towards maintaining order. Any disobedience comprised a sin in the 
eyes of God. The DRC appropriated, or as some would say rather misappropriated, the 																																																								
35 Saul Dubow, “Afrikaner Nationalism, Apartheid and the Conceptualization of 'race',” Journal of African 
History. 33.2 (1992): 212. 
36 J.C. Pauw, Anti-apartheid Theology in the Dutch Reformed Family of Churches: A Depth-Hermeneutical 
Analysi  (PhD. Dissertation, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2007), 112-114; Eugene M. Klaaren, “Creation 
and Apartheid: South African Theology Since 1948,” in Elphick and Davenport. Christianity in South 
Africa, 372-374. 
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neo-Calvinist teachings to the South African context. It asserted that as God was 
everywhere, it was suitable for the church to support political authorities and ideologies, 
especially when those benefited the Afrikaner nation it was most concerned with. While 
the Christian-nationalists of the National Party and the Broederbond employed the 
DRC’s theology to justify their earthly interests, the church hence found a way to 
legitimate its own support for the political implementation of its pluriformity ideal, the 
soon to be formed apartheid regime. 
In the civil religion the DRC, the National Party and the Broederbond jointly 
shaped, the idea that God desired segregation took on another role in convincing 
Afrikaner communities to join their nationalist movement. Conflating the term nation 
with race, ethnicity or any other supposedly distinct community, the three institutions 
presented the separation, or more specifically the separate development of South Africa’s 
many population groups, as a just panacea for handling the country’s diverse reality. In 
accordance with God’s will, each community was to have the chance to develop itself, its 
culture, language and lifestyle, separately but equally. Separation became “the Christian 
way” and any intermingling of nations, ethnicities or races a sin.37 This provided the 
Afrikaans speaking communities an important sense of moral justness. It fostered 
optimism and the belief that they were engaged in an ethically sound project to help all of 
South Africa’s communities advance. Kinghorn perceives this optimism particularly in 
the 1950s when an upsurge took place in mission activities.38 White DRC missionaries as 
well as ordinary members saw it as their special task to support black and colored 																																																								
37 Kinghorn, “Modernization and Apartheid,” 145. 
38 Kinghorn, “Modernization and Apartheid,” 146-7 
 
37	
	
churches in education and leadership. It fitted well within the Christian-nationalist ideal 
of bringing civilization to South Africa and was widely viewed as respectable.  
 
Moodie describes the above views about separate development with the term “positive 
apartheid.”39 It helps explain the appeal of Christian-nationalist ideology among the 
DRC’s white Afrikaans speaking constituency. The emphasis on equal development did 
not only provide the ideology with an image of respectability. It also resonated with 
Afrikaners’ personal experience. Many felt their community had benefitted from the 
development programs set up under the auspices of nationalism and Christian guidance. 
They had elevated the Afrikaner people from decades of poverty and marginalization. 
Now the same could be done for other South African populations.  
Besides this optimistic reasoning, Moodie offers a far more negative 
interpretation of the Christian-nationalists’ allure. Their segregation ideal also tuned in 
with deep anxieties within white Afrikaner communities about the so-called “black 
threat.” The 1930s and 1940s had seen an influx of Africans into cities long dominated by 
white population groups, leading to fears among the latter for their jobs as well as for the 
mixing of cultures. Concerns about social disruption further mounted after the Second 
World War in response to independence movements elsewhere on the continent. Also the 
increasing popularity of the communist party among the black population was considered 
a threat to social order and stability. Moodie as well as Bloomberg and Davies leave little 
																																																								
39 Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom, 263-267. 
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doubt about the true origins of these fears.40 While triggered perhaps by an indeed 
changing reality, they were cultivated through the Christian-nationalist movement. 
Especially the National Party, under the strong influence of the Broederbond, consciously 
nurtured the idea of a “black invasion,” casting itself as the only real party that could 
protect the Afrikaner volk, its culture and welfare. Apartheid formed a key strategy to do 
so. Presented in both pragmatic and idealistic terms, it became the glue for the Christian-
nationalist order about to be consolidated. Racial segregation would help safeguard 
Afrikaner interests and could meanwhile be sold to the broader public as a moral and 
sensible approach to manage South Africa’s plural society. 
The Christian-nationalist civil religion could hence gain a strong foothold among 
Afrikaner DRC communities. It provided the latter with an image of the nation they 
desired, an image of national survival, unity and morality. While clearly manipulated to 
serve power interests, the Afrikaner civil religion also built on existing sentiments and 
was shaped through the socio-political context of the time. When this climate changed, so 
did some of these sentiments. Four decades after the establishment of the National Party 
regime, few Afrikaners could still be mobilized for the Christian-nationalist ideology. 
Today, it has become a source of embarrassment rather than pride.  
 	  
																																																								
40 Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom, 251; Bloomberg, Christian-Nationalism, 228; Davies, Afrikaners in 
the New South Africa, 29 
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A changing world, an untenable idea 
 
Thinking of the end of South Africa’s apartheid era, the first images that come to mind 
are Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC). They represent, among 
many others, the protagonists of South Africa’s prolonged anti-apartheid movement who 
persisted their struggle, through demonstrations, civil disobedience and at times violent 
protests, despite the government’s harsh crackdown. In 1994, Mandela and his ANC 
party broke white minority rule and came to power after remarkably peaceful 
negotiations and the country’s first fully open democratic elections. This part of the story 
is well known. Far less attention tends to be given to the other side of what is now often 
abbreviated to the Struggle. What happened to the Afrikaner civil religion on which the 
apartheid regime had based itself? And what role did its three main carriers play in the 
dismantling of their own system? On this side of the coin we discern once again an 
accumulation of economic, social and political factors. The rising national protests, 
severe trade sanctions and pressure from the international community pushed the 
Broederbond, the National Party and ultimately even the Dutch Reformed Church to 
change course and gradually allow for a departure from systemized racial segregation. At 
the heart of this change was the near complete deflation of the once so carefully contrived 
Christian-nationalist ideology. 
This deflation occurred gradually and with much ambivalence. In a 1988 survey 
among prominent Afrikaner businessmen, politicians and clergy, 81.1 % said they viewed 
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the political system of separate development as somewhat or a serious threat.41 A 
significant majority moreover preferred a federal state with power sharing and no group 
domination as an alternative to the apartheid system. While representing only a small 
section of the population, the survey showed a steep decline of support for the Christian-
nationalist order and its underlying premise of segregation as a morally just way to 
organize society. At the same time, scholars have pointed at the exceedingly slow change 
of attitudes among the broader white Afrikaans speaking public. In Afrikaner Identity 
after Nationalism, Thomas Blaser describes a “conflicting picture of the ‘state of mind’ 
of the Afrikaners in the 1980s.”42 Many appeared aware of the increasing problems with 
apartheid, but refused to let go of the pillars supporting this system. A 1984 survey 
described by Donald Akenson indicated their steadfast commitment to major institutions 
of Afrikaner nationalism, especially the National Party, even while these institutions were 
losing ground amidst the country’s increasing chaos. A majority of respondents also 
expressed continued support for key segregation policies such as the Mixed Marriages 
Act, separate education and separate amenities.43  
The institutions that used to propagate such policies meanwhile had begun to 
retract some of their own doctrines. The National Party and the Broederbond both faced 
deep internal divisions towards the final years of the apartheid regime. While moderates 
sought to open up the system, hardliners threatened to split off if any reform took place. 																																																								
41 Kate Manzo and Pat McGowan, “Afrikaner Fears and the Politics of Despair: Understanding Change in 
South Africa,” International Studies Quarterly 36.1 (1992): 11, 20. 
42 Thomas Blaser, Afrikaner Identity After Nationalism (Basel, Switzerland: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 
2006), 4. 
43 Donald H. Akenson, God's Peoples: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel, and Ulster  (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1992), 300. 
 
41	
	
During P.W. Botha’s government in the 1980s, careful steps were taken to alleviate some 
of the harshest measures, such as the highly discriminative Group Areas Act. Inside the 
Broederbond the so-called moderates gained such influence that they managed to reorient 
the organization towards a more balanced outlook. In her extensive study on the 
Broederbond, Annette Knecht discusses how it ultimately began to push NP elites to 
work towards power sharing with black leaders and a gradual dismantling of apartheid 
laws. In 1993 the organization decided to alter its name into Afrikanerbond, open its 
membership and end its insistence on secrecy. Key to these transformations was the 
increasing awareness within the Broederbond as well as the National Party leadership 
with which it was deeply intertwined, that apartheid had become a liability. With the 
mounting international boycott and internal upheaval, it seemed that the only way to 
ensure Afrikaner survival was to release the Christian-nationalist ideal of Afrikaner 
hegemony and enter negotiations with the ANC. While such negotiations were 
considered hazardous and met with steep resistance, Afrikaner political elites 
increasingly thought it to be a “greater risk to take no risk at all.”44   
The church elites ran into quite different deliberations. Inside the DRC, similar 
divisions occurred as in the NP and the Broederbond between those wishing to maintain 
rigid segregation and rising voices for change.45 Where the political and business elites 
focused increasingly on the pragmatic aspects of this debate, the DRC however ran into 
intricate matters of principle. Abandoning apartheid meant it would have to admit the 																																																								
44 Annette Knecht, Ein Geheimbund Als Akteur Des Wandels: Der Afrikaner Broederbond Und Seine Rolle 
Im Transformationsprozess Südafrikas [A Secret Organization as Actor of Change: The Afrikaner 
Brotherhood and its role in South Africa’s Transition Process] (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2007), 306-
8. 
45 These internal divisions are further elaborated in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
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church had falsely interpreted the Bible about God ordained segregation. This triggered 
an extremely sensitive debate within the DRC as well as among other Christian 
communities in and outside South Africa. Supporters of the church’s Christian-nationalist 
apartheid doctrine stood in sharp opposition to a growing group of theologians, clergy 
and ordinary members claiming that God desired unity among all human beings rather 
than division. As early as the 1960’s, dissidents like Beyers Naudé, had indicated the 
inconsistency between the church’s alliance with the NP government and the Christian 
faith it asserted. Back then, the DRC minister and theologian could count on little support 
and was even expelled from his own church. By the 1980’s however, theological critique 
on segregation had amounted to a storm raging at the DRC’s doors from across the 
Christian world. The World Alliance of Reformed Churches46 along with various black 
and colored Reformed churches in South Africa as well as individual white theologians 
responded to the increasing atrocities against the black population with vehement 
statements denouncing apartheid as a heretic affront to the gospel. The Kairos Document 
of 1985 was particularly antagonistic. It urged the church to actively challenge the system 
and spread the Bible’s message for justice and liberation “not only in words and sermons 
and statements but also through its actions, programmes, campaigns and divine 
services.”47 De facto, Kairos called upon Christians to join the anti-apartheid struggle. 
For many DRC leaders and members, Kairos and the accusation of heresy implied a 																																																								
46 The World Alliance for Reformed Churches (WARC) is an international fellowship of churches rooted in 
largely Calvinist traditions that after expressing strong critique on the DRC’s apartheid theology suspended 
the DRC’s membership in 1982. In 2010 the WARC merged with the Reformed Ecumenical Council into 
the World Communion of Reformed Churches (WCRC).  
47 Kairos Document 1985. https://kairossouthernafrica.wordpress.com/2011/05/08/the-south-africa-kairos-
document-1985/. Retrieved at 12 August 2015. 
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direct threat to everything the church stood for. Those on the defense notably abandoned 
much of the Scriptural rationale for apartheid, but maintained their overall support for the 
regime even after the NP had begun serious talks about power sharing. In the course of 
the 1980’s focus among DRC proponents of segregation shifted from the Afrikaner duty 
to preserve divinely created distinctions to broad arguments of order and morality. They 
claimed it above all as a way to ensure stability among the various population groups and 
a just social strategy to allow for each group’s equal but separate development.  
Ultimately, the DRC national leadership chose for the side of anti-apartheid 
voices, albeit with a quite ambiguous safety clause. First, in 1986, the church national 
leadership declared open membership for all, ending decades of official prohibition for 
black and colored church members to attend white services. Then, in 1990, the DRC 
formally acknowledged it had for too long “adjudged the policy of apartheid... too 
abstractly and theoretically, and therefore too uncritically.”48 Nonetheless, the significant 
Church and Society document issuing this statement made a point of noting the well-
meant principles with which the DRC had endorsed apartheid. It never wished to impose 
discrimination in the name of God, but rather provide for the “optimum development of 
all groups.”49 That the implementation turned out to be so detrimental for the vast 
majority of South Africans was now recognized as an unfortunate reality, but not for lack 
of good intentions.  
																																																								
48 Church and Society 1990: A Testimony of the Dutch Reformed Church (ned Geref Kerk). Bloemfontein: 
General Synodical Commission, 1991. Paragraph 282. 
49 Church and Society 1990. Quoted and discussed in Johann Kinghorn. “On the theology of Church and 
society in the DRC.” Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 70 (March 1990): 21-36. 21. 
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As the institutions began to waver in their support for apartheid, their Afrikaner 
constituency underwent a perhaps far more drastic development. It did not so much 
involve debates about the system, but rather about lifestyles and, subsequently, 
worldviews. The 1970s had seen the emergence of an Afrikaner middle class that 
cherished a more globally oriented secular identity. It watched American TV series, 
listened to BBC news, and bought commercial produce from all over the world in brand 
new shopping malls. Christian-nationalist notions of white superiority, Afrikanerdom and 
divine election appeared, as Jonathan Hyslop aptly shows in “Why did Apartheid’s 
Supporters Capitulate?” were scarcely compatible with this new lifestyle.50 Eager to 
partake in the rapidly globalizing markets and mass culture, Afrikaners became more 
sensitive to foreign critique and ever less willing to defend their leaders’ ideologies, 
whether at home or abroad. This was especially the case among Afrikaner businessmen. 
With little affinity to the traditional farmer or Boer identity, they sought to unlock the 
country’s racist economy and foster connections with the rest of the world. Secularization 
also played its part here. Following Western European trends, Afrikaners attached ever 
less value to their churches. The DRC retained a key historic position in society, much 
more so than in many European countries today. Still, it could no longer count on having 
as central a position in people’s lives as in previous decades.  
Hyslop and Davies perceive the changes in Afrikaner mentality as crucial factors 
pressuring institutions like the NP and the DRC to shift gears. Davies particularly notes 
the disintegration of the once so celebrated Afrikaner unity as highly detrimental to the 																																																								
50 J. Hyslop, “Why Did Apartheid's Supporters Capitulate? ‘Whiteness', Class and Consumption in Urban 
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Christian-nationalist mindset.51 Compliance with collective Afrikaner norms and culture 
made way for a growing emphasis on individualistic expression, whereas the urge to be 
accepted by the larger international community ate at notions of national solidarity and 
sacrifice. The fact that the pillars of the Christian-nationalist movement themselves were 
being torn apart by internal divisions about how to move forward did little to reinforce 
such notions. The very idea of a unified Afrikaner nation increasingly turned out to be a 
farce for which few of its members could still be mobilized.  
The civil religion of Christian-nationalism thus entered a downward spiral. Its 
fading public support generated doubts about Afrikaner unity, which in turn damaged the 
ideal of a homogenous nation. Socio-political developments meanwhile helped accelerate 
the downhill trend. The international boycott strengthened the plea of Afrikaner 
businessmen, usually also powerful Broederbond members, to dismantle discriminative 
economic policies. It moreover tuned in with public fears for the isolation of South Africa 
from the rest of the world. Another important factor here pertains to Afrikaners’ nagging 
conscience. Many had supported apartheid under the pretext of equal but separate 
development. This pretext was becoming increasingly hard to sustain against the 
background of escalating protest and its harsh suppression by the regime. Foreign media 
brought the images of violence right into South African living rooms, making it almost 
impossible to deny the anything but equal impact of racial segregation. 
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The issue of conscience was particularly important for the DRC’s white Afrikaans 
speaking constituency.52 For decades they had been told that as loyal church members 
they were doing the right thing in supporting apartheid. Now, Christians from around the 
world accused them of heresy, and their leaders actually admitted they had made a 
mistake. Illustrative for the extent of this concession was the 1989 statement the 
prominent DRC theologian Willie Jonker made at a conference in the South African 
Rustenburg. Here, Jonker confessed in the name of himself, the DRC and the Afrikaner 
people, the “sin and guilt, and my personal responsibility for the political, social, 
economical and structural wrongs that have been done to many of you, and the results of 
which you and our whole country are still suffering from.”53 The argument of having 
done so with the best of intentions did little to minimize members’ disillusion with the 
DRC and the entire Christian-nationalist belief system it had propagated. In the 1990’s 
they responded by leaving the church in vast numbers. Those who remained withdrew in 
their congregations, seeking minimal public presence in South Africa’s quickly changing 
society. Scholars generally agree that the DRC did not lead these communities in the 
country’s transition towards democracy.54 It did however end up removing the moral 
basis that had been so crucial in fostering public support for the civil religion underlying 
apartheid. 
 																																																								
52 Kinghorn, “Modernization and Apartheid,” 153. 
53 1990 Text by Willie Jonker. Quoted in Louw Alberts and Frank Chikane, The Road to Rustenburg: The 
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54 See for instance: Kuperus, State, Civil Society, and Apartheid in South Africa; and Wolfram Weisse and 
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Although hesitant, all three major carriers hence took steps in undermining the Afrikaner 
civil religion with which they had buttressed the apartheid system. The Broederbond and 
NP turned from an Afrikaner survival strategy of exclusion and suppression to a policy of 
careful engagement to help save what could be saved of Afrikaner interests. The Dutch 
Reformed Church slowly but surely shifted from a white volkskerk to an, at least on 
paper, open church that welcomed all South Africans, acknowledging that segregation 
did not always work out as well as they had hoped. To the critical international 
community and anti-apartheid movement, these changes, not surprisingly, seemed 
minimal at best. Yet, they shook up the belief framework that had long prevailed among 
the broader Afrikaner public. The divisions running through their three major institutions 
not only signaled the near collapse of their social and political system. It exposed the 
perhaps greatest flaw in the Christian-nationalist ideology of the supposed sacredness of 
Afrikaner unity.  
At the end of the 1990s little was left of this Afrikaner civil religion. Its major 
institutions all three suffered significant losses in membership. In the new South Africa of 
Nelson Mandela they retreated from society, taking the public aspects of their once 
rampant segregation doctrine with them. Its image of a distinct Afrikaner nation had 
received tremendous blows. Still, this idea remained a powerful motive for the former 
carriers of Christian-nationalism to, in their own limited ways, join in South Africa’s 
transition. The survival of the Afrikaners as group, the protection of their language, 
culture and economic welfare had the highest priority. To safeguard their position, 
Afrikaner leaders appeared willing to go to great lengths, even if that meant negotiations 
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with the “black threat.” It showed once again how much of the Christian-nationalist order 
was based on pragmatic concerns rather than a deep-seated ideology of sacred missions 
and segregation. 
This ideology however was of central importance to the Afrikaner communities at 
which it had been directed, particularly those who affiliated themselves with the DRC. 
The church had held on to much of its segregation doctrines up until the very end, 
convincing itself and others of the fundamentally well-meant principle of separate 
development. It is this belief in good intentions that continues to reemerge in debates 
about apartheid in contemporary South Africa. While we may never know the depths or 
genuineness of these intentions, they present a key to understanding South Africa’s 
convoluted past. Communities are not mobilized for the sake of political or economic 
interests alone. They need ideas, and a sense of moral right and wrong. For the Afrikaner 
DRC constituency, apartheid formed a system they had become an intricate part of, as 
much as an idea many felt they could honorably support. It was indeed a civil religion, 
deeply institutionalized, decidedly public and engrained in individual and collective self-
perceptions. Its collapse was generated by a complex confluence of factors. Leaders 
moved away from the belief in separate development to protect the interests of the 
Afrikaner nation. For many of their constituents however, this nationalist ideal in the end 
did not appear strong enough to sustain the required unity. In that sense the ideology of 
separate development turned out to be a harder nut to crack. It would demand “a great 
deal of soul-searching” in the words of John De Gruchy,55 to acknowledge that the 
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churches had helped legitimate an oppressive system by presenting it as the “Christian 
way.” While still far from completed, the fact that this soul-searching has been taking 
place remains a remarkable development in and of itself. 
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1.2. South Africa today: class, race, culture  
 
When Desmond Tutu coined the term “rainbow nation” in 1994, he envisioned a country 
in which South Africa’s communities could live together peacefully, without one 
dominating the other. Implicit in this metaphor is the very presence of communal 
differences, whether on the basis of color, ethnicity, culture or otherwise. It symbolizes 
the diversity of a society with eleven official languages and a wide range of population 
groups,56 including the Zulu and the Xhosa, colored57 and Indian people, Afrikaners and 
English. For long, apartheid politics rendered these groups culturally distinct and sought 
to guarantee their strict separation. This essentialist identity approach has left deep marks 
on South African society. Scholars such as Adam Habib, Cees van der Waal and 
Christoph Marx discern it in ANC affirmation policies, the Afrikaans language battles or 
the changing interpretation of South Africa’s famed constitution. What local, national and 
global forces are shaping South Africans’ perceptions of group identity today? To what 
extent are these perceptions a remnant of the apartheid past, or rather a product of more 
recent identity politics in addition to a globalizing and increasingly disparate economy? 																																																								
56 The term “population group” is a regularly used term in official documents describing South Africa’s 
population. Generally, the term refers to four major groups classified as African, Colored, Indian/Asian, 
and White. Within these groups the South African government site distinguishes between “the Nguni 
(comprising the Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele and Swazi people); Sotho-Tswana, who include the Southern, 
Northern and Western Sotho (Tswana people); Tsonga; Venda; Afrikaners; English; Coloured people; 
Indian people; and those who have immigrated to South Africa from the rest of Africa, Europe and Asia 
and who maintain a strong cultural identity.” It says that “members of the Khoi and the San also live in 
South Africa.” South African Government Information. South Africa’s People. 
http://www.info.gov.za/aboutsa/people.htm. Accessed at 6 February 2013. 
57 Whether or not to use capitals here is debatable. For this dissertation I have chosen not to use capitals for 
the group descriptions of black, white and colored. While contested in themselves, these terms are still 
among the most common descriptions used by South Africans to identify themselves and others. It should 
be clear that all three terms carry a heavy load from the past and are considered here as fluid social-political 
constructions rather than static racial categories. 
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The following pages aim to set out the pervasive cleavages along which post-apartheid 
South Africa has come to be organized in terms of class, race and culture. The three 
categories intersect and overlap, and are above all deeply contentious as they counter the 
dream South Africans have continued to foster, against many odds, of a unified, just and 
equal nation. 
 
A divided nation, once again 
 
Two decades since the end of apartheid, the country is faced with deep economic, social 
and political challenges. Despite declining poverty rates, income disparities have 
worsened over the past years to such an extent that South Africa is considered one the 
world’s most consistently unequal countries.58 The disparities in wealth coincide with 
high levels of crime, an escalating HIV epidemic and rising political instability. The 
ANC government is widely perceived to be underachieving as pervasive corruption and 
inefficiency hamper its service delivery. Labor conflicts have been culminating in violent 
protests, with the miner strikes of recent years as just one example of South Africa’s 
brewing social unrest. Amidst these challenges, race remains a major source of 
controversy. Across the board, black South Africans are still far worse off than the 
relatively prosperous white population. The latter tend to have the highest incomes, enjoy 
better health and higher education levels than any other population group. Especially in 																																																								
58 Carlene van der Westhuizen, “Country Snapshot South Africa: Economic Growth, Poverty and 
Equality,” Brookings Institute, 5 January 2012. 2. Accessed at 6 February 2013, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/01/priorities-foresight-
africa/snapshot_southafrica_vanderwesthuizen.   
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education the numbers are striking. Among whites 36.5% have gained a degree beyond 
the twelfth grade, compared to only 8.3% of black and 7.4% of colored South Africans.59  
 
It is tempting to attribute the divisions in South Africa today chiefly to the apartheid past. 
Its legacy of segregation and inequality still pervades the country’s geography, education 
system and economy. Much of the farmland and major corporations remain in the hands 
of a white minority who live in wealthy suburbs and benefit from a historically privileged 
position in society. Black Africans meanwhile continue to reside by and large in the 
impoverished townships and native lands the National Party regime once ordered them to 
live in, with insufficient schooling, health services and employment opportunities. There 
is more at play here however. The ANC led post-apartheid transition generated its own 
challenges, notably through the economic model it chose to work with. Maserumule 
describes how the ANC immediately after 1994 “committed the country to a neo-liberal 
agenda.”60 It opened South Africa’s economy to international markets and ran a policy 
that loosened labor laws, reduced trade barriers and advanced big foreign and national 
corporations over small businesses. Formally, the ANC sought to combine its open 
market approach with social development programs aimed at elevating the country’s 
excruciating poverty. But few of these programs mustered the efficiency and support 
required to take on this humongous task. In negotiations with the National Party, the 
ANC moreover conceded significant economic control to still powerful white elites by 
																																																								
59 Census 2011. Statistical Release  (Statistics South Africa, 2012), 30. 
60 M.H. Maserumule, “Politics of Transition in South Africa and the Post-1994 Democratic State,” Journal 
of Asian and African Studies. 47.3 (2012), 310. 
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allowing them to run the central bank and the treasury.61 These steps appeared at the time 
a sensible strategy to facilitate South Africa’s calm transition towards liberal democracy. 
Twenty years later, the ANC’s neoliberalism has generated economic growth for a few 
“haves” at the cost of a vast majority of “have-nots.” Unemployment currently stands at a 
quarter of the labor force and at half of all South Africans under the age of 24 looking for 
work. 62  Those who do work often make minimal wages while lacking workers’ 
protection or prospects for better paying jobs. 
The “haves” these days do include a growing number of black South Africans. In 
2009, they made up 31% of the core middle class as compared to 15% in 2004.63 The 
emergence of this black middle class also raises questions though. It has profited from a 
mixture of privatization and the development policies the ANC was able to push through 
despite the market-driven economy. Among these development policies are a range of 
economic empowerment and affirmative action measures established in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. They demand companies to hire black employees or set quotas for 
government agencies to ensure a diverse pool of civil servants and their equal treatment. 
According to Ratuva, momentous strides have thus been made for the incorporation of 
blacks in the corporate and public sector.64 The government regulations nonetheless 
tended to benefit only a small group of people who were more often used as tokens in an 
organization rather than actually involved in policy making or management. They 																																																								
61 Jason Hickel, Democracy As Death: The Moral Order of Anti-Liberal Politics in South Africa (Oakland, 
California: University of California Press. 2015), 119-120. 
62 Hickel, Democracy As Death, 120-121 
63 Steven Ratuva, The Politics of Preferential Development: Trans-global Study of Affirmative Action and 
Ethnic Conflict in Fiji, Malaysia and South Africa (Acton: A.C.T. ANU E Press, 2013), 236 
64 Ratuva, The Politics of Preferential Development, 239-240. 
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crucially failed to reach the large mass of poverty-stricken South Africans. Notably, the 
Black Economic Empowerment or BEE policies as they came to be called, created new 
patterns of patronage and discrimination. While directed at the entire non-white 
population, the policies often favored black Africans over colored or Asian communities, 
and notably, ANC members over non-ANC members. The policies have been denounced 
for pushing underskilled workers into high positions, reducing production quality and 
eliciting widespread corruption as companies have sought to circumvent the imposed 
quotas.65 
The issue of corruption takes us to another key challenge in contemporary South 
Africa. After twenty years of single party rule, the country’s political landscape has 
become a myriad of personal vendettas, fraud and negligence.66 The ANC remains a 
barely challenged force in this landscape. A symbol of the anti-apartheid struggle and of 
the country’s democratic achievements, the party has long been beyond reproach for 
many South Africans. Mounting scandals about mismanagement and the extravagant 
spending of its leaders did not prevent the ANC from winning another majority during 
the most recent elections of 2014. Still, political tensions have been on the rise for years 
now. Opposition parties such as the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic 
Freedom Fighters (EFF) are tearing at the ANC’s supporters’ base. Although the DA 
primarily draws voters from white and colored communities, it has managed to gain 
control of at least one province, the Western Cape, and increasing popularity in the 
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equally if not more important Northern region of Gauteng. The self-described Marxist 
EFF meanwhile has been pulling black voters away from the ANC, often through 
ferocious campaigns against the once untouchable liberation party. It tunes in with the 
social protests spreading across the country. The Civic Protest Barometer sets these 
protests at an all-time-high of 218 in 2014.67 They involve organized actions through 
which citizens express their anger, increasingly with violence, at local governments for 
their failure to provide proper pubic services, from water to electricity or infrastructure.  
 
The civic protests signal a deepening sense of disillusion with the new South Africa. The 
high hopes and promises of the mid-nineties have been shattered, especially for the many 
black South Africans whose living standards barely improved. The continued 
discrepancies among different population groups feed into both old and new social 
tensions as well as violence. It is no surprise that the income divides between black and 
white South Africans remain particularly sensitive. They remind blacks of the many 
forms of oppression suffered at the hands of whites during apartheid, while white South 
Africans themselves fear for revenge through for instance labor discrimination or targeted 
attacks on their farms.68 Additional frictions have emerged towards newly arriving 
immigrants from other African countries like Zimbabwe, Malawi and Mozambique. 2008 																																																								
67 D.M. Powell, M. O’Donovan and J. De Visser, Civic Protest Barometer 2007-2014 (Cape Town MLGI. 
2014). 
68 Opinions about the extent of so-called farm attacks in South Africa differ widely. The Afrikaner 
musician Steve Hofmeyr is known for claiming that whites are being killed “like flies” on their farms and 
that one white farmer dies every five days. A report by the NGO Africa Check reveals a more nuanced 
story of around 70 attacks annually in which farmers and farmworkers from across the different population 
groups have died. Africa Check, “Are SA whites really being killed “like flies”? Why Steve Hofmeyr is 
wrong.” 24 June 2013. Accessed at 28 June 2014. https://africacheck.org/reports/are-white-afrikaners-
really-being-killed-like-flies/.  
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saw a series of severe attacks on immigrants who were blamed for taking away jobs from 
the local population. 69 Although the violence has abated somewhat since then, hostilities 
still flare up regularly such as in early 2015 when troops were deployed to stem the anti-
immigrant attacks after seven had been killed. By far the most violence occurs elsewhere 
however, in the form of crime. Despite a reduction in criminality in recent years, South 
Africa still had a murder rate of four and a half times the international average in 2012.70 
Armed burglaries, rape, gang and drugs related violence have become inherent features of 
the lives of millions of South Africans. Those with money live behind the fences of gated 
communities and hire private security agencies to protect themselves. Those without 
money are often left to their own devices as authorities lack resources to police their 
areas or simply refuse to venture into the gang-run townships. On all sides one thing 
appears clear. The key source of division today is class, as deeply intertwined as ever 
with race.71 Income groups broadly parallel the various racial groups formalized during 
apartheid and are often decisive for the extent to which someone has access to facilities, 
employment, education and health services. What should we make of these group 
identities and their position in the so-called rainbow nation? 
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Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Confronting Exclusion. Time for Radical Reconciliation. SA 
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Post-apartheid but not post-race 
 
Christoph Marx states it unambiguously in his article “Ubu and Ubuntu.” Ever since the 
early twentieth century South Africans have in his view “suffered under an obsession 
with ‘national identity.’”72 It is an obsession that surfaces in the profound racialization of 
society. Whether in terms of politics, culture or economics, South Africa remains largely 
organized by racial or ethnic background. Such communal distinctions are being nurtured 
through a constant referral to the different population groups in media, political and 
public discourse. This was the case before the apartheid regime was established in 1948 
and has continued well after its demise in the 1990s. 
The early transition years did mark a significant break in the trend that has left its 
footprints on the current society. A crucial element of the negotiated end to apartheid 
comprised, according to Alexander Johnston, the development of constitutional 
patriotism as an alternative to the ethno-racial nationalism that had characterized the NP 
regime and that also surfaced among some of the anti-apartheid parties.73 Notably, the 
ANC itself long considered African nationalism, a perhaps more open but still deeply 
ethnic version of nationalism, as the cornerstone of its identity. The constitutional 
patriotism Mandela’s party ended up promoting after 1994 entailed an inclusive 
perspective on who belonged to the nation, a clear rejection on any form of ethnic or 
racial superiority thinking and, above all, a commitment to the values embodied in the 
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new South African Constitution as primary binding force. Central among these values 
were and still are “human dignity, non-racialism, non-sexism and the rule of law.”74 
Davies and Giliomee similarly perceive some relief in South Africa’s ethnic 
preoccupation for the brief period after Nelson Mandela’s election. They note the 
multiple efforts made to overcome former divides, most famously through the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission headed by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Most of all, Mandela 
himself emphasized throughout his presidency the need to build nonracial alliances in an 
inclusive nation that welcomes everyone regardless of their history, background or color.  
Before the decade ended however, racial and ethnic differences seemed to 
reemerge on the political agenda. For Giliomee, this shift became apparent with the “two 
nations” speech made by Mandela’s successor Thabo Mbeki in 1998. Here Mbeki 
claimed that South Africa was not becoming one but rather two different nations, 
including one white and relatively prosperous, and the other black and poor.75 While 
often denounced for its divisive tone, the speech did reflect a threatening reality. Most of 
all, it reflected a deep inclination among South Africans to continue to view oneself and 
others in terms of essential group identities, regardless of the non-racialism values of the 
Constitution to which they now subcribed.  
 
The returned or rather continued racialization of South African society is, just like the 
chronic economic inequalities, often first and foremost attributed to its apartheid past. 
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Decades of forced separation not merely left a strong awareness of group identities.76 It 
also engrained an anxiety among the various populations for prejudice and oppression on 
the basis of color or ethnicity. In response, many South Africans have been seeking to 
build layers of protection around their own community, its culture, lifestyle and 
language.77 Any new policy or law tends to be interpreted in terms of how it may benefit 
either black or colored people, whites or Indians. Politicians strategically tune in with 
people’s fear of being discriminated against as they seek support among their 
constituencies. They promise to defend supposedly typical African or Afrikaans 
traditions while blaming socio-economic ills on the lack or failure of affirmative action 
policies. What follows is a racially divided public debate, whether on the topic of civic 
protests, matters of immigration or, to name one famous example, a painting depicting a 
nude President. This painting surfaced in 2012 and is in many ways emblematic of 
discussions around race in South African media. Showing an image of President Zuma 
with exposed genitals, the painting triggered great contention and a strong reaction from 
the ANC and its President. The latter filed a court case against the painter who is white. 
Where some, particularly ANC supporters, saw the painting as indicative of whites’ 
arrogance and their mockery of black leadership and culture, others accused the President 
of having put his sexuality in the limelight by openly practicing polygamy as an 
expression of his Zulu background. Above all, references were made to the past. The 																																																								
76 Paul Maylam, “Unraveling South Africa’s Racial Order: The Historiography of Racism, Segregation, and 
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painting and ensuing controversy would show that South Africans were still struggling 
with their prejudice and cultural differences. As the ANC’s secretary general at the time 
said about the painting: “It’s crude… we have not outgrown racism in our 18 years [of 
democracy].”78 
Referring to the conflicted memory of apartheid does not suffice as an explanation 
for the above trends though. They are fostered through the ways in which South Africa is 
dealing with both past and present challenges of diversity. Regarding the past, scholars 
such as Marx, Shore and Chapman remark on the problematic nature of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC).79 Established in 1995, the TRC was mandated to 
advance national unity and bear witness to the atrocities and human rights violations of 
the apartheid era. Between 1996 and 1998 it held extensive hearings in which victims and 
perpetrators could express their grievances, forgive, repent and in some cases be granted 
amnesty. The Commission received extensive praise for serving as a unique platform to 
expose and reflect on a deeply contested period in South Africa’s history. With its strong 
focus on individual reconciliation however, the TRC has been faulted for not addressing 
the structural ills of the system.80 It failed to recover historical facts and hampered 
investigations into the role of business or apartheid’s many silent beneficiaries. 
Significantly, critics point out the exclusivist African-Christian style of reconciliation that 																																																								
78 David Smith, “Jacob Zuma goes to court over painting depicting his genitals,” The Guardian, 21 May 
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dominated TRC hearings.81 Emphasizing a unique tradition among African Christians to 
forgive, often referenced with the term Ubuntu, Bishop Desmond Tutu and his fellow 
commissioners would have fostered an essentialist understanding of black African 
culture. This not only ignored the country’s vast religious and cultural diversity, but also 
put pressure on participants to act accordingly.  
While the Commission significantly reduced its work in the late nineties, the idea 
of Ubuntu and of a distinct African tradition of forgiveness carried on.82 It has come to 
symbolize a rather controversial (re-)appreciation of tribal African cultures, their 
supposed focus on chiefdom and communalism versus the individualism associated with 
white Western culture. Recent years have seen a rising trend among ANC politicians to 
talk about the need to Africanize South Africa by promoting its specific black African 
cultures and traditions. The emphasis on African communalism also surfaces in the post-
apartheid legal system. According to Davies, this system has increasingly been geared 
towards the protection of particular South African cultures, languages and customs. It 
implies in the Davies’ view a further institutionalization of ethnicity politics.83 Even the 
Constitution that was once praised for its nonracial outlook has become a tool towards 
advancing particular community rights and ethnic differences over a broader sense of 
belonging. One remarkable consequence has been the apparent benefits of these ethnicity 
politics for Afrikaner communities. As a major minority, the latter have claimed special 
rights to for instance educate their children in the Afrikaans language or retain certain 
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monuments commemorating Afrikaner history. While contentious, several of these rights 
were granted in recent years. Davies and Giliomee attribute this lenience primarily to the 
desire of ANC politicians to court the Afrikaner establishment and ensure the vital 
investments of its business sector.84  
 
South Africa today then displays a rather schizophrenic image when it comes to issues of 
race. On the one hand, it touts a democratic triumph over apartheid and pride in a 
constitution based on non-racialism. The national reconciliation process as conducted 
through the TRC is perhaps controversial, but also a symbol of this triumph, showing to 
the world and themselves South Africans’ ability to end an oppressive system of 
segregation without turning to revenge towards any particular group. Simultaneously, the 
country continues to embrace the former regime’s despised group categories. Skepticism 
regarding the post-apartheid transition into a so-called rainbow nation has mounted in 
recent years. The very term reconciliation now holds for South Africans across the 
population groups a negative association with failed justice and increasing chaos rather 
than the stability people had hoped for after the violent struggle years.  
The employment of racial categories appears in this context primarily as response 
to a taken for granted reality. In a study on public debates and daily interactions, 
Whitehead finds that the old apartheid categories seldom emerge to reproduce race on 
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purpose, but rather as a matter of pragmatism.85 Depending on the situation, people claim 
their black- or whiteness in order to clarify why they might critique or support the current 
government. In other cases, race is dismissed as irrelevant, a non-factor in discussions 
about for instance the suffering of small businesses across the country. The categories 
help explain as much as sustain a divided reality that few desire, but from which even 
fewer people perceive a possibility to escape. Adhikari perceives this sentiment in the 
deepening identification among colored communities with their racial identity in post-
apartheid South Africa. “For many, racial thinking is so deeply entrenched that racially 
unifying approaches to politics or inter-group relations are automatically discounted as 
unrealistic, even delusional. (…) Even among those who profess to subscribe to multi-
cultural values, there is fear that Coloured interests will be lost sight of within any 
broadly South Africanist or non-racial outlook.”86  
South Africa thus appears stuck in a chicken and egg story. Communities claim to 
require strong racial identities to survive, whilst the constant buttressing of these 
identities, whether through politics, public debate or in everyday life, preserves and 
reinforces the organization of South African society along racial cleavages. On all sides 
frustrations abound. Even though South Africans largely claim to have lost faith in the 
new nation pronounced after apartheid, the idea that the promises of equality and non-
racialism should one day be fulfilled remains very much alive. It returns prominently 
among the younger generations, the so-called “born-frees,” who are growing up without 																																																								
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having had any personal experiences with the former regime. In what is for them an 
undoubtedly post-apartheid South Africa, they are shaping new alliances within, between 
and beyond the country’s tenacious racial boundaries. How far are they able to push these 
boundaries?  
 
Global citizens caught in cultural identities 
 
In her valuable study Constructing Race, Nadine Dolby tells the story of high school 
students in Durban who in the post-apartheid era have increasingly come to identify 
themselves in terms of taste and culture.87 Their self-perceptions are no longer formed 
through ethnic or communal backgrounds alone, but through global flows of pop music, 
fashion and other cultural expressions that have been flooding South African markets 
ever since they were opened up to rest of the world after 1994. With youth from various 
backgrounds listening to the same English rap, watching the same American TV 
programs and following the same social media, boundaries have been crossed in a way 
unthinkable twenty years ago. They find common ground in the brand of jeans or 
blogging trend they follow. Differences are conspicuously no longer attributed to race, 
but rather to diverse cultural preferences. Yet, Dolby and other scholars conducting 
similar studies, observe that these younger generations often end up making the same 
group distinctions as their parents. Schools and universities show an awkward mixture of 
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integration in the classrooms, and segregation on the schoolyards, along the well-known 
color lines of the past. As Wale puts it in her discussion on university students in 
Johannesburg and Cape Town: “While this discourse [of cultural differences] might 
allow respondents to feel as if they are presenting themselves in a non-racial light, it in 
fact works to reproduce, legitimate and police racial boundaries.”88 
The challenge of these boundaries is particularly visible at those institutions that 
were once exclusively white or Afrikaner. Officially integrated today, these institutions 
still carry the remnants of the old regime with predominantly white leadership, 
prioritization of the Afrikaans language and Western literature and culture. In order to 
function in this environment, black students necessarily adapt to the existing traditions. 
They are referred to as Model C students after the label given to previously white schools 
that became multi-racial after the transition. Wale describes these students as “black 
South Africans who have become well versed in white ways of being, knowing and 
speaking, and thus occupy an in-between racial position.”89 It is a complex position in 
which the students run into accusations of having betrayed their own group, and into 
persistent social-economic barriers with other groups. They can seldom afford the same 
type of entertainment as their white peers while the latter appear unable, or unwilling, to 
connect with the cultural expressions common among their black, colored or Indian 
classmates.  
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The students are not alone in this dynamic. The argument that South Africans 
belong to distinctly different cultural groups emerges across the generations as a way to 
account for their persistent separation in social life. As soon as people leave their 
gradually integrating work places, schools or public institutions, they return to group 
settings that broadly reflect their racial or ethnic backgrounds, with the churches as the 
perhaps most notorious example of such self-segregation. One could say this is neither 
surprising nor unique to South Africa. Problematic however is the extent to which group 
differences continue to be essentialized. Where race might have become a rather 
pragmatic self-description for many South Africans, culture and the way it is expressed 
especially through language, has increasingly taken on the role of absolute identity 
marker. This involves a thorough policing of group boundaries to ensure its cultural 
authenticity is preserved.90 Whoever crosses the boundaries, whether in social or dating 
life, or in worship, risks being cast aside as traitor. It returns to the embedded anxiety 
indicated above for the oppression of one’s own group by other culturally or politically 
dominant groups. Amidst these anxieties it is often overlooked how the various group 
cultures are tied to the despised apartheid categories and how both entail social-political 
constructions that are far from static but constantly shaped and reshaped in alternating 
circumstances. The rest of this section will illuminate these dynamics by taking a closer 
look at some of the communities at stake. South Africans especially with Indian and 
Afrikaner heritage have been struggling to carve out a spot in a country that increasingly 
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stresses its black African identity above anything else. How and to what extent do these 
communities seek to adapt to, or rather withdraw from society? 
 
To begin with Indian communities it is important to first elucidate matters of 
terminology. “Indian” in South Africa generally refers to those segments of the 
population whose ancestors came from the Indian subcontinent in the late 19th and early 
20th century. Between 1860 and 1911 an estimated 150,000 Indians arrived in South 
Africa to work as migrant laborers. 91  They were part of an arrangement by the 
government in Natal to supply workers for its sugar industry. Today, the Indian 
population makes up 2.5% of the total population, with the majority still living in the 
eastern region of KwaZulu-Natal according to the 2011 census.92 Notably, the census 
denotes this population group with both the terms Indian and Asian. The latter would also 
include more recent immigrants from areas such as Bangladesh and Pakistan. Both terms 
remain contentious for their association with the racial categories of apartheid and for 
their dismissal of the group’s immense internal diversity. As an alternative, some prefer 
to speak of Indian South African or South African with Indian descent. The author 
Pallavi Rastogi has offered the term “Afrindian,” implying that “Indianness exists in 
South Africa in an Africanized state.”93   
“Afrindian” may not be a prevalent self-description in present South Africa. It 
does raise some relevant issues. Rastogi first of all employs the term to indicate the 																																																								
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fusing of African and Indian identities as she perceives it particularly in Indian-South 
African fiction.94 Over time, Indians have come to make up an intricate part of South 
Africa. They have shared its burden of apartheid, the struggle to overthrow the system 
and transition towards democracy. This history has affected Indian communities, just as 
the latter helped shape South African society into what it is today. They contributed by 
bringing different traditions and cultures to the country, as well as through their 
involvement in the anti-apartheid movement. This involvement is often dismissed, not in 
the least by Indian South Africans themselves. Many have rather felt guilt over their 
relatively privileged position during the National Party regime when they were often 
granted a special position in terms of for instance housing and education, allowing them 
to be just slightly better off than black South Africans. With the collapse of apartheid, 
fears rose about new forms of discrimination in a society that would now favor the latter 
population. These fears subsided during the first decade of the ANC government as it 
made an effort to reach out to Indian communities and stress their inclusion in the new 
non-racial rainbow nation.95  
This brings us to a second element of Rastogi’s Afrindianness. At its center is the 
desire for a citizenship in which Indians can maintain their traditions while being fully 
recognized as South Africans. Rastogi thus touches upon two key issues. Her emphasis 
on citizenship on the one hand reveals the importance for Indians to not only be 
acknowledged as a cultural community, but also in their social, political and economic 
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position as equal citizens. In Ramsamy’s view, the latter has become pertinent since the 
ANC’s apparent shift from its non-racial rainbow discourse to a new form of 
“Africanism.” Especially disquieting for Indians have been policies introduced during 
President Mbeki’s term to boost the position of African population groups such as Black 
Economic Empowerment. While intended for all “non-whites,” the BEE policies in 
reality seem to focus primarily on African communities, raising Indians’ fear of 
becoming second-rate citizens, simply because they are not “black enough.” Meanwhile, 
Rastogi discerns a strong sense of affiliation among Indians with African communities. 
Implicit in her concept of Afrindianness is the former’s identification with black African 
culture and history. In the novels she studied, Indians appear to move beyond and 
between different races, revealing what Rastogi calls a “hybridization of national 
consciousness.”96 Especially younger generations seem to join in this hybridization, 
merging their parents’ traditions with both African and global cultural expressions. For 
many youth, being Indian or not appears less of an issue today. Their prime identity is 
South African. 
 
Moving on to Afrikaner communities again first requires some clarification with regard 
to terminology. As the previous section indicated, “Afrikaner” has been and remains a 
highly controversial identity category. If we look at the 2011 census, there is no 
mentioning of Afrikaners as a distinct population group. Instead, the document speaks of 
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“Afrikaans speakers” that make up 13.5% of the population.97 It signals the near 
complete deflation of what once constituted South Africa’s most dominant population 
group. What is left can according to Davies be captured with three definitions. For some, 
the term Afrikaner refers merely to those with Afrikaans as their mother tongue. Others 
claim it to include chiefly Afrikaans speaking whites, or thirdly, those who describe 
themselves as Afrikaner and claim a distinct culturally homogeneous identity.98 As such, 
Davies allows for the inclusion of black, colored and Indian Afrikaans speakers, while 
recognizing the tendency among many self-identified Afrikaners to think of their 
community as white Afrikaans speaking only. Having been most engaged in a range of 
heated identity debates over the past years, this last group will be of particular interest 
here. 
 At the heart of the mentioned debates lies the issue of language. The Afrikaans 
mother tongue has become a core symbol for white Afrikaans speakers as something 
many fear will disappear unless its use in South African society is safeguarded. Cees van 
der Waal describes an intense struggle over the presence of Afrikaans at Stellenbosch 
University, traditionally a major Afrikaner institute. The author understands the struggle 
as ‘moral panic’ in response to a deep sense of threat.99 For conservative Afrikaners, the 
language tends to form a last stronghold. It is all their community has left after almost 
everything that used to define them is perceived to be lost in a society increasingly 
focused on African culture and English as primary language. Reminiscent of similar 																																																								
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struggles at the dawn of the 20th century, the recent language debates tune in well with 
South Africa’s current political climate. Afrikaans language enthusiasts strategically refer 
to the ANC’s ethnicity politics and claim equal minority rights for their cause. Emphasis 
has been put on the racial neutrality of their demands and the involvement of Afrikaans 
speaking colored communities. This does not take away the primarily white orientation of 
many pro-Afrikaans statements though, as well as their tendency to embrace essentialist 
perceptions of Afrikaner ethnic identity.100  
The language debates reveal more than concern for the Afrikaans mother tongue. 
They reflect a broader struggle among those who think of themselves as Afrikaners. 
Davies speaks about their lack of a clear joint group ethos.101 There may be some who 
speak out strongly to advance the Afrikaans language. For the most part however, the 
community is riven with deep internal divisions over their position in the new South 
Africa. How can they claim an identity and language so profoundly connected with the 
apartheid past, so manipulated and used to justify the oppression of millions? At the same 
time, what would happen if they do not request social, cultural and political space for 
what many still perceive as their community? After initial support for policies that sought 
to compensate victims of apartheid, Afrikaners have grown impatient with the ANC’s 
affirmation laws and now fear for reverse discrimination if they do not stand up for their 
rights. Large numbers of white Afrikaans speaking youth have already left the country in 
search for opportunities elsewhere. Others have withdrawn in small enclaves, seeking as 
little contact with the rest of the country as possible. The latter however appears scarcely 																																																								
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possible in today’s increasingly connected world. National and international media reach 
deep into the most remote corners of the country, while sons and daughters bring home 
different cultures and ideas they have picked up abroad. For these youth, Afrikaner 
identity has become but one of many modes of identification. It competes with the 
English language of their work places, African-American hip-hop music, Pentecostal 
spirituality, and most of all with a global self-perception.102 Their passports say they are 
South African, but many reside elsewhere and have family and friends all over the world. 
They have become global citizens.  
 
Obviously, much more can be said about the two described communities in addition to 
the other designated “African” or “black” and so-called “colored” population groups. The 
former is so diverse that one can hardly speak of a single community. Black South 
Africans often first identify themselves as Zulu or Xhosa and draw sharp boundaries 
around what are perceived as distinctly different cultures, traditions and languages. The 
description of “colored” is equally complex in that it indicates an Afrikaans speaking 
community that descended mostly from enslaved people and people from African, Asian 
as well as European descent. Over time, colored South Africans obtained a separate status 
within the country’s racial hierarchy as a “mixed race” group, also referred to as 
“brown,” that was considered superior to blacks but inferior to whites.103 Similar to 
Indian communities, colored South Africans struggle with not being black enough for 
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current affirmative action policies. They also carry an ambiguous luggage of the 
apartheid past in which they enjoyed certain advantages over black Africans but still 
endured vast discrimination at the hand of the white minority regime. Withdrawing into a 
distinct group identity has long been a strategy for colored communities to protect 
themselves against either black or white domination. It involves strong emphasis on the 
Afrikaans language and a certain pride in feeling comfortable to mix African, Eastern and 
Western cultures. Recent years have however seen contradictory developments in which 
some colored communities replace Afrikaans with English as their home language and try 
to identify more strongly with the so-called black elements of their heritage, whereas 
others have been drawing closer alliances with white Afrikaans speakers, stressing their 
common language and, as we will see later, common Dutch Reformed tradition.  
Within each of the four official population groups communal identities retain an 
unrelenting significance. Having an Indian or Afrikaner background strongly affects a 
person’s position in society, chances for work, education and social standing. Ethnicity 
and color remain central issues in South African public discourse and are carefully 
considered as well as manipulated in policy making and legislation. Nonetheless, it seems 
as if the country’s long prevalent communalism is gradually losing its rigidity. A 
changing economy, increased migration flows and global culture tear at the once so firm 
ethnic and racial boundaries. While it is mostly the younger generations who are at the 
forefront of this change, their hybridizing identities affect broader society. It is an impact 
that cuts in two ways. It forces schools, parents and public institutions to engage with 
different population groups and slowly break down their divisions as they see their youth 
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and businesses crossing borders. Simultaneously, it triggers reverse responses. Across the 
various communities, people are seen to retract within their own cultural fortresses to 
shield themselves from outside influences. It appears partly a response to the resistance 
Werbner and Korom perceive among communities that feel forced into a quickly 
globalizing world.104 Even more so, South Africa’s persistent communalism can be seen 
as a reaction to the country’s identity politics. The ANC’s drift towards “Africanism” has 
done little to relieve such responses. Its sporadic support for communities’ cultural or 
economic demands runs the risk of pushing them further into the specified population 
categories. This leaves the younger generations in a difficult position. They engage with 
diversity in the classroom, while sharing Facebook posts or traveling abroad. As soon as 
they wish to settle down in their own country though, many may see little choice but to 
turn to the communities of their upbringing for support, networking, political protection 
and social life. As long as South Africa remains as thoroughly racialized as it is now, this 
is unlikely to change soon. It nonetheless does not mean that group perceptions and 
relations remain stagnant. Considering the country’s tortuous past, much has already 
changed. South Africans today are bound to engage with each other at work, in schools or 
in sports more than they were ever before. It takes time before the effects of such a 
transition become apparent.  
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Conclusion 
 
Upon a visit to the national capital of Pretoria in 2012, the city was still in the process of 
replacing the old street names for ones that refer to heroes of the liberation struggle. 
Beatrix / Voortrekker Street became Steve Biko Street whilst Vermeulen Street turned 
into Madiba Drive. The fact that this process took place as late as 18 years after the 
collapse of the former regime is telling of South Africa’s prolonged journey with 
apartheid. Many of the system’s core traits have prevailed, albeit often in a revised 
format. Most visible are the racially segregated neighborhoods and the discrepancy 
between predominantly black townships and wealthy white suburbs. Besides the white 
suburbs however, one can today find gated communities for the black elites, as well as 
inner city areas inhabited by an interracial mix of impoverished people. Race continues to 
be a pivotal identity marker, but is no longer perceived as the central line of division in 
society. Social-economic inequalities appear to have come in its place, besides cultural 
differences, both of which remaining deeply intertwined with race.  
Reminiscent perhaps most of the apartheid days is the continued emphasis on the 
preservation of supposedly distinct ethnic communities. Throughout the population 
groups, these distinctions often receive priority over ideals of national unity. 
Disappointed with the unfulfilled promises of the rainbow nation, South Africans are 
returning to the default option of self-segregation. Retreating within one’s own group 
appears the best out of the worst strategies to deal with the many insecurities of the post-
apartheid era, especially for those who consider themselves cultural minorities such as 
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the Afrikaner, Indian and colored communities. This is not to say that South Africans 
lack any sense of common national belonging. Johnston perceives a minimum but still 
highly functional nationhood in the new South Africa that binds the various communities 
together on the basis of a broadly agreed upon set of secular democratic values as 
expounded in the Constitution. Simultaneously however, Johnston points at a shadow 
nation in which alternative religious and tribal value systems with often exclusivist or 
even outright discriminatory traditions are existing alongside, and clashing with, the 
official discourse of inclusiveness.105 In these shadows, which frequently end up in the 
limelight as we saw with Zuma’s painting controversy, the old mindset of apartheid 
appears to resurface. The idea of the intrinsic value of particular group cultures and of the 
separate functioning of these groups in society as a sound way to protect their cultures 
remains a particularly obstinate legacy of this mindset. 
The difficulty to overcome such ideas becomes apparent when younger 
generations venture into the few areas where South Africa’s population groups interact on 
a somewhat equal level. Central to the recent grievances of black students in Stellenbosch 
was the sense that they were ultimately expected to behave “white” and that there was 
insufficient space at the university for their “blackness.” What these two terms 
encompass is far from clear, and hardly the point. More noteworthy is that these students 
experienced the small in-between space they could occupy at a supposedly multiracial 
university to still be dominated by one single group. Their sentiments are important to 
take into account. They signal the impact of the ongoing racialization of public debates in 
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South Africa, as well as the direction in which these debates have been heading for a 
number of years now. The country’s post-apartheid search for reconciliation is 
increasingly considered a doomed project. Instead of interracial engagement and 
integration, South Africans want their authorities to first focus on social-economic 
justice, especially for the poor black majority.  
It is a setting that presents grave difficulties for the religious institution at the 
center of this dissertation research. Leaders of the Reformed churches are after decades of 
internal discussions gradually reaching a point of agreement that they should unify into 
one multiracial institution. Their talks of unity and reconciliation however correspond 
little with the reality of congregations on the ground and their daily challenges to survive. 
It is a survival struggle that still takes place largely along racial and ethnic lines. Breaking 
such patterns is hard enough in general, let alone for a religious institution that once made 
separateness into a principal doctrine.  
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CHAPTER 2. A theoretical frame: Religion as identity, structure and belief 
 
The South African context sketched in the previous chapter lays out two key dilemmas 
for its Reformed church communities. On the one hand, they seek to join the country’s 
trajectory towards greater national unity, justice and reconciliation. At the same time, 
they are desperate to maintain what is left of their own groups and protect supposedly 
distinct cultures, languages and church traditions against further erosion. Visions of 
inclusivity furthermore clash with a persistent reality of segregation and inequality. The 
pursuit of racial integration in religious life is perceived as threatening to the communal 
solidarity necessary to face the country’s enduring insecurity, a solidarity that the 
churches have historically bolstered through their separated structures. These 
juxtapositions, wider unity versus particular identity preservation, and inclusivity versus 
exclusivist group solidarity, are far from unique to the South African context though. 
They emerge in multiethnic churches in the United States that struggle to align their 
members’ diverging backgrounds, or among Muslim minorities in Europe that try to 
maintain traditions while integrating into secular-Christian societies. In other situations, 
think of India, Israel or Iraq, religious attachments to certain cultures and groups have 
spawned violent clashes, especially when communities sense the pressure to forsake 
certain key elements of their faith based identities.  
 Situating South Africa’s Reformed churches amidst broader debates about 
religion and identity offers substantial tools to analyze their dilemmas with diversity. 
Valuable is first of all the shift that has taken place in religious studies from a focus on 
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secularization to pluralization or the various ways in which religious identities are 
evolving as societies become more diverse rather than less religious. This shift will be 
discussed in section 2.1 primarily to help understand how Reformed communities in 
South Africa respond to the confrontation of their institutions as well as truth claims with 
increased competition from other traditions and worldviews. Equally important are 
debates about religious-nationalism, section 2.2 in this chapter. They not only denote the 
intricate manner in which religious, national, racial and ethnic identities become 
entangled, but also the everyday religious structures that help sustain the ensuing social 
divisions. A brief case study on the Northern Ireland conflict will serve to illustrate such 
structures. It is also meant to address, in the conclusion of this chapter, gaps in the 
literature on religious-ethnic and nationalist intersections. How do these intersections 
evolve in relation to today’s individualizing religious identities? What happens when the 
institutions that long upheld rigid group attachments change course? 
 
2.1. Religion in society 
 
Church actors in South Africa frequently responded with relief when I would introduce 
my approach to religion as one inspired by the social sciences rather than a particular 
church tradition. It was considered an “outsider” perspective and a welcome alternative to 
the abundant theological studies existing on the Reformed churches in South Africa. Such 
a perspective calls for further explanation though. Evidently, the social sciences 
informing this dissertation involve a great variety of disciplines that can barely be 
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captured in a single approach, apart from the commonality that they are indeed not 
related to any particular religious tradition. Focus is therefore given to two key debates 
regarding the social scientific study of religion. One pertains to the dilemma of studying 
religion as a highly varied social, human and historic construct, while recognizing its role 
as a fundamental reality in the lives of believers worldwide. Secondly, social scientists 
whether with a sociological, anthropological or political science background, grapple 
with the position of religion in contemporary societies. The thesis of secularization might 
have failed, but what has come in its place? Instead of religious decline, scholars refer to 
religious change, or the increasingly fluid ways in which faith today is being manifested, 
mixed and matched with other religious and secular belief frameworks. But what to make 
of this distinction between the religious and the secular, and how useful are these terms in 
understanding the everyday religious experience of, say, a Dutch Reformed congregant in 
Bloemfontein? 
 
A social scientific approach 
 
Core to the social scientific approach taken in this research is first of all the 
understanding of religion as an embedded function in society that is constructed, 
manipulated and historic, personal, collective and, notably, fundamental to the lives of 
people in diverse ways. It implies a constant tension between on the one hand the notion 
of religion as shaped through particular circumstances, and on the other hand the 
tendency of believers to perceive their religious beliefs, values and traditions as static, 
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deriving directly from the transcendent. Emile Durkheim addressed this tension when he 
stressed religion to be both an image of and function in society.106 It would build on 
communities’ collective consciousness and simultaneously help develop this 
consciousness by providing key categories for shared understanding of the social world. 
Religion should thus be perceived as perhaps a human construct, but real in the 
observers’ minds and lives and arising from actual life experiences. Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann added another dimension to this theory in The Social Construction of 
Reality.107 It denoted, in a nutshell, the paradox of a social world that is created and 
constantly recreated by people, but experienced as an objective reality. Religion 
comprises one such human enterprise to help make sense of one’s surroundings and 
firmly establish these worldviews into fundamental meanings. The Reformed churches 
were forced to deal with this paradox as they navigated their way out of apartheid in the 
1990s. Claiming the idea of God ordained segregation as a mistaken interpretation of the 
Bible, the churches undermined a belief many congregants had long taken for granted. By 
discontinuing a community’s once sacred perception, they thus weakened, using Peter 
Berger’s terms, their own plausibility structure.108  
 The fact that the Reformed churches have nonetheless remained influential in 
post-apartheid South Africa points at another key social scientific view of religion as not 
only a human and social function, but also a historically determined power construct. 
Thousands of members left the Dutch Reformed Church after 1990, but few completely 																																																								
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relinquished their attachment to the institution of their childhood and community, or the 
perceptions disseminated through this institution. Beyond a way to help explain the 
world, the church had been part of what Bourdieu has famously called habitus. It 
involves systems of perceptions and beliefs about one’s surroundings that are internalized 
from early childhood and shaped according to the reality of daily life.109 The habitus 
operates largely beyond people’s consciousness. Without realizing, people come to 
understand their social reality, particularly their class identity and the power relations 
involved, as the way it is. Bourdieu denotes the acquired values and perceptions we take 
for granted as doxa. Religion, he says, plays a crucial role in feeding this doxa. It presents 
the world around us as a natural, if not supernatural, state of being. As such, religion, or 
more specifically religious habitus, was and still is highly instrumental in justifying the 
social hierarchy that remained a reality for (ex-) Reformed church members well after the 
dismantling of apartheid. The elites of the country had long manipulated religious 
dispositions in such a way that they explained their power and the subordinate position of 
others as in accordance with divine order. Through religious practice, these dispositions 
had become self-reproducing. They fostered the recognition or rather misrecognition of 
inequality as normal. Throughout this dissertation we will see the prevailing influence of 
such dispositions in current South Africa, and particularly within its Reformed Church 
family. 
 One risk of looking at religion in terms of power is that it dismisses perspectives 
from within the involved communities. While a significant number of people have given 																																																								
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up on the Reformed churches, many others stayed. For the past two decades, these 
members have seen vast changes in the church as well as in their own religious 
experience. Their experiences constitute a starting point for the study at hand. It follows 
the interpretive sociology propagated by Max Weber and expanded in the anthropology 
of Clifford Geertz. Weber considered religion a crucial function in society that, similar to 
other social studies subjects, had to be perceived primarily through the eyes and actions 
of participants, the believers themselves, rather than through institutional rules.110 Geertz 
translated this focus on the participant to what he called the “thick description” of human 
culture. Focusing on religion as a function within culture, he described it as “a system 
which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in 
men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these 
conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem 
uniquely realistic.”111 Geertz’s approach then calls for a detailed description of sacred 
symbols and their interpretation by those enacting them. Such micro analysis allows for 
students of culture as well as religion not only to think concretely about their objects of 
study, but also “creatively and imaginatively with them.”112 As thick a description as 
Geertz advocated is barely possible within the scope of this research, particularly 
considering the number of communities that will be considered. The approach is instead 
helpful in that it calls for the close consideration of perspectives among the women and 
men inside Reformed Church communities on processes of unification. These ordinary 																																																								
110  Max Weber, Hans H. Gerth, and C. W. Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1958).  
111 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 90. 
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churchgoers tell different stories about why they pursue interracial connections, or not, 
than does the institution itself. Their stories need to be considered against the details of 
their specific surroundings. Is a congregation situated in a rural or urban area, with a 
homogeneous or heterogeneous demography, characterized by a rigid social hierarchy or 
changing mobility? 
It should be clear that such circumstances define only part of people’s religious 
experience. A final social-scientific perspective this dissertation features, concentrates on 
the highly personal nature in which people perform their faith, in and outside designated 
institutions. For William James and Martin Riesebrodt, for instance, any 
conceptualization of religion should first closely consider people’s diverse encounters 
with the divine. Central here is the idea that religion meets in various ways the inherently 
human need to deal with life, particularly in terms of suffering. The philosopher-
psychologist William James spoke of religion as primarily a personal experience or act 
through which people relate to what they perceive as godly.113 Riesebrodt importantly 
emphasized the performative aspect of these experiences. As the title of his book The 
Promise of Salvation suggests, the author’s prime understanding of religion also entailed 
its potential for warding off misfortune.114 Riesebrodt discerned this perceived promise 
across religious expressions, from the Abrahamic faiths to Buddhist and Shinto traditions. 
Depending on the cultural context, individuals practice religion differently, but they do so 
ultimately with the same purpose to answer the universal need to overcome suffering.  																																																								
113 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York: Modern 
library, 1936). 
114 Martin Riesebrodt, The Promise of Salvation: A Theory of Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago 
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Giving focus to religious performances and diverse personal interpretations opens 
up studies of religion like this dissertation towards a broader range of human experiences 
and, notably, allows for syncretic traits. Some people do not consider themselves 
adherents of a particular religion, but do join in Buddhist meditation. Others mix different 
religious acts and beliefs, whether or not associated with a monotheistic God or non-
personal powers. Understanding religion as a complex set of practices to help deal with 
distress should, in Riesebrodt’s view, encompass all these different forms. This view 
bears relevance for the situation the Reformed churches find themselves in today. 
Practices of worship and liturgy generally constituted key pillars around which the 
communities in this study evolved. They were performed by individuals inside the 
church, but often attributed greater significance outside the sanctuary. While praying for 
water at a town hall meeting or building day care facilities for a neighboring community, 
interviewees often said they experienced their faith more deeply than in the church.  
 
In summary, religion in this dissertation is never understood independently from the 
historic, political, cultural and social-economic context in which it is manifested. At the 
same time, careful attention is paid to the perspectives of believers themselves and their 
daily experience with religion as a fundamental source of identity and authority. Nancy 
Ammerman’s concept of “everyday religion” well captures its simultaneously personal 
and social embeddedness. Ammerman begins with an open description of religious action 
as “whenever people talk about and orient their lives in ways that go beyond everyday 
modern rationality, when they enchant their lives by drawing on spiritual language and 
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concepts and experiences.” 115  Notably, she then moves beyond a solely private 
conception of religion and stresses its collective naming and interpretation in historic, 
political and legal settings. As these settings change, the way in which religion is lived, 
changes as well. This brings us to the next issue of how to understand the position of 
religion in contemporary societies where once dominant institutions such as the Dutch 
Reformed Church confront an increasingly diverse and individualized religious 
landscape. 
 
Theories of religious change 
 
Critique on global secularization theses, the notion that religion will decline worldwide as 
a result of modernization, is hardly new. Scholars from a wide range of disciplines have 
been writing for years that religion is here to stay, if not on the rise. Societies may be 
rapidly modernizing, but that has not produced the once predicted weakening of religion. 
Instead, José Casanova, Peter Berger, Grace Davie and Danièle Hervieu-Léger have, 
amongst others, signaled the changing position of religion today. Religious traditions 
increasingly become a matter of choice and are being integrated into hybrid modes of 
sacred as well as secular worldviews. This apparent shift poses both challenges and 
opportunities for religious communities, not least for those of South Africa’s Reformed 
Church family. Its institutions might struggle to retain their membership base. Members 
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meanwhile explore new horizons, taking their religion into supposedly secular spaces and 
well beyond the private sphere to which it would, according to secularization theories, 
become confined. 
 
To gain insight on what is happening here, this section takes a closer look the arguments 
about what the contemporary situation means for religion in society. Central to the 
critique of secularization are debates on what, if not decline, modernity then entails for 
religion. Authors tend to first turn to S.N. Eisenstadt’s theory of multiple modernities. 
With this theory Eisenstadt famously challenged prevailing associations between 
modernization processes and the development Western countries have gone through, 
from traditionally uniform agrarian communities to highly differentiated societies with a 
strong separation between state and religion. The developments these regions 
experienced might have historical precedence and serve as a point of reference. However, 
they are according to Eisenstadt neither completed nor universally transmittable. Across 
the world, different nations and communities see different interpretations and 
implementations of modernity. While Eisenstadt stresses their ongoing construction and 
reconstruction, he does signify some general trends. Prime among them is structural 
differentiation, the increasingly complex division of society into separate institutions, 
from spheres of education to politics, religion or labor. In addition, he points at shifting 
perceptions of authority. Rather than taking divine or political power as a given, 
individual human agency has come to the foreground, allowing for a wider variety of 
visions on social order. This relates to what Eisenstadt views as an inherently modern 
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tension between pluralistic and universal visions, between allowing difference on the one 
hand and the urge to subdue them under one totalizing worldview on the other hand.  
 Scholars of religion, prominently José Casanova and Peter Berger, have referred 
to Eisenstadt’s theory to explain the persistent influence of religion in modernizing 
societies across the world. In sync with his multiple modernities, José Casanova, for 
instance, points at multiple roads towards the functional differentiation associated with 
secularization.116 While some countries have indeed separated church from state, others 
see a closer alignment between certain government and religious functions, for instance 
to foster nationalist ideology. South Africa seems to epitomize one such alternative road. 
Since the end of apartheid, it has been balancing a rapidly modernizing society, including 
a Western style separation of church and state firmly consolidated in the constitution, 
with deeply religious, predominantly Christian, public life. It was not without reason that 
the state initiated Truth and Reconciliation Commission relied so heavily on Christian 
discourse. Notions of reconciliation and forgiveness through Jesus Christ resonated with 
at least 80 percent of the country’s population, across racial and ethnic divisions. 
Churches have over the past two decades consistently enjoyed higher levels of trust than 
any public institution in the country.117 Christianity in general has grown rather than 
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decreased, especially with the rapid rise of Pentecostalism that, between the years of 
1996 and 2001 alone, increased by 55 percent.118  
 Beyond the persistent public influence of religion, South Africa displays another 
key dynamic Casanova and Berger have both described. Religion is becoming a matter of 
individual choice rather than the collective tradition one is born into. Among the 
exploding number of Pentecostals, for instance, are many South Africans who decided to 
leave the churches of their childhood to join this global movement and its emphasis on 
one’s personal relationship with God. Notwithstanding the many other factors leading to 
such decisions, they signal a trend scholars of religion perceive worldwide towards 
increasingly diverse market spaces in which people can choose from a range of religious 
and secular worldviews. It is a trend that forms, in Berger’s view, the perhaps most 
salient consequence of modernization processes. While these processes may play out 
differently across the world, they seldom evade the impact of pluralization. Peter Berger 
has referred to pluralization as the increased exposure of people to the competition of 
different convictions, values and lifestyles.119 In megacities and through the spread of 
mass culture and communication, we are nowadays bound to encounter others with 
different beliefs, religious or not, in constantly and rapidly evolving social interactions. 
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Rather than following institutional guidelines, Steve Bruce argues in the same line, 
individuals thus determine ever more their own sense of meaning.120 
 Pluralization as outcome of modernity raises significant questions for the study of 
religion, and for religion in general. In his recent work, The Many Altars of Modernity, 
Berger shows how plurality turns religious beliefs into but one option out of many and 
thus takes away their long taken for granted stature.121 It does not necessarily imply a 
weakening of religion though. Above all, Berger stresses the increasing influence of 
secular discourses and the tendency among believers to go back and forth between both 
religious and non-religious perceptions of the world around them as they navigate diverse 
realities. Ammerman also notes this back and forth, especially in respect to the everyday 
experience of religion in people’s lives. Referring to William Sewell’s notions of 
multiple solidarities and transposability of rules, she explains how people in modern 
differentiated societies tend to locate themselves within various structures at the same 
time.122 The rules they experience in one, say the church, may be different from those at 
home or at work. Few are able to keep them separate at all times. As a result, individuals 
take different rules from one sphere into another, across institutional and social 
boundaries. 
 While this might not hurt religion per se, it affects religious institutions that seek 
to impose one particular rule, the rule of God, on all aspects of life. The Dutch Reformed 
Church has, as we saw earlier, already struggled with supplanting one aspect of its long 																																																								
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dominant rule, apartheid, for a less exclusive belief system. Ultimately, this struggle 
relates to larger questions on how to balance the idea of one universal truth with the 
rising availability of other proclaimed truths. It comes back to the inherently modern 
tension Eisenstadt indicates between pluralistic and universal visions. The Reformed 
churches since the collapse of the previous regime confront the challenge of having to 
adapt once totalizing worldviews to a reality of difference. Difference here not only 
pertains to greater racial and ethnic diversity and the ensuing variety in styles of 
worshipping, norms and beliefs. It also encompasses divergent attitudes towards the role 
of religion as guardian of a certain social morality. The Reformed churches, and many 
other denominations in South Africa, wrestle with questions about homosexuality, 
divorce and premarital sex, or the inclusion of women in leadership. Particularly difficult 
in this respect are the internal debates that have been splitting congregations, presbyteries 
and synods apart. Those favoring more openness of the church towards racial, ethnic, 
gender or sexual differences stand opposite to those pursuing a rather exclusive church 
that firmly stands for a distinct moral framework as well as group identity. 
 
In between these opposites however, a majority of Reformed churchgoers are more likely 
to walk a middle path that perhaps builds on a specific religious tradition, but keeps the 
door open to other options. They might be conservative on social matters, but open to 
racial diversity. For these members, pluralization amounts rather to the expansion of so-
called grey areas between religion and secularity. For a better comprehension of such 
gray areas, it serves to look at Grace Davie’s discussion on religion in contemporary 
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Europe. Whilst Berger presents Western Europe as one of the few areas where 
secularization actually has taken place,123 Davie challenges even this exception. She 
perceives a continued public presence of religion on the continent, be it in a quite 
particular manner. With the term “vicarious” she explains how in many European 
societies, an active minority performs religion on behalf of a largely approving 
majority.124 Sweden provides a case in point. Few Swedish people would describe 
themselves as believing in a particular church tradition. Many do retain, at least on paper, 
their membership to the Lutheran Church of Sweden. They allow government support to 
help preserve its buildings and are willing to pay significant taxes for this purpose. At 
times of national crisis, people turn to their churches for collective ceremonies or 
expressions of mourning. Religion in Sweden as in many other parts of Europe thus 
concerns a matter of belonging, rather than believing. Davie’s analysis illustrates that 
modernities keep shifting within parts of the Western world as much as elsewhere, also 
when it comes to modern religious expressions. What was once considered a key trait of 
contemporary European life, the decline of the traditional churches, turns out to be far 
less straightforward. Their influence continues both in public and private, among 
religious and supposedly secular audiences. Neither of these divides reflects the reality of 
European attitudes towards religion today. Surely its position has changed significantly. 
Religion can no longer count on claiming authority, nor can churches expect large 
numbers of actual believers. 																																																								
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This last point however raises an interesting question. What does modern belief 
really entail? Europeans may have replaced their beliefs in Catholicism or Calvinism with 
rather vague claims of belonging to a Christian tradition. Does that mean they hold no 
beliefs at all? Danièle Hervieu-Léger would likely answer the above question negatively. 
The French sociologist of religion perceives a rising need for belief as a way to deal with 
the insecurities of our current plural age. Hervieu-Léger however does not talk about 
religion per se. Her primary concern is belief, of which religion is just one of many 
modes. Other ways of believing may be manifested through utopian cult groups, sports or 
ethnic identities. Crucial for Hervieu-Léger is to note the mutual interactions between 
traditional religions and these new forms of believing, in what she considers religious 
“bricolage.”125 The emerging belief frameworks often borrow extensively from the rituals 
and symbols of existing institutions. Meanwhile, traditions such as Judaism or 
Catholicism increasingly incorporate secular features in what seems like a constant 
reinventing and recharging of the collective memory of a shared religious tradition. 
Interesting is moreover Hervieu-Léger’s emphasis on the revival of ethnic 
religious groups in this respect. People in Northern Ireland, or South Africa for that 
matter, may draw from their church institutions to bolster claims of belonging to a 
specific ethnic community. The public exploitation of their symbols meanwhile proves 
crucial to sustain the involved religions and reconnect them to a collective sense of 
lineage. This last point appears especially true for some of the Reformed churches 
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discussed in this dissertation. They refuse to relinquish the racial or ethnic attachments 
they believe are vital to safeguarding their presence within a certain community. It brings 
Hervieu-Léger to her conclusion that “the rise of the religious does not necessarily give 
rise to religion.”126 She has no doubt about the serious damage traditional religious 
institutions suffer in current societies. Instead of focusing on whether or not this counts 
for secularization, Hervieu-Léger stresses the need to deal with the consequences of the 
changing religious. At its core is personal experience. As people decide themselves about 
what gives meaning to their lives, they find ways to merge beliefs with the non-religious 
conditions surrounding them. A doctor could focus on the scientific aspects of her work, 
but simultaneously perceive her ability to save a patient as a religious sign. While doing 
so she may incorporate Catholic symbolism, but does not require a specific religious 
institution to confirm or express this. 
 
The grey areas Davie and Hervieu-Léger perceive around the common distinction 
between religion and secularity return throughout the upcoming chapters. Outside the 
immediate worship area, in pragmatic church community works, we will find fascinating 
interactions between people with supposedly opposite traditions, in which some adapted 
rigid beliefs to fit changing realities while others adopted alternative beliefs to handle the 
lack of change. Across the interviews conducted for this research, congregants moreover 
indicated intriguing combinations of both the belonging and the believing Davie 
describes. They stressed their historic affiliations with the Reformed institution as part of 																																																								
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their group identity and simultaneously disconnected their beliefs from this institution, 
stating them in rather general Christian terms. As for the church institutions themselves, 
we will see both decline and revitalization. Religious life in South Africa at large, with all 
the individual choices people nowadays make, continues to be organized chiefly through 
church institutions. These institutions do not stand still. Under pressure of the immense 
upsurge of Pentecostalism across the continent, traditional South African churches 
including the Reformed ones, have started to incorporate more charismatic features, 
healing practices and gospel music in their services. Simultaneously, they seek to battle 
sharply decreasing membership numbers among the rising middle class with shorter 
supposedly Western style worship that focuses on individual meditation and intellectual 
reflection.  
Thinking of such dynamics as one of multiple roads to modernity or 
differentiation is essential, though only the first step to help grasp the many layers on 
which South Africans build their religious identity today. South Africa, one could say, 
defies any distinction between the religious and the secular. In the presented case studies, 
communities not merely go back and forth, but interweave deeply spiritual with highly 
mundane discourses and practices to make sense of their surroundings and help shape 
them. Ample tensions emerge here, and not necessarily between the usual suspects. 
Beyond controversies over race, doctrines or morality, church communities clash over 
what they perceive as the best survival strategy amidst the country’s daunting 
inequalities, crime and political mismanagement. These clashes then take us to that other 
dimension of religious change: religious conflict. 
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2.2. Religion in conflict 
 
Today’s pluralizing societies, in which people pick and choose from an ever expanding 
range of worldviews, not merely affects the way in which religion is experienced. It 
triggers grave social tensions between the various groups representing such worldviews. 
The increase of diversity is often considered a threat to communities that wish to hold on 
to particular beliefs and traditions. Especially religious communities that claim 
attachment to a certain ethnic or national identity are found to respond with resistance, if 
not outright aggression, against the religious market places denoted in the previous 
section. Instead of choice, these communities emphasize the absolute truth of their 
tradition and are willing to sacrifice lives to defend the supposed exclusive bond with a 
certain territory or population group. It illuminates what scholars like Mark 
Juergensmeyer and Catarina Kinnval perceive as the current rise of religious-nationalist 
movements in which communities seek to defend their traditions with at times extreme 
violence. How is it that religious traditions can become so deeply entangled with specific 
ethnic, national or racial identities? And what to make of these identity categories in the 
first place? Such questions are pivotal to discern the dynamics underlying the 
essentialization as well as hybridization of post-apartheid identities mentioned in chapter 
one. The churches play a particular part in both processes that will be illustrated further 
on in this section with a case study on the conflict in Northern Ireland. The role of 
religion here has, similar to South Africa, been exaggerated as well as underrated, with 
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little attention to the rather elusive ways in which church actors up until today shape 
Northern Ireland’s tenacious divisions.  
 
When religious, national, ethnic and racial identities become entangled 
 
“[I]n the societies of the Americas there are no such things as race, nation or religion, per 
se – only race, nation, and religion as they are constructed in and through each other, and 
through other categories of difference.” 127  Henry Goldschmidt concentrates on the 
American continent, but his words easily apply to other parts of the world. The categories 
he mentions abound globally, often deeply intertwined, interdependent and, as scholars 
across disciplines tend to agree, construed by and through humans and their social, 
political and cultural contexts. Problematic in the academic depiction of such constructed 
identities is the contrast with self-descriptions among the identity groups at stake. South 
Africa exhibits abundant examples both in the past and the present of how such 
descriptions are often made in absolute terms. People claim to be born into a certain 
ethnicity, with one religious truth claim on a land that is supposed to belong to them only. 
Conversely, if people do not describe themselves as such, others will. The obstinate 
tendency to place oneself and others in static group categories confronts researchers of 
South Africa, and more generally of religion and its national, racial or ethnic 
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entanglements with significant dilemmas. How to distinguish these entanglements and 
analyze them without falling into the same trap of essentialization? 
 
Let us first take a closer look at some of the major terms involved here. In her essay 
“Essentialising Essentialism,” Pnina Werbner states that, “to essentialize is to impute a 
fundamental, basic, absolutely necessary constitutive quality to a person, social category, 
ethnic group, religious community or nation.”128 Immediately, Werbner stresses the 
deceptiveness of such essentialist forms of representation. They imply a false sense of 
timelessness and absolute homogeneity that often results in the rigid distinction between 
those considered inside or outside the group. Werbner clarifies however that not all 
collectivities or self-representations are necessarily essentialist. She makes an interesting 
distinction between the kind of ethnic identities and racialized identities so prevalent in 
countries like South Africa. While the former evidently points at group differences and 
holds clear potential for being essentialized, it can do so from within a community and its 
fluid surroundings. Race on the other hand always involves in Werbner’s view an identity 
fixed by dominant external forces and is often violently imposed upon opposite groups.129 
Nation constitutes yet another often essentialized form of identification. Similar to race 
and ethnicity, it tends to comprise strong beliefs in separateness and un-changeability. 
Nationalists claim distinct features of different national communities that ought to be 
sustained and reinforced by ensuring strict boundaries between them. Catarina Kinnvall 
moreover emphasizes the strong interplay between essentialist identities like race and 																																																								
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nation.130 They mutually reinforce each other and help construct perceptions of internal 
similarity and negative prejudice towards outsiders. 
Kinnval touches upon a crucial point here. What makes identity categories such as 
race, religion and nationality so complex to work with is not just the fact that they tend to 
be viewed as timeless and static. They conspicuously fortify each other in such 
essentialization. Religion plays an important but often dismissed role here. In studies on 
ethnic or nationalist social movements, religion has long been cast off as a marginal 
factor in the largely secular manipulation of identities to justify a group’s right to certain 
territory. Known scholars of nationalism, Benedict Anderson and Liah Greenfeld 
amongst others, have claimed that nationalist ideologies emerged partly due to the 
declining influence of religion in modern societies. Especially in Western Europe, 
nationalism is seen as having replaced religion as major common belief system. Peter van 
der Veer and Anthony Smith are among the staunchest critics of this discard of religion. 
According to them religion not only acts as a primary marker of national identities, but 
also provides them with meaning, practices and content. Michael Emerson, Christian 
Smith and Henry Goldschmidt make similar arguments towards the interplay between 
religion and race. 
This interplay becomes apparent at three core levels, each reminiscent of our 
earlier discussion on Afrikaner civil religion. First is the function of religion, separately 
but even more so in conjunction with nationalism, as rallying point in times of crisis. It 
returns to the tendency of religions to provide fundamental tools to deal with suffering 
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and death. This was precisely what the DRC did in the aftermath of the South African 
wars, both in terms of explanation – the wars would constitute a divine test for Afrikaner 
unity – and practical support in form of community development. Especially when 
surroundings change rapidly due to war, forces of globalization or the collapse of 
authority, people look for such tools and turn (back) to their faith. In the words of 
Juergensmeyer, “religion is the language of ultimate order.”131 It provides clear answers 
and gives a sense of control in a world of disorder. The idea of belonging to a nation, 
Kinnvall asserts, can offer a similar sense of security. It allows for a clear demarcation of 
a community’s boundaries with absolute rules and values.132 Members of the proclaimed 
Afrikaner nation and of the Dutch Reformed “People’s church” could thus count on solid 
knowledge of why and how they had to safeguard their existence amidst the perceived 
chaos. George Dreyfus has further illustrated the ways in which religion and nationalism 
reinforce each other with his case study on Hindu Nationalism.133 The latter emerged as a 
movement strongly resisting the economic and cultural changes affecting India such as 
the spread of global consumer goods or American movies and music. Fearing the 
intrusion of Western and other foreign influences, Hindu Nationalists emphasized the 
need for purity. Both the land and its major religion ought to be protected against outside 
interference. A threat to Hinduism was perceived a threat to the nation while the latter 
could only be kept pure as long as its true religious traditions were maintained. 																																																								
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 A second level of entanglement involves the role of religion in legitimating 
national and racial distinctions and their preservation as exclusive categories. It supplies 
core beliefs and rationale for the notion of peoplehood. These beliefs often pertain to the 
profound relation felt between a certain people, race or ethnicity and the sacred. 
Afrikaner communities were told they had been chosen by God and ordered to protect 
their distinctiveness. According to Smith and Van der Veer such sentiments of 
chosenness have been fundamental to many past and current nationalist movements. They 
see it among Dutch and British Protestants in the 19th century, Hindu nationalists in India 
and political Zionists in Israel today. For Van der Veer, the belief in an elected people 
tends to be connected with a view of the nation as awaiting spiritual rebirth.134 Smith in 
turn speaks of the nation as a sacred communion of the people. It aligns notions of a 
shared ethnic ancestry with the search for cultural distinction and a moral-legal 
framework that lines out the duties and rights all members have in common. 135 
Goldschmidt draws similar connections between religion and race. The narrative of a 
chosen people has in his view been essential for producing racial identities in the United 
States. Christian notions of peoplehood would have fostered a deep belief in 
unchangeable identities that strongly affected American discourse on race up until recent 
times.136 
Religion can thus become a vital source of national and racial identification. In a 
third related intersection, it more specifically operates as a cultural reservoir from which 																																																								
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communities can draw images and ceremonies to fortify these self-perceptions. Roger 
Friedland underscores religion’s institutional space and potential to give actual content to 
a group’s collective representation.137 Through rituals of blessings and services at crucial 
moments in a nation’s history, religious actors nurture people’s sense of belonging to the 
community. Once their religious tradition becomes tied to a specific nation, it may act as 
a core national unifier. It brings different individuals together for an all-encompassing 
cause: to preserve the nation in the eyes of God. Conversely, the nation is understood as a 
principal source of political power that can and should carry out the divine will on earth. 
Parallel arguments have been made towards racial communities. In the South of the 
United States or South Africa, white churches claimed it in accordance with God’s plan 
to separate the races and ensure white hegemony. While this argument has lost much of 
its appeal in the contemporary United States, racial segregation remains a reality among 
many churches on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Emerson and Smith explain this by 
pointing primarily at the organization of American religion today.138 Congregations 
across society have been fostering internal similarity and cultural homogeneity as a way 
to carve out their own space in an increasingly pluralized religious field. The resulting 
segmentation builds upon as well as fuels racial differences outside the churches. As the 
latter continue to create meaning and a sense of belonging for their members in separate 
ways, it is barely surprising that racial boundaries persevere.  
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The above intersections are certainly not the only ways in which religious, 
national, ethnic and racial identities mutually enhance each other. One can also think 
back of Hervieu-Léger’s argument on the use of ethnic alliances to connect or reconnect a 
fading religious institution with a certain communal lineage. The DRC’s historic alliance 
with Afrikaner communities is emblematic here. As the church scuffles to justify its 
presence after apartheid, this alliance has become deeply contentious. It simultaneously 
appears more important than ever before as the main identity marker that distinguishes 
this church from the countless denominations now vying for influence in South Africa’s 
religious market space. 
 
Mapping these and other levels of religious-ethnic entanglement offers insight into 
religious responses to social disruption, and to the accelerated confrontation with 
diversity. They draw a bigger picture in which we can situate the history of South 
Africa’s Reformed churches as part of a global trend among religious, and non-religious 
communities for that matter, to stress the absolute character of their identities and the 
need to ward off any external threats that could undermine their supposed purity. Often 
missing in such analyses however, are the vast intricacies inherent to the identity 
categories at issue. Indicating their social or political constructedness is important, but 
does not suffice. This becomes especially apparent with the term race. Critical race 
theorists such as Philomena Essed and Anoop Nayak warn against the reproduction of 
power constructs underlying the term through its constant use in identity research and 
public discourse. With the term “everyday racism,” Essed explains how race and racism 
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are being internalized and often considered part of routine situations and practices 
without acknowledging the ways in which they continue to serve power interest of certain 
groups of people, particularly whites.139 Nayak specifies the position of researchers in 
keeping the notions alive by perhaps dismissing it as constructed, but still referring to 
racial constructions as key categories in their interviews, surveys and questionnaires.140 
He also notes the paradox of indicating the power structures underneath identity 
categories on the one hand, and seeking to avoid the stigmatization of any particular 
group, dominant or not, on the other hand.   
To evade this paradox, studies on identity and diversity often employ notions such 
as hybridity, fluidity, or creolization. They imply processes of mixing in which people 
integrate elements from various identity groups. Rather than perceiving these identities as 
static, emphasis is put on the agency of groups and individuals in continuously shaping 
and reshaping their own sense of belonging. Anthropologists such as Frank Korom 
moreover note the processes of cultural mixing that occur as an alternative response 
towards the social changes associated with pluralization. Korom thus explains the self-
described creolization processes among Indo-Trinidadians as a way to oppose the 
hegemony of the dominant Afro-Caribbean group while maintaining aspects of their own 
culture. 141  Incorporating elements of Afro-Caribbean culture into Shi’a traditions 
originating from Persia, these communities have been able to accommodate to their 
globalizing surroundings and prevent their own culture from disappearing. 																																																								
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Hybridizing or creolizing identities are helpful terms to characterize South 
Africa’s post-apartheid landscape. Chapter one already noted tendencies among 
especially the younger generations to move between and across racial and ethnic 
categories that were once considered immovable. Still, this dissertation also detects 
significant challenges with the hybridity paradigm. Pointing out the multiple and 
constantly shifting layers on which modern social identities are built might be necessary 
to undermine the persistent essentialization and stigmatization of these identities. It is 
rarely welcomed, or recognized by the communities themselves. Pressed to acknowledge 
cultural mixing in their church traditions, many indeed resort to all too familiar responses 
of social closure and disengagement. Korom provides further insight into this dynamic by 
recognizing simultaneous trends of creolization and decreolization. The latter for 
instance, emerges when members of Trinidad’s Indo-Caribbean diaspora sought to 
parallel certain aspects of Indic traditions with Afro-Caribbean ones instead of 
amalgamating them.142 This conscious selection from traditions formed another strategy 
for them to resist pressures of social change and maintain their local culture separately 
from their surroundings. In her introduction to Debating Cultural Hybridity, Werbner 
usefully distinguishes between such conscious processes and the rather unconscious ways 
in which communities navigate diversity. Hybridization often takes place without people 
noticing it, for instance through the slow and natural evolution of languages.143 However, 
when it is felt as forced intentionally through external changes in economy or politics, 
communities are likely to sharpen their boundaries. The challenge for researchers remains 																																																								
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to expound and situate the self-descriptions that emerge here within their historic 
contexts, and perhaps most importantly, to uncover the factors driving these 
identifications as well as the multiple ways in which they play out in reality. 
 
When religion divides, or reconciles: The case of Northern Ireland 
 
Taken to their extreme, religious-nationalist entanglements provide ample munitions for 
violent conflict. They justify sacrifice for God and nation, motivate communities to fight 
the perceived other and supply the necessary symbols, rituals and practical resources for 
mobilization. These ingredients might have all been present in South Africa’s civil 
religion of apartheid. Few however would label the violence during the anti-apartheid 
struggle as part of a religious-nationalist conflict. The struggle concerned issues of 
power, discrimination, the distribution of resources, similar issues that trigger the 
sometimes violent tensions in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa. Chapter one did 
display the extensive role of Christian-nationalism in the buildup, consolidation and 
ultimate collapse of the former regime. This is however insufficient for explaining the 
more subtle influence religion had and continues to have in nourishing the country’s 
racial and ethnic divisions up until today. To help tease out such subtleties, this section 
draws from another case of religious-nationalism gone awry. Northern Ireland evidently 
presents a very different situation from South Africa, but with interesting parallels. It 
entailed deep divisions between ethnically defined groups that borrowed heavily from 
their religions to engage in a prolonged conflict over, indeed, power and resources. 
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Notably, Northern Ireland has also seen a quite peaceful end to its conflict in which the 
involved religious groups modified positions, though not their separated structures. What 
does it tell us about the impact of these structures in times of conflict, and reconciliation? 
 
Before exploring one of the most well-known conflicts of the 20th century, it is useful to 
briefly address the two extremes along which religion and conflict are often perceived. In 
The Ambivalence of the Sacred, Scott Appleby elucidates this contrast by pointing to the 
notion of religion’s internal pluralism.144 Its concepts of the sacred are, as we discussed 
before, constantly adapted and rediscovered within new contexts. They include a wide 
range of religious writings and rituals that can be interpreted towards both violent and 
peaceful behavior. Religious leaders might highlight texts with themes of reconciliation 
and forgiveness that help undermine myths of victimhood or ethnic superiority. Much can 
however go wrong with the translation of such texts to a tradition’s followers. How the 
latter will interpret them, greatly depends, according to Appleby, on their socio-economic 
background or general education.145 People below the poverty line, with little schooling 
are often vulnerable for misconception or the manipulation of certain beliefs, peaceful or 
not, to reinforce exclusive identities. Religious leaders not seldom hold strong ties with 
radical nationalist or sectarian movements. They remain silent about atrocities in return 
for resources or influence, quietly condoning extreme violence on the basis of faith.  
																																																								
144 R.S. Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation, (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 31-33. 
145 Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 118 
 
108	
	
The case of Northern Ireland illuminates many of Appleby’s concerns about 
religion’s detrimental influence in conflict situations, especially when it becomes 
intertwined with ethnic essentialism. Commonly, the protracted Troubles of Northern 
Ireland, with its violent peak in the early to mid-1970s, is considered a conflict about who 
controlled this sliver of land that took place along ethnic and sectarian lines. Nationalists 
seeking to join the Irish Republic sharply distinguished their Irish Catholic identity from 
the Ulster Protestant identity of their unionist antagonists who wanted Northern Ireland to 
remain part of the United Kingdom. How these religious identities truly shaped the 
conflict however, remains a contested debate.146 Questions have been raised whether the 
main actor on the Irish side, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), exhibited any religiosity 
apart from a rather pragmatic use of Catholic imagery to for instance support notions of 
martyrdom. Analyses of the conflict tend to speak of the political opportunism and the 
pursuit of nation building that drove the fighting parties rather than their religious 
ideologies. 
This is where the confusion about religion often begins. Its role in violent 
communal strife is rarely about religiosity or religious doctrine per se. Comparing the 
Irish case with Afrikaner nationalism and Zionism, Mark Suzman shows the complex 
concurrence of ideology, political opportunities and socio-economic circumstances 
necessary for religious-nationalist movements to gain momentum in their struggle for 
autonomy. Religion, according to Suzman, contributes to this package as one significant 																																																								
146 An insightful study on the debate of whether the Northern Irish conflict was religious can be found in: L 
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factor. The appeal of for instance Catholics’ religious-nationalist ideology long remained 
dependent on the political context in Northern Ireland and Britain, and failed to gain 
substantial support beyond the intellectual elites.147 Ultimately, but a small number of 
Northern Ireland’s Catholics and Protestants were truly committed to the antagonist 
religious-ethnic narratives of their church and political leaders. A vast majority however 
did find themselves wedged in essentialized identity groups. Claire Mitchell’s work is 
particularly perceptive here. In her work Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern 
Ireland, Mitchell emphasizes the multiple ways in which religion supplies thick fabric to 
the usually thin boundaries along which identity conflicts tend to be defined.148 It gives 
meaning to existing differences, and helps consolidate them. Mitchell thus indeed denotes 
religion as the central dividing line in Northern Irish politics and society at large. Well 
after the Good Friday Accords made a formal end to the armed conflict in 1998, it 
continued to fuel prejudice and suspicion among the involved communities, not merely as 
an indicator of ethno-national boundaries, but by providing concrete content through 
rituals, norms and values, institutions, space for community gathering, ideas and beliefs.  
Among Northern Irish Protestants, these ideas did constitute one key element in 
their narrative of the conflict that centered on the notion of liberty. In an effort to 
distinguish their own group from what they viewed as submissive Catholics, Protestants 
often highlighted traditions of free thought. Many claimed their religion a personal 
choice, stressing its contrast with the authoritarianism of the Catholic Church. Another 																																																								
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influential religious idea often perceived among Protestants related to the covenant 
concept.149 It entailed the belief in the Protestants of Ulster being a chosen people. In an 
exclusive contract with God, they agreed to follow the divine rule on earth in exchange 
for blessings on their promised land of Northern Ireland. The covenant belief moreover 
implied a deep sense of loyalty from Ulster towards the British Protestant Crown and 
expectation that the British would intervene on behalf of their fellow people of faith. 
While the idea of a covenant has little appeal these days, it left a powerful legacy. For 
many Protestants, religion and politics remain deeply intertwined. Even though the 
British are scorned for having done little to reward their devotion, many Ulster 
Protestants still nurture a deep sense of affiliation with their neighbors across the Irish 
Sea. Mitchell moreover notes that covenant beliefs could easily resurface in case of crisis 
or in protest towards further British disengagement.150  
 Catholics in Northern Ireland have generally been held to attach less value to 
religious ideas than Protestants did. Mitchell as well as Gladys Ganiel and Paul Dixon 
nonetheless note the significance of notions of victimhood and sacrifice in shaping 
Catholic attitudes towards the conflict. These often involved powerful images of Christ as 
an innocent victim of oppression who died for the sake of others. Catholics’ identification 
with this image reinforced their sense of discrimination and suffering. Where this led 
some to withdraw in a mode of passivity, others took to extreme action, embracing 
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martyrdom for instance during the Hunger Strikes in the early eighties.151 Besides these 
images, religion was influential in offering Catholics a platform for community gathering 
and ritual. The Catholic Church throughout the Troubles functioned as a vital space for 
its members to voice concerns, organize politically and bolster communal solidarity with 
powerful spiritual symbols and ceremony. Notably, the church has continued in this 
function for many Catholics, including those who claim to no longer believe. 
 As such, we arrive at a key issue. Deeply embedded in society, religion has 
persisted in affecting Northern Irish communities regardless of their level of religious 
commitment. In interviews Mitchell conducted throughout her studies, many indicated 
that they felt little affiliation with the church, hardly attended any services, but still 
identified as either Protestant or Catholic. This identification tended to correlate with 
profound sentiments of belonging and social boundaries. Protestants said they did not 
hang out with Catholics, let alone intermarry. Schools have remained largely segregated 
along religious lines, as have sports clubs, media, political or voluntary organizations. 
Religion thus deeply pervades everyday life, often more than class or national 
identities.152 It moreover continues to do so in antagonist ways, promoting a discourse of 
Catholic victimhood, or notions of moral superiority among Protestants. Mostly however, 
religion has served as a cultural reservoir in Northern Ireland. It up until today offers 
crucial imagery, institutional space and ideas about the communities and their preset 
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differences. Socialized early in life, these differences have become commonsensical for 
most of the population.  
Recent years do see some gradual changes in this respect and a slow development 
towards more hybridized identities. Mitchell points at trends among Catholics who have 
moved to the cities and who tend towards the more individualized worshipping that used 
to be associated exclusively with Protestants. These Catholics are also likely to 
emphasize notions of equality rather than victimhood and suffering.153 Ganiel and Dixon 
meanwhile perceive a shift in focus among Protestants from fear of Catholicism towards 
moral concerns about for instance abortion or homosexuality and their dangers for society 
as a whole rather than for one particular group.154 
Northern Ireland thus illustrates the deep and often troublesome intertwining of 
religion and ethnicity. At the same time, it offers relevant insights into how religion can 
play a role in untangling these identities and help reconcile major adversaries. Appleby in 
this respect notes the various efforts through which Catholic and Protestant institutions 
have throughout the conflict sought to overcome sectarianism within and among their 
church communities.155 These included both large-scale initiatives such as “The Beyond 
Sectarianism Project,” and a wide range of local church projects. Throughout the 1990s 
and up until today their main aim has been to foster interchurch collaboration as well as 
cross-community dialogue and tolerance. Appleby discusses the value of these projects 
especially in terms of long-term attitudinal change. They may not address current 																																																								
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political issues or help resolve tensions over integrating schools or police forces. Instead, 
the church peace endeavors appear most significant in that they help foster a climate of 
reconciliation, often at the level of neighborhoods or local congregations, to smooth 
people’s transition into a new post-conflict Northern Ireland.  
Ganiel, Dixon and Mitchell each point to such efforts in their respective studies. 
Drawing from R.S. Warner’s work on religious communities, Mitchell discusses their 
more general potential in bridge building by employing rituals and ceremonies accessible 
to people from different backgrounds.156 Ganiel and Dixon similarly identify religion’s 
social capital in fostering harmonious relationships between communities by offering a 
physical platform, religiously imbued discourse of reconciliation as well as resources for 
civic activism. Ecumenical movements tend to be especially engaged in this respect as 
they seek to bring together a variety of religious traditions and foster mutual 
understanding. Due to the broadly divisive nature of Protestant-Catholic relations in 
Northern Ireland, the impact of such dialogue efforts however remains doubtful. 
Typically, they reach but a small group of people who already favor a more peaceful 
approach to the conflict prior to attending the meeting. Ecumenical activities moreover 
tend to attract believers already open to other traditions rather than those strongly 
involved with one particular tradition.  
With their article “Religion, Pragmatic Fundamentalism and the Transformation 
of the Northern Ireland Conflict” Ganiel and Dixon draw attention to this last group. 
Fundamentalist Protestants in Northern Ireland, those deeply committed to their faith and 
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its supposed ethnic affiliation, made a significant turnabout in their attitudes towards the 
conflict which, according to the article, contributed to the peace process. By the mid-
nineties most had moved away from long cherished convictions of belonging to a chosen 
people.157 The earlier mentioned covenant concept encountered increasing critique from 
among Protestant churches. Evangelical groups most notably were casting the belief in a 
special relation between God, Ulster and Britain as idolatry. It undermined some of the 
main arguments religious as well as political leaders had long employed to foster 
antagonism towards Catholics. These arguments were further weakened by the situation 
on the ground in which decades of violence for God’s cause had rendered little but social-
economic deprivation and isolation. As their position became increasingly unsustainable, 
anti-Catholic fundamentalists gradually moved towards engagement across long held 
divides. This engagement appeared more pragmatic than anything else. Realizing that 
they were losing public support for their narratives of chosenness, church actors and their 
political representatives not only agreed to enter the negotiations they had so long 
refused, but also turned out to be quite malleable towards the demands of their long 
despised Catholic neighbors. 
 
What becomes clear from this limited discussion on Northern Ireland is that religion had 
an important but nonetheless elusive position in the conflict. Religious actors on both 
sides of the Northern Ireland conflict may have at times engaged in extremism as they 
called followers to fight in the name of God. Most however played a less obvious part in 																																																								
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the violence. Churches across the board were most influential in the way they maintained 
and reinforced community boundaries. Providing separate gathering spaces, rituals and 
religious ideas and values for believers as well as non-believers, Protestant and Catholic 
churches greatly contributed to the divisions that continue to characterize Northern Irish 
society today and that have allowed the conflict to linger for such an extended time 
period. For most of that time, religious peacemakers and their efforts to untangle 
religious-nationalist attachments meanwhile lingered on the margins. They might have 
helped ease the transition for certain communities, but their concrete impact remains hard 
to measure. Those religious actors who did affect the peace process directly were driven 
by chiefly pragmatic motives. The Protestant leaders who finally moved away from their 
covenant beliefs and towards negotiations, did not necessarily do so to promote peace, 
but first and foremost to retain their own base of support.  
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Conclusion 
 
At the outset of this dissertation research, focus was initially given to religious-
nationalism as main theoretical framework. It appeared an appropriate basis from which 
to analyze the transformation of a church institution once imbued with Christian-
nationalist doctrines to fit with South Africa’s post-apartheid reality. The insights offered 
by Anthony Smith, Peter van der Veer and Catarina Kinnval amongst others on the 
entangling of religious, nationalist, ethnic and racial identities elucidate the exceedingly 
slow pace of this transformation. Drawing parallels with other nationalist movements 
moreover exhibits the distinct role of religious actors in constructing, reinforcing and 
sustaining rigid group boundaries to the extent that they come to justify violent 
aggression against the perceived other.  
This ties in with a second line of debates considered in the early stages of the 
study at hand regarding religion as a factor in both aggravating and mitigating violence 
between different ethnic or national communities. The anti-apartheid struggle is often 
mentioned as an example of both. Where the Dutch Reformed Church crucially provided 
moral reasoning for state suppression of the black majority, other religious actors 
undermined this legitimacy with extensive discourse and initiatives focused on racial 
reconciliation. Northern Ireland similarly emerges as a prime case of both religious 
capabilities, albeit with considerably more indications towards the detrimental impact of 
religion in deepening rather than bridging social divisions.  
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The last point signals several important gaps in current studies on religious-
nationalist movements and conflicts. Not only do such studies often remain limited to the 
extremes on both sides of the peace-conflict continuum. They also tend to focus on the 
height of the strife and much less on what happened afterwards. Abundant and helpful 
analyses have been conducted into the emergence of Christian-nationalism in South 
Africa and its consolidation with the establishment of the National Party regime. Recent 
years have also seen a growing research field on the contributions churches have made in 
resisting this regime, not seldom inspired by church struggles against oppression 
elsewhere in the world, from Northern Ireland to Latin America. In these studies many 
questions remain though about the long haul of post-conflict reconstruction. Claire 
Mitchell has valuably distinguished the everyday structures through which religious 
actors, whether or not they were involved in reconciliation efforts, maintained patterns of 
separation for many years after the Northern Ireland peace agreement. Her insights help 
delineate similar patterns in South Africa, but are insufficient to explain the processes we 
see in this case where the very protagonists of segregation in the past now actively seek 
to foster unity. Central to these processes is another dimension often dismissed in 
religious-nationalism and conflict studies. How are religious actors themselves reframing 
their identities in societies in transition? 
The Reformed churches’ search to overcome the past is intricately tied to their 
concomitant struggle with the changing position of religion in society. Calling for racial 
unity is one thing. But how to implement this in churches that face stiff competition from 
their Pentecostal neighbors, on top of internal authority crises? With increasingly 
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demanding and individualized constituencies, the once dominant Reformed institutions 
wrestle to push through any top-down change. Members themselves meanwhile appear to 
waver. They fiercely hold on to their old segregated institutions in response to the threats 
perceived to be emanating from increasingly diverse surroundings. Yet, they 
simultaneously shop around for alternative faith experiences far removed from these 
institutions. Investigating such contradicting responses necessitates a close consideration 
of both religious-nationalism and religious change debates. The latter provide a crucial 
backdrop to the sharpening of religious-ethnic and national boundaries that we see 
worldwide, and that continues to characterize South Africa’s church structures. They also 
show such sharpening as only one response to the individualization and pluralization 
facing religious traditions. Other responses rather involve the mixing of identities and the 
blurring of boundaries between the religious and the secular. They allow for, in some 
cases unconscious, restructuring of long essentialized identities. Yet, they also run the 
risk of deepening the defiance Werbner and Korom have indicated among those 
suspicious of hybridization. 
By tying the insights of authors like Smith, Werbner and Mitchell to those of for 
instance Berger, Ammerman and Davie, this dissertation seeks to address some of the 
gaps in the existing literature on religion and its entanglement with ethnic and national 
identities. It consciously started with debates on religious change to draw connections 
between the perceived rise of religious-nationalist movements and processes of 
pluralization. Above all, these debates are necessary to discern how the identities 
involved in such movements are shifting and increasingly construed outside of traditional 
 
119	
	
structures. This shifting might produce more individualized religious identities that place 
less value on ethnically defined institutions. Still, it should be clear that the latter remain 
highly influential, also in the long haul. As Ammerman argues, people still get most of 
their religious cues from institutional traditions.158 It elucidates why a church like the 
DRC with its sharply declining membership and overall deteriorating public position, 
continues to be a significant actor in South Africa’s religious landscape. It also raises 
questions about what happens when these institutions try to change their own clues. The 
Reformed churches’ search for a multiracial unity is far from complete and has, in the 
eyes of many, done more harm than good. Nonetheless, it offers a valuable opportunity to 
investigate the multifaceted strategies with which religious communities approach social 
change, and become part of the change themselves. 
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PART II. TOWARDS AN IMPERATIVE UNITY 
CHAPTER 3. Once we were one: church (dis)unity from 1948 until today 
 
Among the many points of contention within South Africa’s family of Reformed 
churches is, ironically, whether it is working towards unification or rather reunification. 
The former term, to be used also throughout this dissertation, has become a relatively 
neutral way of indicating a future unity of the four Reformed churches long segregated by 
race. Reunification however implies a narrative of a united past that was broken and that 
needs to be restored. Proponents of this term refer to the early Dutch Reformed Church of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth century in which racial and ethnic communities 
worshipped together in the only church allowed in Dutch controlled South Africa. This 
narrative has been criticized for ignoring a historic reality in which non-white 
congregants formed only a small minority, often seated in the back of the church far 
removed from white congregants. It would also ignore the de facto segregation of the 
DRC into white congregations and mission posts for black and colored communities, 
each developing its own distinct church identity.  
 Still, the narrative of a united past remains a central motive for processes of 
unification today, particularly within the DRC. At the heart of these processes is the ideal 
to structurally integrate the Reformed churches into one multiracial institution. It would 
signal the ultimate proof that the churches have changed and adapted to their post-
apartheid reality. Conversely, the fact that they have thus far remained largely segregated 
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on the basis of the old apartheid categories, is considered indicative of the churches’ 
failure to overcome their past. Often forgotten here is the complex and ambiguous history 
of the relationships among the so-called black and white Reformed churches. Both have 
been pursuing some form of church unity throughout the apartheid era and ever since, be 
it in often sharply divergent ways. Their story displays dilemmas of belonging, of 
separation and the ability to maintain your own culture versus unity and the risk of being 
overwhelmed by others. Significantly, the churches’ struggle with unity shows the 
controversial role of religion, and the symbolic power of a confession of faith named 
after the South African town of Belhar, in simultaneously bridging and simultaneously 
deepening divisions.  
 
3.1. Pre-1994: Modeling apartheid 
 
A family story 
 
The Reformed churches’ search for unity, one could say, starts as early as 1652, when the 
Dutch established their outpost at the Cape to provide fresh supplies for ships on the way 
to the Far East. Along with these supplies, the Dutch trading company offered Dutch 
Reformed services for its early immigrants settling in South Africa. In the following 
decades, the Dutch Reformed Church established a monopoly in the colony, banning all 
other churches and indigenous faiths. It would maintain this position until the British 
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gained control of the Cape by the end of the eighteenth century. Throughout this period 
the DRC tended mostly to white communities of Northern European descent. This 
however did not make the DRC an exclusively white church.159 Farmers provided 
services to their non-white farmworkers, while children from mixed backgrounds could 
be baptized and attend worship. This brief and often contentious history of joint 
worshipping has up until today formed a key element in the DRC’s claim on a united 
past. It came to an end halfway through the nineteenth century when the DRC began to 
extend evangelization efforts throughout the country. Early onwards, the mission posts 
and ultimately mission churches were set up to serve indigenous communities separately 
from their neighboring white congregations.  
 In 1857 the DRC secured these missionary practices by formally legitimizing its 
church organization on the basis of race. The church leadership claimed that “for the 
weakness of some” segregation would be the best and scripturally sound solution to 
whites’ discomfort with black worshippers participating in DRC services. The decision 
spawned the establishment of the Dutch Reformed Mission Church (DRMC) in 1881 to 
tend to the so-called “colored” community, a term that referred to the predominantly 
Afrikaans speaking population group of mixed Asian, African and European heritage. 
Meanwhile separate “black” synods were formed for the various indigenous African 
communities that would later merge into the Dutch Reformed Church in Africa (DRCA). 
Eventually, communities with Indian and Asian backgrounds also received their own 
services and established the “Indian” Reformed Church in Africa (RCA). These three 																																																								
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churches became known as the black Reformed churches or “daughter” churches while 
the DRC proclaimed itself as their white “mother” church. With its division into colored, 
black, Indian and white churches, the Reformed family hence constituted an early model 
of the apartheid categories that were formalized by the National Party regime after 1948. 
 Along with the unfolding segregation in the church family and the country at 
large, voices also arose for unification. Throughout the twentieth century, each of the four 
churches at different times urged closer collaboration or even full integration of the 
churches’ organizational structures, with varying degrees of response from the others. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the three non-white Reformed churches often favored unity 
more strongly than the DRC, and at least partially succeeded in this aim. In 1994 the 
DRMC and the DRCA merged into the Uniting Reformed Church of Southern Africa 
(URCSA). It was established as a new church within the family of Reformed churches 
that, while tracing its roots to the DRC, would exist as an independent entity. The term 
“uniting” indicated URCSA’s larger vision to include the other family members when 
they would be ready to accept the invitation. So far, neither the RCA or the DRC has 
done so.  
 
The terminology used to describe the family relationships reveals a great deal about the 
challenges facing the churches’ enduring search for unity. The family names that evolved 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century exemplified the deeply paternalistic 
attitudes embedded among the four churches. Though officially autonomous, the 
“daughters” heavily relied on the “mother” church for financial aid, education and 
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leadership. White missionaries usually headed their congregations, while the few non-
white leaders were essentially bound by DRC decisions and risked severe financial 
repercussions in case of any dissent.  
 Notably, the DRC distinguished between the daughter churches on the one hand 
and two “sister” churches on the other. The latter referred to the Reformed churches that 
had split off from the DRC mid-nineteenth century, the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk 
and the Gereformeerde Kerk in Suid-Afrika. Rather than racial segregation, this split 
occurred for reasons of theological discord. Both churches maintained a white Afrikaans 
speaking membership just like the DRC. Apart from their common background and 
constituency, the DRC’s relationship with the two sister churches tended to be one of 
minimal contact. Occasionally they reached out to each other to discuss possible 
collaboration or future unification, but so far little has come of such efforts. Despite the 
nominal contact, the sister church terminology suggested a sense of equality quite 
different from the DRC’s relationship with the DRCA, DRMC and RCA. For the three 
black Reformed churches, the mother-daughter language implied an inherent white 
superiority that came to be deeply despised during the years of the anti-apartheid 
struggle. Nonetheless, the terms prevailed among all four Reformed churches up until 
recently.  
 This dissertation refers to mother and daughter churches to indicate the 
relationships between the churches and their self-descriptions during the time periods 
discussed. In the post-apartheid era this includes the notion of mother church as it has 
remained a predominant way in which DRC members identify with their church. The 
 
125	
	
three former daughter churches are generally referred to with the umbrella term of black 
Reformed churches. Black in this case does not so much refer to one specific racial 
category as in the apartheid days, but rather points at the three churches’ roots in being 
established for non-white populations. It has for many of their members become a proud 
self-description that denotes their distinction from the still predominantly white DRC. 
 
Schism versus unity in the DRC 
 
As the self-acclaimed mother church, the DRC up until today holds a central position in 
South Africa’s family of Reformed churches. Besides being its largest and wealthiest 
church, the DRC long dominated the other family members and continues to be seen by 
many as the leading mother church. Much of this perception was formed through the 
earlier mentioned mission policy. Gideon van der Watt describes the mission policy as 
first and foremost a race based system in which the white church sought to evangelize 
what it perceived as South Africa’s black “heathen” communities.160 It followed the 
church’s ideal of embedding the Dutch Reformed tradition in all of South Africa in 
addition to a profound fear of mixing the country’s different races. From its inception in 
the 19th century, the DRC mission policy comprised a strong preference for racially 
segregated churches that not only separated black from white, but also black from 
colored, colored from Indian, and even distinguished between the various black 																																																								
160 Gideon van der Watt., “Die sendingpraktyk van die Ned.Geref. Kerk: Enkele tendense vanaf 1952 tot 
met die eeuwenteling” [Mission practices in the Dutch Reformed Church: Some trends from 1952 until the 
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indigenous communities. The policy was justified with what later became a notorious 
motto of the apartheid regime: separate but equal development. Organizing church 
membership by race, the DRC asserted, formed the most suitable arrangement for each of 
the four churches to thrive within and help grow their respective communities.  
 The arrangement involved extensive DRC support for its family members in the 
form of church buildings, staff salaries and other in-kind or financial resources. While 
reinforcing their dependency on the mother church, the DRC exercised a strong hold on 
every aspect of its daughter churches. It demanded veto power in the DRMC and DRCA 
decision making, owned their properties and controlled their ministry education at 
designated seminaries. The black Reformed churches had little say in their own curricula 
development, nor were they consulted about the DRC missionaries that headed their 
congregations as ministers and chairmen of their local church councils.161 Good family 
relationships for the DRC thus primarily implied a one-way street in which the mother 
church both supported and controlled the other three churches. 
Comfortable in this unilateral position, the Dutch Reformed Church for decades 
expressed little interest in seeking closer unity with its family members. It wished to 
contain the black Reformed churches, but not cooperate with them on equal terms. The 
DRC leadership refrained from and even obstructed measures towards formally 
integrating the family’s church structures. Illustrative is the case of the Federal Council of 
Dutch Reformed Churches. The DRC established this Council in 1964 primarily in an 
effort to keep the family together as racial tensions in South Africa heightened after the 
																																																								
161 Pauw, Anti-apartheid Theology in the Dutch Reformed Family of Churches, 93. 
 
127	
	
Sharpville massacre. The Council involved representatives from each of the four 
churches and provided them a platform to discuss common concerns and offer advice to 
the church family at large. Throughout the 1970’s the DRMC and DRCA sought to 
transform the council into a more substantive general synod that could speak as one voice 
and help move the churches away from their segregated status quo. The DRC rejected 
this proposal, leaving the council a toothless advisory body. The Council could critique 
the political situation in the country but remained moderate in its statements. Though 
appreciated as a platform to meet each other, the daughter churches grew increasingly 
frustrated with the Council’s refusal to push for reform. After the DRMC left in 1990, the 
Council died a slow death until it was officially disbanded by the DRC in 2004. 
 In spite of persistent resistance, the DRC also harbored voices favoring structural 
church unification. Initial echoes of a call for change came as the movement against 
apartheid intensified in the eighties. Through an Open Letter in Die Kerkbode of June 9, 
1982 a group of 123 ministers and theologians urged a visible expression of the family’s 
unity in the spirit of what they viewed as Jesus Christ’s central message of reconciliation 
among people and between humanity and God. Later that decade, this vision was 
reinforced through the Church and Society documents of 1986 and 1990 and the DRC 
General Synod of 1990. Church leaders openly claimed church unity as a vital element of 
the Reformed faith. The DRC committed itself to developing a kerkverband [church 
association] that would unite the four churches without compromising their diversity in 
language, culture and liturgy.162 Diversity should not hamper church unity according to 
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the General Synod, and church membership was to be open to all and no longer defined 
by race.  
 Ironically, this move towards integration resulted in a deeply traumatizing 
separation. In 1987, one year after the first Church and Society document, around 8000 
DRC members split off from their mother church and established the Afrikaner 
Protestantse Kerk (APK), a new Dutch Reformed church for Afrikaners only. The APK 
strongly opposed the Church and Society declarations, particularly regarding open church 
membership, and they persisted in segregated church services on the basis of race and 
ethnicity. In numbers, the loss was barely worth mentioning. Psychologically however, 
the “church schism” as the APK split-off was called, would haunt the DRC for years to 
come. It undermined a central part of the church’s identity as an institution of unity for 
the Afrikaners. To leave the mother church was perceived to be a breach of loyalty that 
not only hurt those who left, but also those who stayed. Illustrative were the words in Die 
Kerkbode of July 1987 of Johan Heyns, the DRC moderator at the time: “…who accepts 
the church as spiritual mother and has been loyally nurtured by her with the word and the 
sacraments, cannot but cry about what just happened.”163 
 
The profound distress following the APK’s establishment signals two interconnected and 
still prevalent themes in DRC attitudes towards unification. One pertains to the internal 
divisions that have long characterized the church in spite of its emphasis on Afrikaner 																																																								
163  J.A. Heyns in Die Kerkbode, 22 July 1987, 22. Quoted in J.M. Van der Merwe, “Kerk En Samelewing 
25 Jaar Later: Was Die Kool Die Sous Werd?” [Church and Society 25 years later: was it worthwhile?] 
Christelike Lektuurfonds in collaboration with Stellenbosch University 22 (2012), 571. Accessed 12 April 
2015, http://ngtt.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/65>.  
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unity. These divisions run along theological lines as illustrated earlier by the formation of 
the two Reformed sister churches mid-nineteenth century. More problematic however 
have been the vast differences between the DRC’s regional synods. The latter operated 
independently and with barely any general oversight up until 1962. In that year the DRC 
General Synod was formed as an umbrella structure for the seven regional synods that 
existed at the time, guiding and reinforcing church policies for the entire DRC. Though 
united, the regional synods today often pride themselves for their autonomy and 
emphasize their cultural distinctiveness. The greatest divide is generally perceived 
between the regional synods of the Free State and Transvaal on the one hand and the 
Western and Southern Cape [abbreviated to Western Cape] synod on the other. The latter 
is known for its relatively affluent and liberal-minded urban constituencies in contrast to 
the generally more impoverished conservative rural communities in the Free State and 
Transvaal. Forging a joint church policy across these divides without alienating one or 
the other has often required the General Synod to walk a tightrope. This significantly 
complicates contemporary unification debates. Whereas the Western Cape has throughout 
the years pushed the topic on the agenda, the Free State and Transvaal synods have thus 
far opposed any formal arrangement that would integrate the Reformed family. In their 
resistance, these two regional synods often claim to express a primary fear among their 
congregations that such integration could endanger the DRC’s internal bonds. Many 
would rather leave the DRC than merge into a new church with the other family 
members. 
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 The threat implied in this last point brings us to the second recurrent theme, or 
rather dilemma in the DRC’s unification priorities and sense of belonging. Fostering 
unity in the broader Reformed family, the church risks angering its more conservative 
members who seek to maintain their church’s Afrikaner identity. The church they 
associate themselves with cannot be anything else but Afrikaans. Persisting this identity 
for the sake of internal DRC unity however is likely to constrain the already tensed 
relationships with the black Reformed churches. The General Synod has responded to 
these pressures with conflicting messages. Since 1994 it claims to endorse and strive for 
“a greater structural expression of the unity in the DRC family.” It would be imperative 
to its [reconciliation], joint witness and a more effective service” in South Africa.164 
Simultaneously, the General Synod today emphasizes the term “church association,” 
indicating a preference for a loose affiliation of churches rather than one formally 
integrated church. It has moreover raised a number of church bureaucratic impediments 
to the unification process, demanding a substantive two-thirds majority not only among 
the General Synod’s immediate representatives but also among local DRC church 
councils in favor of church unity. The ambivalence on display here is not unique to the 
DRC and returns in the next paragraph’s discussion about the black Reformed churches 
and their position in the RC family.   
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Unity versus independence among the black churches 
 
Like the DRC, the three black Reformed churches were never unambiguous about church 
unification. They alternated between demanding a closer and more structural arrangement 
with the DRC on the one hand, and seeking distance from the church and its association 
with the apartheid regime on the other. The churches sharply denounced the DRC’s 
segregation policies and at the same time urged the process of unification with the DRC. 
When the latter appeared unlikely to happen, the two main black Reformed churches, the 
DRMC and DRCA, in 1994 settled for a bilateral unity and dissolved themselves into the 
Uniting Reformed Church of Southern Africa. What drove them in their search for unity, 
and what held them back? 
The roots of the black Reformed churches as mission posts are crucial in understanding 
their position in the church family. With the purpose of evangelizing South Africa’s non-
white population groups, the DRCA, DRMC and RCA were initially set up as but 
indigenous versions of the Dutch Reformed Church. As they developed their own 
identities over time, the three mission churches increasingly came to see themselves as 
independent entities that, while closely tied to the DRC, comprised their own styles of 
worshipping, church organization and scriptural interpretations. They not only differed 
from the DRC, but also from each other. Based primarily in the Cape region, the DRMC 
early onwards became an anchor of its colored community, reflecting the latter’s puritan 
values and pietism and providing services in its prevalent language, Afrikaans.165 Still 
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referred to as the mission church, the DRMC resembled the mother church in terms of 
language and puritanism, but developed a distinct identity based on the hybrid Asian, 
African and European culture characterizing the Cape colored community. A relatively 
strong and homogenous base furthermore enabled the DRMC to sustain some of its own 
churches, making it less reliant on DRC subsidies.  
 Quite different was the context in which the DRCA and RCA evolved. Rather 
than serving one particular community, the former had been set up to tend to the various 
indigenous population groups in their separate languages, such as isiXhosa, isiZulu, 
Sesotho or Setswana. Whilst each group built its own church culture based on local 
customs and traditions, the DRCA maintained close relations with the DRC. Kinghorn 
aptly describes the black African church as “always cast in the role of grateful 
beneficiaries of white benevolence.”166 The dependency of DRC support combined with 
their varied localities hampered DRCA congregations to formulate one overarching 
church culture. The RCA in contrast, developed perhaps the most distinct identity of all 
three churches. Starting out as its own church entity in 1968 with only four 
congregations, the small Indian Reformed church primarily focused on spreading the 
gospel among South Africa’s Indian and Muslim population.167 It also heavily relied on 
DRC financial aid but managed to distinguish itself from the mother church through its 
strictly evangelical character and almost exclusive focus on communities with Indian or 
Asian backgrounds.   																																																								
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 In their relation with the DRC, the three black Reformed churches shared an 
initially submissive position. Dominated by white missionaries and financially tied, they 
abided by the DRC’s policies of racial segregation. The 1950 DRMC synod affirmed the 
notion of separate development as the best way to uplift the impoverished colored 
community even after it had decided not to take an official stand on apartheid. Likewise, 
the DRCA and RCA refrained from criticizing the system that discriminated against their 
own constituencies. Notable is the DRCA Synod of 1975. For the first time in its history, 
this synod officially denounced apartheid as unscriptural and called for an end to the 
segregated status quo of the Reformed Church family. Few DRCA ministers however 
heeded their Synod’s decision, fearing the negative consequences of such resistance for 
their DRC subsidized salaries. These subsidies might have been despised throughout the 
black Reformed churches, but they were also indispensable. In Leepo Modise’s words, 
“[subsidies] felt comfortable within the racially separated church and society.”168 
 Nonetheless, the 1975 Synod of the DRCA signified a change in attitude towards 
the DRC. Its condemnation of apartheid was followed by the DRMC Synod of 1978, 
which also concluded that “the apartheid policy, as maintained by the government, is in 
contradiction with the Bible.” 169  The two Synod meetings reflected an increasing 
influence of the churches’ black leaders and their theological contributions to the 
Reformed church family. As the DRCA elected its first black moderator, Rev. E.T.S. 																																																								
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Buti, the DRMC saw the rising star of Rev. Alan Boesak. The latter became one of the 
DRC’s most severe critics in the 1980s and a key church actor in the anti-apartheid 
movement. He set forward a theology of black liberation, combining his Reformed 
tradition with the Catholic liberation theologies of Latin America that urged church 
solidarity with the poor. Boesak’s theology claimed Jesus Christ to be a liberating Lord 
who called his followers to actively oppose injustices against deprived population 
groups.170 According to this perspective, apartheid and its detrimental implications for 
black South Africans constituted a profound form of oppression and was heretical in the 
eyes of God. This theological view of apartheid as heresy came to prevail among the 
three black churches with Alan Boesak as its most prominent spokesman. 
 The rising critique of the DRC and its apartheid practices culminated in the 1982 
declaration of a status confessionis in South Africa. The World Alliance of Reformed 
Churches (WARC), where the DRC and the rest of the South African Reformed family 
came together with groups of Christians from every continent, issued this statement 
asserting that the gospel itself was at stake and calling on Christians, as a matter of faith, 
to confront the injustices caused by apartheid. Under the leadership of Alan Boesak, the 
WARC suspended the DRC’s membership in the Alliance until the church would 
renounce its apartheid theology. The DRMC followed the Alliance’s example with a 
similar statement later that year. Lashing out at the DRC, the mission church denounced 
any theological justification of apartheid as a “mockery to the Gospel of Jesus Christ.”171 
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It confronted the DRC with its complicity in a system of racism and discrimination. Both 
the DRCA and the RCA supported the rationale behind the status confessionis but 
remained internally divided about the extent to which they should formally antagonize 
the institution many of their members still perceived as their mother church. This caused 
severe tensions especially within the RCA. Although most of its ministers rejected 
apartheid, some feared that an outspoken position on the country’s political situation 
could distract the church from its main evangelical calling.172 They also dreaded the 
financial implications of such a position and preferred to remain under the DRC’s wings 
rather than oppose it.  
 Another key event shaping the relationships between the black Reformed 
churches and the DRC comprised the Belhar Confession. This 1982 document was first 
and foremost written by a DRMC commission as a “cry from the heart,”173 a statement of 
faith against the quickly deteriorating political situation in South Africa. It did not discuss 
apartheid explicitly but rather called churches worldwide to reject any doctrine of “sinful 
separation” and confess their faith in unity, justice and reconciliation. These three themes 
were at the center of Belhar and became the DRMC’s leading guidelines after the church 
adopted it as a fourth confession in 1986. Despite the call for unity, the Belhar 
Confession would evolve into a source of intense division within the Reformed family. 
DRC members widely renounced it for being but another political attempt to vilify their 
mother church while black and colored communities came to perceive Belhar as the 																																																								
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cornerstone of their church identity. The next section expounds these intricacies and their 
implication for the churches’ unity process. At this stage it is most important to mention 
Belhar as a watershed moment in the history of the black Reformed churches. From this 
point onwards there was no way back. The black churches, spearheaded by the DRMC, 
had taken a clear stance against the apartheid system of their mother church, and against 
the segregated structures characterizing their church family relationships. 
The path with which the black Reformed churches arrived at this position was far 
from straightforward however. In the years prior to Belhar, they went back and forth 
between mounting ideological opposition to racial segregation on the one hand and de 
facto preservation of the system they despised on the other hand. Throughout the 
apartheid era the three churches sought to transform the paternalistic family relationships 
into a more equal arrangement. Rather than the toothless Federal Council of Reformed 
Churches, they for instance pushed for an overarching General Synod that not only 
expressed the bonds between the four churches but also signified their rejection of racial 
segregation through joint policies and declarations on the situation in the country. Both 
the DRCA and DRMC called for structural unity in their respective 1975 and 1978 Synod 
meetings. The RCA in 1980 furthermore described unity within the church family as 
“God-given” and urged its realization at all church levels, from congregation to 
presbytery to synod.174 Despite the solemnity of these statements, little was done towards 
implementing them. To a great extent this can be attributed to the DRC’s dominance of 
the black Reformed churches through its missionaries and financial leverage. Stressing 
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the need for the separate development of each ethnic church, the DRC pushed black 
church leaders to accept the family’s close but invisible bonds as sufficient and refrain 
from seeking a more manifest expression of unity.  
 The black Reformed churches meanwhile had their own reasons for initially 
persisting in separation. Since their establishment as mission churches their primary aim 
had been to achieve greater independence. Having control over their own decision 
making, minister appointment and theological education constituted one of the few ways 
through which the three churches could protest the DRC in the early apartheid decades. 
Other forms of resistance were quickly cut off. The DRC and its missionaries 
successfully restrained the black churches from issuing even the most moderate 
statements on apartheid, leaving the latter with little space to maneuver in a system that 
pervaded society. Only towards the 1980s did the DRC reduce its influence over the 
daughter churches, notably when it allowed the DRMC full control of its theological 
training in 1982. By that time though, the desire for independence had declined in favor 
of an increasing urge for visible church unity. 
 What ultimately pushed the black churches towards integration rather than 
segregation had much to do with the quickly deteriorating situation in the South Africa of 
the late seventies and early eighties. The countrywide protests and their often violent 
crackdowns signaled an intrinsic failure of the DRC’s separate but equal development 
policy. Racial segregation had created a deeply unequal society that was now on the 
verge of collapse. Through statements like the status confessionis and the Belhar 
Confession, the churches indicated their coming to terms with this reality. They no longer 
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followed the DRC and its apartheid theology. Instead they formulated their own 
theological framework based mainly on the premise that God desired reconciliation 
among people and that the church could fulfill this desire through displaying visible 
unity. Structurally integrating its institutions had now become a litmus test for the 
Reformed family to show its sincerity in abandoning a doctrine of separation. 
 Formally, the black Reformed churches strove to unite the entire church family. 
But as the anti-apartheid struggle intensified, the DRMC and DRCA shifted their focus 
towards bilateral unity talks, excluding the DRC. The escalating political situation 
combined with the harsh criticism from the black Reformed churches towards the DRC 
had severely strained their family relationships. Especially the status confessionis 
generated deep controversy. For DRC members, the statement implied the betrayal of the 
daughter churches and their surrender to international pressure. The black churches 
meanwhile felt supported now that the wider global church community had voiced such 
strong condemnation of the mother church’s apartheid doctrine. In this tensed climate, the 
DRC stepped up its resistance to the structural unification of the church family. By 1988 
it had withdrawn entirely from the unity talks, while the RCA choose not to join as it 
remained internally divided on its position towards the DRC and apartheid. The DRCA 
and DRMC ultimately decided to continue their efforts bilaterally.   
 
In April 1994 the two black Reformed churches dissolved themselves to jointly form the 
Uniting Reformed Church of Southern Africa (URCSA). The new name indicated an 
open invitation for the other family churches to join URCSA. Having taken out the 
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“Dutch” of Dutch Reformed, URCSA also expressed its independence from the white 
church in both ethnic identity and in theology.175 While the DRC continued to resist 
Belhar, URCSA adopted the Belhar Confession and its emphasis on social justice as a 
center piece of the new church’s confessional base. Its congregations would no longer be 
obedient daughters in the Reformed family, but rather autonomous churches that retained 
relations with the other World Reformed churches on their own terms and not on those of 
the DRC. In stressing this autonomy, the new church’s leadership also recognized the 
internal diversity embedded within URCSA. Congregations were encouraged to maintain 
the worship language and style they had been accustomed to, even as hope was expressed 
that the long segregated black and colored communities would ultimately overcome these 
divisions and integrate their churches. At last independent from the DRC, the black 
Reformed churches through their new URCSA institution continued to look for unity 
with the old mother church. The structural unification of all four Reformed churches was 
still viewed as the ultimate proof that they had left behind their convoluted past. Twenty 
years since URCSA’s establishment, however, the churches remain far removed from this 
ideal. At the center of their enduring division is the one document that was supposed to 
bring unity, the Belhar Confession. 
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3.2. Belhar: a symbol of the past as basis for the future 
 
A torch of unity 
 
It appears to be a contraction in terms. The Belhar Confession that speaks so highly of 
unity and reconciliation has since its first draft in 1982 been pivotal to the church 
family’s discord. For URCSA, Belhar symbolizes its roots in a church that challenged 
apartheid. It today demands the unconditional incorporation of the Confession in any new 
unity structure of the Reformed Church family. The DRC in contrast, refuses to adopt it, 
pointing at a large segment of its members that would object to Belhar because of the 
political context in which it was written. Meanwhile, the Confession is gaining 
acceptance among churches abroad as well as liberal sections of the white church in 
South Africa. Entire presbyteries, congregations and even seminaries have moved 
autonomously to accept it as a basis of faith for their local or regional church bodies. 
While the DRC debates and wavers, Belhar has evolved into perhaps the most divisive 
issue in its ongoing unification process with URCSA. The latter refuses to proceed before 
the DRC’s national leadership includes the Confession in its confessional foundation, 
whereas the old mother church seems unable to make up its mind. 
 
To understand this contention, we need to go back to the original Confession and its 
meaning for the church family. The draft was barely four pages long and structured along 
five paragraphs that each referred to a wide array of Bible passages supporting its 
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message. A small group of authors commissioned by the DRMC had formulated the 
Confession, including most notably Dirkie Smit and Alan Boesak.176 Their stated aim 
was to offer an unambiguous condemnation of a doctrine that sought to separate people 
on the basis of their descent. It followed the earlier mentioned status confessionis in 
asserting that the gospel itself was at stake due to the situation in South Africa. By 
adopting Belhar as a full confession in 1986, the DRMC elevated its status as a document 
of faith to church doctrine. It was added to the other three confessions that had until then 
formed the religious foundation of Reformed churches worldwide, with the most recent 
one dating as far back as the sixteen hundreds. Making Belhar into a fourth confession 
thus presented a powerful symbolic move through which the mission church not only 
clarified its position towards its own church members, but also sent out a strong message 
to the broader community of Reformed churches. 
 Unity constituted a prominent theme in this message. It was stated as both a “gift 
and an obligation” that any church of Jesus Christ should actively pursue. This meant the 
unequivocal rejection of any “false doctrine” that endorsed segregation, be it racial, 
ethnic or on sexual grounds. In addition, the Confession called on the Christian church 
community to make its own unity visible by worshipping together and practicing faith 
with one another. The second theme of reconciliation further elaborated this active role 
for the church in bringing people together and opposing ideologies that promoted hatred 
or alienation. Thirdly, Belhar stated its commitment to justice and urged church solidarity 
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with “the destitute, the poor and the wronged.”177 At all times, Christian communities had 
to take a stand against injustices in the special way that God supported the downtrodden. 
The Confession did not specify which injustices the church should oppose. In an 
Accompanying Letter, Belhar’s authors did explicate their particular concern with the 
situation in South Africa and within the Reformed Church family. The letter pleaded the 
family to make a new beginning with this confession and asked it to join those who 
drafted and adopted Belhar on a path towards unity, justice and reconciliation.  
 The Accompanying Letter formed a crucial part of the Belhar Confession. Up to 
this day, it is offered alongside the Confession as an explanatory note on the context in 
which it was drafted. Although the letter specifically addressed the DRC, it made a point 
of not accusing the church or any other particular community. The authors instead 
highlighted their appeal to all churches and communities to reject any ideology that 
forcefully separated people. The DRMC and its successor URCSA long persisted this line 
of argument. Belhar in their view contained a universal statement of faith that applied to 
churches and people facing situations of oppression worldwide. For the DRC in 
particular, it involved a rather mild message. The Accompanying Letter demanded the 
church to change so that it could join a united Reformed church family. This remained 
the key argument for the Confession’s authors. Only when the churches would literally 
merge their services and structures, would they answer God’s call for visible unity and 
leave behind their sins of segregation. Notwithstanding this pleading tone, the Belhar 
Confession did convey a strongly dismissive judgment of the South African context. Its 
																																																								
177 Botha and Naudé, Good News to Confess,19-22. 
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political regime was depicted as sinful in the eyes of God and a direct affront to the 
gospel. Without blaming the DRC directly for these sins, the authors left little doubt as to 
whom they considered responsible for the deplorable reality of segregation in the church 
and the country at large. Attributing this reality to what the authors called a “false 
doctrine” only barely disguised their sharp condemnation of the apartheid theology 
everyone at the time knew to be associated with the Dutch Reformed Church in South 
Africa.  
 
Belhar thus comprised a conciliatory as well as antagonistic component. It almost gently 
appealed to the Christian principles of the church and simultaneously denounced the 
politics it had been involved in with an unprecedented sharp edge.178 With this dual 
standard the DRMC balanced its commitment to the Reformed Church family with its 
growing resistance to the belief system still at the heart of the family. Belhar thus formed 
a deviation from the relative silence with which the DRMC had approached apartheid to 
that point, a deviation that the mission church did not reach on its own. It crucially built 
on efforts of theologians and ministers across the church family and among other 
denominations. Especially interesting to mention here is the Confessing Circle, also 
known as the Broederkring or Circle of Brothers and not to be confused with the 
Afrikaner Broederbond. The Confessing Circle involved a group of black, white and 
colored Reformed ministers that had since the 1970’s gathered to discuss the situation in 																																																								
178 Belhar’s pleading tone particularly stood out in contrast to the Kairos Document of 1985. Developed as 
an ecumenical declaration rather than a Reformed confession, Kairos presented a forceful theological 
critique on apartheid in which the churches were called upon to not merely condemn the system but 
actively engage in the anti-apartheid struggle. See also section 1.1. in this dissertation. 
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South Africa and the position of their churches. The Circle perceived the term confession 
as a moment of truth in which the church affirmed its denunciation of any injustice. This 
idea formed a crucial source of inspiration for Belhar’s drafting committee. Many in the 
DRMC and future URCSA came to associate the affirmation of the Christian 
commitment to justice with the notion of guilt. The churches, particularly the DRC, but 
also the black Reformed churches themselves, had not done enough to resist apartheid’s 
destructive and highly inequitable policies. Belhar provided an opportunity to admit this 
guilt and offer a remedy in the form of advocating visible church unity. 
 
A source of division 
 
Remembering the history of Belhar’s adoption during the violent Struggle years, it is not 
surprising that it should be seen differently by various parts of South Africa’s Reformed 
Church family. The Confession extended a hand towards the mother church, asking it to 
join on a journey of racial integration, but simultaneously accused it of heresy. Without 
spelling it out, the Confession’s authors made it quite clear that the DRC bore the blame 
for the “objectionable doctrine” that had jeopardized the gospel itself. This implicit 
message came to define much of the DRC’s response. For many of its members Belhar 
comprised a personal attack and demonization of their church for the eyes of the world. 
How could a confession of unity and reconciliation trigger such enmity?  
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Answering this question firstly takes us back to the politicized context in which Belhar 
emerged. For the black Reformed churches the Belhar Confession responded to decades 
of suppression and appeared the only tool powerful enough to express their despair. 
URCSA in particular came to deeply associate its identity with the confession its 
predecessor had helped draft. Belhar reflected the church’s ultimate goal of unifying the 
Reformed family and presented its definite break with apartheid. In Johan Botha’s words, 
Belhar “became a catechism of the heart… not merely a confessional document for 
URCSA; the church now in fact is the Confession.”179 In the course of the 1990s and 
early 2000s URCSA has sought to incorporate the Confession’s principles into its church 
liturgy, sermons, hymns and worship services. It has on multiple occasions stated 
Belhar’s importance for future unification with the other three churches. In 1996 URCSA 
specifically demanded the DRC’s adoption of the Confession before it would continue 
any conversations about unity. This precondition would later be withdrawn, but the image 
remained of a confession one could barely touch without also touching the church in 
which it had originated. URCSA had become Belhar, and for URCSA, 
Belhar’sacceptance had become the acid test to show that the church family was serious 
about unity and about rejecting its past.  
 The Dutch Reformed Church on the other hand related Belhar’s first draft in 1982 
to a threatening context in which anti-apartheid protests ruptured the country and the 
church itself faced questioning and allegations of heresy by an increasingly critical 
international community. This last point touched a raw nerve in the DRC’s still deeply 
																																																								
179 Botha and Naudé, Good News to Confess, 88. 
 
146	
	
devout constituency. The allegations were understood to suggest not only the heretical 
nature of a certain doctrine, but also of its adherents. Being associated with sinfulness 
instigated strong resentment among DRC members that found outlet symbol in the Belhar 
Confession. Regardless of its plead for reconciliation, many DRC members considered 
Belhar a highly accusatory document written with the specific aim to disparage the 
mother church and its Afrikaner membership. It did not help that Alan Boesak had been 
on the Confession’s drafting committee. The DRMC minister was widely held 
responsible for the DRC’s expulsion from the World Association of Reformed Churches 
and for the condemnation of its apartheid theology. His association with Belhar turned 
the latter into an even more controversial document for the DRC. It came to be seen as 
part of the political struggle against apartheid and hence bereft of theological value for 
the church. 
 
Belhar’s theological meaning has constituted a second important source of controversy. 
Supporters have long pointed at the Confession’s extensive Biblical references and its 
overlap with Christian values of reconciliation and inclusivity. Opponents often claimed 
the un-Biblical nature of Belhar, building their arguments especially on the way it sided 
with the poor rather than with humanity at large. This last point is most contentious. It 
comprises the accusation that Belhar involved the contested thought of liberation 
theologies emerging from Latin America. According to these theologies, God would have 
a special preference for the poor and the oppressed and called upon the church to actively 
engage with their struggles in society. In the viewpoint of the more conservative neo-
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Calvinist sections of the DRC, this notion stood opposite to their belief in the 
omnipresence of God and Christ’s salvation of everyone, rich and poor, powerful and 
vulnerable. Piet Naudé amongst others points out the difficulty with this line of 
argumentation. “The accusation that the confession reflects liberation theology cannot be 
taken seriously, as Belhar nowhere uses the class struggle as basis for its social analysis, 
nor does it confess the preferential option for the poor as advocated by Latin American 
liberation theologians from their specific context.”180 Naudé furthermore argues that the 
negative association with liberation theology was used by opponents to tarnish Belhar on 
purpose and undermine its value as a statement of faith for the church.  
 Whether or not Belhar represented liberation theology, the perception that it did 
remains prevalent inside the DRC, and problematic. Russel Botman perceives a deeper 
theological conflict at play here. The Confession in his view pronounced an alternative 
take on the gospel that significantly diverged from the DRC’s dominant belief framework 
at the time.181 Belhar represented a stream of thought among the Reformed churches that 
drew heavily on the theology of Karl Barth and the 1934 Barmen Declaration against the 
Nazi regime in Germany.182 It emphasized social justice and reconciliation. Above all, 
Belhar claimed a God who desired visible unity and who perhaps not favored, but still 
sided with the oppressed. This offered a sharp contrast to the DRC’s doctrine of 
segregation, as well as to its historic attitudes regarding the public role of the church. 
Belhar squarely situated the church in the social-political context of South Africa and 																																																								
180 Naudé, Neither Calendar nor Clock, 142. 
181 Russel Botman, “Belhar and the white Dutch Reformed Church: changes in the DRC 1974-1990,” in 
Weisse, Maintaining Apartheid or Promoting Change? 123-134. 
182 See also Naudé, Neither Calendar nor Clock,  77-79. 
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required a timely response to its political and social-economic injustices. The DRC in 
contrast maintained Abraham Kuyper’s claim of divinely ordained pluriformity and 
sphere sovereignty. Each sector or group in society was supposed to function according 
to its own distinct structures and the church was not expected to intervene with God’s 
order through social activism. The DRC’s interpretation of Kuyper might have involved 
numerous inconsistencies, not in the least regarding its own extensive meddling with 
state politics in South Africa and its obvious siding with one distinct group namely the 
Afrikaners. Kuyper’s ideas nonetheless dominated the DRC well into the 1990s and left 
little space for the alternative viewpoints presented by the Belhar Confession. This 
collision of theological frameworks, between the so-called Barthians and Kuyperians 
formed according to Botman a central impediment to the acceptation of the Belhar 
Confession in the DRC. 
If we turn to the contemporary situation in the Reformed family, the above 
theological debates appear rather absent. The DRC General Synod in 1998 officially 
acknowledged that Belhar does not entail liberation theology and that its content is 
consistent with the other Reformed statements of faith.183 The misappropriation of 
Kuyperian theology and its contribution to apartheid has also gained wide recognition in 
the DRC. Few today would openly endorse notions of pluriformity or even sphere 
sovereignty. Among the DRC’s leadership and academic elites, Belhar has moreover 
been receiving ever more support for the religious language it would offer on 
reconciliation and the need for inclusivity in the church. Nevertheless, little agreement 
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has been reached on what to do with the Belhar Confession. In the two decades since the 
first draft in 1982, the Dutch Reformed Church persisted in its resistance, just as URCSA 
continued to press other churches to adopt the Confession. Through ambiguous 
statements, the DRC General Synod claimed to accept Belhar as a valuable document but 
refused to adopt it as a full confession “on the basis of the commentary received from 
members and church councils.”184 A consultation with DRC congregations in 2007 found 
a majority of these members critical of the Confession primarily due to its politicized 
nature. Critical DRC theologians as well as members meanwhile developed an extensive 
semi-religious line of argumentation on why Belhar should also be rejected.185 The 
Confession would have little to add to existing church doctrines and trigger difficult 
emotions about the vilification of the church towards the end of apartheid. 
 Inside URCSA Belhar has not remained without controversy either. The 
Confession tends to be more closely associated with the so-called colored sections of the 
church who once came from the DRMC. Congregations with their roots in the black 
DRCA often feel less affinity with Belhar. Both sections of the church moreover remain 
de facto segregated along the old lines of the apartheid regime. The reality of black and 
colored still worshipping separately has undermined Belhar’s message, raising doubts as 
to whether URCSA can practice the principles it preaches. Recent years show some 
progress regarding Belhar’s acceptance in the church family. Notably, the DRC General 
Synod of 2011 officially launched an orderly church process through which the 																																																								
184 DRC 1998, General Synod, Par. 10.3. Belydenis van Belhar [Confession of Belhar], 422-425. 
185 Piet Strauss, professor at the Free State University and former moderator of the DRC, has been 
particularly vocal about his critique on Belhar. See for instance: P.J. Strauss, “Belydenis, Kerkverband En 
Belhar [Confession, Church Association and Belhar],” Dutch Reformed Theological Journal = Nederduitse 
Gereformeerde Teologiese Tydskrif 46 (2005): 560-575. 
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Confession should become part of its doctrinal base.186 A substantive vote was conducted 
in 2015 in which a majority of regional synods ultimately decided against the proposal to 
create “space for Belhar.”187 The low turnout, just about 17 % of all confessing DRC 
members voted, significantly undermined the anticipated process. If and when Belhar 
will in one way or another be included in the DRC’s confessional base remains to be 
seen. 
 
Politics, whether in relation to the church family or the country at large, has thus largely 
overshadowed any conversation about the Belhar Confession in the church family. Still 
today, the DRC as much as URCSA refer to the Struggle years to explain the need to 
either endorse or dispute Belhar. It has come to embody divergent narratives of the past 
and the role of the church. For URCSA, Belhar tells a tale of victimhood of the black 
churches during apartheid, their resistance and ultimate victory over the white church, 
while DRC members associate the Confession with their own victimization as a 
beleaguered Afrikaner minority, cast aside by the rest of the world as the bad guys in the 
transformation story of South Africa. Amidst these narratives, the original message of the 
Belhar Confession not only appears lost. It has rather become a symbol of the divisions of 
the past and as such a highly contentious basis on which to move into future unity. 
 
 
  																																																								
186 DRC 2011, General Synod Agenda. Par. B.3. Belhar. 292. 
187 DRC 2015, General Synod Aanvullende Agenda [Additional Agenda], A.3. Artikel 1.  
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3.3. Post-1994: Struggling to join a new era 
 
URCSA’s rocky start 
 
The establishment of the Uniting Reformed Churches of Southern Africa in 1994 aptly 
coincided with South Africa’s first open democratic elections later that same month. It 
marked a symbolic change for the country and the churches involved with URCSA as 
they began their journey towards racial integration. Even before its inception though, the 
union of the former black DRCA and colored DRCM drew heavy antagonism from 
among regional church leaders. The cause of church unification had perhaps formed a 
crucial element of their struggle against the apartheid regime, and against the domination 
of the white church. Implementing it soon proved to be a whole different ball game. On 
either side, church leaders feared the loss of the distinct cultural identities of their 
congregations as well as the hard fought decision making power in their own segregated 
institutions. The struggle that evolved here, turned out to be emblematic for the future of 
URCSA in which the old apartheid categories have until the present day continued to 
divide the uniting church between black and colored.  
 
To understand the meaning of these renewed divisions in a process of church unification 
demands a brief exploration of the major conflict at stake here between two defecting 
regional synods of the DRCA and the newly established URCSA. Inside the DRCA 
concerns had mounted throughout the early nineties about how its church was rapidly 
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being dissolved for the sake of unity. It was feared that the impoverished black African 
church would lose influence in matters of theological education, church order and 
confession.188 URCSA’s adoption of the Belhar Confession in particular roused emotions 
among DRCA leaders in the Free State and Northern Cape regions. They perceived the 
Confession as a DRMC project that heightened frictions inside the Reformed family 
rather than reconciling them. Ultimately, the two DRCA regional synods of the Free State 
and of Phororo in the Northern Cape withdrew from the process and decided to continue 
their own separate churches in the two designated regions. Refusing to fully dissolve the 
DRCA, the two synods undermined URCSA’s central premise to integrate all of the long 
divided black and colored communities of the DRCA and DRMC respectively. URCSA’s 
leadership felt compelled to take the two synods to court and initially won the case. The 
DRCA synods were ordered to follow the unity agreement and dissolve themselves. Two 
years later though, in 1998, an appeals court decided in favor of the dissenting synods 
and granted them, and any other congregation objecting to the unity agreement, the right 
to retain their legal status as DRCA churches with their own buildings and properties.189  
 This last decision instigated deep fractions within the still precarious unification 
process. The DRCA’s continued presence in the Free State and Northern Cape confronted 
congregations with a difficult choice. Should they remain with their former church or join 																																																								
188 A.M. Hoffman, D.T. Keta and M.J. Ramolahlehi, The Story of the NGKA and It’s Decisions Concerning 
Unification. Presented in abbreviated version at the Achterberg Meeting of the family of DRC churches, 
November 6-8, 2006, 3-8. 
189 An extensive and valuable discussion on the legal aspects of these decisions can be found in: Mary Anne 
Plaatjies van Huffel and Johan M. van der Merwe, “Die reis met kerkeenwording tussen die Verenigende 
Gereformeerde Kerk in Suider-Afrika en die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Afrika” [Journey towards 
church unification between the Uniting Reformed Chuch of Southern Africa and the Dutch Reformed 
Church in Africa,] Verbum et Ecclesia [Online] 33.1 (2012): 7 pages, Accessed at 5 September 2014, 
http://www.ve.org.za/index.php/VE/article/view/724.  
 
153	
	
the newly established URCSA? Unable to reach consent, several congregations split up, 
sometimes with only a handful of members leaving for one or the other church. Their 
relations further deteriorated when congregations began to dispute each other’s 
properties. By 2011, at least 39 court cases had been filed by either URCSA or DRCA 
congregations. Many of them took years to be resolved if they were settled at all. A key 
recurring point of disagreement concerned the decision making process at the point of 
unification. From the DRCA side, questions would be raised as to whether the 
congregation in question and its members had been fully involved in the decision to 
merge into URCSA. Without sufficient evidence to prove such involvement, several 
courts gave DRCA communities the benefit of the doubt and ordered URCSA to move 
out of the disputed church buildings.190 URCSA churches meanwhile claimed the right to 
occupy the buildings as part of the 1994 unity agreement.  
 Today many cases remain undecided. They involve convoluted arrangements in 
which one church might be using the congregation’s original building while the other has 
its members worshipping in a shack on the same premises or in a congregant’s 
backyard.191 The split often runs straight through communities and families. It has incited 
prolonged disputes in which both sides disrupted services and at times even violently 
attacked members of the opposing church.  
Although such vehement antagonism tends to be limited to the two regions in 
which the DRCA continues to exist, its impact reaches far beyond the Free State and 																																																								
190 For examples, see: DRC Free State 2012. Verslag oor Eiendomdispute tussen Nederduitse 
Gereformeerde Kerk in Afrika enVerenigende Gereformeerde Kerk in Suider Afrika [Report on Properties 
Disputes between the DRCA and URCSA], March 2012. 
191 See for instance the case of Excelsior, DRC Free State 2012, Verslag oor Eiendomdispute, 15-16. 
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Northern Cape. Stemming from either the DRMC or DRCA, URCSA congregations 
throughout the country preserve strong affiliations with their former churches and 
respective colored or black constituencies. Especially the latter have maintained a deep 
sense of loyalty to their old church. Many display resentment about what is often 
perceived as the DRMC’s domination of URCSA. The colored mission churches 
historically presided over more financial and educational resources than the poorer black 
churches. Emblematic of these historic divisions is the high number of colored 
representatives, as compared to former DRCA representatives, in URCSA’s leadership 
and main theological seminaries. This also helps explain the DRCA’s early resistance to 
join the unification process. The Free State and Phororo synods did not merely withdraw 
because of discontent with the church order or confession of the new church. They 
responded to deep suspicions towards the colored elite coming from the DRMC and the 
fear of the latter controlling much of the new church at the expense of former DRCA 
communities.192 The ongoing court cases severely aggravated these long present tensions 
between URCSA’s black and colored members. Both sides have blamed the other for 
initiating the financially and socially devastating disputes. Both sides have moreover 
sought to involve the DRC in their dispute, and accused the old mother church of 
partiality. 
 The DRC officially presented itself as a neutral actor that did not choose sides for 
either URCSA or the DRCA.193 DRC leaders on multiple occasions helped broker 
agreements between the two parties upon the invitation of both. But the reality on the 																																																								
192 Tshaka, “The Hastening that Waits,” 3. 
193 DRC Free State 2012, Verslag oor Eiendomdispute, 7-8. 
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ground was rather more complicated. Local DRC congregations have been far from 
neutral. Many in the Free State and Northern Cape regions continued to financially 
support their former daughter churches, especially those rooted in the DRCA. Without 
the evidence to prove it, URCSA has claimed these contributions a major reason why the 
often poor DRCA churches can continue their lawsuits.194 It has consequently accused 
the DRC of intervening on behalf of the DRCA by allowing local congregations to help 
pay for the court cases. What makes this allegation more complicated still is that after 
URCSA’s establishment, DRC congregations across the country withdrew or threatened 
to withdraw their traditional support to their black and colored family churches, causing 
particular hardship for former DRCA communities that greatly depended on this support. 
Both the DRC and URCSA have explained this as a logical result of the latter’s formation 
as an autonomous church. This reasoning however does little to alleviate a reality in 
which black URCSA churches are still suffering the loss of their financial lifeline twenty 
years since their initiation, while those that continued as DRCA appear to be faring 
relatively well in their close relations with the DRC. 
 
Beyond causing deep internal frictions among the black Reformed churches, the conflict 
between the DRCA and URCSA has thus jeopardized the larger and still ongoing 
unification process with the DRC. The assumed partiality of the white church has led 
URCSA to withdraw from several rounds of unity talks, stating it cannot engage with the 																																																								
194 Although URCSA has not issued a formal complaint on this matter, its leaders expressed their 
suspicions especially during mediation talks with the WARC. See for instance: URCSA 2009, Minutes of a 
meeting held with WARC, 4-6 March 2009 and WARC Mediasie / Facilitering NG Kerk en VGKSA 
Verslag [Mediation / Facilitation DRC and URCSA Report], Carmelite Retreat Centre, 14-15 October 
2009.  
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DRC as long as it helps finance the court cases. Similarly, the DRCA refuses to negotiate 
unification while its church properties remain contested.195 On the side of the DRC, the 
conflict has installed deep anxieties for the potential consequences of a future merger 
with the other churches. Moving too quickly in this process without clear stipulations on 
matters of ownership and church law is feared to repeat the same mistakes that were 
made on the road to URCSA. 
 URCSA’s in-house contention furthermore reveals underlying dynamics bound to 
return in any further steps towards church unity. At the core is the still deeply embedded 
racial categorization of South Africa’s church communities and their distorted 
relationships during apartheid. The DRCA’s fear in the 1990s of the DRCM dominating 
the new church had everything to do with the racial hierarchy of the past that privileged 
colored communities over black South Africans. The former also experienced harsh 
deprivation as a result of discriminatory apartheid laws. But they were allowed to build 
and own buildings where blacks could not, or could work certain jobs that indigenous 
groups were prohibited from obtaining. The income inequality this system generated left 
deep traces in South Africa’s Reformed church family. Its congregations today not only 
continue to be divided by race, ethnicity and language, but also and especially by social-
economic status.196 This status tends to coincide with diverging worship styles, languages 
and liturgies that URCSA communities have found hard to bridge. A black Xhosa 
speaking township church employing no instruments but its congregants’ voices will be 																																																								
195 This opinion was for instance expressed in a letter from the DRCA Free State Moderature presented to 
URCSA and DRC at a meeting of the Joint Working Team on settling the properties dispute, dated January 
22, 2009 as well as a letter by the DRCA Free State Moderature to the WARC Consultation and 
Moderatures of the DRC, RCA and URCSA, dated February 27, 2009.  
196 Tshaka, “The Hastening that Waits,” 3 
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unlikely to merge with a colored Afrikaans speaking community in central Stellenbosch 
that sings alongside a small orchestra including trumpets and violins. The fact that 
resources are limited on all sides does not help URCSA’s integration. Ministers lack the 
time and money to attend to their own congregation’s needs, let alone to translate hymns 
or facilitate better relations between the different communities. These relations are further 
complicated through long standing patterns of mutual prejudice inside black and colored 
populations and the sometimes blunt racism among them. As a result, URCSA faces a 
reality of official unity while its congregations remain segregated along the racial lines of 
the two former daughter churches. It sounds a warning to broader family unity. When 
black and colored churches experience such difficulties, what are the chances for 
unification between them and the white churches that headed the apartheid system’s 
racial hierarchy? 
 
Two decades of unity talks 
 
If one compares the position of the family of Reformed churches today with that of 1994 
little seems to have changed. The family still consists of four different churches 
organized largely along the same racial divisions that characterized the apartheid era. 
This impasse did not occur for lack of effort though. The past two decades saw scores of 
meetings, attempts towards collaboration and initiatives to integrate church structures at 
local, regional as well as national levels. A significant range of gatherings took place in 
2006 in which top leaders from URCSA, DRC, DRCA and the still existing though very 
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small RCA agreed on a process that should take them towards one united church 
association. Although the process broke down before any of the proposed actions were 
implemented, it provides a crucial backdrop. A discussion of the major events leading up 
to the 2006 breakthrough, its initial success and subsequent breakdown is critical for 
understanding where the church family stands on unity today and how it has continued its 
struggle to adapt to South Africa’s post-apartheid reality. 
Matthias Gensicke has described the early 1990s, before the establishment of 
URCSA, as a period of relative optimism within the church family.197 While the 
apartheid system was gradually being dismantled, the four churches began to express 
renewed interest in extending their collaboration. All hoped to join in the new direction 
towards which the country was heading. In an illustrative Kerkbode article DRC leader 
Frits Gaum wrote that this was the time for the church family to “show one united front 
and speak from one mouth: we now have to jointly witness what the gospel of Jesus 
Christ has to say to the people of this fractured country.”198  Several meetings took place 
in which leaders of the four churches met to discuss the possibilities of unification. The 
hopeful atmosphere of these meetings could however not conceal the churches’ intrinsic 
differences. Key among them was the disagreement between the DRC and the black 
Reformed churches over the model of their future cooperation. Where the former 
envisioned a rather loose federation, the black churches argued for an organic process 
through which all four family members would ultimately dissolve into one new church. 
																																																								
197 Gensicke, Zwischen Beharrung Und Veränderung, 175-182. 
198 Dr. Frits Gaum, “Nader aan eenheid.” [Closer to unity], Die Kerkbode, 28 August 1992, 4. Quoted in 
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They staunchly rejected the federation model, claiming it implied a mere continuation of 
the apartheid system in which separate churches persisted under the umbrella of one 
dominant church, the DRC.199 The enduring dispute over the Belhar Confession did little 
to alleviate these differences. As the DRMC and DRCA moved towards bilateral 
unification without the DRC, family relationships further deteriorated. Unity talks 
between the newly formed URCSA and the DRC had stalled by the end of 1994 and 
would not restart for nearly a decade.  
 In spite of this official deadlock, the two churches continued to explore more 
informal ways of cooperation. Most of these efforts took place in the Western Cape. DRC 
and URCSA presbyteries in for instance Stellenbosch and Wesland began to hold joint 
meetings for their respective areas while the two churches’ regional charity organizations 
merged into a joint non-profit organization, Badisa, to tend to the needs of both their 
constituencies together. In 2000 URCSA’s theological seminary moved in with the 
DRC’s theology department at Stellenbosch University, launching a complex as well as 
crucial collaboration between the two churches’ main education institutions.  
 One year later, the URCSA and DRC synods of the Western Cape took an 
important step with the joint organization of the Cape Convent. It comprised two 
gatherings, in 2001 and again in 2004, in which local leaders from both sides developed a 
set of parameters along which they believed a future united church could be established. 
Central among these parameters was the adoption of the Belhar Confession. The local 																																																								
199  Mary-Anne Plaatjies-Van Huffel, Die Doleansiekerkreg en die kerkreg en kerkregering van die 
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Sendingkerke en die Verenigende Gereformeerde Kerk in Suider-Afrika [The 
Doleansie Church Polity and the Church Law and Church Order of the Dutch Reformed Mission Churces 
and the Uniting Reformed Church of Southern Africa,] (PhD Thesis, University of Pretoria. Pretoria, 2013), 
458-460. Accessed at 8 September 2014, http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-04022009-190218/.  
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leaders furthermore agreed that the new church should be coordinated by one overarching 
general synod while congregations, presbyteries and regional synods retained the 
freedom to find their own “spontaneous” path of integration without coercion from 
outside.200 As such, the Convent recognized URCSA’s desire for full unification on the 
basis of the Belhar Confession. It simultaneously provided a sense of space to DRC 
communities that sought to preserve their autonomy in the new structure. The Convent 
presented its conclusions to the churches’ national leadership with the hope that it would 
offer a basis for future conversations on church unity. Mary-Anne Plaatjies-Van Huffel 
emphasizes that none of the Convent’s proposals held any official value as they were 
developed outside the general synods of either church.201 The Cape Convent nonetheless 
sparked similar initiatives in other regions and as such paved the way for a new round of 
unity talks on the national level.   
 The first of these talks took place at Esselenpark in June 2006. An essential 
outcome of the historic two day gathering comprised a statement asserting the unanimous 
commitment of DRC and URCSA leaders to their unification process. Widely 
disseminated to congregations and church councils on either side, the statement signaled 
a new phase in the family’s history. Both churches apologized for the pain they had 
caused each other in the past and stated their shared vision to start anew with a united 
reformed church “committed to the biblical demands of love, reconciliation, justice and 
																																																								
200 DRC 2004. Notule van die tweede vergadering van die Konvent vir Eenheid [Minutes of the second 
meeting of the Convent for Unity], Brackenfell, Bellville, 22-24 June 2004. 
201 Plaatjies-Van Huffel, Die Doleansiekerkreg, 453-455. 
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peace.”202 This vision was to be implemented within a three years’ time frame. Three 
more meetings followed Esselenpark over the course of several months. In August of the 
same year, the executive committees of all four churches gathered in Bloemfontein where 
they prepared for a larger meeting of 127 representatives at Achterberg in November 
2006 and a subsequent Achterberg II meeting in February 2007.  
 At the outset, the fast sequence of meetings spawned high expectations. With all 
four churches present, URCSA hoped to complete the broken cycle through which the 
church had symbolized its partial unity, finally reconcile with the two remaining DRCA 
synods and with the DRC. A younger generation of DRC leaders meanwhile emphasized 
the importance of the unity process for recovering its position in the new South Africa. 
To foster their structural integration, the churches agreed on four central themes. These 
involved the new church’s confessional base, its organizational model, joint ventures, and 
reconciliation between the four family members, particularly the DRCA and URCSA. 
Regarding the confessional base, the new church would adopt Belhar with a special 
clause of exempt for individual ministers and members unwilling to accept it. The church 
model itself resembled the Cape Convent’s recommendations for one general synod and 
an organic process of integration while presbyteries and congregations retained their 
autonomy. Consensus was also reached on the importance of bottom-up initiatives to 
encourage organizational collaboration across the four churches. On the topic of 
reconciliation, however, the DRCA and URCSA failed to settle their long standing 
properties conflict. 																																																								
202 Esselenpark Declaration, Covenanting for the Reunification of the Family of DR Churches, 
Esselenpark, 20 June 2006. 
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 The inability of the old daughter churches to find an accord exemplified the 
profound tensions underlying the family’s rush towards unification. Soon after the second 
meeting at Achterberg in 2007, cracks appeared in the other agreements the churches 
thought they had accomplished. Following ambivalent statements by the DRC leadership 
on Belhar and the new church model, URCSA accused the former of shifting the goal 
posts for church unity. It found that the DRC once again rejected the Confession and 
proposed a church federation, knowing URCSA’s strong opposition to such a model. 
According to the URCSA, the DRC had thus made “a disturbing departure from our 
understanding reached at Esselenpark and the “Points of Consensus” reached at the 
Achterberg consultations.”203 The DRC however asserted a different understanding. The 
meetings had, in the DRC’s view, generated proposals with which both churches would 
return to their membership base. Having received negative feedback through its 2007 
consultation with local congregations,204 the church leaders felt it justifiable to adjust the 
proposals accordingly.  
 A series of events further undermined the precarious relationship between the 
family’s major churches. Key among them was an exchange between the moderators of 
the DRC and URCSA at the time, Piet Strauss and Thias Kgatla respectively. In a number 
of public speeches and articles disseminated across the church family, each leader 
																																																								
203 URCSA 2008, The Complete Decision of URCSA General Synod on the Process of Church Unity, 
Hammanskraal. 29 September  – 5 October, 2008. 
204 This is the earlier mentioned consultation in which a majority of DRC members claimed to oppose a full 
adoption of the Belhar Confession. Pieterse and Steyn, Terugvoerverslag aan die Moderamen, 17-18 
March 2008. 
 
163	
	
accused the other of obstructing the process on purpose.205 What had begun as a clash of 
personalities evolved into a traumatic episode of back and forth messages between the 
two churches on how to resolve the leaders’ conflict and whether or not unity talks could 
continue under these circumstances. Ultimately in October 2008, URCSA’s General 
Synod decided to completely cease its engagement with the DRC. “Until the DRC is 
seriously committed and ready for unity talks” it placed a moratorium on these talks and 
would not take any further step towards unification on the national level.206 URCSA 
explicitly encouraged churches to proceed with collaboration efforts at local or regional 
level. Few churches however heeded this call. The 2008 Moratorium had signaled the 
defeat of the unification process. Throughout the church family, communities chose to 
halt joint operations until further notice from their national leadership rather than 
continue on their own accord.  
 Church leaders from both the DRC and URCSA meanwhile sought ways to revive 
the process with external assistance. Both extended an invitation to the World Alliance of 
Reformed Churches to facilitate mediation between the two churches with the possibility 
of involving the DRCA and RCA at a later stage.207 Early in 2009 the first such 
mediation rounds took place under the leadership of WARC General Secretary Jerry 
Pillay. Topics of conversation included the churches’ apartheid past, the Belhar 
Confession and the unification process. To what extent these conversations succeeded in 																																																								
205 See for instance Prof. S.T. Kgatla, “Where are we with Church Unity within the DRC family?” URCSA 
News, 11 December 2007, 9; and Piet Strauss, “Message from DRC to URCSA,” Delivered at URCSA 
General Synod, 29 September – 5 October 2008. 
206 URCSA 2008, General Synod. Decision 22, point 4a. 
207 WARC 2009, A Statement by the Delegation from the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, 6 March 
2009.  
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improving the churches’ relationships remains still to be seen. Since they began though, 
at least two signs of progress occurred that deserve mentioning. As mentioned earlier, the 
DRC General Synod of 2011 decided with overwhelming support from its representatives 
to start the process of adopting the Belhar Confession.208 Within a year after this decision, 
URCSA’s General Synod lifted its Moratorium, opening up a new phase of national unity 
talks among all four churches. This phase is still ongoing. It involves mediation 
facilitated by Jerry Pillay between URCSA and the DRC separately as well as with all 
four Reformed churches together. A road map has been established, stipulating ten stages 
through which a Reunited Church should be constituted, along with a Memorandum of 
Understanding on the key agreements underlying this new church.  
 
Especially these most recent developments denote a sense of advancement in the family’s 
unity process. They follow a trend of improving relationships at national level and an 
apparent willingness among all four churches to remove key obstructions such as the 
dispute around Belhar and URCSA’s memorandum. The 2006 breakthrough played an 
imperative role here. Esselenpark and subsequent meetings provided space for church 
leaders to meet each other, often for the first time on relatively equal terms, and to build 
consensus on key issues. While this consensus broke down in 2008 it continues to form 
the groundwork of today’s unity talks as well as a major source of inspiration. The 
Esselenpark and the first Achterberg meetings are often remembered as unique gatherings 
																																																								
208 DRC 2011, General Synod, B.3 Belhar. 
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in which participants found spiritual common ground in an effort to overcome their 
historic divisions.209  
So far, this common ground has been insufficient though for reaching and 
implementing a structural agreement. The lack of tangible progress undermines 
confidence in the churches’ potential to unite. Few of their members are keeping track of 
the national unity process or are even aware of the conversations taking place at the top. 
In DRC congregations, church members rather tend to withdraw within their own 
communities, showing little interest in collaboration with other churches in the Reformed 
Church family. URCSA congregations are struggling with internal challenges as they 
seek to integrate their own communities. Where the family stands today is hence hard to 
say. It has taken significant steps towards unity, but at what costs?  
  
																																																								
209 Ben du Toit shared such memories in two messages disseminated among DRC Congregations: Muur 
van skeiding… oopgeskuif! [Wall of separation… opened!] 21 June 2006; and Indrukke uit Achterbergh: 
Die Here gaan voor ons uit! [Impressions from Achterberg: The Lord leads us the way!] 8 November 2006.  
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Conclusion  
 
Looking back at the recent history of the Reformed Church family a deeply conflicted 
attitude towards unity emerges. The DRC has claimed it as the rightful return to the 
family’s joint past and an imperative to strengthening its voice in society. When it comes 
to structural implementation the church however raises bureaucratic barriers, lengthening 
a process that already stretches over a period of two decades. URCSA leaders meanwhile 
speak passionately of unification as the litmus test to overcome their apartheid divisions, 
but they have made it hard to pass such a test by setting conditions the other three 
churches, especially the DRC, strongly object to. This objection in itself raises doubts 
about the DRC’s commitment. Does it refuse to adopt Belhar because of the Confession’s 
presumed politicization, or rather because it is not ready for the unification that could 
follow such adoption? And how prepared is URCSA for a unity that does not answer to 
all its demands, especially considering that church’s persistent internal struggles?   
 
Four key factors still hinder unity processes at the national level. They relate to the 
particular South African context of the Reformed churches, yet also reveal a broader 
story of religious institutions seeking to reframe their identity, and adjust their normative 
frameworks accordingly. A first factor concerns the immense difficulty of determining 
what this new identity is supposed to entail and what it means for the deep sense of 
belonging still felt by the four churches to the communities in which they are rooted. It 
surfaces in the DRC’s hesitance to make decisions that could upset its traditional 
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membership base of white Afrikaans speakers. As a majority of them is thought to 
oppose the adoption of the Belhar Confession and structural church unification, DRC 
leaders have been cautious to advance these issues. Fearing another church schism, they 
seek to build broad consensus by first consulting congregations before making any final 
decisions. This has resulted in significant delays. It also signals unwillingness on the part 
of DRC leaders to risk internal unity for the sake of the broader church family. On the 
part of URCSA we see similar trends. Resolving internal struggles or the dispute with the 
DRCA often receives priority over greater family unity. URCSA leaders have refused to 
participate in unity talks before finding an accord with their DRCA counterparts. Black 
and colored congregations meanwhile have been sustaining their specific community 
cultures rather than integrate. After decades of suppression, few are willing to relinquish 
the autonomy they gained since 1994. Deciding on their own liturgy and language 
symbolizes this independence, but also impedes the development of a joint URCSA 
identity, not to speak of a common Reformed family identity.  
 The churches’ conflicting narratives of history form a second significant 
obstruction to unity. It shows the dual challenge of coming to terms with one’s own 
wrongdoing in the past, and finding common ground on how to present this past. Both 
URCSA and the DRC tend to agree on the destructive effects of the apartheid policies. 
The DRC has on multiple occasions expressed regrets for its involvement in the former 
regime just as URCSA apologized for its predecessors’ long lack of resistance. This 
exchange of apologies still does not alter the widely divergent perspectives with which 
the churches view their history. The DRC wavers between recognizing its faults and 
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displaying solidarity with a white constituency increasingly fed up with the perceived 
vilification of their mother church. Its leadership has been careful to address the 
difficulties of white South Africans and the so-called “crises of faith” they experienced 
after the apartheid doctrine collapsed.210 For URCSA on the other hand, the DRC’s guilt 
is beyond doubt and it is critical to demand that the church renews over and again its 
commitment to justice and reconciliation. Deriving part of its identity from the black 
churches’ struggle against the white DRC, URCSA has been reluctant to release its 
pressure. The requirement to adopt Belhar epitomizes this narrative. For the DRC on the 
other hand, Belhar remains part of an account of isolation, symbolizing a traumatic time 
in which the church came to be associated with heresy. 
 Intertwined with these stories is a third factor of contrasting visions about the 
future. Underlying these visions we find notable incoherencies regarding the churches’ 
liturgical and theological practices that return to their divergent roots as either mother or 
daughter in an unequal family situation. Where the DRC sees a close united faith basis 
among the four churches ever since the 17th century, URCSA doubts there ever was such 
unity. Any prospect of unification for URCSA requires a tangible process through which 
the various churches will ultimately merge their structures. It has to be manifested first 
and foremost in terms of liturgy, with shared songs, prayers, rituals and sermons. The 
DRC is generally content to strengthen the existing family’s spiritual bonds and 
cooperative efforts. It stresses the theological necessity of such bonds to prove adherence 
to the gospel’s message of inclusivity, but sees less urgency in visibly translating them 
																																																								
210 DRC 2013, General Synod Agenda, A.12.11.3 Die NG Kerk en Apartheid [The DRC and Apartheid]. 
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towards joint worshipping. What shape a future church association should take remains, 
therefore, deeply contested. Throughout the unity talks, leaders from both sides have 
avoided the topic. Instead of discussing their vision for unity, focus is given to immediate 
matters such as the development of a new church order and the integration of the 
churches’ charity divisions.  
 This leads us to a fourth factor regarding the process itself. Here we encounter 
typical challenges of institutional change in which high-minded ambitions falter on 
authority crises, transfixed organizational structures and intransigent personalities. The 
churches’ unity talks have been fraught with misunderstandings and clashing leadership 
styles on top of practical difficulties resulting from the lack of capacities or unwillingness 
to commit available resources. Especially the issue of finances forms a major stumbling 
block. As the DRC presides over a larger budget than the other three churches, it has been 
providing most of the funding for the joint meetings and rounds of mediation. This puts 
the white church in a powerful position reminiscent of its past paternalism. Memories of 
this past in combination with the inherent organizational differences between the 
churches engender intense frustration on the part of the black Reformed churches, as 
expressed for instance through URCSA’s 2008 Moratorium. The DRC with its strong 
focus on congregational autonomy perceived it a logical step after Achterberg II to 
consult members on the agreement and make the necessary adaptations. Inside URCSA, 
which is known for a more hierarchal leadership structure, the agreement had been 
interpreted as an actual decision ready for implementation. It found the new proposals 
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deeply disrespectful and indicative of the DRC’s hidden agenda to reshape the process 
along its own terms.  
 
It should be clear that these factors are neither exclusive nor complete. They broadly 
indicate the key points of contention on which national unity talks have continued to 
falter over the last two decades. At every turn, one question encapsulates the differences: 
What should be the role of the Belhar Confession? The DRC and URCSA each link 
Belhar to their identities that would be either compromised by its adoption in the case of 
the former, or harmed by its rejection as the latter has asserted. Belhar also significantly 
emerges in the churches’ narratives of their past and present relationships as it 
symbolizes their struggles with the family’s segregation. Finally, the Belhar Confession 
has evolved into an almost insurmountable obstacle during the churches’ joint meetings 
and unity talks. Leaders on both sides go back and forth on whether or not its adoption 
should be a condition for unification and if so, how this should be phrased. They fluctuate 
between including Belhar as a full-fledged confession or an optional one that exempts 
individuals who prefer not to accept it. As long as the churches fail to agree on the 
Confession it is unlikely for them to make progress on other elements of the unity 
process. Still, the current impasse cannot be attributed to Belhar entirely. It is a symbol 
more than a cause. As we move towards a deeper assessment of the church family in the 
next chapters, it will be crucial to see how these dynamics are being played out on the 
ground. How important is Belhar for local congregations and church organizations 
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seeking to integrate? What role do they play in the larger unification process and how 
does this intersect with the churches’ discourse on unity? 
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CHAPTER 4. When faith is not enough: Unity discourse amidst divided identities 
 
Throughout South Africa’s recent history, the family of Reformed churches has 
employed religious discourse to shape its communities’ social identities. Building up to 
and during the apartheid regime, the Dutch Reformed Church helped consolidate distinct 
racial and ethnic group categories through its Christian-nationalist ideology. In the early 
nineties, the black Reformed churches along with other denominations undermined these 
categories by reframing segregation in terms of sin and heresy. Today, the Reformed 
Church family as a whole touts a discourse of integration of the various race groups and 
of disentanglement of the long entrenched religious-nationalist and ethnic affiliations in 
the church. At the center of this discourse is what the churches call the Biblical 
imperative of “unity in diversity.” Through a vision of one unified Reformed church with 
room and respect for local distinctions, the DRC and URCSA pronounce an inclusive 
Christian identity that is engaged with all South Africans, while remaining close to 
specific community values and traditions. 
The following pages investigate how the Reformed family has been seeking to 
reframe its identity in post-apartheid South Africa through a discourse of unity. What, 
first of all, does this discourse entail, and to what extent does it comprise a break with 
former discourses of racial and ethnic exclusivism? Secondly, this chapter asks the 
question of how effective the talk of unification is in facilitating reconciliation between 
the long divided churches. After a concise discussion on discourse analysis, we will turn 
to the official party line of the two main Reformed churches, assess the key tenets of their 
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retrospection and major constraints at the leadership level. A next section further 
analyzes these arguments through the perspective of popular and academic church 
debates. Since the 2006 breakthrough in unification talks, these debates show both 
progress and deep contention. Where some perceive the establishment of a Reunited 
Reformed Church as the logical next step, others refuse to have anything to with it. We 
will look at both supporters and a growing number of skeptics in the Reformed family. 
This last group represents a significant backlash to the churches’ unity discourse. It 
claims the ideal of integration as unhelpful if not detrimental to dealing with the vast 
inequalities congregations face in contemporary South Africa. In this polarized setting, 
the church family confronts the challenge to not only transcend the divides of the old 
regime, but also those of the new nation. 
 
4.1. Analyzing identity discourse 
 
To analyze the churches’ intricate unity discourse, this chapter incorporates some of the 
religious-nationalism debates addressed in the initial theoretical framework of this 
dissertation. Especially significant are Anthony Smith’s and Claire Mitchell’s 
contributions on the role of religion in bolstering national and ethnic identities.211 Smith 
refers to the Afrikaner Christian-nationalist ideology of the previous century as a classic 
example of the covenant myth he finds among “chosen peoples” around the world, from 
Armenia to Israel. Its main tenets involve the belief in ethnic election, sacred territory and 																																																								
211 Smith, Chosen Peoples, 2003; Mitchell, Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern Ireland, 2006. 
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sacrifice. A group of people presents itself as a distinct nation, divinely chosen to live on 
a certain land, for which its members are willing to give their lives. Above all, it claims to 
live under a special covenant with the deity that implies mutual obligations to fulfill the 
deity’s wishes on earth with the expectation of certain divine benefits in return.212 The 
covenant language Smith detects among global religious-nationalist movements returns 
in rather unexpected ways when Reformed Church leaders use it to affirm their 
commitment to unity. We will look at the extent to which this commitment departs not 
only from the old doctrine of ethnic election, but also from the underlying premise of an 
ethnic “volkskerk” [people’s church], that exclusively serves one community. Mitchell 
indicates in her analysis of Northern Ireland the “thick fabric” religion provides to 
communities’ sense of national or ethnic belonging. It is not merely a boundary marker 
that in her case distinguishes Catholic from Protestant contestants, but gives actual 
content to their identities. Religion supplies certain values and lifestyles, a physical space 
to gather in, and a common cause, the preservation of the faith community, to gather 
around. Crucially, religion often offers historic narratives as well as rituals through which 
this cause is being passed on to future generations. In South Africa, churches have for 
decades served as sanctuaries for particular identity groups, the only place relatively safe 
from the regime. Religious, ethnic and racial identities are profoundly intertwined here, 
presenting severe challenges for a church family that seeks to build one church upon 
these group divisions.  
																																																								
212 Anthony Smith, “The Sacred Dimension of Nationalism,” Millennium. Journal of International Studies, 
Vol. 29, no. 3 (2000): 803-810. 
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 Contributors to the unity debates do not cease to reiterate the hope of breaking 
down their communal distinctions. Highlighting the Reformed faith as primary 
motivation for doing so, they appear to follow the trend Brewer, Higgens and Teeney 
discern among faith-based organizations that seek to play a role in peacemaking. Such 
organizations according to the authors, tend to “stake a claim to expertise in dealing with 
issues like restorative justice, forgiveness and ‘truth’ through their spiritual texts and 
traditions.” They employ religious language to help their communities develop 
alternative visions for societies torn by conflict and in the process claim a special moral 
status.213 The authors also point at South African churches as example, this time of 
developing a discourse of reconciliation instead of nationalist exclusivism. Under 
leadership of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a number of churches helped initiate and 
implement the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the nineties. Christian values of 
forgiveness and loving one’s neighbor were often called upon during the Commission to 
help steer South Africans away from violence. With their unity discourse, the DRC and 
URCSA are offering their own vision of a cohesive South Africa that figures the churches 
at the forefront of racial reconciliation. The realization of this ideal has however been a 
source of sharp disagreement. It involves intense discussions on how to be reformed on 
the African continent today. What does it mean for a church to be both Christian and 
South African, conservative and liberal, black and white, Afrikaans and Suthu speaking, 
poor, middle class and wealthy? 
																																																								
213 John Brewer, Gareth Higgins, and Francis Teeney, “Religion and Peacemaking: a Conceptualization,” 
Sociology 44.6 (2010): 1024-1026. 
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 Paul Lichterman’s discussion of civic identity has particular relevance here.214 In 
comparing two groups inside the same church alliance in a mid-sized American city, 
Lichterman looks at how religion helped both to frame their roles in society, but in 
largely conflicting and situation-specific ways. Christian terminology was used by one 
group towards a broad vision of community engagement meant to bridge racial and 
economic differences, where the other group preferred a more specific secular language 
of anti-racism to strengthen their collaboration across denominational differences. Both 
struggled to define what their group stood for and how to relate to others. And in each 
case, Lichterman finds religious rationale at the center of the contention. Depending on 
their context, members selected different aspects of their faith to defend their proclaimed 
cause, thus allowing for what the author calls diverging styles of identity mapping. It 
helps explain a remarkable trend we also see in the Reformed churches’ polemical unity 
discourse. Religion plays a key role here but seldom in the principled ways in which 
church actors like to present their faith. Instead, religious language tends to be employed 
pragmatically to justify different responses to a given socio-political reality. It is 
constantly intertwined with secular arguments on either the benefits or dangers of 
integration. Unity supporters and skeptics may even refer to the same Bible passages, 
only to bolster opposite strategies of social outreach versus inward group protection as 
the presumed best approach for the church to adapt to South Africa’s current conditions.  
 Analyzing debates about religious and social identity among the Reformed 
churches, it is hard not to encounter lingering group biases, if not blatant racism. This 																																																								
214 Paul Lichterman, “Religion and the Construction of Civic Identity,” American Sociological Review 73.1 
(2008): pp. 83-104. 
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chapter is not aimed at uncovering the various layers of prejudice inside the churches’ 
discourse. It will be necessary to indicate their presence though and the way they help 
shape arguments for and against integration. Critical discourse analysts Wodak and Van 
Dijk have conducted extensive studies on how discourse, especially that of elites, 
reinforces ethnic or racial group boundaries.215 Van Dijk particularly describes the 
euphemisms and linguistic hyperboles leaders often use to present their own constituency 
as victims and the perceived outsiders as potential threats to “our” culture and security. 
Internal solidarity is highlighted, while members of other communities, “they,” tend to be 
described in negative terms as unreliable, opportunistic and violent. Such us-versus-them 
language long characterized the official discourse of the Dutch Reformed Church during 
the apartheid years. To what extent have Reformed church leaders and ordinary members 
been able to change this language to support the inclusive identities to which they claim 
to aspire today? 
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4.2. The party line  
 
The official motive for unification is straightforward in the family of Reformed churches. 
“…because He is the One who made the church one, we want to obey Him.”216 “…so that 
the world may believe that separation, enmity and hatred between people and groups is 
sin which Christ has already conquered.”217 Both DRC and URCSA say that God wants 
their churches to be united and that they are obliged to follow God’s wishes. One does 
not need to dig deep though to find a more convoluted message, one that often 
undermines the inclusivity to which the churches claim to aspire in their unity ideal. The 
DRC General Synod hardly conceals its interest in unification for the sake of restoring 
the DRC’s voice in society. URCSA’s General Synod Committee has made the unity 
question inextricably linked to its own agenda of ensuring the adoption of the Belhar 
Confession in the entire church family. Meanwhile, the leaderships of both institutions 
question the probability of their actual integration. They express, through countless 
reports and meeting documents, doubts about the benefits unity could have for ordinary 
members. Above all, they warn about its potential to endanger local culture and language. 
The debates among the two churches show a complex struggle of reshaping their 
identities, still largely based on communalism, to fit with an ideal of interracial and 
interethnic partnership. Desperate to preserve their communal base within either white or 
black and colored population groups, DRC and URCSA leaders not seldom appear to 																																																								
216 DRC 2007, Konsultasie oor Kerkhereniging [DRC Consultation about Church Reunification], 30 July 
2007.  
217 DRMC 1986, The Belhar Confession and Accompanying Letter, Point 2. Accessed at 27 January 2015, 
http://www.vgksa.org.za/documents/The%20Belhar%20Confession.pdf.  
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reinforce antagonistic stereotypes of each other. How do they balance a discourse of 
racial reconciliation with mutually accusatory narratives of the past, on top of deep 
concerns for internal polarization? 
 
Love the DRC, and please do not leave it        
 
In the early nineties, the Dutch Reformed Church leadership began to undertake efforts to 
renew its identity from a church deeply associated with apartheid and the Afrikaner 
community to a more inclusive institution equally engaged with all of South Africa’s 
populations. Early onwards, these efforts became intertwined with debates about unifying 
the Reformed Church family. A milestone in this respect constituted the General Synod 
of 1994, also known as the “Synod of Reconciliation.” It involved a remarkable visit of 
the newly elected President Mandela, who called the church that once supported his long 
imprisonment to now join the country on its journey out of apartheid. The DRC for its 
part apologized to several of its former ministers, including most notably Beyers Naudé, 
for rejecting their opposition to the National Party regime. It also urged its members to 
cooperate in deconstructing the negative attitudes of the past and in reconciling the 
nation.218 In the following years, the DRC General Synod would often reiterate this 
position and relate it to the goal the church had set itself: to foster unity within the larger 
Reformed Church family. Close and structural collaboration across the color line were 
according to the DRC inevitable if the churches wished to help rebuild a post-apartheid 																																																								
218 DRC 1994, General Synod Besluite [Decisions], 20, 36.  
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South Africa. It constituted a significant departure from the DRC’s long held position as 
stronghold for white Afrikaners. How to implement the professed aims however soon 
turned into a source of great contention. 
  
Considering first the official discourse of the DRC as expressed through its General 
Synod from 1994 until today, we discern a relatively consistent support for reunifying the 
church family for the sake of national and church reconciliation.219 Ten years after the 
Synod of Reconciliation, the DRC leadership stated it “is afraid to say this, but we are of 
the opinion that a failure in this respect [reunification] will not only mean we failed the 
Lord, but also the South African society.”220 Proposals for what such unity entails have 
changed only slightly over time. At its core remains a structural arrangement through 
which the DRC, URCSA, DRCA and RCA form a new reunited church association 
[“kerkverband”]. In more recent statements, leaders have specified that they envision one 
joint general synod and a gradual and completely voluntary integration of regional synods 
and local congregations. The latter will remain autonomous legal entities in the new 
church association. Central to the DRC’s official vision for unity is furthermore some 
level of support for the Belhar Confession as one of the churches’ main guiding 
documents. As we saw earlier, the General Synod is still working towards the adoption of 
Belhar as a confession of the DRC, with considerable difficulties. Finally, the General 
Synod has emphasized the importance of joint projects [“gesamentlijke projekte”] 																																																								
219 Unlike URCSA, the DRC is consistent in using the term reunification [“hereniging”] when it speaks of 
the merger of the four churches in the Reformed family. It encompasses a direct reference to the notion that 
the churches used to be one in the past before the consolidation of apartheid practices. 
220 DRC 2004, Besluite Kerkhereniging 1966-2004 [Decisions Church Reunification 1966-2004], 9. 
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through which all four churches collaborate at local and regional level, for instance to 
build a neighborhood youth center or help renovate church buildings. Such projects 
should in the DRC’s view take place outside the official unification process. They allow 
for a more grassroots approach that does not require formal commitments or approval 
from the churches’ national leaderships.221  
 To justify the need for reunification to its constituency, the DRC formally tends to 
point out four key motivations.222 Essential is first of all its claim on the Bible’s 
endorsement of unity among all Christian churches and their members. The General 
Synod of 2007 specifically quoted the Gospel of John in the New Testament with the 
phrase: “I pray that they will be one, so that the world can believe.”223 The New 
Testament, DRC leaders claimed in this paper, puts great emphasis on the sense of 
communion among the followers of Jesus Christ regardless of their different 
backgrounds. A second often mentioned argument pertains to the churches’ unique 
calling. God sent Reformed churches on a joint mission to bring the gospel to Southern 
Africa. To fulfill this mission effectively it is of paramount importance that they 
overcome their former divides. For how could the churches convey the gospel’s message 
of reconciliation and love in South Africa as long as they remain embroiled over the past? 
Thirdly, the DRC alludes to the family’s history. It promotes the fact that the Reformed 
churches used to be one during the first two centuries of their existence. The segregation 																																																								
221 DRC 2008, Besluite van die uitgebreide moderamen oor kerkhereniging [Decisions from the extended 
moderamen about church reunification], 11-12 June 2008.  
222 See for instance: Pieterse and Steyn. Terugvoerverslag. 
223 The Gospel according to St. John, chapter 17. Quoted in DRC 2007, General Synod Aanvullende 
Agenda [Supplemental Agenda] 1.2.2. Posisie tov kerkeenheid/kerkhereniging  [Position towards church 
unity / church reunification], 26-27. 
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at the time of apartheid was unbiblical and should therefore not result in the church 
family’s permanent division along racial lines. In this respect, the DRC has often praised 
URCSA for its crucial efforts to help eliminate the sins of apartheid by reunifying part of 
the family in the early nineties. It exemplified the reunion DRC leaders pursue for the 
entire family, a reunion that not only brings the churches back together in one alliance, 
but that also highlights their compatibility. In an elaborate introduction to the 2007 
Consultation on Belhar and church unification, the DRC underlined this fourth motive for 
unity, stating that “we have become increasingly aware that there lies a richness in our 
diversity and that our differences are a miraculous gift of the Lord with which we have to 
serve each other.”224 
 The argumentation for unity is emblematic of how the DRC has been presenting 
itself in recent years. Above all, it claims the church should look outward towards the 
world and live up to what the General Synod has been calling its “missional identity.” 
This involves a commitment to not only spread the word of God, but also to reach out to 
people in need and, significantly, engage across social divides. Missional according to the 
DRC implies a celebration of diversity “in yourself, your marriage, your relationships, 
the broader community, our beautiful rainbow country, globally, and in the whole 
creation.” 225  Congregations are encouraged to look beyond their immediate local 
concerns and collaborate with people with different backgrounds and beliefs than 
themselves. Through their variety in worship style, liturgy and traditions, the DRC 
																																																								
224 DRC 2007, Konsultasieboek Kerkhereniging [Consultation Book Church Reunification], 10. 
225 DRC 2013, General Synod Agenda. 12.7 Raamwerkdokument oor die Missionale Aard en Roeping van 
die Kerk [Framework document on the Missional Character and Calling of the Church], 204. 
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argues, the communities of the Reformed family can build a better understanding of the 
entirety of God’s grace and love.226 It is within this diversity, that they can be one with 
God and with each other. To fortify this argument, church leaders increasingly refer to 
the content of the disputed Belhar Confession.227 It is said to offer the church a spiritual 
vocabulary of reconciliation imperative for fostering social cohesion in church and 
nation. The Confession that originated in the black Reformed churches is considered a 
“truth that can help churches in South Africa with their witness.”228 In rejecting the 
oppression of the past, it would provide an essential platform from which they can jointly 
address the inequities of today. 
DRC leaders thus urge members to be open-minded and prepare for a reunion 
with their black and colored brothers and sisters. They however run into heated debates 
amongst themselves about what such a union should imply for the future of the mother 
church. Inside the General Synod, fights have evolved over the meaning of diversity in 
general, the model through which the churches should be integrated, Belhar of course, 
and the reliability of the main partner at stake, URCSA. Tensions run so high at times 
that DRC leaders fear for a repetition of the bewailed schism in the 1980s when a group 
of dissidents left to form the pro-apartheid APK.  
  The debates over diversity are interesting first of all because of the way racial 
differences among the churches and in society at large have been approached here, or 																																																								
226 DRC 2008, “Die kerk wat ons wil wees…” [The church we want to be…], 11-12 June 2008. 
227 Neels Jackson, “NG Kerk wil Belhar ter wille van homself insluit” [DRC wants to include Belhar for 
the sake of itself]. Die Kerkbode, 2 October 2014. Accessed at 24 November 2014, 
http://kerkbode.bybelmedia.org.za/2014/10/ng-kerk-wil-belhar-ter-wille-van-homself-insluit/. 
228 WCRC 2012. Letter from DRC and URCSA management teams and Dr. Jerry Pillay after conversations 
on 25-27 Februari 2012. 
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rather avoided. Accepting diversity as a welcome reality has since the early 2000s formed 
a central tenet of the DRC’s unity discourse. It also ties in with the mentioned missional 
identity and the idea of being an outwardly focused church that engages with the many 
different backgrounds and worldviews present in South African society. Opinions widely 
diverge though about the actual inclusion of people with diverging backgrounds in church 
organizational structures, generating sharp controversies between the so-called morally 
conservative and more liberal segments in the church. Notably, these controversies 
revolve around issues of gender and sexuality rather than racial divides. Illustrative is the 
Diversity Committee the DRC General Synod installed in 2004. At its inception, the 
Committee indicated that it was to be above all a platform for raising awareness about the 
position of women and people with different sexual preferences within the church. In 
subsequent years, it also came to address racial and cultural differences in the larger 
church family, but only nominally. Of an eleven-page report from the Committee to the 
General Synod of 2011, less than one page is devoted to race related questions among the 
different Reformed churches or in society at large.229 The other ten pages focus on 
divides within the DRC regarding gender, homosexuality and interpretation of the 
Scriptures. They mention staunch antagonism between proponents of a strict Bible 
interpretation that leaves little room for female or gay clergy, and supporters of a more 
liberal approach in which the church adapts to ever changing circumstances. 
In both groups, racial diversity appears a sideline discussion. It forms but one of 
the many differences the church needs to deal with. As with almost everything in the 
																																																								
229 DRC 2011, General Synod Agenda. Attachment 4. Diversiteitsbestuur [Diversity Committee]. 
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DRC these days, the debate on diversity has been problematized itself, with several key 
actors lamenting its limited definition.230 “The only “diversity” that has been noteworthy 
in the past three years,” the late Charles Malan and former moderator of the Diversity 
Committee stated, “was hence the difference between “us” and women.”231 Even after 
confessing guilt over apartheid, the DRC according to Malan has done little to put 
matters of race and racism on the table. 
 Besides contentious language over whom to include or exclude, the DRC 
leadership has, secondly, been scrambling to preserve consistency on how to present the 
organizational format through which its unity ideal should take shape and the place of 
Belhar within this format. Few agree with the official stance the church adopted years 
ago to work towards a church alliance including the four Reformed churches with Belhar 
as foundational document. For some, the envisioned alliance appears too vague, where 
others think even the loosest arrangement between the DRC and the black Reformed 
churches would impose too much structure on local congregations.  
The divisions about the ultimate implementation of church unity present a chief 
concern for the DRC leadership. Its discourse shows a great deal of fear about members 
leaving the church in its entirely once the DRC decides to unite with URCSA, especially 
while the latter continues to demand the adoption of Belhar as precondition. Arguing that 
such “schism has to be avoided at all cost,” the General Synod of 2004 adopted the 
																																																								
230 See for instance: Cobus van Wyngaard, “The language of diversity in reconstructing whiteness in the 
Dutch Reformed Church,” in  R. Drew Smith, William Ackah and Anthony G. Reddie, Churches, 
Blackness and Contested Multiculturalism (New York NY, 2014), 157-170. 
231 Charles Malan, “Die NG Kerk se hantering van diversiteit – ‘n kritische bestekopname” [The DRC’s 
approach to diversity – a critical assessment,” Internal DRC discussion document, Pretoria, 2010. 
 
186	
	
“Ruim Huis” [open house] principle.232 In general, it pleaded for an attitude of tolerance 
towards different points of view inside the DRC and in the broader church family. More 
specifically, the open house principle served to bolster a proposal made at the same 
Synod to make the Belhar Confession optional. This implied the possibility for ministers 
and members to refuse its acceptance on an individual basis. In a similar trend, the DRC 
has issued compromising language on an actual merger between the four Reformed 
churches, prioritizing spontaneous collaborations, or the previously mentioned “joint 
projects,” over formal commitment and suggesting an additional synod with limited 
powers to be added to the existing ones instead of one integrated general synod at the 
head of a future reunited church.233  
Part of the contention here is, as numerous church leadership sources display, the 
insecurity regarding DRC members’ readiness for a future unity. This emerges in 
unofficial discussions, during meetings of the Moderamen, the church management team, 
interviews with leaders, and mediation sessions with the World Council of Reformed 
Churches (WCRC).234 Throughout these rather informal conversations, DRC leaders 
stress the importance of finding internal consensus first in order to avoid an exodus of 
members at the time of an actual church fusion. Regular references are made to the 2007 
Consultation235 that showed severe resistance among church members to the idea of one 
united church with Belhar in its confessional base. In response to the Consultation, DRC 																																																								
232 DRC 2004, General Synod Decisions, 2-3. 
233 See especially DRC 2008, Besluite van die uitgebreide moderamen oor kerkhereniging. 
234 The mediation commenced in 2009 after negotiations with URCSA broke down and have continued up 
until today. They involve talks with the WCRC (or WARC prior to 2010) alone and together with URCSA 
about the challenges as well as possibilities for a joint future. 
235 See in this dissertation, section 3.2. 
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leaders have proposed offering multiple alternatives for members to choose from so as to 
take away their concerns that unity is imposed from the top.236 These include amongst 
others more time for a decision on Belhar and a looser alliance, at least to begin with. 
The DRC has asked both the World Council and URCSA to be considerate of the 
political sensitivities surrounding Belhar.237 It would be associated with an era most 
members do not want to be reminded of. Rather than finding a way to adopt the 
Confession directly, the DRC has called on the black Reformed churches for help in 
guiding its members towards a better appreciation of Belhar’s content. The church has 
often stressed its “sentimental value” for URCSA, but with the immediate caveat that 
DRC members bear equally sentimental anxieties about Belhar due to the political 
context in which it was written. 
 Finally, leaders inside the DRC have been raising doubts in their internal 
communication about the main family member it wishes to include in a new church 
association. Behind closed doors, URCSA is often referred to as a capricious partner, 
unprepared for an actual integration process and coercive in its effort to get other 
churches to adopt Belhar. The sense of coercion is especially delicate. The former 
moderator of the DRC General Synod, Piet Strauss, emphasized the voluntary nature of 
confessions and accuses URCSA of undermining this principle by making Belhar a 
condition for further negotiations. 238  With such a harsh condition, URCSA would 
moreover make it very difficult to come to an agreement. This has made DRC leaders 																																																								
236 DRC 2008, Moderamenvergadering. [Meeting of the Moderamen], 17-18 March 2008. 
237 See for instance: WARC 2009, Notas van die gesprek tussen die NG Kerk, WARC en die VGKSA 
[Minutes of the conversation between the DRC, WARC and the URCSA], 6 March 2009. 
238 Interview, Piet Strauss, 11 April 2014. 
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like Strauss wonder how committed their partner really is to turn the talks into a success. 
The persistent conflict between URCSA and the DRCA and the ensuing tensions among 
the former’s black and colored congregations have stirred questions about how serious a 
“uniting” church can be about the unification process when it fails to reconcile its own 
communities. 
Deep frustrations in this respect also emerge towards procedural aspects of the 
two churches’ unity trajectory. During internal debates, DRC leaders quarrel about the 
misinterpretation of its proposal for an optional Belhar Confession during unity talks. 
This was never meant to be a final resolution as URCSA claimed it to be. Much of the 
conflict that followed URCSA’s 2008 Moratorium, DRC leaders attribute to the 
churches’ divergent leadership styles. In the black churches’ hierarchical culture, 
statements during joint meetings are said to be taken far more seriously than in the 
consensus approach characterizing the white church. The latter tends to move proposals 
back and forth multiple times between national leaders, regional synods and local 
councils before they are finalized, where URCSA leaders would be used to enforce their 
decisions from the top down. Not everyone appreciates the DRC’s consensus style. 
Coenie Burger, also a former moderator of the General Synod, signaled the difficulty it 
causes in terms of efficiency and clarity towards members as well as the other churches 
in the family.239 Until this approach changes however, Burger along with many of his 
colleagues expect continued disputes with their peers at URCSA about how to advance 
the churches’ fragile unity agreements. 
																																																								
239 Interview, Coenie Burger, 12 March and 18 February 2014. 
 
189	
	
 
Despite the many reservations, church unity remains a vital element of the DRC 
leaderships’ outward and internal discourse to revamp its identity from an Afrikaner 
bastion to an inclusive institution engaged with the broader society. Merging with the 
black Reformed churches constitutes the perhaps most tangible expression of this 
identity. Significantly, it is supposed to help the DRC fulfill the divine task it has set 
itself of spreading the gospel on the African continent. Church leaders have been 
reiterating these arguments for over two decades now, typically without much reference 
to the apartheid past or Afrikaner nationalism they seek to dispose of. Instead, focus tends 
to be given to a broad spiritual rationale involving Jesus Christ’s message of 
reconciliation. Equally important appears the church’s responsibility to help foster 
cohesion among different people by actively bringing them together in worship. As such, 
the vision of unity in diversity has triggered reflections that were long considered 
impossible, about what it really means to be an open church in contemporary South 
Africa.  
Much of the debate inside the church leadership however, centers on internal 
cohesion and displays what Van Dijk calls a strong level of in-group favoritism.240 
Ultimately, the church gives priority to the interests of its own white Afrikaans-speaking 
constituency. It tries everything to maintain this membership basis and convince 
diverging voices within the church to accept each other’s presence. As part of the “open 
house” principle, DRC supporters of Belhar are asked to give space to opponents to 																																																								
240 Teun van Dijk, “The reality of racism.” Festschrift für die Wirklichkeit VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, (2000): 211-225; Wodak and Dijk, Racism at the Top, 213. 
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refuse the Confession as individuals. Those favoring a more conservative approach 
towards homosexuality in the church are asked to be tolerant and engage with “the other” 
in their families. Values of inclusiveness and tolerance are hence primarily called for to 
ward off frictions inside the DRC and far less to interact with different racial 
communities, let alone integrate with URCSA. The latter is often presented in 
stereotypical terms as an autocratic and difficult partner. Instead of furthering an 
agreement between the two churches, DRC leaders have made their talks subordinate to 
membership consensus. On every step of the way, members need to be involved in the 
decision-making. This has allowed for an impasse in which DRC leaders might employ 
ambitious language about the need for a united and diverse church, but put the brakes on 
its implementation as they wait for their constituents to come along. For all its high 
minded discourse and Scriptural references, the DRC’s practical concerns about internal 
polarization retain precedence over family unity, inhibiting the church from translating its 
Biblical imperative into concrete action. 
  
URCSA between devotion and distrust        
 
Building up to the formation of URCSA in 1994, the two merging churches had a clear 
common cause: to prove their break with the existing apartheid system by establishing 
one church that united communities across racial boundaries. As Nelson Mandela’s South 
Africa took shape, URCSA was poised to find itself a new cause to identify with. The 
former DRCA and DRMC congregations turned out to have little in common though, 
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besides the old fight against apartheid, as illustrated by the court cases that soon 
followed. During the former regime, both had struggled to form their own church cultures 
independent from the DRC and both had remained closely tied to the mother church. 
URCSA would have to show its autonomy from the DRC as well as bridge the different 
traditions the black Reformed churches had built for themselves. The Belhar Confession 
emerged in this context as the cornerstone of URCSA’s identity in a post-apartheid South 
Africa. Above all, URCSA emphasized Belhar’s message of unity among the Reformed 
churches. How this should be accomplished however remains a matter of controversy 
inside the uniting church, with heated debates about how to proceed with the DRC. To 
what extent does its understanding of the unification process differ from that of the DRC 
and which constraints has URCSA encountered here? 
 
Compared to the DRC, URCSA’s formal discourse on unity is less elaborate. Agendas 
and reports by URCSA’s General Synod Committee, the equivalent of the DRC’s 
General Synod, include abundant mentioning of the general value of church unity, but in 
an almost taken for granted way. If further explanation is offered, it is usually through the 
Belhar Confession. URCSA’s Strategic Plan for 2010-2016 includes a lengthy quotation 
from the Confession to describe how it understands unity in the church's core vision.241 
Elsewhere, URCSA leaders merely reference Belhar and its three major themes of unity, 
reconciliation and justice. Their language reveals a strongly faith-based rationale. 
Reiterating Belhar’s claim that separation of people is sinful, URCSA emphasizes that 
																																																								
241 URCSA 2012, Sixth General Synod Acta. Strategic Plan 2010-2016, 9-10. 
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God wants the churches to be visibly united and that Christ has already shown the way in 
bringing people together and fostering reconciliation. On the point of family unification, 
the General Synod Committee states, “our own integrity and faithfulness are at stake.”242 
URCSA is called specifically to live up to God’s standard of unity.243 
 The sense of calling is important. As we saw earlier in the DRC, URCSA also 
puts itself in a special position towards Southern Africa. It is here that the church has a 
mission to bring the gospel and act as an example of Jesus Christ’s message of love and 
healing. The past plays a central role in this argument. Recognizing the DRC’s support 
for the atrocities of the previous regime and the relative silence from the black Reformed 
churches during much of the apartheid era, URCSA leaders state it is their responsibility 
to now become a model of integration that will help overcome South Africa’s 
divisions.244 They used to be one before the sin of segregation took hold of the Reformed 
churches. Now they have to be together again to display their belief in Christ who broke 
down the walls between people and between people and God.245 Once more, the Belhar 
Confession returns here as reinforcement. URCSA communities owe it to God and their 
country to implement the Confession they adopted and should do so in concrete ways. 
Rejecting an unjust ideology of the past is not enough. The churches have to work 
actively to overcome social and political injustices today. To do so with credibility 
																																																								
242 URCSA General Synod Committee 2005. Resolutions Church Unity, in URCSA 2012, Compilation of 
Documents on Church Reunification: Process Between URCSA and DRC 2004-2012. Edition July 2012, 7. 
243 URCSA 2004, Decision on DRC General Synod 2004. 
244 Mary-Anne Plaatjies van Huffel, “Twenty years of unity talks. The journey towards the merger of the 
Dutch Reformed Family.” Article submitted for publication in URCSA News, March 2014. 
245 URCSA 2006, Moderator’s Address to Joint DRC Family General Synodical Commissions, 6-8 
November 2006. 
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demands unity of the entire Reformed church family.  “The church is inherently inclusive 
or would otherwise come to annul its calling.”246 
 URCSA thus presents in its discourse the structural unification of the family of 
Reformed churches as the only way through which the church can answer God’s call. At 
the core is an organic unity arrangement that includes all four churches deriving from the 
Dutch Reformed tradition and that is based on Presbyterian principles. It entails a united 
church with one general synod and locally distinct congregations that actively work 
towards their ultimate racial integration. URCSA starkly contrasts this organic structure 
to DRC proposals for a loose federation of individual churches with each their own 
leadership bodies. Such an arrangement would not merely reaffirm the racial divisions 
still present among the Reformed churches. It signals, in URCSA’s view, the DRC’s 
historic reluctance to partner with the black Reformed churches on equal terms, and 
fundamentally implies a return to apartheid practices.  
While emphasizing this visible and organic unity, URCSA does make a point of 
creating space for different expressions inside the church. Congregations are encouraged 
to seek integration but simultaneously assured that they can preserve their own traditions 
when it comes to for instance singing, worship language or costume. This appears 
reminiscent of the DRC’s focus on internal diversity. Still, where the DRC stresses the 
need to listen to such differences by allowing ample congregational autonomy and 
members’ consent, URCSA rather highlights the need for firmly established core 
teachings and principles that are the same for everyone. The basis for organic unity is a 																																																								
246 Pieter Grove, Groeteboodskap aan NGK Wes en Suidkaap Sinode [Greeting message to DRC West and 
Southern Cape Synod], 7 May 2015. 
 
194	
	
“home with enough space, with freedom for people to be different from one another, 
provided everyone eats from the same pot in the kitchen.”247  
Eating from the same pot or not, URCSA is no stranger to vast internal conflict 
with regard to matters of unity. Recent years have seen increasing support for family 
unification within the church’s national management team. But further down the 
hierarchy, regional synod leaders and representatives from local church councils have 
been challenging this position as they put large question marks over the trustworthiness 
of the DRC as unity partner. These disagreements become apparent in URCSA’s General 
Synod Committee documents and official statements towards its church base. They repeat 
the firm belief in unity and inform members about positive developments in the contact 
between the two churches.248 Such statements are quickly followed though by a host of 
concerns about the DRC. Key among them is the sense that the DRC lacks dedication to 
the process and that it willfully seeks to obstruct integration. The 2008 Moratorium 
decision, which was disseminated broadly among URCSA congregations, referred to the 
DRC’s wavering on Belhar and its suggestion for a federal rather than an organic model 
as clear indication that the old mother church was not yet ready for unity.249 A church 
that took “unity so lightly” was, as URCSA’s moderator of that moment, Thias Kgatla 
described it in URCSA News, “not ready to obey God.”250  
																																																								
247 URCSA 2008, General Synod Committee Decisions. Decision 24. 
248 See for instance: URCSA 2011, Pastoral letter to URCSA congregations on the decision of the Dutch 
Reformed Church General Synod’s Acceptance of the Belhar Confession, 20 October 2011. 
249 URCSA General Synod 2008, Recommendation.  
250 Thias Kgatla, “Where are we with church unity within the DRC family? URCSA News, 11 December 
2007. 
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Above all, URCSA’s internal divisions play out in debates around Belhar. The 
question on whether or not the Confession forms a prerequisite for unity has been a 
source of contention throughout the past two decades. Since URCSA made this demand 
and almost immediately withdrew it in the mid-nineties, its leadership has repeatedly and 
officially assured the DRC that it does not expect anyone to accept Belhar. Its adoption 
cannot be coerced and should always be a matter of free will. In an internal discussion the 
General Synod Committee observed that “…we could make too much of Belhar, making 
it into an imposition on the members of sister churches. That would be in conflict with 
the nature of a confession as a voluntary, Spirit-induced stand that a person takes in the 
midst of a community of faith.”251 URCSA has therefore asked its family members to 
find a way to include the Confession in their doctrinal base without necessarily adopting 
it.252 While the church does not explicate what such inclusion then should entail, it 
emphasizes this request as non-negotiable for the continuation of unity talks. The result 
has been great confusion. By referring to Belhar in terms of non-negotiability, URCSA 
creates the impression that coercion is after all applied to the unification process. Of little 
help are its haphazard and often contradictory statements on the matter. After the DRC 
requested a joint study of the Confession at a 2009 mediation session for instance, 
URCSA responded with its own request that the DRC should still work towards a full 
acceptance of Belhar and not merely “assess the possibility.”253 Beyond confusion, such 
statements have stirred deep indignation across the church family about a unification 																																																								
251 URCSA General Synod 2008, Executive Report. Point 7.d. 
252 DRCA 2009, General Synod Attachment 1:The discussion between the DRCA and URCSA concerning 
Belhar Confession. 
253 URCSA 2009, Minutes of a meeting held with WARC, 4- 6 March 2009. 
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process that is already complex and that should not be made dependable on a contested 
confession.  
 Underneath URCSA’s mixed messages regarding Belhar, lingers profound 
suspicion of the DRC as a conversation partner. This emerged particularly in the church’s 
early mediation sessions with the World Council of Reformed Churches.254 In these 
sessions, URCSA leaders asserted that the DRC was never really interested in structural 
collaboration and had been intentionally delaying the talks. They perceived a pattern 
throughout the church’s history of seeking to substitute halfhearted arrangements like the 
Federal Council for true unity. Still allowing the churches to maintain their separate 
leadership bodies, the Council enhanced rather than changed the segregated status quo. 
Also the DRC’s emphasis on joint interracial projects has according to URCSA formed a 
mere technique to frustrate unification rather than expand it. It would divert attention 
away from the official process and towards low-impact and paternalistic exchanges. 
Presenting the joint projects as interracial cooperation would moreover enable the DRC 
to claim it has overcome racial prejudice without making any actual commitment. The 
refusal to accept Belhar constitutes for URCSA the ultimate proof that the DRC does not 
want to unite with people of color. After all, Belhar requests churches to put into practice 
its principles of unity, justice and reconciliation. Central to URCSA’s language about the 
DRC here is the notion that the old mother church should first replace its apartheid 
mindset with Belhar’s principles in word and deed before either church moves ahead 
																																																								
254 See for instance URCSA 2009, Minutes of a meeting held with WARC; and WARC 2009, WARC 
Fasilitering/Mediasie NG Kerk en VGKSA [WARC Facilitation/Mediation DRC and URCSA], 14-15 
October 2009. 
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with unification. As Thias Kgatla conveyed in a speech in front of the WARC: “The DRC 
needs space to think about its racist attitude but never rushed into unity prematurely.”255  
 Running through the discourse of URCSA leaders are, besides concerns about the 
DRC, qualms over their own communities’ preparedness for unity. The two most recent 
moderators, Thias Kgatla and Marie-Anne Plaatjies Van Huffel, have both addressed the 
problem of racism among URCSA members. Congregations still struggle, according to 
Kgatla, to cross the color line. Rather than building relationships across former DRCA-
DRMC divides, they have been wedged in parochial attitudes with an inward focus on 
their own racial or ethnic community.256 Plaatjies Van Huffel recently quoted one of the 
authors of the Belhar Confession in saying that “[r]acism is lurking in all of our hearts” 
and stresses that all, not merely the DRC, should work to deconstruct it.257 URCSA’s 
leadership appears aware that its membership base is hardly more enthusiastic about unity 
than that of the DRC. The conflict with the DRCA and ensuing court cases have sapped 
energy from congregations and caused deep cleavages inside the church. The 2010-2016 
Strategic Plan mentions inadequate internal unity as the number one threat the church is 
facing today and warns of further polarization. It also indicates URCSA’s overall dearth 
of resources in this respect. Congregations that can hardly afford to pay their minister, if 
they even have one, are considered unlikely to engage in projects with other churches, in 
or outside the Reformed family.258 
 																																																								
255 URCSA 2009, Minutes of a meeting held with WARC. 
256 URCSA 2012, Sixth General Synod Acta. Addendum 1. Outgoing Moderator’s Opening Address by 
Thias Kgatla, 136-144. 
257 Plaatjies van Huffel, “Twenty years of unity talks,” 6. 
258 URCSA 2012, Strategic Plan 2010-2016, 4-5. 
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For all the hostility towards the DRC, URCSA’s leadership discourse shows some 
striking parallels with that of the former mother church. Both involve ambitious language 
about the significance of unity for church and society. Both refer to their faith as primary 
source of inspiration and perceive a calling from God to help heal South Africa’s 
divisions as one integrated church. Similar to the DRC, URCSA struggles with internal 
critique not so much on this vision but rather on how it should be executed. It is equally 
concerned about the danger of further polarization inside the church and the threat this 
implies to its very existence. Contrary to the DRC though, URCSA does not seek to 
placate these differences. Nor does it put the traditions and viewpoints of local members 
on a pedestal, as is often the case inside the DRC. Instead, URCSA issues strong 
statements and expects its members to comply.  
In an apparent paradox, URSCA at the same time ensures congregations the 
protection of their local cultural expressions against domination from any church 
authority. The combination of a top-down hierarchy with strong congregational 
autonomy however primarily appears an expression of pragmatic necessity. URCSA does 
not have a building for its General Synod Secretariat and has hardly been able to raise 
money for the hundreds of representatives traveling to the next General Synod 
Committee meeting. The lack of resources significantly impedes communication between 
national leaders and local church actors, making it harder to inform the latter about the 
unity talks, let alone involve them in the decision making process. Conversely, national 
leaders can barely spare time or resources to supervise what is happening within 
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congregations. They have little choice but to allow the preservation of still largely 
segregated communal church cultures. 
 URCSA’s internal divides are hence less about particular issues on which 
members disagree and more about its larger identity. This counts for another key contrast 
with the DRC. While the latter has been going through an intensive rebranding process, it 
can still fall back on a long-standing and recognizable church identity rooted in a 
relatively homogeneous white Afrikaans speaking community. URCSA on the other hand 
wrestles with a constituency as heterogeneous as the South African society at large. It 
serves communities in eleven languages across the various population groups. URCSA is 
thus, more than the DRC, familiar with negotiating multiple affiliations under one 
umbrella organization. The church constantly has to balance between the specific 
identities these groups seek to reenact mostly through religious ritual, and ensuring their 
shared connection with the larger URCSA institution. Vast ethnic and cultural differences 
make this almost impossible, but not entirely. The discourse on church unity has enabled 
URCSA to consolidate a common sense of belonging to a church that links its 
communities through past and present concerns. It places Belhar, the struggle against 
apartheid and current injustices deriving from this era above differences in worship, 
socio-cultural values and liturgy. The church was established with the belief in 
integration, and the fulfillment of this belief forms the chief mission for everyone. 
Whereas the notion of unity is reiterated over and again, relatively little is said 
about why the church should partner with the DRC specifically. Here lies a crucial 
inconsistency in URCSA’s unity discourse. It speaks of the need to integrate black and 
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colored communities in the church and of the significance of a formal arrangement with 
the white church. The idea of URCSA’s black and colored congregations merging with 
DRC ones is however barely encouraged. Apart from some broad references to the 
churches’ family ties and the need for grassroots unity initiatives, URCSA’s discourse on 
the DRC tends to be disparaging and intransigent. It comprises a perception of the white 
church as the bully of the past with little eye for any changes it might have made in recent 
years.  
Notable in this respect is that the church barely speaks of “re-unification.” In a 
2006 address to the other three churches, URCSA presented its desire to reunite so as to 
return to the situation before 1857 when the family was one.259 But most other documents 
talk about “unification,” or perhaps alternate between the two terms. It signals the sense 
of inequality through which URCSA perceives its relationship with the DRC from the 
very beginning. It also flags the gap between URCSA’s spiritually induced ideals and its 
historic skepticism of the DRC. Leaders pride their record of uniting the Reformed 
churches. But when it comes to actual integration, many struggle to muster enough 
devotion to overcome their deep distrust of the white church in everyday life. The 
ambivalence at play here ultimately returns in the disparate measures URCSA uses when 
it weighs relationships among its own black and colored members against those with the 
DRC. For the former, integration has top priority and race is dismissed as a factor of 
importance. For the white church however, integration is conditional and racial divisions 
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underscored as an unfortunate but highly present reality that makes the cause of family 
unity all but impossible.  
 
From covenant to a joint roadmap         
 
The mutual suspicions discussed above have not prevented church leaders from jointly 
demonstrating their fervent resolve to merge into one new institution. Since talks 
recommenced in 2006, a steady flow of official statements has been disseminated among 
URCSA and DRC members. They are signed by leaders from both sides and outline 
spirited motives for a new Reformed Church identity in unity. These statements display a 
gradual transition over the past decade from an almost entirely faith-based rationale 
towards an increasingly pragmatic framework of the required steps to be taken. What 
they barely show are the tough preceding discussions. Pivotal in this respect are the 
WARC / WCRC mediation sessions and a number of letter exchanges through which the 
churches have been debating their convoluted relationship. What narratives emerge here 
and how do they shape the unity conversation? 
 
The previous section already indicated several common fundamentals on which the two 
churches have built their vision for a united future. Primary among them are the shared 
belief in God’s wish for unity and the sense of a divine calling to carry out this wish on 
the African continent. As the churches re-launched their unity talks in 2006, they jointly 
bolstered these fundamentals with an even more powerful religious language than they 
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had been employing individually. The first time leaders from both churches met at 
Esselenpark, they declared that the churches were not merely trying to integrate their 
organizations to adhere to Christian values of unity and reconciliation, but that they 
entered a deeply spiritual covenant together. It is a covenant for the reunification of the 
church family, “not from our own will or under pressure from social and political 
processes, but because we believe that the Lord… requires this of us.”260 
Likening this covenant to the one between God and the people of Israel, URCSA 
in a separate statement stressed the mutual obligations it implied for both parties, which 
the church intends to “honor at all costs.”261 For the DRC, the covenant language signaled 
to its membership a break with the political context that long overshadowed unity 
attempts. The church was not coerced into this process by external forces that sought 
proof of the DRC’s departure from apartheid, but pursued unity voluntarily and on the 
sole basis of faith. Rather than lingering in the past, the covenant language displayed a 
sense of urgency. The churches both emphasized that their unity was meant to make a 
difference in Africa today. Setting out a timespan of three years, they committed 
themselves to a new reunited church in which the various communities would work 
together to resolve their problems, rather than each by themselves.262 Within two years 
however, the covenant had broken down dramatically. After the 2008 Moratorium it took 
the churches another four years to pick up the thread. By the time URCSA lifted its ban 
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on national unity talks in 2012, the churches had replaced much of their religious 
language with a highly practical discussion on the what and how of a future merger.  
 
What drove the churches towards this pragmatic approach becomes clear when we take a 
closer look at the conversations taking place between the DRC and URCSA since 
Esselenpark. Key here is first of all the contradictions emerging in the ambitious 
covenant language. Even as the churches were alleging their conviction in God’s calling 
to unite, they already stressed the pertinence of protecting each community’s individual 
identity. At the meeting at Achterberg, both URCSA and the DRC vowed to protect their 
communities’ distinct cultural riches in whatever church structure they would end up with 
by allowing them to maintain their own language, customs and traditions.263 Ensuing 
agreements have continued to describe the congregation as the ultimate expression of the 
church in a local context.264 Unity could not be imposed on congregations but should 
engage them in an inclusive bottom-up process. How the churches intended to balance 
their communities’ diversity with the desired integration into one organic unity model 
was rarely elaborated.  
This brings us to a second and perhaps most significant problem in the churches’ 
joint unity discourses. Beneath the spirited talk of reconciliation in the name of Christ 
one discerns a thorough skepticism on both sides regarding the feasibility of an actual 
merger. It builds on antagonistic narratives of the churches’ approach to past and present 
racial divisions. Behind closed doors, in discussions with the World Council of Reformed 																																																								
263 Achterberg Declaration, 2006. 
264 Memorandum of Understanding Between URCSA and DRC, 2013. 
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Churches and through abrasive letter exchanges, URCSA and the DRC have each in their 
own way stated apartheid as a persistent barrier to accomplishing the future partnership 
their faith calls them to. In these more informal settings one question appears particularly 
tenacious. Has the DRC truly moved beyond its segregation doctrine? URCSA tends to 
doubt this. In mediation sessions with the World Council of Reformed Churches it has on 
multiple occasions presented its everyday confrontation with racism in the white church. 
As an URCSA representative exclaimed during one of the sessions: “[they] think we are 
beggars… No more!” 265  The few non-whites that have come to attend DRC 
congregations in recent years would according to URCSA involve mostly domestic 
workers of wealthier white church members. They still worship at separate times than 
their white employers, during services specially set up for them in their own language. 
Rarely are these black and colored churchgoers seen to rise to leadership positions in 
local DRC councils, let alone in regional or national synods. All this is considered to be 
indicative of the underlying resistance in the DRC to perceiving all believers, across 
different races and ethnicities, as equal.  
 A 2008 exchange about membership to the All African Church Council (AACC) 
further underscored the above argument. The DRC had asked URCSA to formally 
recommend it to join the Council. In two scourging letters URCSA explained its 
reluctance to do so. It is a “painful exercise,” the church management wrote, “to describe 
the DRC’s continued defense of apartheid… even in the democratic South Africa.”266 A 
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church so obsessed with the interests of its white constituency, URCSA asserted, would 
be unfit for membership in an all-African church council. The DRC was said to 
consistently hamper the possibility of integrating with its black and colored partners by 
opposing Belhar or awaiting the full approval of constituents who will likely refuse this. 
Also DRC efforts to include the other two black Reformed churches in the unity talks 
were mentioned in this respect. Considering the ongoing court cases with the DRCA, 
URCSA stated that the DRC could have known how disruptive it would be to try to 
include this church in the unity talks at this time. Significantly, the letters stated that the 
DRC was not ready to join an interracial alliance because it never fulfilled the 
requirements the World Alliance of Reformed Churches267 made for re-admitting the 
church in the nineties after it had withdrawn DRC membership due to its involvement in 
the apartheid regime. The requirements encompassed church unification and the inclusion 
of Belhar in its doctrinal base, both as litmus tests for the DRC’s departure from the old 
doctrine of racial inequality. The lack of any tangible accomplishment in either proved to 
URCSA that the DRC remained stuck in a past it never completely acknowledged. At the 
time of the letter exchange URCSA however left out of the equation that the DRC was in 
fact readmitted to the Alliance. 
 The DRC’s response to these charges shows a quite different narrative. It reacted 
to the letters exchange with disappointment, if not indignation. How could URCSA claim 
the DRC still defended apartheid when the WARC it referred to fully vindicated the 																																																								
267 The World Alliance of Reformed Churches merged in 2006 into the World Communion of Reformed 
Churches, the same institute that has been facilitating mediation sessions between the DRC and URCSA on 
the unification process. Early mediation documents still refer to the Commission’s old name and 
abbreviation, the WARC. 
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church over ten years ago?268 The DRC was allowed back into the Alliance in 1998 
because it had demonstrated serious engagement with the unity process. The Alliance 
never required the acceptance of the Belhar Confession, but rather an affirmation of the 
status confessionis and a sound rejection of apartheid ideology, to which the DRC 
obliged. Beyond these technicalities, the DRC disagreed with the portrait URCSA had 
painted of an exclusively white church. This ignored the changes the DRC said it made 
over the years to become a more diverse place and the actual presence of “persons of 
color (if we still need to talk about color)” in its church offices and congregations.269 
Particularly congregations in the Free State and Western Transvaal regions were 
mentioned in the DRC’s response to URCSA as serving between 40 to 50% non-white 
worshippers. Elsewhere, the DRC described this change in more personal terms. It 
perceived “wonderful energy and positive relationships” between the different churches, 
as expressed through collaborative social works and other forms of cooperation.270 “We 
experience how race barriers disintegrate.”  
 While trying to point out positive developments, DRC leaders have throughout 
their unity talks with URCSA also indicated distress over the constant referrals to its 
history, whether by URCSA or others. The association between the church and atrocities 
of the apartheid regime is often said to be painful for its communities that seek to move 
on in the new South Africa.271 Reminiscing about the past not merely inhibits the pursuit 
of a joint future according to the DRC. It distracts from the challenges facing churches in 																																																								
268 DRC 2008, Letter to URCSA on Application Membership AACC. 
269 DRC 2008, Letter to URCSA on Application Membership AACC. 
270 DRC 2009, Submission by the Dutch Reformed Church to the Plenary of October 14-15, 2009 Meeting 
Between Task Teams of the DRC and URCSA, 8. 
271 DRC 2009, Minutes of the conversation between the DRC, WARC and the URCSA.  
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the present. Rather than racism, congregations should struggle with secularism. It is not a 
matter of welcoming different people in the sanctuary, but of welcoming anybody at all. 
Over the past two decades the DRC has seen a steady decline in numbers. Just in 2012 
the church was estimated to have lost over 20,000 members.272 Those who remain are 
conflicted about the extent to which they should adapt to a rapidly changing society in 
which youth want band music where there used to be only organ playing, or women 
request influence in traditionally male dominated church councils. They confront a 
difficult social reality of unemployment, crime and deteriorating public services. Families 
are split up as children emigrate to find work elsewhere. Once flourishing rural 
congregations can no longer afford their own minister as congregants are leaving for the 
cities or losing interest in church life in general. Notably, the DRC does recognize in its 
conversations with URCSA that many of today’s problems are connected with the former 
regime. Against this acknowledgement it however puts forward the victimhood endured 
by the DRC’s own Afrikaner constituency before 1948. In a 2012 mediation session DRC 
participants explained how the Anglo-Boer wars and the poverty that followed caused 
great pain and “determined their [the Afrikaner people] way of doing over the past 
decades.”273 Ironically, the DRC thus urges everyone to focus on current affairs rather 
than the past, except when it concerns Afrikaner history and suffering at the hand of the 
British. 
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As the churches fail to align their diverging identities and narratives, their unity 
debates have come to display increasing realism. If the countless meetings and 
conversations since the first Esselenpark meeting reveal anything, it is the improbability 
that the churches will anytime soon find consensus on matters of principle. This 
consensus pretty much stops at the joint belief in a God of unity. It breaks down as soon 
as the churches enter any conversation about Belhar or the proper acknowledgement of 
the churches’ apartheid past and its enduring impact. Recent years hence show a shift in 
focus towards the more pragmatic aspects of a future church merger. These involve 
concrete proposals for collaboration, mostly to help elevate South Africa’s poor, and 
secondly, to change the churches’ organizational structures and allow for tangible 
integration.  
Regarding the first, it is interesting to note the mounting attention the two 
churches pay to issues of social justice. Removed from the immediate context of the 
congregation, this appears a principled matter on which the DRC and URCSA have been 
able to find relatively neutral common ground. Both agree that their country is plagued 
by socio-economic inequity, partly as a result of the previous regime’s oppression, and 
partly due to the current government’s ineptitude to distribute the country’s wealth 
equally. They also agree these days on the understanding of justice as a restorative 
process to ensure all South Africans fair treatment in different aspects of life, from work 
and politics to personal and church relations. URCSA introduced this conception during a 
WARC mediation session in 2009 after which it has gradually been incorporated into the 
churches’ official unity agenda, culminating in the 2012 Memorandum of Agreement. 
 
209	
	
The Agreement presents restorative justice as a Scriptural duty that the churches should 
embrace not as a goal in itself, but as a means towards their ultimate goal of 
reconciliation. It recognizes the persistence of racism and classism in South Africa and 
finds major reasons for today’s injustices in bad leadership, past and present ideologies 
and power imbalances in society. 274  Above all, the Agreement calls for practical 
measures to help restore communities. The most tangible proposal here constitutes a 
church property audit that could enable black and colored congregations to obtain rightful 
ownership to the buildings that are often still registered under the DRC’s name. 
The plea for concrete measures then returns in the churches’ initiatives for a step-
by-step plan to merge their separate structures. A 2013 joint statement tells URCSA and 
DRC members not to expect any “quick fixes.”275 With all of God’s will and authority, 
the churches no longer believe church unification can happen as swiftly as they thought 
in 2006. Rather than speaking of covenants, the churches now call for visible actions to 
show society they are serious about reconciliation. For the DRC, such actions are 
essential to prove its transparency towards members and its seriousness towards URCSA. 
With the entrenched distrust of the DRC and few achievements so far to take back to their 
constituency, URSCA leaders have been equally eager to stress the need for hard results 
rather than broad spiritual promises. With a detailed Road Map, also in 2013, the two 
churches outlined their next moves, such as the development of a joint church order or 
the moment when the first joint general synod will be convened. Finding a solution on 
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Belhar also constitutes part of the Road Map. Here the churches however remain stuck. 
Their practical approach enabled URCSA and the DRC to book some successes in 
drawing the specifics of a future unity and reaching consensus on the social focus of their 
collaboration. Thus far however, it has failed to move them beyond their mutual 
suspicions and conflicting stories of victimhood, of which Belhar remains a pivotal 
symbol. 
 
With the past hovering over the unity talks, the churches’ leaderships struggle to build 
trust. Their discussions tend to be painted in black and white, literally and figuratively. 
No adoption of Belhar means no break with apartheid and hence no church merger. 
Commitment to unification is measured by the number of black worshippers in white 
churches and vice versa. Both churches seem to employ narratives of the past to fortify 
their own group identities and interests, at the cost of a more inclusive sense of 
belonging. Hammering on apartheid’s continuing legacy, URCSA has portrayed itself as 
the primary and much needed force of resistance to the lingering white supremacy inside 
the Reformed Church family. The harsh conditions it has set for the unification process 
help advance this image. URCSA continues the fight for justice and will not let the DRC 
get away with the past by boasting about integration with a black church. Unity must 
come at a price, which URCSA has set at the adoption of Belhar and concrete restorative 
justice programs. Until it meets these terms, the DRC retains the image of the old white 
mother church that requires remorse for its past mistakes, rather than of a viable 
colleague with whom URCSA can build a new church. The DRC challenges this imagery 
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with its own narrative of the past and present. It displays a more complicated history in 
which apartheid’s persecutors used to be victims themselves, who today once more face 
threats to their identity as a white Afrikaans speaking minority. Church unity in this 
narrative is not merely about breaking with the past, but about restoring a community and 
recognizing its constructive role in society. It depicts URCSA as an indispensable yet 
largely impeding factor towards this goal.  
 The joint unity discourse hence exhibits critical discrepancies between official 
statements stressing partnership on the road to a common destiny, and underlying 
narratives that pit the churches against each other in an enduring battle over the past. 
Still, the surfacing of such inconsistencies through mediation sessions and letter 
exchanges seems to have brought the unification process to a more manageable level. 
Church leaders today are careful about promising a quick resolve and prefer pragmatism 
to the deeply spiritual but barely feasible ambitions they began with.  
 
Our cultural homes           
 
The above paragraphs display a leadership discourse fraught with high ambitions as well 
as deep inconsistencies on the matter of unity. Both URCSA and the DRC go to great 
lengths to emphasize their belief in the visible integration of their institutions and present 
this as a cornerstone of their post-apartheid identity. The religious language with which 
the church family tries to depart from the past however is reminiscent of how the DRC 
used to justify segregation. Most striking is the “covenant” terminology of the initial 
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unity declarations URCSA and the DRC made in 2006 and 2007. In stating their joint 
commitment to church unification, neither makes any mention of how this term used to 
be at the center of the DRC’s apartheid theology. Back then, the church claimed there to 
be a covenant between God and the white Afrikaner nation. Today, it includes black 
Reformed churches that actively join in the same divine calling the DRC once professed 
for itself: to bring the gospel to the different peoples of Southern Africa. The churches 
might no longer be sacralizing a sense of nationhood, nor do they claim the ethnic 
election myth Smith attributed to the Afrikaner religious-nationalist movement of the 
early 20th century.276 Through their unity talks, the DRC as well as URCSA do seem to 
persist in a profound entanglement between their faith and the specific territory of South 
Africa, and between the institutions and the ethnic or racial communities they serve. 
These affiliations are continuously reaffirmed. It is through their specific religious rituals, 
texts and music, that the churches assert an essential role in supporting their distinct 
constituencies, perhaps underneath a spiritual mantle of unity, but still in separate 
realities.  
 The general lack of references to the old ideology is remarkable here, especially 
considering URCSA’s sharp critique of the churches’ history as segregated ethnic 
bulwarks. For all their concerns about the lingering racism or ethnic divisions inside the 
church family, URCSA leaders are surprisingly silent about the religious-nationalist 
beliefs that used to inform such practices. Together with a small number of critical voices 
in the DRC, they state every now and then the danger of too close an affiliation with a 
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single group of people. Far more common however is the stipulation that communal 
identities deserve utmost protection. Both churches throughout the unity process 
prioritize local culture over a broader sense of belonging. They do so in a way that, 
intentionally or not, reproduces the racial stereotypes they claim so eager to break with. 
Both celebrate their own history, as heroes or victims, while dismissing the other as 
domineering and obtrusive. In doing so, both employ stylistic euphemisms like “local,” 
“culture” and “language” to substitute for the more loaded notions of race or ethnicity. 
URCSA may discuss internally its problems with crossing the color line between former 
DRCA and DRMC congregations, just as the DRC has recognized in closed management 
meetings the overwhelmingly white composition of its members and their general lack of 
sensitivity towards black neighbors. Neither will explicate this in their public 
communication though. Rather, leaders seek to reassure constituents their church will 
always remain their cultural home and will not be pushed to adopt someone else’s 
traditions. 
 In much of the discourse, diversity is thus prioritized over unity, even though the 
churches pronounce the compatibility of these terms. Both claim to celebrate difference 
while striving for integration, but neither broadens this ambition beyond their immediate 
constituencies. Focus is given to soothing internal differences rather than bridging divides 
in the larger church family. These divides are being maintained through contrasting 
narratives in which each portrays the other as opponent rather than equal partner. 
Through the narratives church leaders on both sides reinforce a rather profane “us versus 
them” line of thinking that undermines their own spiritual vision of unity. Even so, their 
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repeated call for one new church should not be taken lightly. It returns in conversations 
across the family and forms the basis from which local church actors have been seeking 
to forge closer connections between long segregated communities. Significantly, it has 
stirred debates among church members and theologians moving well beyond their 
leaders’ careful statements and onto the controversial issues the latter seek to avoid.  
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4.3. Into the debates 
 
The centrality of the congregation is perhaps one of the few things that most inside the 
Reformed Church family agree on. General Synod leaders can reform the national church 
order, coordinate minister education or provide recommendations on how to interpret the 
main doctrines. But the congregation is an autonomous body that decides about what 
happens at local level and how their leaders’ guidelines will be implemented on the 
ground. This opens up a broad space for debate. Through an array of social and academic 
church media, from blogs, Facebook pages and magazines such as Die Kerkbode and 
URCSA News to theological journals and seminars, congregants vent their opinions about 
what occurs at leadership level and beyond. Ministers challenge national efforts to curb 
their pensions while theologians offer alternative interpretations of the Reformed 
confessions vis-à-vis homosexuality and members lament the use of instruments during 
Sunday service. At stake here are convoluted perceptions of church and social identity. 
Debates on music, liturgy or morality often end up with questions, and strong statements, 
about what the Reformed churches should stand for, to what extent they have adapted to 
the new South Africa or whether and how they should do more to reconcile its 
communities. 
Church unification reoccurs, almost always in association with the Belhar 
Confession, throughout these debates as a central dividing issue. On one side, stand the 
critics who do not believe that unity between URCSA and the DRC can do much good. 
The church for them primarily comprises a space in which certain groups can find peace 
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from the rest of society. On the other side, we find fervent supporters of unification and 
of the idea that the church should engage with the larger society and its diversity. This 
section investigates the discourses of these two seemingly opposite camps in written and 
verbal sources, intended for church elites and for a broader audience. It assesses their 
argumentation throughout these media outlets as well as from my informal conversations 
with Reformed theologians, theology students and church leaders.277 Key to the analysis 
is to see what has made the stakes of a unified church identity so high inside the 
Reformed family and what this tells us about the intersections between religion and 
identity. Why do some perceive unification as a panacea for a broken family and nation, 
where others fear it could mean the end of their church?  
 
A church for the locals          
 
“Although we might be part of one family, adult children cannot all stay once again with 
their families under the same roof.”278 This statement was made by a respondent in the 
Eastern Cape region to the DRC Consultation in 2007 on unification and Belhar. It is 
emblematic of a sentiment felt strongly across the Reformed churches that they are meant 
to live separate lives. Support for some form of segregation never fully disappeared in the 
church family and appears to have grown in recent years as counteraction to the national 																																																								
277 These informal conversations were conducted during my field research in South Africa in 2012 and 
2014. They involved (emerging) church elites speaking about their personal opinions regarding unification 
and not in the name of the particular church body, e.g. General Synod or theology faculty, they represented. 
Their conversations and contributions are hence analyzed here as part of the popular discourse rather than 
in relation to the official leadership discourse. 
278 Pieterse and Steyn, Terugvoerverslag, 20.  
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unity debates. In this perspective, a merger between URCSA and the DRC is not merely 
considered unfeasible. It would be disadvantageous to either church, and notably, beyond 
God’s desire for Christians to live together only in spiritual unison. As we saw earlier, 
church leaders regularly point to their members’ skepticism to account for the failing 
unification process. But who are these members and what motivates their position?  
 Opposition to unity generally reaches beyond the churches’ historic divisions by 
race, class, region or theology. Critics are found in both black and white congregations, 
rural and urban, poor and wealthy. They emerge in conservative and liberal church 
media, in the Free State as well as the Western Cape regions. But background and 
situation do influence the intensity with which members express their critique and how 
they form their own and others’ identities around it. The most antagonistic voices inside 
the DRC tend to be white and based in struggling rural areas in the Free State or 
Transvaal. They describe themselves as bearers of the original DRC identity that is 
Reformed, socially conservative and Afrikaans speaking. Their contributions appear in 
Afrikaans media such as Die Kerkbode or Die Volksblad, on blogs like Hier Sta Ek [Here 
I stand] or in online discussions on the DRC’s official Diversity Forum.279 Relevant 
sources also include regional synod meetings and consultations, especially in the Free 
State, and Reformed theology articles or books. These often present a broader critique on 
																																																								
279 The Diversity Forum was an online discussion forum started at the official DRC website in 2010. It was 
deactivated after little more than a year due to personal attacks and removed from the website. Some of the 
discussion is still available at the conservative website Glo die Bybel [Believe the Bible]: 
http://glodiebybel.co.za/index.php/ngk-diversiteitsforum-m.html. Visited at 4 December 2015. 
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current directions inside the DRC, whether in terms of church unity, Belhar, or 
interpretation of the Scriptures, that are perceived to undermine its core traditions.280  
 On the other end of the spectrum among black and colored URCSA communities, 
a quite different profile appears. The most vocal opposition to unity here has long been 
expressed through the church magazine URCSA News.281 Published and read by only a 
small number of URCSA members primarily in the Western Cape, the magazine is hardly 
representative. Yet, its often controversial statements on unity return in informal 
conversations with URCSA leaders and theologians across the country. That these 
opinions are rarely written down apart from URCSA News publications is an interesting 
feat in itself. While the lack of established media outlets and resources certainly play a 
role here, it also signals URCSA’s strong identification with the idea of unity. 
Challenging this idea happens mainly in off-the record discussions or while emphasizing 
the DRC as the major problem, not unity itself. 
This last point is key to almost all critique. Rarely do members question the 
principle value of unity for their church and for their personal beliefs. In an article posted 
on the Hier Sta Ek blog, a DRC affiliated author begins his attack on URCSA and Belhar 
with the statement that “I am absolutely in favor of church unity.”282 Throughout URCSA 
																																																								
280 This position emerges with vehemence in the book Die Trojaanse Perd in die NG Kerk: Die Kanker van 
Evolusie en Liberalisme [The Trojan Horse in the DRC: The Cancer of Evolution and Liberalism. The book 
was published privately in 2010 by a group of authors, most notably Henrietta Klaassing and Hennie 
Mouton, and has been heavily debated inside the DRC for its rigid opposition towards evolution theory and 
homosexuality in the church. 
281 Throughout my visit to South Africa in May 2014, URCSA leaders indicated that URCSA News was 
about to be reorganized and that they expected a change in the paper’s leadership to result in a more 
supportive position towards unity. In 2015 it was still unclear how this reorganization would proceed. 
282 Piet Theron, “Nooit weer synode toe” [Never return to the synod], Hier Sta Ek Blog [Here I stand Blog], 
25 June 2013, http://hierstaanek.com/2013/06/30/belhar-instrument-van-eenheid-of-kerkskeuring/.  
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News, contributors proclaim unification as the ultimate goal that should never be 
compromised.283 They employ the same broad religious terminology that emerged in the 
churches’ leadership discourse, including references to a God of unity and Christ’s 
message of reconciliation of all people regardless of color or class. Remarkably though, 
such notions appear in this context as reasons not to pursue actual integration of the four 
Reformed churches. Unity in spirit is considered, especially among DRC critics, 
sufficient to obey God’s wishes. The Bible makes no mention of the need for a visible 
unification of all churches that exist in the world, but rather embraces their diversity. It is 
within this diversity that they are united through their shared belief in Jesus Christ. As 
followers of the son of God and with their common basis in the Reformed tradition, Piet 
Strauss argued in Pilgrimage to Unity, the DRC and URCSA are already one.284 The 
former General Synod leader and professor in theology at the University of the Free State 
thus expressed a sense of redundancy prevalent among both churches. Many DRC 
members wonder what an official merger would add to the churches’ existing bond as 
family members and fellow Christians. They do not oppose contact between black and 
white congregants per se. On the contrary, interracial interaction is strongly encouraged. 
But it should occur as a result of spontaneous actions from within the community and not 
because church leaders say so.  
																																																								
283 See for instance: “Samewerking” [cooperation] is not unity, says Dr. Daniel Maluleke,” URCSA News, 
21 July 2008, 10. 
284 Reggie Nel and Howard Du Toit (eds.), Ons Pelgrimstog Na Eenheid / Our Pilgramage to Unity. 
Conversations on Healing and Reconciliation Within the Dutch Reformed Church Family (University of 
Pretoria, 2007), 93-94. 
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 The notion of “joint projects” returns here. DRC critics of unification often 
prioritize small-scale pulpit exchanges or a joint church bazaar285 over national structures, 
claiming that the former allow the various church communities to engage with each other 
while maintaining their distinct identities. Inside URCSA, few mention such joint 
projects due to the term's negative connotation. It is broadly considered a code for the 
DRC to resist any formalized alignment with the black Reformed churches while 
upholding the appearance of interracial collaboration. Nonetheless, URCSA members 
also doubt the added value of a formal merger. They caution against its legal 
ramifications and fear a repeat of their church’s destructive property conflicts with the 
DRCA.286 Again, the overall value of unity remains unquestioned. It should have 
occurred long ago, immediately after apartheid ended. But when considering the present 
deadlock, URCSA critics similar to their peers at the DRC, prefer a gradual process that 
starts at community level. A white and black congregation might pray together in a 
special joint Pentecost service during the week, but then return to their respective church 
buildings on Sunday to worship God in the language and style they feel most comfortable 
with. It is through such grassroots initiatives that the churches express their unity as 
fellow instruments of God’s will on earth, much more so than through infinite meetings 
on how to integrate presbyteries and synods. 
 Resentment towards structural unification furthermore feeds on members’ 
pervasive distrust of their leaderships and what is widely viewed as excessive church 																																																								
285 A pulpit exchange in this context involves an URCSA and DRC congregation that exchange ministers or 
join each other’s worship services for a number of Sundays. A church bazaar involves a fair usually 
organized on church property at which members sell small home items or baked goods, often for the benefit 
of a common public cause. 
286 “Re-unification: Judges show the legal way,” URCSA News, 11 December 2007, 5. 
 
221	
	
bureaucracy. “It is the red-tape that keeps us divided,” said a DRC affiliated theology 
student Stellenbosch University in reference to the unification process.287 In both the 
DRC and URCSA, members are increasingly frustrated with the enduring impasse this 
process appears to be in. The difficulties are partly attributed to clashing personalities and 
the fixation with church rules and regulations. Above all, however, outrage is directed 
towards leaders’ inability to reach an agreement on the Belhar Confession. The constant 
back and forth on its adoption in a new united church has triggered deep contempt among 
the churches’ constituencies. DRC members wonder why so much energy and money is 
spent on a doctrine nobody reads or needs. In an extensive discussion on the topic at the 
church’s official Facebook page, a contributor noted: “I think the DRC misses the point - 
ministers can better visit members than spend so much time on confessions.”288 Others 
referred to the Belhar debates as mere church politics, a way for liberal leaders in wealthy 
suburbs to divert attention from the real problems rural communities are facing as their 
churches empty and their traditions fade.289 
Meanwhile inside URCSA, many complain that leaders fail to understand what is 
truly needed. The churches should be talking about the meaning of Belhar, not about the 
form in which it will one day be included in a church order few members are even aware 
of. According to the Dean of Stellenbosch’ Faculty of Theology, Nico Koopman, the 
Confession pertains to URCSA’s identity as an autonomous institution with its own 																																																								
287 Conversation, DRC student Stellenbosch Theology Faculty, 26 March 2014. 
288 NG Kerk [DRC] Facebook Page, 16 September 2013. 
https://www.facebook.com/NGKerk/posts/10153427805885001. 
289 See for instance: Johannes De Koning, “Om te Belhar of nie,” Woord-Skatte Gemyn op Tsumeb Blog 
[Mining Word Treasures in Tsumeb Blog], 21 October 2013, 
http://skattegemynuitgodsewoordintsumeb.blogspot.com/2013/10/om-te-belhar-of-nie.html  
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dignity. 290  The urge for Belhar’s adoption relates to a much deeper yearning for 
recognition of this identity, as well as an ingrained fear of domination by the DRC. 
Belhar also addresses the inequalities that still linger between the churches and their 
communities. The vast disparities in wealth, education and living circumstances should 
be the main concern of both churches’ leaderships today, whether or not they are working 
towards official unification.  
 
The critique that debates about unification and Belhar deflect the churches from problems 
inside and among their communities is pertinent. It emerges in relation to DRC 
congregations situated in poor rural areas or deteriorating city centers. For them, the 
church’s focus should be on local challenges of crime, unemployment and care for the 
elderly. We also find it among struggling URCSA communities that rather want their 
leaders to help pay for ministers and church buildings than travel across the country for 
unity talks with the DRC. A letter to URCSA News utters a member’s vexation with the 
resources spent on such talks, urging the church to “leave the DRC (and church family)” 
and concentrate on the “neediness and poverty within our congregations.”291 Inside both 
churches, emphasis is put on resolving one’s own problems before reaching outward. 
Where URCSA used to be paralyzed by property disputes and the DRC stuck in debates 
about social and moral questions, unification has long been far from a priority. On either 
side, critics argue that efforts to merge two churches that can barely retain their own 
																																																								
290 Conversation, Nico Koopman, 17 February 2014. 
291 Zack Mokgoebo, “Los die NG Kerk (familie) uit” [Leave the DRC (family)], URCSA News, 12 
December 2008, 10. 
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members will likely exacerbate internal tensions. Collaborations with the DRC have in 
the past caused frictions between black and colored URCSA communities when the 
former would favor certain congregations and for instance provide a black church with 
more financial support than a neighboring colored one. DRC members in turn expect that 
engagement with URCSA could result in the departure of entire congregations and even 
regional synods that do not agree with the latter’s demand to include Belhar in a future 
unity agreement. Many also fear that such an agreement will compel them to partner with 
ailing URCSA communities, generating conflicts in and among both churches about how 
to evenly distribute the few resources available. In this perspective, an official church 
merger is not only redundant or a distraction. Unification, ironically, has become 
associated with potentially lethal polarization. It constitutes a severe threat to the internal 
solidarity communities say they need to survive in South Africa’s hostile environment. 
Beyond material loss, church members dread the ultimate demise of their identity. 
In a united church, DRC participants in a Western Cape Consultation wondered, “will we 
still hear Afrikaans,” or “will the new General Synod force us to sing Xhosa-songs?”292 
Identity tends to be described firstly in terms of language, culture or social values. But 
contributors to the unity debates do not shy from discussing racial dimensions. On the 
DRC side, regular references surface to the white Afrikaans character of the church. It 
should be maintained to prevent even the last “Afrikaner-Bastion” from falling.293 The 
unity discourse obtains a politicized quality here. It triggers negative connotations with 
																																																								
292 DRC Western and Southern Cape, Opsommend Verslag: Konsultasie-vraelyste oor Kerkhereniging 
[Summarizing Report: Consultation Questions about Church Reunification], 2007.  
293 Pieterse and Steyn, Terugvoerverslag, 32 
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South Africa’s post-apartheid transition and the chaos and insecurity the black majority 
government would have generated. In Die Kerkbode Coenie Burger, a DRC leader 
generally in favor of unity, recognized that his constituents are fed up with change. “We 
are all a little bit transformation-tired.”294 Unification presents yet another transition for a 
community that for the past two decades has experienced a deep sense of bereavement. In 
the words of Burger: “We have not only had to surrender power (not a bad thing 
actually!), but we also had to see how many of the things we love and care about were 
taken away.”295 From this perspective of loss, URCSA tends to be equated with the ANC: 
another black majority threatening to outnumber and culturally diminish the white 
minority. URCSA members meanwhile fear having to relinquish their traditions for the 
sake of racial integration. Many carry with them a deep apprehension of white power, 
internalized through decades of oppression.296 The DRC is still considered a strong and 
wealthy institution that could easily dominate needy black and colored congregations. 
With little hope of the DRC adapting to their customs, they are concerned about 
potentially painful concessions they would have to make in the practical implementation 
of unity. In future integrated structures, would there still be space for key aspects of 
URCSA’s identity, from the traditionally extensive singing and clapping in black 
congregations to, evidently, explicit support for the Belhar Confession? 
																																																								
294 C. Burger, “Wat is aan die gebeur met ons? [What is happening with us?], Die Kerkbode, 10 November 
2006, 9. 
295 Burger, “Wat is aan die gebeur met ons?” 9. 
296 The sense of an internalized suspicion of white power comes up in many conversations with URCSA 
theologians and leaders, for instance with Pieter Grove, 5 March 2014; and Marie-Anne Plaatjies Van 
Huffel, 20 February 2014. 
 
225	
	
 The surfacing of racial identities in the above line of unity critique is confusing. 
Beyond entrenched patterns of prejudice, it conveys the comprehension that church 
unification touches upon chief concerns regarding the future of South Africa. It is not 
merely about two churches joining hands, but about the larger process of reconciling the 
nation’s historic divisions. This realization however appears a source of exasperation 
rather than inspiration. Considering church relations in the context of racial integration, 
DRC critics argue, puts the church in a volatile position, alongside national leaders who 
employ the “race card” towards their own political interests.297 They lament the pressure 
put on their congregations to unify, and adopt Belhar along the way, in order to prove the 
departure from apartheid. It would capitalize on feelings of guilt, rather than the message 
of the Bible. It also brings back a past most church members seek to forget. “The DRC is 
now open for all races - is that not enough?”298 Its members ask why URCSA wants their 
church to once again deal with matters of race after it closed this chapter in the 1990’s. 
Racial bias is no longer the issue. Churchgoers say they simply prefer to worship in 
familiar settings, involving people with similar backgrounds, whether in terms of race, 
language, upbringing or social-economic position. Blaming today’s divisions on racism is 
beside the point as well as an easy excuse to discard a far more complex reality. Inside 
URCSA, we come across another argument towards a similar dejection. Its leaders 
emphasize the need to look beyond race especially when considering an emerging trend 
of URCSA members leaving to join DRC churches. These members tend to be coming 																																																								
297 “Teenstanders van Belhar word afgedreig met die rassisme kaart” [Opponents of Belhar are threatened 
with racism card], Hier Sta Ek Blog, 23 August 2013, http://hierstaanek.com/2013/08/23/teenstanders-van-
belhar-word-afgedreig-met-die-rassisme-kaart/. 
298 Pieterse and Steyn, Terugvoerverslag, 30. 
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from middle class, higher educated, Afrikaans speaking colored communities.299 They 
gradually blend into suburban white churches that worship in Afrikaans and better match 
their lifestyles with shorter services and more casual dress than is common in URCSA 
churches. Racial boundaries might be crossed here, but this is not the kind of integration 
URCSA envisions. It signifies once again the lingering threat of the former mother 
church taking control of black and colored communities. Color has a part, but should 
always be discussed alongside issues of power and inequity.300 
The sense of threat reoccurs throughout the Reformed church debates and seems 
intrinsically linked with how the communities view their past and present position in 
society. The domination of one group by the other remains a raw nerve. For black and 
colored communities, apartheid never completely ended, whereas white communities 
claim increasing discrimination at the hands of the current regime. In either case, the 
church emerges as a prime site of group protection. It is often romanticized among critics 
of unification as the one space in an ever changing and confusing society, where they can 
find continuity and familiarity. In this ideal, the church figures first and foremost as a 
social body vested in the community it serves. Its main priorities involve the spiritual, 
and quite often also physical care of the people in its immediate environment along with 
the preservation of social order. It is an order mostly conceived of in local context. The 
church answers to the needs of a particular region, town or neighborhood and reinforces 
the social bonds and identity of its community. Davies has described the focus on local 
solidarity as a historical trend among Afrikaners and key to their survival strategy as a 																																																								
299 For more on this topic, see sections 5.2 and 5.3 in this dissertation.	
300 Interviews, Marie-Anne Plaatjies van Huffel, 20 February 2014 and 6 March 2014. 
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group.301 It returns not only in the DRC’s unity discourse, but also in that of URCSA. 
Internal cohesion is valued over engagement with the rest of society. The Biblical 
imperative of unity is employed here not towards embracing differences, but rather to 
avoid them. 
 Beyond this imperative it is remarkable how little religious language occurs 
among opponents of church unification. They mostly rely on secular rationales to claim 
boundaries around culture, race, ethnicity and language. These four categories are used 
interchangeably without any one of them being singled out as major identity marker. If 
anything, the churches themselves tend to be recognized as the primary indicator of group 
boundaries. It happens often in combination with another category like race or language, 
as a way to differentiate for instance between a black Xhosa and an Afrikaans speaking 
URCSA community. This brings us back to Mitchell’s discussion on the “thick fabric” 
religion provides to an otherwise thin ethnic affiliation. Following the unification 
critique, this appears the case in both churches as they reiterate the importance of 
buttressing their communal identities through specific faith traditions, texts and rituals, 
instead of merging them into one united church. Conversely however, race is mentioned 
repeatedly as the defining characteristic of the different churches. It is the church identity 
that remains thin without the distinct customs of the racial communities that attend them. 
In this narrative, the DRC would no longer be the DRC without the solemn Afrikaans 
preaching style its white constituency prefers, while URCSA could just as well dissolve 
																																																								
301 Davies, Afrikaners in the new South Africa, 99-129. 
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into the DRC if it no longer provides a home to the lively songs and healing prayers of its 
black and colored congregants.  
 Whereas the above discussion exposes mostly parallels between DRC and 
URCSA critics of church unification, it should be said that the two groups rarely agree 
with one another in public. Both present the other as major impediment to the kind of 
spiritual grassroots unity to which they claim to aspire. Above all, the two sides attribute 
the strained relationships inside the church family to the other’s attitude towards Belhar. 
“If it was not for Belhar, we would have long been united,” Piet Strauss is known to 
proclaim.302 But even without the controversies surrounding the Confession, Strauss 
expects DRC constituencies to find reasons for keeping unity at bay. A similar sentiment 
is found among his colleagues at URCSA who, while strongly committed to the basic 
premises of unification, see few immediate prospects for the project. 303 Even when 
Belhar would be accepted, they are unsure if it would be enough to bring the deeply 
divided churches closer together. Important to note here is that the various camps 
represent perhaps crucial but by far not the only dividing lines in the church family. 
Church actors often dither between multiple views on unity, borrowing from both 
supportive and critical perspectives to help make sense of their vastly diverging realities. 
 
What nonetheless stands out in this section is the almost unanimous agreement that unity 
skeptics should not be cast aside as segregationists or proponents of apartheid. Only a 
very small minority claims to desire a return to the old regime. Most others vouch support 																																																								
302 Interview, Piet Strauss, 17 April 2014.  
303 Conversation, John Letsie, 4 April 2014. 
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for at least the idea of unity, but with strong reservations regarding its implementation 
through a structural merger of the DRC and URCSA. Their arguments exhibit the 
profound entwining of religious and theological power with social identity, political and 
racial power. Opposing unity has become a way through which church members express 
their position towards post-apartheid South Africa. It presents a deep commitment to the 
local community as a way to survive amidst enduring insecurity and engrained distrust of 
national authorities. The churches’ search for unity, including a solution for the Belhar 
question, has been made synonymous here with South Africa’s problematic transition 
towards full democracy. The Confession and its convoluted role in the anti-apartheid 
struggle provides a discursive instrument through which unity opponents inside the DRC 
make their case that the churches should not engage themselves in thorny political 
conflicts and instead focus on members’ immediate concerns. URCSA critics also 
employ the Confession as rhetoric weapon, but rather to bolster their claim that seeking 
unity with a church that refuses to accept the black churches’ core confession is a waste 
of scarce resources and time. All relate the churches’ plan to realize a visible union at 
national level with the country’s handling of diversity. Forced integration, whether at 
school or at work, has for black, white and colored come at the cost of social cohesion 
within the various population groups without offering a working alternative to ensure 
safety and trust in society. Until such safety is felt, the churches remain more than ever 
havens in which communities withdraw from anything associated with the complex 
world outside, which at this moment comprises both unification and Belhar.  
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A church for the world          
 
“[I]nstitutional unity is a prerequisite for restoring the legitimacy of the public witness of 
the churches of the DR family… Practice what you preach!”304 With his elaborate 
defense of church unification, Etienne Dawid de Villiers represents a circle of South 
African Reformed theologians who believe in the absolute necessity of structural unity 
for the church family’s future. Only together, can the Reformed churches sustain their 
presence and adhere to the gospel’s call to foster love and forgiveness on the African 
continent. The academics are not alone in this belief. They find support in popular church 
magazines, among ministers and members of middle class churches in the suburbs of the 
Western Cape, and notably, among a younger DRC and URCSA generation. The profile 
of unity supporters thus tends to be higher educated, younger, urban and relatively well-
off in comparison to the above discussed critics. They also send letters to Die Kerkbode, 
write on blogs such as Die Ander Kant [The Other Side], and contribute to Facebook and 
online discussion forums like Kerk in Konteks [Church in Context]. They appear to be a 
small group, with the same names reoccurring across the various media outlets. Yet, they 
often belong to existing or future elites and have been central to reinforcing and 
disseminating the churches’ official unity message. Once again, URCSA is conspicuous 
by its absence in these debates. Its only active media outlet, URCSA News, might publish 
every now and then a leadership essay supporting church unification, but has otherwise 
remained largely on the opposing side. The informal conversations I conducted with 																																																								
304 D.E. De Villiers, “The interdependence of public witness and institutional unity in the Dutch Reformed 
family of churches,” Verbum et Ecclesia 29 (3) (2008): 741.  
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theologians and students as well as local leaders will therefore be of particular 
importance to obtain a better understanding of the pro-unity rationale inside URCSA.  
 In both churches, this rationale builds to a large extent on what De Villiers calls 
the “Reformed approach of transformation.”305 It involves the conviction that God not 
only creates, but also transforms the world and that he calls the faithful to be instruments 
in his transformation work. This implies for Christian churches and individual Christians 
a critical responsibility to bear witness to public issues and actively engage with their 
societies. They should embody their faith by helping achieve God’s desire for a just and 
unified community of believers throughout the world. According to Dirkie Smit, such 
embodiment entails, in the context of South Africa, living unity, real reconciliation and 
compassionate justice. To act as public witnesses of God on earth, the churches need to 
join hands in concrete actions towards diminishing violence, prejudice and oppression. 
On the theme of unity, Smit bolsters his vision by referring to John Calvin’s discussion of 
baptism and the Lord ’s Supper. “How can those who have together been baptized in 
Christ through the one Spirit live without mutual love and unity? (…) How can we rush 
forward (like swine, says Calvin) to receive the bread and wine, yet not receive one 
another..?”306 His reference to the three central themes of the Belhar Confession is no 
coincidence. Theological reflections in support of unity among the Reformed churches 
often employ Belhar as means of endorsement. Even those resisting the Confession’s full 																																																								
305 De Villiers, “The interdependence of public witness,” 729-730. De Villiers contrasts the transformation 
approach with the two-kingdom and sectarian approaches that the author claims are gaining prevalence 
among DRC members. These two approaches generally stand for a separation between the Biblical realm 
of ethics and morality, and a public realm of politics, culture and economics, where the transformation 
approach calls for their integration. 
306 Dirkie Smit, “What does it mean to live in South Africa and to be Reformed?” In Dirkie Smit and 
Robert Vosloo, Essays on Being Reformed: Collected Essays 3 (Stellenbosch: SUN Press, 2009), 253. 
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adoption in the DRC, emphasize its value for the churches’ unification process.307 By 
outlining concrete ways in which the church can further social cohesion, Belhar would 
offer crucial language for congregations to translate their belief in being tools of God 
towards practical engagement across social divides. It ties the unification of the 
Reformed churches to their duty to help heal the nation and take care of its most 
vulnerable populations. To fulfill this duty, the churches need to be integrated, not just in 
spirit, but visibly before the eyes of the world. Separately, they lack the resources and 
above all the credibility to alleviate South Africa’s enduring inequalities.  
 The concern about credibility also surfaces as a distinct argument for unity in 
non-academic debates. A DRC minister writing in the popular and rather conservative 
Christian magazine Juig! [Praise!] lamented the great animosities between South African 
communities despite the fact that the vast majority is Christian. “That clearly does not 
rhyme with expressions in the Bible!”308 The author urged unity among the churches to 
prove to themselves and society that they take seriously the gospel’s message of justice 
and peace. As illustration he told the story of two regional DRC and URCSA synods that 
jointly helped mitigate a labor dispute in the Western Cape. There is more at stake here 
than the defense of Christian values. For many supporters of unity, enhancing the 
credibility of the church is a matter of sheer survival. It relates to the growing perception 
that the status quo of the Reformed church family has become untenable. For twenty 
consecutive years, the DRC has been losing members. The family as a whole can barely 
																																																								
307 De Beer, “Die Missionêre Waarde Van Die Belhar,” 61-63. 
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compete with South Africa’s wide array of denominations, particularly with the ever 
expanding charismatic church movement. 
Unification hence emerges as a key strategy to prevent the churches from falling 
into complete obsolescence. It presents a powerful symbolic move towards a closure of 
the past, and an opportunity to improve the churches’ standing in society from a last 
source of segregation to a model of reconciliation. Beyond symbolism, pro-unity voices 
highlight the practical benefits of family integration for the communities involved.309 As 
one single institution, the two churches will be better equipped to respond to the 
country’s many social ills. Both refer proudly to a 2013 statement DRC and URCSA 
leaders made with regard to hydraulic fracturing for the exploration of natural gas.310 It 
pressured government officials to prohibit this practice by expounding the churches’ 
shared faith-based concern for the environmental risks involved as well as the immediate 
damage it could inflict on their communities. Unfortunately for this side of the discourse, 
such initiatives remain rare. The lack of progress after two decades of unity talks has 
instigated quite some soul searching among the Reformed churches. Die Kerkbode and to 
a lesser extent URCSA News offer a relentless flow of articles and letters by members for 
whom their segregation has become a source of utter embarrassment. “As separate 
churches,” the late Reverend Nico Smit writes in Die Kerkbode, “the family of Reformed 
churches will retain the stigma of an apartheid church.”311 This is especially painful in 
light of the extensive deliberations the churches have conducted in recent years about 																																																								
309 Interview, Frederick Marais, 28 February 2014. 
310 Statement on The Proposed Regulator Framework for Hydrolic Fracturing. Signed by Dawid Kuyler 
(URCSA), Kobus Gerber (DRC), Ben du Toit (DRC), Victor Pillay (RCA), 7 November 2013.  
311 Nico Smit, “Die kerk wat ons moes wees” [The church that we must be], Die Kerkbode, 18 July 2008, 8. 
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their calling to spread Christ’s message of reconciliation in South Africa. Other sections 
of society, from schools to sport clubs, seem to be moving further ahead with this 
message than the very institutions that claim it intrinsic to their conviction. “If we as 
believers, the carriers of faith, hope and love, cannot agree with each other, how can we 
expect non-church people to take us seriously?”312 The churches are not merely losing 
their credibility. They are losing South Africa’s struggle to defeat the past.  
For many unity supporters, overcoming the past is equally if not more important 
than their churches’ survival. Unification constitutes an absolute necessity to make 
amends for the damage the DRC in particular caused the country by legitimating a racist 
system as the will of God. “Confessions of guilt,” URCSA theologian Jaap Durand 
argues, are but the “symptoms of a disease” if they don’t include visible change in the 
form of one new church association.313 Years of futile joint projects and ineffective 
exchanges at local level have turned institutional integration into the only viable path 
forward. It should happen sooner rather than later, without expecting full consensus. 
Unity supporters lament their leaders’ hesitance and flawed attempts to appease everyone 
inside the family. Yet, they also wrestle with the thought of unity exacerbating division. 
On the opinion pages of the Afrikaans newspaper Beeld, concerned DRC members 
debate how to respond to the intensifying animosities between pro- and anti-Belhar 
voices, those for and against unification, liberal and conservative or in the eyes of some, 
fundamentalist. Should the latter receive special guidance to come to terms with the 																																																								
312 Nico Jacobs, “Hereniging: kerk verloor geloofwaardigheid” [Reunification: church lost credibility], Die 
Kerkbode, 21 March 2008, 15. 
313 Jaap Durand, Ontluisterde Wereld: Die Afrikaner En Sy Kerk in 'n Veranderende Suid-Afrika [Degraded 
World: The Afrikaner and His Church in a Changing South Africa], (Wellington. South Africa: Lux Verbi. 
2002), 66. 
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inevitability of church unity? 314 Or should everyone learn to be more tolerant of 
differences, regardless of color, politics or income?315 To what extent is unity about 
diversity, and what will be the costs of a merger for the various cultures inside each of the 
Reformed churches?  
Especially this last question torments church members in favor of a fusion 
between the DRC and URCSA. Realizing the bitterness among the churches, many doubt 
its probability and call for restraint. Their rationale in favor of unity is rarely expressed 
without stipulations that, ironically, mirror many of the arguments critics have been 
making against it. One major stipulation pertains to the need to be considerate of church 
communities’ cultural and ethnic affiliations, particularly when it comes to language. 
Illustrative is a 2009 DRC document to encourage intercultural congregations. It showed 
concern with what is broadly considered the growing sentiment to reinforce Afrikaans as 
the main, if not sole, language of worship. The church, according to the document, 
epitomizes for many of its members a final stronghold of the language that once 
dominated the country, to the extent that some “bluntly refuse to speak any other 
language.” 316  The author urged congregations to be more open-minded but 
simultaneously stressed the need to be mindful of this sentiment. We find similar 
emotions inside URCSA. In a public church meeting for Afrikaans speaking URCSA 																																																								
314 Mynhardt Kok, “Begelei lidmate wat teen hereniging is” [Guide members who resist reunification], 
Beeld, 18 October 2013. Accessed at 20 October 2013,  http://www.beeld.com/opinie/2013-10-18-brief-
begelei-lidmate-wat-teen-hereniging-is; Daan Cloete, “New people for a new nation!… And the church?” 
URCSA News, 13 December 2013, 12. 
315 Jan Venter, “Skep ruimte vir ander se standpunt” [Create space for other person’s point of view], Beeld, 
3 October 13. Accessed at 20 October 2013, http://www.beeld.com/opinie/2013-10-03-brief-skep-ruimte-
vir-ander-se-standpunt. 
316 Andries N.E. Louw, The management of cultural differences between congregations who are working 
together, DRC Synodical Witness Forum, August 2009. 
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congregations in the Free State, members vehemently defended the right to be served in 
the mother tongue of their colored community.317 Barely able to sustain their church 
buildings or minister salaries, many claimed to fear the Suthu speaking majority in their 
regional synod taking over their minority churches. Speakers at the meeting expressed 
careful support for collaboration with Afrikaans speaking DRC communities instead, but 
under strict conditions that this would not compromise their distinct style of worshipping 
or decision-making power. 
 Language is rarely the real issue here. It nonetheless emerges throughout the unity 
discourse as a well-recognized problem that should be addressed before proceeding with 
unification. Language here symbolizes, and is continuously related to, other insecurities 
regarding the perceived debilitation of minority cultures by an increasingly dominant 
English media, political and education landscape. In the DRC, language debates tend to 
be entangled above all with discussions about its past and present identity as “volkskerk” 
for the Afrikaner people. It is an identity that is both recognized and denounced. “We are 
an Afrikaner church. We cry over this. We confess guilt because of this. We work very 
hard (at least I hope we do) so that this no longer needs to be true.”318 Cobus van 
Wyngaard, a young DRC theologian, repeatedly acknowledges on his blog Die Ander 
Kant the “volks” disposition of his church simply due to the fact that the vast majority of 
its members remain Afrikaans speaking and white. But he refuses to identify with this 
character and rather perceives himself as member of a broader ecumenical voice in South 																																																								
317 Conversation between the URCSA Moderature and representatives of Afrikaans speaking URCSA 
Congregations in the Free State, Heidedaal South, 1 May 2014. 
318 “Die NG Kerk praat saam Afrikaner organisasies?” [The DRC speaks along with Afrikaner 
organizations?] Die Ander Kant Blog [The Other Side Blog], 10 May 2012. 
http://anderkant.wordpress.com/2012/05/10/die-ng-kerk-praat-saam-afrikaner-organisasies/.  
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Africa. Wyngaard’s views find echoes among younger generations across the Reformed 
family. They feel less Afrikaans or Suthu or Xhosa than their parents and are comfortable 
speaking English, in and outside the church. Still, they are highly aware that their 
churches’ strong communal and language affiliations will not soon be broken down. 
Unity for them is on the one hand taken for granted as the future of the church family. In 
the words of a DRC student at Stellenbosch: “[I]ntegration is the reality of South 
Africa… today and tomorrow.”319 With little confidence in the churches’ ability to 
change however, few expect them to merge even in their lifetime. URCSA students I 
spoke with expressed their strong endorsement of integration at the level of the 
Stellenbosch Theology Faculty. But they doubted the advantages of such inter-racial and 
inter-church collaboration for their own congregations. “My priority,” one student 
asserted, “is to make the black church grow, to make it more involved in the broader 
community... and involve them in being part of the church.”320  
 Pro-unity voices, young and old, often reference congregations’ persistent 
communalism to account for the lack of progress in their cause. The persistent “apartheid 
state-of-mind” they discern among fellow churchgoers, emerges as another key argument 
for constraint. Theologian Piet Naudé admonished the DRC General Synod of 2013 
during his opening sermon, claiming that “[t]he biggest danger is to think small about 
God. To put God away in your tradition, your history, your language, your customs, or 
for that matter, your church order.”321 Naudé in the same sermon stressed his vision for a 
																																																								
319 Interview, DRC student at Stellenbosch Theology Faculty, 2 April 2014. 
320 Interview, URCSA student at Stellenbosch Theology Faculty, 3 April 2014. 
321 Piet Naudé, Opening Sermon at the DRC General Synod Meeting 2013, 6 October 2013. 
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united South African Reformed church “in ten years.” Many of his colleagues though, 
refer to members’ supposed narrow-mindedness to advise against setting any deadline on 
the unification process. DRC as well as URCSA leaders and theologians warn for 
undercurrents of racism that are impeding unification processes and that they fear will 
worsen if integration happens too rapidly.  
The perceived constraints of language, communalism and resistance to overall 
change have hence led unity supports to step down their ambitions. Many end up drawing 
the same conclusion as unity critics: that if any form of unity is desirable, it is best to start 
small. Instead of great new church structures, unity proponents increasingly lean towards 
local initiatives with congregations already willing to cooperate on concrete matters. 
Alternatively, they prefer the intermediate level of the churches’ social service programs 
through which DRC and URCSA members can jointly organize a soup kitchen without 
necessarily integrating their worship services. Both strategies are pointed out for their 
clear focus on community development in contrast to the general obscurity surrounding 
national unity talks. The latter is said to be alienating communities, whereas bottom-up 
collaborations offer an accessible path towards integration bereft of church politics. This 
message shows up prominently in Die Kerkbode and academic or semi-academic 
publications on the benefits of church unity.322 They involve examples of a DRC 
congregation helping out an URCSA community that has been unable to afford a 
minister, or of joint fundraising festivities or even dialogue sessions about the apartheid 
																																																								
322 See for instance Nel and Du Toit, Ons Pelgrimstog Na Eenheid / Our Pilgramage to Unity. Deel IV. 
Vandag: Verhale van Eenheid [Part IV. Today: Stories of Unity], 116-147. 
 
239	
	
past.323 Different kinds of “good news stories” appear in URCSA News. Instead of 
cooperation, signs of autonomy are celebrated here, such as the congregation of 
Polokwane that raised its own money for a new church building, or a Western Cape 
URCSA church taking the initiative to integrate Afrikaans and Xhosa speaking 
services.324   
 Amidst these diverging stories, DRC and URCSA actors make their support for 
unity conditional to its implications for communities on the ground. However high the 
stakes, church unification should not cause further membership decline or aggravate 
dependency patterns. Although some have called on church leaders to be more forceful in 
the process, most agree that unity cannot be coerced. The reluctance to deal with social, 
racial and cultural differences in worship is considered a major reason for people to leave 
churches that are trying to change their ways.325 Given the volatile circumstances of 
Reformed communities across the country, unification might bring more diversity than 
congregants can handle at the moment.  
In an effort to avoid further polarization, unity proponents have in recent years 
begun to align their agenda with their general synods’ broader focus on missional 
identity. This entails, as we saw in chapter three, the calling to spread the gospel and its 
message of love and reconciliation in South Africa. It appears a reversal of the initial pro-																																																								
323 “NGK en VGK hou saam ‘kerkjol’ op Groot-Brak” [DRC and URCSA organize church fair together at 
Groot-Brak], Die Kerkbode, 7 November 2008, 3; Attie Nel, “NGK en VGK vat hande” [DRC and URCSA 
join hands], Die Kerkbode, 7 March 2008, 3. 
324 “URCSA Polokwane celebrates God’ grace,” URCSA News,  11 December 2007, 2; “Scottsdene shows 
the way to a truly United Church,” URCSA News, 28 March 2008, 12. 
325 Braam Hanekom, “Moontlike Redes Hoekom Mense die Kerk Verlaat” [Possible Reasons for Why 
People Leave the Church] Nuusperspektief Blog [News Perspective Blog], 17 January 2014. 
http://www.nuusperspektief.co.za/?p=871. This article refers to research by a DRC General Synod 
committee on Congregational Development.  
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unity argument that the churches’ ability to bear public witness is contingent on their 
structural unification. Instead, DRC and URCSA communities should first expand their 
scope and actively engage with the larger society so that they will be better prepared for 
an interracial alliance in the future. They should support people in need wherever and 
whoever they are. Outreach might take place through official church programs or in the 
form of small group initiatives. It is through such social works, students, ministers and 
academics from the Western Cape to the Free State hope, that congregants will be 
exposed to the difficulties of their fellow South Africans and gradually overcome their 
prejudice. In this view, unification of the Reformed family is considered helpful, but 
scarcely a purpose in itself. 
 
The mentioned restrictions and their implications exhibit once again the incongruity of 
the Reformed churches’ pro-unification rationale. In popular and academic debates, unity 
supporters, mirroring in the churches’ leadership discourse, waver between on the one 
hand fervent beliefs in its practical and principled necessity, and on the other hand 
concern for deepening internal divisions as result of a future church merger. They seem 
determined to distance themselves from the unity skeptics, however, by offering an 
alternative vision for the church, and the country at large. It is a vision in which the 
church’s primary goal is to serve the world and all its various inhabitants, not just the 
immediate congregation. Racial and ethnic differences are to be welcomed, not evaded. 
The vision is carried by an extensive theology based on the Reformed tradition of public 
witness and transformation. And also here, the Belhar Confession serves as a key 
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discursive device, be it this time to boost the notion of visible integration as the only way 
forward for the Reformed family. In presenting this vision, DRC as well as URCSA unity 
supporters claim for themselves a moral high ground based on religious belief. Similar to 
Brewer, Higgins and Teeny’s discussion of Bishop Tutu and the TRC, they reiterate the 
special position of the church as a bearer of truth and justice. From this position it has a 
social obligation to foster racial integration in the heart of South Africa’s communities, 
for “who else but the church has to give moral guidance?”326 
Yet, unity supporters simultaneously and perhaps unintentionally, reaffirm major 
arguments with which skeptics question the attainability of such moral high ground. 
Especially notable is the reiteration of congregations’ supposedly innate communalism. 
Both camps seem to take their members’ attachment to a single racial or ethnic identity 
for granted and employ it as rationale against an official fusion at this time. Unity 
supporters will not go as far as the skeptics in warning of the endangerment of distinct 
community identities. They do however urge the acknowledgment of so-called identity 
crises among church members. It is remarkable how frequent terms like Afrikaner, 
Afrikaans, “volkskerk” and communalism surface in this discourse, often with negative 
connotations, but with the constant recognition that these remain significant traits of the 
Reformed church family, above all the DRC. The terms emerge in defense of not 
pursuing structural unification momentarily. “We are not ready now,” is said, without 
detailing what time and conditions would signal the churches’ readiness.  
																																																								
326 Malan, “Die NG Kerk se hantering van diversiteit – ‘n kritiese bestekopname.” 
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It would do the pro-unity camp injustice however to be cast aside as merely 
inconsistent. They might not have worked out the details. But through a constant deeply 
devout unity discourse, its supporters have helped create an intellectual climate, at least 
inside their own churches, that ties Christian credibility to interracial collaboration. This 
moves beyond the reconciliation paradigm of the 1990s. It calls for not just forgiveness, 
but brings into the living rooms of ordinary church members a concrete responsibility to 
cooperate across social divides. While faith is claimed as a major motivator here, it is 
certainly not the only one. In the end, unity supporters, again just as their critics, are 
primarily concerned for their churches to survive amidst the stiff competition from other 
religious and non-religious worldviews. They believe that a fusion of the Reformed 
family into one multiracial institution will help strengthen its position in South Africa’s 
intricate political and religious landscape. As such, adhering to God’s will for unity is as 
much a means to an end, as it is an end in itself. 
 
Divided identities           
  
The above debates offer an intriguing perspective on the entanglement of religious and 
social identities within the Reformed churches. The persistent contention over unity and 
Belhar has become a way for members across the church family, and to an extent across 
racial divides, to draw boundaries between themselves and others, between so-called 
conservatives and liberals, impoverished farmers and plush academia, those stuck in 
apartheid and those who moved on. Faith appears at the center, with both critics and 
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supporters claiming the gospel and their Reformed tradition as the basis on which their 
arguments are built. Paradoxically, the two camps employ almost identical Bible 
references to argue for quite a different take on the position of the church in society. Both 
claim their faith in the spiritual unity of the Christian church and in its moral duty to 
build bridges between people of different backgrounds. Both also pursue roughly the 
same goal of a continued presence and significance of the Reformed churches in South 
Africa. For the anti-camp this implies the rejection of any structural arrangement to 
enforce integration, whereas unity proponents perceive a clear message in favor of such 
an arrangement.  
To understand what then causes this antagonism, it is helpful to return to 
Lichterman’s discussion of religion and civic identity. As in his study of divisions inside 
a local church alliance in the United States, the clashing discourse on unification in the 
Reformed family has little to do with diverging principles or interpretations of faith, but 
appears chiefly about context and identity. Unification supporters often speak from a 
position of relative comfort and homogeneity in terms of social-economic class. As 
academics or based at middle-class urban or suburban church communities, many seem 
eager to fit in the new South Africa and portray themselves as open-minded citizens who 
have overcome the prejudices of the past. Church unification helps them map this 
identity. It offers a story of racial integration on their own premises, beyond the country’s 
polemical political landscape. Emphasizing faith as major motive is crucial to avoid 
association with contentious government initiatives of restorative action or black 
empowerment. It is also the faith-based identity those on the more liberal spectrum of the 
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Reformed family seek to put forward as part of the change they have made since the end 
of apartheid towards an inclusive church for everyone. 
 Conversely, critics of unification tend to view themselves and the church 
communities on whose behalf they write, in an enduring battle against the direction in 
which South Africa is heading. They do not want to conform to a rainbow ideal that for 
many failed to bring the welfare and equality it promised, but rather generated insecurity 
and chaos. In rallying against a church merger, critics find a way to manifest such 
sentiments and reinforce their groups’ boundaries. They present materially and culturally 
endangered minorities that need the church as a source of protection and stability rather 
than a platform for change. It is an identity that is primarily framed in worldly arguments 
of custom, language and, not seldom, race. If religious rationale is employed, it is to 
boost internal unity and solidarity through particular church rituals, along with a socially 
conservative interpretation of the Reformed faith.  
 Critics and supporters of unity hence not only use different styles to map their 
identities depending on the contexts from which they discuss a potential fusion between 
URCSA and the DRC. They also end up with widely diverging perceptions on what these 
identities imply in everyday life, from one that seeks to relate to the broader society, to a 
more inwardly focused sense of belonging. Both perceptions, and many in between, have 
long been present in the church family. They cannot be understood independently from 
the discussions tearing the churches apart towards the end of the former regime. 
Questions about the potential benefits or disadvantages of the separation of church 
communities by group identity are as relevant today as they were in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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The main difference is that all sides generally agree these days on the detrimental effect 
of the way segregation was enforced during apartheid. Whether separation practices are 
inherently bad remains for many undecided. A climate of political correctness inhibits 
contributors to the popular and academic debates to express what many across the 
Reformed family, and across both camps, will quietly admit in conversations: that in their 
daily realities, they still prefer to worship in separate churches.   
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Conclusion 
 
Following the above unity discourse, one wonders whether it comprises a mere cloak for 
the same old segregated church, or a truly new vision of a transforming institution. It 
would not be the first time that the Dutch Reformed Church employed an official 
vocabulary of inclusiveness while inwardly sustaining its position as the Afrikaner 
“volkskerk.” During much of the apartheid period, the church said it aspired to unity with 
the black Reformed churches, at least spiritually. From the moment it opened its doors to 
non-white members in the late eighties, the DRC reaffirmed its mission to be a 
welcoming place for all South Africans. But most of its in-door debates continue to 
reveal a church highly protective of its white Afrikaans-speaking character and 
suspicious of outside influences. It emerges implicitly when leaders stress the importance 
of consensus to avoid a schism in the church’s traditional membership base, and 
explicitly among members urging the preservation of their “Afrikaner bastion.” URCSA 
is problematic in different ways. Unity is intrinsic to its identity, but has been 
compromised ever since the church’s establishment. Discourse by its leadership abounds 
with hostility towards the other churches URCSA claims to pursue a merger with, chiefly 
the DRC. Leaders and members often justify the reality of segregation among their own 
congregations as a consequence of local differences. Meanwhile the church lacks a 
coherent policy to tend to the many different languages of these local communities, 
providing documents in either English or Afrikaans if a choice is given at all. 
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 Nevertheless, both churches have for two decades now persisted in a certain ideal 
of church unification. This in itself presents a significant departure from Smith’s 
discussion of the DRC’s religious-nationalist past. Emphasizing the increased 
effectiveness of a joint interracial institution to act as instruments of God on earth, the 
unity vision breaks with the long prevalent notion that the Bible urges the separation of 
different racial communities and their churches. It also undermines the basic premise that 
the church serves to enhance these communal identities. The church might still be a space 
where local culture is expressed, but should in the vision of unity proponents, always 
seek to engage with the broader society. As such, unification not merely comprises an 
ideal for the future. It evinces a particular understanding of the position of the church and 
its members in society today as public witnesses of God’s wish for justice for all of 
humanity. Notable here is furthermore what is not mentioned. No references are made to 
a chosen nation or the idea of sacrifice for a sacred territory, whether in official, popular 
or academic debates. What used to uphold the DRC’s myth of ethnic election appears to 
be forgotten or willfully ignored. When one of its pillars, the covenant between 
Afrikaners and God, does reemerge, it is rephrased towards an almost diametrically 
opposite goal of forging a joint agreement across different communities, rather than one 
single people.  
 Compared to the old apartheid doctrines, today’s unity discourse hence seems to 
present an actual innovation. A key intricacy remains the ongoing discussion within the 
church family about its practical implementation. Here we find not only a gap between 
words and deeds, but also between faith and reality, religious rationale and secular 
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interests. Spiritual terms have crucially helped the DRC and URCSA to map the common 
fundamentals on which to base their future united church. The main document employed 
here, the Belhar Confession, has however evolved into a rhetorical object symbolizing the 
improbability of unity rather than its potential to resolve the churches’ embedded 
divisions. This is emblematic for the larger unification discourse. Leaders have despite 
their increasing pragmatism on this matter continued to use a mostly religious and moral 
line of argumentation to convince their constituencies of the need, or rather the Biblical 
imperative, of unity, that pays little attention to the political, racial and social-economic 
tensions congregations face in their struggle to survive. Highly sensitive to any form of 
change and lacking details on how this change could benefit them, communities have 
been turning against unification proposals. Similar to Belhar, church unity now 
epitomizes church polarization. Contributors to popular debates ask what unification, 
even when done in the name of God, will do about the deterioration of rural and inner-
city communities, especially when the mere idea of unity generates so much friction. 
How will it prevent a further decline of membership, compensate for the loss of ethnic 
dignity or language, or help congregations compete with other denominations? 
When church leaders do respond to such questions, they often fall back on a 
largely secular default discourse of community preservation. They emphasize over and 
again that unity will not undermine the very unique traditions of each individual church 
and its local congregations. Leaders talk about culture where members allude to racial 
and ethnic distinctions. Either way, they reaffirm the profound attachments their churches 
have long claimed to exclusive identity groups. This is often accompanied with mutually 
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stereotypical language. DRC members find the loose style of black and colored 
congregations incompatible with their own, or URCSA warns of the domineering 
character of the white church. For neither church, has the spiritually induced unity 
discourse been sufficient to disentangle the profound religious-ethnic and racial 
affiliations at play here. Perversely one could say, it has spawned further divisions within 
and between the churches. 
 The intertwining Claire Mitchell and others denote between religious, ethnic and 
racial identities thus remains a significant element of how South Africa’s Reformed 
churches present themselves, inwardly and outwardly, in favor of, or opposed to 
unification. Across the board though, the churches agree this does not necessarily impede 
a sense of belonging that transcends social divisions. The shared belief in Christ along 
with a deep-seated commitment to the land of South Africa continues to tie the various 
groups together, whether they like it or not. Significantly, the churches’ past appears a 
source of bonding as much as division. The fact that they have not visibly overcome the 
legacy of apartheid is painful for everyone. Throughout formal and informal church 
debates, this reality has instigated intense self-reflection, if not outright self-flagellation. 
DRC and URCSA communities may vastly disagree about what happened during and 
after apartheid. They seem to find each other in a discourse of frustration with the status 
quo, and in the awareness that they can only change it together. 
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CHAPTER 5. Joining hands in prayer, but not in the church 
 
Over the past two decades, the Reformed churches have concentrated on moving their 
institutional discourse and practice away from segregation. The separate reality of most 
congregations forms a thorn in the side of unity proponents and evidence for many in and 
outside the Reformed family that it remains unable to put its apartheid past behind. What 
tends to be overlooked here are the gradual changes happening within church 
communities on the ground, not necessarily in conjunction with national processes of 
unification or reconciliation, but rather in response to constantly altering social-economic 
circumstances as well as broader dynamics of religious change. Church members may 
resist formal efforts to integrate their home institution, but perceive little problem, or 
even inspiration, in engaging with other communities in a local soup kitchen or drugs 
prevention project. At this small scale, interracial contact appears easier than in the 
churches’ general synods. People find common ground in addressing local concerns and 
in a broad religious language of helping each other in the name of Jesus Christ. As with 
the churches’ changing discourse, problems however arise with such practical unity 
efforts. Not seldom do they end up deepening divides if they generate any sustainable 
change at all.  
 This chapter analyzes the implementation of the hoped for changes in the 
Reformed family, and the lack thereof, in the Western Cape, the Free State and through 
the churches’ social works programs in both regions. The provinces were selected since 
they account for two important and rather opposite developments inside the church 
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family. In the relatively wealthy Western Cape, the DRC and URCSA have been 
expanding local leadership alliances but with strikingly little involvement of 
congregations on the ground. The Free State rather represents a survival struggle that has 
forced church communities on either side of the old color line to consolidate their 
resources, whether they like it or not. The social works programs finally display a rare 
example of cross-community partnerships directed towards poverty relief. In both regions 
as well as the social works programs, increasing emphasis is put on the need for a 
grassroots approach to racial integration in the church family. Communities are invited to 
contribute to the national unification process by furthering contact between different 
churches and racial or ethnic communities at their own local level. Only very few do so, 
and even less succeed. The intricacies at play here will be studied on the basis of field 
studies in five communities, urban and rural, and four social programs. They display 
stories of intentional transformation and accidental change, strategies and challenges in 
overcoming entrenched racial, ethnic and social-economic divisions. It is important to 
note the predominant focus of these stories on white and colored communities. Black 
Reformed communities have generally remained more secluded and less involved in the 
churches’ transformation process. The fact that there are barely any cases of black and 
white or even black and colored unity initiatives indicates a crucial void in this process 
that to this date has received little recognition among the Reformed churches at large.  
 
 
 
 
252	
	
Overview congregations and church organizations 
 
This table presents an overview of the congregations discussed in this chapter and 
whether or not integration has taken place on the level of church organization, leadership, 
worship, exchanges or social works. The congregations comprise communities in 
Stellenbosch and Cape Town in the Western Cape, and in Bloemfontein, Ladybrand and 
Philippolis in the Free State. Included are also the four Reformed church organizations 
that will be addressed in the section on social programs. The table indicates if any 
integration takes place (Yes); if there is no significant integration to speak of (No); or if a 
certain type of integration is not applicable (N/A).  
 
 
City / town 
and region 
Congregation or 
organization 
Integration in 
organization / 
leadership 
Integration 
in church 
worship 
Pulpit 
exchanges 
Joint 
social 
works 
Stellenbosch, 
Western Cape URCSA Rynse Yes No Yes Yes 
 
URCSA Ida’s 
Valley Yes No Yes Yes 
 URCSA Cloetesville Yes No Yes Yes 
 DRC Welgelegen Yes No Yes Yes 
 
DRC 
Moedergemeente Yes No Yes Yes 
Cape Town, 
Western Cape URCSA Wynberg* Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 DRC Wynberg* Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bloemfontein, 
Free State 
URCSA 
Heatherdale No Yes^ No Yes 
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City / town 
and region 
Congregation or 
organization 
Integration in 
organization / 
leadership 
Integration 
in church 
worship 
Pulpit 
exchanges 
Joint 
social 
works 
 DRC De Bloem No Yes No No 
Ladybrand, 
Free State 
DRC Ladybrand 
Moedergemeente No Yes No No 
Philippolis, 
Free State 
URCSA 
Bergmanshoogte Yes No No Yes 
 DRC Philippolis Yes No No Yes 
Western Cape Commission for Witness (CFW) Yes N/A N/A Yes 
 Badisa Yes N/A N/A Yes 
Free State Partners in Witness No N/A N/A Yes 
 Towers of Hope No Yes No Yes 
 
* Situation prior to breakdown in unification process 
^ Integration primarily between colored and black, but not with white communities 
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5.1. Religion, race and integration: A critical debate 
 
What does it take for faith communities to leave their comfort zones and engage across 
the social divides their places of worship so often cultivate? And what to make of the 
interracial or interethnic contact that evolves in such situations? These two questions 
returned throughout my field research in South Africa in 2012 and 2014. They emerged 
within DRC and URCSA communities that actively pursued interracial partnerships and 
among congregations that were forced into collaborations after they could no longer pay 
the bills independently. Most sought to explain their diverging trajectories through the 
specific settings in which they had occurred. It was this particular minister or the new 
demographics of that neighborhood that compelled the churches to alter their ways, or 
inhibited them to do so. Many of these particular stories relate to the changing position of 
religion we see in societies across the world though. The transition from institutional to 
individual religious experience, and from a single taken for granted truth to a pluralist 
landscape of religious and secular belief systems has not bypassed South Africa’s 
Reformed churches. On the contrary one could say, the churches appear primary 
examples of how this transition is affecting the ways in which faith communities are 
reshaping their religious identities, and subsequently, their social identities.  
 
A critical challenge the DRC and URCSA face is what Hervieu-Léger and Bruce 
amongst others denote as the weakening of religious authorities in modern society.327 																																																								
327 Bruce, “Cathedrals to cults,” 23; Hervieu-Léger, Religion As a Chain of Memory, 167-8. 
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Churchgoers prefer to develop their own individual relationship with God to observing 
ancient traditions based on doctrines that bear little affinity with today’s fast-paced lives. 
They tend to focus more than ever on the immediate concerns of their congregation rather 
than the collective rulings of national church leaders and general synods. Above all, DRC 
as much as URCSA members have over the past decades been following the trend 
scholars such as Berger and Casanova call the awareness of choice and change in 
contemporary religious experience.328 People who have been born into the DRC or 
URCSA increasingly recognize the availability of other religious options that are 
potentially more fitting to their personal needs. They try out different churches, spiritual 
workshops or no religion at all, and mix and match their experiences into an infinitely 
changing patchwork of worldviews. Many do return to their Reformed tradition, an 
interesting feat in itself, but with new expectations. They demand vibrant services with 
English gospel songs, modern Bible classes for children or space for meditation and 
spiritual reflection. The churches confront the dilemma of adapting to such new demands 
and lose those members who prefer a more conservative approach, or maintaining the 
status quo and miss out on new growth opportunities.  
 This dilemma also affects the churches’ approach to questions of racial 
integration. With their dwindling membership numbers and the devaluation of church 
authority, DRC and URCSA congregations can no longer afford the exclusive approach 
to membership they long sustained. Once homogeneously white Afrikaner, black or 
																																																								
328 Peter L. Berger and Anton C. Zijderveld, In Praise of Doubt: How to Have Convictions Without 
Becoming a Fanatic (New York: HarperOne/HarperCollins Publishers, 2009); Casanova, “Rethinking 
Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective.” 
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colored communities are falling apart as the original members leave for other churches or 
become absent members with little involvement in the community. Partnerships with 
other churches, including those that tend to different racial and ethnic population groups, 
are deemed necessary to help congregations survive amidst the steep competition of 
South Africa’s pluralist religious landscape. Still, congregations continue to resist such 
partnerships as they fear the loss of their particular church identities. They dread a 
takeover by the other party of the communal safe haven their church has always offered. 
As we will see in the following pages, churches across the Reformed family have been 
exploring different responses to deal with such dilemmas, from the full merger of 
congregations with a newly formed multiracial identity to a merely pragmatic agreement 
to share a minister position with the preservation of each church’s own and largely 
segregated services.   
The interactions that emerge through these divergent responses to diversity take 
us to another line of debate about the changing position of religion in today’s increasingly 
pluralist societies. To what extent should faith communities actively bring together 
people with different ethnic, racial and national backgrounds, or even with different 
worldviews or sexual preferences? In the United States, heated debates have emerged in 
recent years regarding the rise of so-called multiracial or multicultural Christian 
congregations. They involve congregations in which “no one racial group is 80% or more 
of the people.”329 These debates are extensive and cannot be done justice within the 
parameters of this research. Noteworthy however for the South African context are the 																																																								
329 Korie L. Edwards, Brad Christerson and Michael O. Emerson, “Race, Religious Organizations, and 
Integration,” Annual Review of Sociology 39, (2013): 213. 
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questions emerging here about the potential of racially diverse congregations to foster 
social cohesion. Proponents of church unification in the Reformed churches often 
perceive this potential as a given. While acknowledging the many challenges, DRC and 
URCSA unity supporters generally assume that the mere increase of interracial contact 
through the church will help improve relationships between their respective communities 
in as well as outside of the sanctuary. Studies of racial diversity in American church life 
similarly highlight its advantages. Central to the conclusions of for instance De Young, 
Emerson, Yancey and Chia is the idea that separate churches for the country’s various 
population groups reinforce racial segregation and stratification in society whereas more 
diverse congregations can help overcome communal tensions. 330  Stephen Warner 
famously speaks about “the capacity religion has to bridge boundaries, both between 
communities and individuals” through embodied ritual.331 Physically sharing meals and 
music in church would allow people from different backgrounds to bond and build 
religious solidarity. Scholars such as Yancey and Kim have additionally found that 
multiracial congregations tend to involve a greater diversity in terms of income and help 
foster more social-economic solidarity than in homogenous congregations.332  
 Besides these apparent benefits, scholars in the United States have been pointing 
out significant drawbacks of church integration. Well-known among them is Peter 
																																																								
330 Curtiss P. DeYoung, Michael O. Emerson, George A. Yancey, and Karen H. K. Chia, United by Faith: 
The Multiracial Congregation As an Answer to the Problem of Race (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
331 Stephen Warner, “Religion, Boundaries and Bridges,” Sociology of Religion 58:3, (1997): 217-218 
332 George Yancey and Ye Yung Kim, “Racial Diversity, Gender Equality, and SES Diversity in Christian 
Congregations: Exploring the Connections of Racism, Sexism, and Classism in Multiracial and 
Nonmultiracial Churches,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion Vol. 47, No. 1 (Mar., 2008): 103-
111. 
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Wagner’s argument that diversity can harm the growth of strong internally harmonious 
congregations.333 Other scholars emphasize that only very few congregations manage to 
build and maintain a diverse membership and that their impact remains limited to the 
individual level. Becker finds in her study of a liberal and conservative multiracial 
congregation in the United States the tendency to perceive race as primarily an 
interpersonal problem that can be resolved through more contact and spiritual self-
reflection about one’s own racist attitudes.334 Also Emerson and Smith indicate a trend 
among American Evangelicals to evade difficult discussions about institutionalized 
discrimination and rather focus on racial reconciliation between individuals. Tranby, 
Hartman and Edwards take this critique a step further. Not only are structural forms of 
racism dismissed in multiracial churches, they tend to be reinforced through the 
persistence of a dominant white culture and leadership at the cost of minority groups. 
According to Edwards, racial integration in the church usually does not move beyond 
symbolism. African-American or Hispanic churchgoers might be represented through 
certain emblems in a once chiefly white church, or through special holidays or services in 
their language. But rarely are they involved in the “more core congregational 
characteristics, such as the theological orientation, worship service structure, sermonic 
presentation, and leadership structure.”335 Even when white people comprise a minority 
in a multiracial church, their styles of worship, music and other religious traditions often 																																																								
333 C.P. Wagner, Our Kind of People: The Ethical Dimensions of Church Growth in America (Atlanta: J. 
Knox Press, 1979), 150. 
334 Penny E. Becker, “Making Inclusive Communities: Congregations and the "problem" of Race,” Social 
Problems 45.4 (1998): 470. 
335 Korie L. Edwards, “Bring Race to the Center: the Importance of Race in Racially Diverse Religious 
Organizations,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 47.1 (2008): 5. 
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prevail over those of non-white communities. For Tranby and Hartman, the white 
predominance in multiracial congregations demands a more critical deliberation of 
whiteness theories. Especially important in view of these authors is the recognition that 
American society is still largely organized along the norms of white Anglo-American 
culture in which whiteness is considered “mainstream” and everything else a deviation 
from the norm.336 When in a church setting, groups from non-white backgrounds mix 
with whites, the former are expected to adapt to the latter rather than the other way 
round.337 Church integration in these cases not merely conforms to the existing situation 
of white dominance in the country according to Tranby, Hartman and Edwards. It runs 
the risk of fortifying racial hierarchies and deepening divides between different 
population groups.  
 The above criticisms on multiracial churches in the United States are rare in the 
context of South Africa’s Reformed churches, but not completely absent. Research about 
the topic is limited to isolated case studies with little consideration of broader church 
unity or racial reconciliation processes. During my conversations however, Reformed 
leaders and theologians regularly noted the importance of incorporating critical race 
theories as well as their frustration with the lack of a more structural approach to the 
integration of the church family. One young DRC theologian, Cobus van Wyngaard, has 
																																																								
336 Eric Tranby and Douglass Hartman, “Critical Whiteness Theories and the Evangelical “race Problem”: 
Extending Emerson and Smith's Divided by Faith,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 47.3 (2008): 
346-349. 
337 Cobbs, Perry and Dougherty for instance found that in multiracial congregations in the US, explanations 
for racial inequality shift among black congregants from structural towards the individual causes more 
commonly mentioned among white congregants. See: R. J. Cobb, S. L. Perry, and K. D. Dougherty, 
“United by Faith? Race/ethnicity, Congregational Diversity, and Explanations of Racial Inequality,” 
Sociology of Religion 76.2 (2015): 177-198. 
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been particularly active in “reconstructing whiteness in the Dutch Reformed Church.”338 
In his assessment of the DRC’s diversity discourse, Wyngaard laments the lack of critical 
self-reflection. The church has in his view concentrated its pursuit of greater inclusivity 
on overcoming divides between black and white without contemplating persistent power 
dynamics or how these identity categories have been constructed and kept in place.  
Problematic in both American and South African debates about racial integration in the 
church is the reiteration of race as an identity category in itself. It may be recognized as a 
socially constructed category but nonetheless continues to be used by researchers as a 
way to differentiate between certain groups of people. This is often done while referring 
to the descriptions with which people present themselves. Also in this chapter, the terms 
of white, colored and black are employed in order to indicate self-described identities that 
should always be considered as social and deeply politicized constructions rather than 
predetermined group indications.339 Somers’ discussion of narrative identities is helpful 
in this respect.340 Seeking to move away from the a priori categorization of persons, she 
looks at identities as embedded within time, space and relationships, and above all within 
stories that change through time and space. The communities in which people live and 
the places where they end up working determine the ever shifting narratives through 
which they perceive themselves and the world around them. Which narratives 
																																																								
338 Cobus van Wyngaard, “The language of “diversity” in reconstructing whiteness in the Dutch Reformed 
Church,” in R. Drew Smith, William Ackah and Anthony G. Reddie, Churches, Blackness and Contested 
Multiculturalism (New York NY, 2014): 157-170. 
339 In the South African context these terms are not only very common but also often written with capitals. 
In this study I have, in adherence to current American scholarly debates about race and religion, chosen not 
to use capitals. 
340 Margaret R. Somers, “The Narrative Constitution of Identity: a Relational and Network Approach,” 
Theory and Society : Renewal and Critique in Social Theory 23.5 (1994): 605-649.  
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predominate in turn depend according to Somers to a great extent on the distribution of 
power in society. In the South African context with its long history of white dominance, 
the narrative of a racial hierarchy that favors white communities over black thus remains 
prevalent even as individual narratives have begun to shift away from a strict division 
into racial categories.  
 Also notable in current debates about race and religion is the absence of the 
religious change theories discussed earlier in this section. Focus is given to traditional 
expressions of religion through church institutions and congregations. Evidently, both 
retain significant influence on their members. The increasing versatility of these members 
as they move between different worldviews and identities is however also changing the 
ways in which they relate to members from other faith communities, and consequently 
other racial or ethnic communities. People might not meet each other inside the church, 
but find common ground in their beliefs during secular activities, whether at work, during 
voluntary activities or in school. A useful term here is what Nancy Ammerman describes 
as spiritual tribes. It relates to any space in which “a spiritually inclined person finds 
another person who is at least open to talking about the world in terms that include 
religious dimensions.”341 In a complex and increasingly secular context, people with 
different backgrounds build unlikely alliances on the basis of vaguely shared spiritual 
topics, values or perspectives on society. Such perspectives are still informed through 
particular religious institutions but not necessarily limited to their immediate members. 
For Ammerman, the notion of spiritual tribes helps understand religion as one element of 
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people’s cultural package. It provides a cue to others with similar elements that they can 
connect on the matter of faith if not on other matters. In South Africa, where people 
remain separated at so many levels, whether through racial categories, language or class, 
such cues can be essential to contribute to the country’s prolonged reconciliation process. 
Discussing a variety of cases, this chapter is aimed at uncovering instances in which 
religious connections emerge and what they imply for the potential of the churches to 
help overcome South Africa’s well-known divides.  
  
 
263	
	
5.2. Faith and frustration on the Cape of Good Hope 
 
In relative proximity 
 
Historically, both URCSA and the DRC have had a strong presence in South Africa’s 
Western Cape province. URCSA’s founding meeting took place in one of the many 
suburbs around Cape Town, the provincial capital, seat of the national Parliament, as well 
as South Africa’s second largest city. Both churches send their theology students to 
nearby Stellenbosch, a central academic hub and stronghold for Afrikaans speakers. 
Furthermore, the DRC regional synod of the Western and Southern Cape as well as 
URCSA’s regional synod in the Cape traditionally hold significant sway in the churches’ 
respective national leadership bodies. Especially the former is known for proposing key 
initiatives for the larger church family, notably on church reunification. These initiatives 
cannot be understood outside of the particular regional context of the Western Cape, or 
simply the Cape. 
 
Despite being among the wealthiest regions, the Western Cape faces the same type of 
problems that keep tormenting the rest of the country. Two decades after apartheid, its 
communities remain largely segregated by race and increasingly by social-economic 
position. Income gaps are sharpening and poverty has been unrelenting, particularly in 
the vast slums surrounding Cape Town. Whites tend to live in affluent neighborhoods, 
colored communities inhabit lower middle class areas while black South Africans are still 
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overrepresented in the impoverished townships. That said, the Western Cape tends to fare 
better economically than most other provinces and has made some strides towards 
residential integration. It stands out as the only province in South Africa not dominated 
by the African National Congress. Since 2009 the Democratic Alliance, the official 
opposition party led by Helen Zille, governs the region. The party finds its electorate 
mainly among the Cape’s proportionally high number of white and colored communities, 
48.8 and 15.7 percent respectively versus a national percentage of 8.9 for both in 2011.342 
Among either group, Afrikaans is the main household language, followed closely by 
English. If any racial mixing occurs in the Cape, it is primarily between these two 
communities. Several of Cape Town’s suburbs today show a gradual integration of white 
and colored South Africans.343 The latter have been moving upward on the social ladder 
and some can now afford middle class housing and private education for their children at 
schools offering both English and Afrikaans programs. The poorest areas meanwhile 
continue to be almost homogeneously black, just as the richest neighborhoods remain 
white. 
 With most people preferring to worship at a site nearby, churches in the Western 
Cape as much as elsewhere tend to reflect the racial composition of the neighborhood in 
which they are situated. The vast majority of Reformed churches in this region appears 
either white, black or colored. Residential segregation, and its persistent association with 
class and racial divisions, thus remains one of the most pivotal factors here keeping the 
																																																								
342 Census 2011, 16 
343 L. Hill and S. Bekker, “Language, Residential Space and Inequality in Cape Town: Broad-Brush 
Profiles and Trends,” Etude De La Population Africaine 28.1 (2014): 661-680.  
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various church communities apart from each other. However, as neighborhoods gradually 
change, so do the churches. A recent report on multicultural congregations showed some 
level of interracial mixing among 21% of Reformed churches in the wider Cape region 
(including the Eastern and Northern Cape provinces).344 Another 19% claimed they 
would like to be more multicultural. Among the key integrating factors, the report 
indicated the increased diversity of the community in terms of racial background and 
language within the church’s residential boundaries. While recognizing that most 
Reformed congregations still served a single ethnic group with its own language and 
traditions, the report suggested a rising level of diversity among churches participating in 
the study, or at least support for diversity. This support is significant. It emerges 
throughout surveys conducted among especially DRC church members in the Cape, 
asking them about their attitudes towards church unification and Belhar. Notwithstanding 
the broad critique that also exists here, these attitudes generally tend to lean towards a 
positive appreciation of both issues.  
 Such appreciation seems in line with, and is constantly nourished through, the 
wide ranging unification initiatives Reformed church leaders have been undertaking in 
the Cape over the past two decades. Well before the DRC’s General Synod entered 
official unity talks with URCSA, the regional DRC Cape synod had already begun 
structural collaboration with URCSA’s predecessor, the Dutch Reformed Mission 
Church. In 1991 the two churches jointly established the Commission for Witness (CFW, 																																																								
344 M.A. Van der Westhuizen, W. Van der Merwe and R. Van Velde, “Multicultural churches in 
intercultural ministries.” Report presented at the Multicultural Conference at Belville, South Africa, 22-23 
July 2014. Accessed at 3 March 2015,  http://communitas.co.za/taakspanne/gks/multikulturele-
konferensie/. 
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in Afrikaans: Kommissie vir Getuienisaksie in die Wes-Kaap) to coordinate their mission 
activities in the region. The DRC Cape synod was the only regional synod to submit a 
report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission about its role in the apartheid era in 
1997, the same year in which URCSA submitted its own report on behalf of the entire 
Uniting Reformed Church. The DRC Presbytery of Stellenbosch had made a similar 
submission one year earlier. These regional church bodies acted independently at the time 
and far ahead of the national DRC leadership that refused to cooperate with the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.345  
 In more recent years the Western Cape sections of the DRC as well as URCSA 
have continued to spearhead matters of unity and reconciliation in the church family. 
While the general synods of both churches remained bogged down by complex 
procedures, regional leaders established joint synod committees, merged presbyteries and 
gradually expanded other forms of cooperation across racial divides. One of their most 
significant initiatives in this respect comprised the Cape Convent on Unity in the early 
2000s.346 Another noteworthy partnership is found at the Stellenbosch University Faculty 
of Theology. In 2000, URCSA moved its theological education from the University of 
the Western Cape to the DRC's Seminary at Stellenbosch. Today, students from both 
churches might follow their individual tracks to prepare for ministry in either the DRC or 
URCSA, but they do so in the same building of the Stellenbosch Theology Faculty, with 
professors from across the different population groups, sharing daily classes and 																																																								
345 Christo Thesnaar, “Reformed churches’ struggle for justice. Lessons learnt from their submissions 
before the TRC,” in Mary-Anne Plaatjies and Robert Vosloo. Reformed Churches in South Africa and the 
Struggle for Justice, 385-399. 
346 For more on the Cape Convent, see section 3.3. in this dissertation. 
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extracurricular programs. Nico Koopman, an URCSA trained theologian, has since 2010 
been serving as the Dean of the Faculty. Difficulties abound in determining 
responsibilities and balancing financial resources. The DRC generally dominates the 
faculty in terms of numbers and resources. It nonetheless serves as a site for 
unprecedented collaboration between URCSA and the DRC as well as a basis for other 
church organizations to tag along and pursue inter-church educational partnerships.347  
 These strides towards church unity attest to the distinct situation of the Cape. The 
presence of a relatively large colored and white population comprises another vital factor 
contributing to integration efforts in this region. It has made unity processes different 
here than in other parts of the country where you find only small white and colored 
pockets among a majority black African population. The two communities share the 
Afrikaans language as well as a more formal expression of their faith than is common 
among black Reformed communities. This is partly due to the history of the church 
family. Where black Reformed churches used to be allowed, if not encouraged, to 
maintain their own customs, the colored churches were expected to mirror the DRC as 
much as possible. Current disparities also play a crucial role here. Colored and white 
South Africans tend to display higher levels of income and schooling than black 
population groups.348 In the context of the Cape, the two communities increasingly meet 
at the work place, in middle class neighborhoods and at school. 
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In addition to the many church unification projects of the region, the social-
economic and demographic context hence plays an important part in bringing the long 
divided DRC and URCSA communities closer together. They are evidently far removed 
from each other as a result of both past and present inequities, but nonetheless appear in 
relative proximity, especially in comparison with the other population groups present 
within the Reformed family. It is therefore all the more remarkable that the Cape’s 
Reformed family continues to be organized largely along the lines of the old apartheid 
categories. Despite the many unity initiatives and proclaimed support for integration, 
URCSA and DRC congregations across the Western Cape tend to have little to no 
contact. How have local churches and their leaders been approaching this challenge, and 
what hampers their efforts? 
 
The story of Stellenbosch: Uniting structures, not communities 
 
Arriving in Stellenbosch, visitors often wonder whether they are still on the African 
continent. The picturesque university town boasts freshly painted buildings from the 
Dutch era that have been turned into hotels, restaurants and boutiques for the many 
tourists who are touring the nearby wineries. Students, most of them white and Afrikaans 
speaking, flock the sidewalk cafes and well-kept parks. Neat middle and upper class 
suburbs surround the city on one side. On the other side, and far out of sight for the 
tourists, the impoverished township of Kayamandi sprawls into the farmlands. URCSA 
maintains a small congregation here, led by a white minister whose salary is largely paid 
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for by other Reformed churches in town. Among them is the DRC Moedergemeente 
[literally “mother community”] and DRC Welgelegen, both situated in wealthy white 
neighborhoods with a strong presence of professors, university staff and their families. 
Besides supporting Kayamandi, the two DRC churches partner with the URCSA 
congregations of Idas Valley, Cloetesville and Rynse. Rynse is the only church left in the 
city center with a majority colored membership. Others were pushed out during the 
apartheid era as part of the Group Areas Act. The neighborhoods of Idas Valley and 
Cloetesville evolved during this era as specifically designated areas for Stellenbosch’s 
large colored community, which in 2011 amounted to 52,2 % of the entire city 
population.349 Most of the residents here are poor or lower middle class, working in the 
service industry if they are employed at all. Drugs and crime are major problems in Idas 
Valley and Cloetesville as well as in the predominantly black township of Kayamandi. 
 The church partnerships formed amidst these disparities have since 2006 been 
coordinated through the Uniting Presbytery of Stellenbosch (UPS). UPS is one of the few 
presbyteries nationwide in which the DRC and URCSA have merged their organizational 
structures. Presbyteries of the two churches in most instances oversee the congregations 
in their area separately, each being responsible for disciplining their own ministers and 
church council members, coordinating as well as closing existing congregations, or 
establishing new ones. By integrating these activities into one presbytery, the Reformed 
churches of Stellenbosch have taken a major step towards unification at a local level. 
They meet each other on a regular basis, discuss common concerns and foster direct 																																																								
349 Statistics South Africa, Stellenbosch. Based on Census 2011. 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=993&id=stellenbosch-municipality. Retrieved at 3 April 2015.  
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collaboration between the DRC and URCSA congregations under their jurisdiction. 
During my research in South Africa, Stellenbosch was often mentioned as a unique 
success story of church integration. For many church actors on the ground however, the 
story had arrived at an unsatisfactory impasse. Years of partnership and extensive 
projects to overcome racial divides had done little to change the reality of a deeply 
segregated city and church life.  
The disillusion I encountered in 2012 and 2014 stemmed from a long history of 
high-minded though often ineffective unity efforts within the boundaries of the 
Stellenbosch Presbytery. They still garnished appreciation among the churches involved 
but also increasing doubts as to how much a formal approach to integration could really 
achieve. Robert Vosloo, a Stellenbosch theologian, and Theunis Botha, a minister at one 
of the city’s DRC congregations, have both described the Presbytery’s unification process 
as a treacherous road.350 As early as 1976, Stellenbosch presbyteries of the Reformed 
Church family began meeting each other in an official capacity through the so-called 
Liaison Committee. This Committee had been established in response to the Soweto 
uprisings in order to offer the churches a space for conversation to help mitigate tensions 
between their respective communities. Although the Liaison Committee had little direct 
impact in the increasingly dire social-political situation of the late seventies and early 
eighties, it did pave the way for further cooperation. 1987 saw the constitution of the first 																																																								
350 R. Vosloo, “The presbytery and church reunification in the Dutch reformed family of churches in South 
Africa : the story of the United Presbytery of Stellenbosch,” in Allan J.A. Janssen Collegial Bishop?: 
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Combined Presbytery in which the DRC and URCSA’s predecessor, the Dutch Reformed 
Mission Church, would regularly gather to discuss immediate common concerns of both 
their presbyteries. This stage also died a slow death and by the early nineties all joint 
operations were suspended.  
 From here, it took another fifteen years for the current Uniting Presbytery to take 
shape. During those years Reformed church leaders of Stellenbosch gradually expanded 
their personal relationships, moving from deep mutual suspicions to a slowly emerging 
sense of trust and partnership.351 This resulted not only in the ultimate merger of the once 
racially divided presbyteries. It also generated a host of initiatives to stimulate interaction 
between Stellenbosch’ black, white and colored church communities, from minister 
exchanges to joint bazaars or mutual visits to each other’s communities. Significant 
limitations remained in place though. Until the churches would officially unite their 
national leadership structures, UPS could only make recommendations on matters of 
congregational oversight. Final decisions were left to the individual DRC and URCSA 
presbyteries that still gathered separately in addition to the Uniting Presbytery. The very 
word “uniting” indicates that UPS had come a long way, but that its process of 
integration was far from complete.  
 In recent years the UPS has, despite the ongoing struggle to complete its 
trajectory, boasted several accomplishments in gathering URCSA and DRC communities 
through concrete structures and activities. For the attending ministers the Presbytery first 
of all constituted a platform for conversation and relation building. Its frequent meetings 																																																								
351 Vosloo, “The presbytery and church reunification in the Dutch reformed family of churches in South 
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formed an opportunity to address pragmatic matters inside their congregations, from 
finances and vacant minister posts to the planning for joint celebrations. Beyond such 
practicalities, UPS was proudly presented as a model of reconciliation for the rest of the 
church and the broader society. “[The church] family of Stellenbosch is established to put 
the past squarely on the table.”352 Above all, ministers across the involved churches 
stressed the UPS’s importance for engaging with the broader Stellenbosch community 
today. It offered them a space to share their concerns for the city and develop functional 
agreements away from church- and national politics. A DRC minister depicted UPS as a 
“ground level alternative to frustrating unity efforts at synodical level.”353 As an example, 
the minster referred to the consensus the Presbytery reached on the Belhar Confession 
and the incorporation of its core principles of unity, reconciliation and justice into its 
faith basis and daily work. According to an URCSA colleague, the Presbytery had 
crucially helped improve interracial relationships by in his case changing the way he 
viewed white communities and particularly the old mother church.354 Being able to 
connect with DRC ministers on a regular basis had mitigated his long held suspicions of 
racism in the church. Ministers on both sides claimed they felt comfortable to reach out to 
each other and address personal problems as well as issues related to their congregations. 
They aired their challenges of convincing congregations to be more socially engaged, or 
asked for help in dealing with the detrimental conditions for congregants working at the 
farms around Stellenbosch. The direct communication channels were furthermore used to 
																																																								
352 UPS Press release in Eikestadnuus, December 2010. Quoted in Botha, Ons sal mekaar nie los nie, 82. 
353 Interview, DRC minister, 12 March 2014. 
354 Interview, URCSA minister, 19 February 2014. 
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ask direct support for certain community initiatives, like the realization of a new youth 
center in the neighborhood. 
 As a second key accomplishment, and strategy to expand such direct contact, 
church actors involved with the UPS pointed to its twinning program. The program 
encompassed close partnerships between specific congregations, such as URCSA Rynse 
with DRC Welgelegen, and DRC Moedergemeente with URCSA Cloetesville and Idas 
Valley. In most cases, the congregations in question shared a history of contact, dating 
back to the apartheid era. Unlike in the past, the UPS emphasized in a 2010 meeting 
report that the twinning partnerships were built on equal terms and with respect for each 
church’s individual input.355 Ministers of twinning congregations met periodically, in 
some cases every month, to exchange news about their communities. They initiated 
activities together like a joint Easter service or pulpit exchanges in which the ministers 
take turns in preaching at each other’s congregation. At community level, members were 
encouraged to join in social works and fundraising events of each of the participating 
churches. They invited each other to their annual church fairs, to volunteer together in 
soup kitchens or jointly visit other communities in need. One URCSA members told of 
her experiences with an inter-church prayer group in which women from various 
Reformed churches and other denominations in Stellenbosch developed a food program 
to help out impoverished families in cases of emergency. The experience she said not 
only helped build trust among the women. It also took them into situations they would 
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otherwise avoid. “I would never go to Kayamandi on my own. The church takes initiative 
and that is how we meet and get to know one another.”356 
 Members as well as ministers praised such partnerships, especially when they 
translated to tangible poverty relief. “Contact works better,” a member at the twinning 
DRC congregation explained, “when we create something together… We need exposure 
to each other to help change perceptions.” Often times, the joint initiatives took place in 
the context of a broader ecumenical effort. A particular favorite was Stellemploy, a 
church-based non-profit organization that provided career training and opportunities to 
Stellenbosch’ many unemployed. DRC Moedergemeente and its twinning partner 
URCSA Cloetesville both supported the NGO along with half a dozen other churches. 
They did so financially or in kind by for instance advertising the skills of unemployed 
church members in local papers and helping to link them up to Stellenbosch businesses. 
Stellemploy for one URCSA minister exemplified the kind of project the churches truly 
needed, one that required an “external vision for the community, not just for yourself.”357 
Opportunities for direct interaction between the different racial communities remained 
scarce though. Church involvement with programs like Stellemploy tended to be 
coordinated by a small number of ministers and lay leaders who liaised with the social 
works program on behalf of either the DRC or URCSA separately. They asked members 
to volunteer, but few members were engaged in the further implementation of the 
program, and even less collaborated across the still prevalent racial boundaries. 
																																																								
356 Interview, URCSA Rynse member, 24 March 2014. 
357 Interview, URCSA minister, 26 March 2014. 
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 With respect to member engagement, Stellenbosch ministers as well as 
congregants ultimately referred to the successful Agape initiative that had evolved under 
the umbrella of the UPS in the early 2000s and was primarily run by individual 
churchgoers. Members from DRC Moedergemeente and URCSA Idas Valley and 
Cloetesville had begun the initiative of meeting at each other’s homes to “eat together, 
pray and talk.”358 Agape, a New Testament word for love, gradually turned into a regular 
activity, engaging up to 100 members in small group dinners and occasional celebrations 
throughout the year. Participants described Agape primarily as a vehicle to get to know 
each other. “Through Agape,” an URCSA member recalled, “I made friends inside the 
DRC. I still easily pick up the phone to call them and drop by.”359  
 Besides friendship, the dinners were meant to engage church members from 
various racial and social-economic backgrounds in faith-based dialogues about topics of 
general concern. Minutes of the meetings that were held, reveal extensive discussions 
about local youth unemployment, drug abuse or the larger state of South Africa after 
twenty years of democracy. The intimacy of each other’s houses was considered to help 
churchgoers speak freely about their points of view on these matters. The major goal was 
not to find agreement, but to “expand comfort zones.”360 In a context where communities 
seldom meet, this exposure in itself constituted a significant accomplishment for many 
participants. Reports of the Agape meetings generally reported members’ emphasis on 
their joint prayers and concrete activities and rarely connected with the UPS’ greater 																																																								
358 Interview, Agape participant, 24 March 2014. 
359 Interview, Agape participant, 24 March 2014.  
360 Agape Fees, 14 April. Verwagtinge soos gelys teen die muur [Agape Party, April 14. Expectations as 
listed at the wall.] Meeting document obtained from Agape member and organizer, author and date not 
included. 
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attempts towards structural church unity. Members recognized the “disillusion of these 
attempts in the past, in the eighties when the process failed and we had status issues.” 
These days they still felt persistent “prejudice and alienation” hampering their daily 
contact but stressed their ability to overcome these challenges through faith.361 With 
broad references to the belief in Jesus Christ and the Bible’s message of love and 
reconciliation, the Agape initiative appeared determined to overcome the divisions of the 
past and the present on an individual level. Sharing food also comprised a crucial 
spiritual element in participants’ interpersonal reconciliation. “It reminds of the ordinary 
meals that Jesus had with his disciples. When we have an Agape meal together, it is a 
celebration of our love and communion.”362 After a range of meetings and informal get-
togethers, Agape quite suddenly came to an in end in 2013. Some of the involved 
URCSA and DRC congregants continued to meet as friends, but no longer as part of a 
church based activity. When asked why Agape ceased to exist, those involved chiefly 
pointed at the moment that ministers took leadership of the initiative. “We needed them 
[the ministers] to steer it, but they did things differently… they looked at it too critically 
and seemed afraid to just do it.”363 
 
The last comment signifies a greater problem at stake throughout the UPS’ unity 
programs. After years of trying to bring the different communities closer together, the 
Stellenbosch Reformed churches remained as divided as ever. Ministers claimed their 																																																								
361 Agape 2010, Gedagtes waaroor ons kan gesel by die Agape vergadering [Thoughts about which we can 
talk during the Agape meeting], 22 April 2010. 
362 Agape 2008, Fees VG Cloetesville saam met NG Moederkerk Stellenbosch [Agape Celebration URCSA 
Cloetesville together with DRC Moederkerk Stellenbosch], 16 April 2008. 
363 Interview, Agape participant, 24 March 2014.  
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members continued to resist integration. The members themselves said they were waiting 
for the ministers and other church leaders to take charge and initiate new unity programs. 
Underneath these mutual accusations, a more complex picture emerged. It comprised two 
different worlds inside the same church family, the same presbytery, the same town. Race 
and class distinctions still determined these worlds, and as such shaped the major issues 
occupying the various congregations. URCSA congregations based in the largely colored 
neighborhoods of Cloetesville and Idas Valley confronted among the highest 
unemployment levels in the city. Their primary concerns included school dropouts, 
teenage pregnancies and alcoholism. A short drive away, DRC congregations found 
themselves in predominantly white neighborhoods dealing with what Theunis Botha has 
called the “bad fruits of luxury.”364 Its middle to upper class membership was becoming 
more individualistic and losing commitment to the church community. Their children 
were leaving the DRC all together, hopping from charismatic church to a center for 
Buddhist spirituality, or to no religion at all. 
 Whenever DRC and URCSA members and ministers met within or beyond the 
context of a unity initiative, they had to face up to these stark divergences. For the 
ministers inside the Uniting Presbytery, this implied a constant struggle to align their 
priorities and coordinate efforts. At DRC Welgelegen for instance, the major focus had 
been for years on how to invigorate the congregation and bring in a younger generation to 
compensate for its declining numbers. The church for long enjoyed a reputation of being 
rather “snobbish and stiff,” a church mostly for academics and theologians affiliated with 
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Stellenbosch University.365 These days, Welgelegen provided separate services for its 
youth with lively music and activities, as well as the possibility to choose between a 
traditional early morning service or the significantly more popular and relatively informal 
late morning service. At URCSA Cloetesville conversely, an emptying church was the 
least of the minister’s problems. On most Sundays, the church was bursting at the seams 
as all members, young and old, joined with the band in singing and worshipping. Many of 
these members though were not able to pay their annual dues and were in need of food 
services to supplement meager salaries or government benefits. During one of the 
interviews, the minister had to cut the conversation short to talk to a member about his 
drug addiction. The poverty in his congregation, the minister conveyed, was often 
“invisible for white people.”366  
 While the Uniting Presbytery offered an important platform to share these 
problems, it also confronted the ministers with the present inequality amongst 
themselves, primarily in terms of finances. DRC employees generally earned higher 
salaries than their URCSA colleagues in similar positions. Time and again, tensions 
flared up about what caused this unevenness as well as the right way to handle it. A 
particularly delicate topic constituted the Presbytery supported salaries of white ministers 
inside colored or black URCSA congregations. Should they be based on URCSA 
standards or rather follow the higher DRC rate? The Presbytery lacked clear guidelines 
from the churches’ national leadership about how to respond to such questions. As one of 
the first Presbyteries to unite, the UPS was still experimenting with the practical 																																																								
365 Interview, DRC Welgelegen member, 10 March 2014. 
366 Interview, URCSA minister, 17 March 2014. 
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implications of the inter-church collaboration. Financial aspects were especially complex 
given the fact that the DRC side of the Presbytery remained significantly wealthier than 
the URCSA side. With its middle to upper class membership and historic capital, the 
DRC in Stellenbosch presided over vastly more funds and as a consequence contributed 
more to any joint venture of the two churches. Support from the Uniting Presbytery for a 
minister’s position in fact meant the DRC paying out his or her salary. The unequal 
distribution of resources not only caused tensions but also confusion among the ministers 
about the correlation between race and money. URCSA ministers suspected that their 
white colleagues were receiving more support from the DRC than colored and black 
ministers. DRC ministers meanwhile feared, and preemptively resisted, the day they 
might have to surrender parts of their income to the black and colored ministers inside the 
Presbytery as part of a national unity agreement. Neither had a clear idea of what would 
or should happen to arrive at more equal terms. 
 Despite their different financial situations and concerns, the ministers found 
common ground on a personal level. Where the new arrivals benefited from a common 
educational background at the Stellenbosch Theological Seminary, the older generation 
was able to build on years of joint meetings and other opportunities to get to know each 
other. Church members lacked such opportunities. They rarely encountered people from 
the other Reformed churches. When encounters did occur, they involved a significant 
effort on the part of the visiting congregation to overcome both physical and 
psychological distance. A joint Pentecost service held for the twinning congregations 
DRC Welgelegen and URCSA Rynse one evening in May 2012 epitomized this. On their 
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way to Welgelegen, members from URCSA Rynse first had to wait for an arranged bus 
service to take them to a neighborhood on the other side of town. Upon arrival, the 
congregants entered a large modern church, sharply contrasting with their own small 17th 
century building that once served enslaved communities. They joined a service in formal 
Afrikaans, different from the dialect most were used to, with unfamiliar songs and rituals. 
At the end of the service, members from each congregation grouped together separately 
for tea and soup before heading back to their own respective neighborhoods. On the way 
home, URCSA members noted they had hardly spoken with people from the other 
church, as both sides had seemed unable to cross the worlds keeping them apart. 
 Noteworthy in this example is that relatively speaking, the members from 
Welgelegen and Rynse were not that far apart in terms of for instance language, lifestyle 
and to an extent income, especially when compared to much poorer communities such as 
Kayamandi. Despite such commonalities, members from both sides said they experienced 
the gatherings as difficult confrontations. Rynse congregants talked about how they 
remembered a time in which the people at Welgelegen were their bosses for whom they 
had to step aside on the streets, or avoid direct eye contact. One man recognized the 
freedom to enter the “white man’s church” as a significant achievement of today’s post-
apartheid South Africa, and that this should continue to be the major premise for future 
unification in the church family. The member nonetheless admitted, “I do not feel this 
freedom today.”367 On the side of Welgelegen, churchgoers also expressed a deep sense 
of discomfort with the prearranged unity meetings. In the words of a local business owner 
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and longtime Welgelegen member: “I do not want to engage with diversity in the 
church…. I already do so every other day of the week through my work. On Sunday I 
want a break.”368 “They [the joint activities] are too forced,” another more elderly 
congregant insisted, “it does not work.”369 The woman along with several of her fellow 
congregants also described the positive encounters they experienced with Rynse. Many 
praised the faithfulness of Rynse’s sizable membership and said they felt true inspiration 
during its worship service. A random Sunday at Rynse continued to attract some people 
from Welgelegen who have kept coming on their own account after the planned pulpit 
exchanges ended. Most interviewees however admitted that once the initial excitement 
had worn off, they felt more comfortable staying within the boundaries of their own 
church and that they had not returned to Rynse. 
 Conversations with other congregations inside the Uniting Presbytery reflected 
the overall experience of Rynse and Welgelegen. They revealed support for the 
fundamental idea of church unity, but not for what many referred to as forced contact. 
URCSA as well as DRC members described unification as a central obligation of the 
Reformed churches. It involved for both an active role on the part of the churches to 
foster love among their communities and joint works to improve their social-economic 
wellbeing. DRC members particularly expressed the hope that unity between the 
churches could strengthen their relief efforts in destitute parts of the city by engaging 
committed volunteers from URCSA who knew poverty first-hand. Among URCSA 
members, unity was more often thought of as a chance to raise awareness in the larger 																																																								
368 Interview, DRC Welgelegen member, 10 March 2014. 
369 Interview, DRC Welgelegen member, 10 March 2014. 
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white community, above all the business and farm owners among them, about the 
disparities facing Stellenbosch’ colored and black communities.  
 On either side however, members conveyed little faith in the existing unity 
programs to fulfill these hopes. Rather, the programs appeared a source of disillusion. 
Across the Presbytery, congregants lamented the near complete lack of interaction 
between them and the lack of visible integration despite the many efforts to merge church 
structures at national and local level. “There has been no deep change.” “We are still 
homogeneous, monocultural. We are too white and too rich.”370 With this last comment, a 
woman at Welgelegen specifically referred to the low DRC turnout at joint activities with 
other church communities. She felt that living in wealth and comfort had made it “easy to 
just give money… and not make contact.”371 During a group conversation at Idas Valley, 
congregants also wondered about the use of such activities, especially when the few 
whites who attended could “return to their farms or businesses afterwards only to 
continue the repressive treatment of colored workers.”372 Several claimed to have friends 
on “the other side” and acknowledged the vital sponsoring of their twinning partner DRC 
Moedergemeente to keep Idas Valley afloat. But they appeared torn about the extent to 
which their church should expand its contact with the DRC. Local friendships and 
financial support had not changed the structural inequalities between their communities. 
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371 Interview, DRC Welgelegen member, 10 March 2014. 
372 Interview, URCSA Idas Valley focus group, 5 March 2014. 
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“The church leadership should first move ahead [with unity]. Until then we are wasting 
time.”373 
 
Considering Stellenbosch’ disparate social-economic context, the frustrations emerging 
throughout the UPS’ unity programs are not surprising. The resistance ministers detected 
among members suspicious of integration builds on a long history of geographical, class 
and racial distinctions. But the story depicted here is not black and white. Many members 
who claimed to be disappointed with the churches’ unity process also stated their belief in 
its necessity. They generally valued initiatives like Agape and the twinning programs as a 
chance to meet each other and satisfy their curiosity regarding the various expressions of 
their Reformed tradition throughout the church family. Problems arose with expectations 
about the possibility of actual unification. Congregants often told me they craved such a 
larger vision towards one integrated institution. They deplored the churches’ failure to 
catch up with the rest of the country and demanded strong leadership to overcome their 
apartheid legacy.  
 Especially interesting here was the increasing awareness among URCSA and 
DRC members that further collaboration could generate mutual advantages. With the 
decline in members and commitment, DRC congregations looked at well-attended 
URCSA communities as source of inspiration as well as potential volunteers for their 
social works. Meanwhile the DRC no longer constituted a mere financial donor in view 
of URCSA members, but also a pool of experts and powerful business owners they hoped 
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284	
	
to involve in sustainable development efforts. In some twinning partnerships, ministers 
had begun to explore community activities in which the DRC offered skills and 
connections while URCSA members brought in the numbers and the knowledge of needs 
on the ground. Still, progress in this kind of collaboration remained slow and often barely 
visible for the communities involved. Without clear results nor perspective on national 
church unification, many URCSA and DRC members lost confidence in the entire 
process, whether it comprised formal unity talks or local partnerships. Awkward 
situations of formal togetherness seemed to reaffirm rather than bridge differences 
between the segregated church communities of Stellenbosch. The joint structures of the 
Uniting Presbytery perhaps inspired leaders across the Reformed Church family. They, so 
far at least, failed to galvanize church members, including those in favor of integration, to 
physically step out of their comfort zones. 
 
The Wynberg affair: Grassroots integration, structural barriers 
 
The town of Wynberg, one of Cape Town’s southern suburbs, has become synonymous 
in the Reformed Church family with high hope as well as deep despair of church 
unification. In 2008, the DRC and URCSA congregations of Wynberg did what their 
General Synods had been talking about for years. They established the Wynberg 
Collaboration Agreement to merge the two congregations into one multiracial church. 
This merger never materialized though. Following a chain of events, including the death 
of one of the involved ministers and various legal ramifications, the Wynberg integration 
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process fell apart. Today, the two congregations once again pray separately, just across 
the road from each other, with one notable exception. Part of the URCSA members, most 
describing themselves as colored, moved in with the still predominantly white DRC 
congregation, leaving behind their former church and community. 
 The story of Wynberg not only constitutes a case of unification gone astray. It is 
also a particularly well-documented story. The path towards the Wynberg Agreement, its 
clash with church orders and bureaucracy, and the ultimate collapse have drawn vast 
attention from Reformed church media and beyond. The DRC minister in question wrote 
a detailed report in addition to multiple articles about the process.374 The Presbytery of 
URCSA Wynberg kept track of each relevant decision and meeting between August 2007 
and April 2009.375 A quick search online reveals dozens of news articles, blog postings 
and Facebook discussions about the sad turn of events that had initially seemed so 
promising. What drove the communities of Wynberg to engage in these events in the first 
place, and how can we understand their apparent failure? 
 
As with the Stellenbosch Uniting Presbytery, the Wynberg unification process is 
intricately linked to its local context. Designated as a colored neighborhood during the 
apartheid era, Wynberg today is still home to a significant colored population of about 46 
																																																								
374 Reverend Danie Nel of DRC Wynberg shared this report with me: Danie Nel, Die Herenigingsprocess 
van Wynberg [The Reunification Process of Wynberg]. The undated and unpublished document covers the 
period from 2007 to 2010. Most of it can also be found on the DRC Wynberg website: 
http://www.ngkerkwynberg.co.za/Kerkeenheid.htm. In conversations with URCSA Presbytery of Wynberg 
the report was validated as an accurate presentation of the facts despite being written from the perspective 
of the involved DRC minister.  
375 URCSA Capeland 2009. Verloop van die Wynberg aangeleentheid [Order of events of the Wynberg 
affair]. Presented at URCSA Cape regional synod meeting, 15 October 2009. 
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percent, while whites make up another 24 percent.376 Poverty numbers are clearly higher 
among the first group, but recent years have seen the rise of a colored middle class that 
tends to be more educated and enjoy higher incomes than in the surrounding areas. The 
Afrikaans speaking and largely colored URCSA Wynberg illustrates this trend as one of 
the richest congregations in the greater URCSA Presbytery of Wynberg it is subject to. 
For long, the congregation stood in the shadows of the neighboring DRC Wynberg with 
its impressive historic church building and upper-class membership that comprised major 
leaders of the white Afrikaans community in the Cape. Since the 1990s however, DRC 
Wynberg has steadily been shrinking. Members are leaving and new arrivals, primarily 
from a nearby military base, tend to stay for only short intervals before they move out of 
the area again. Even though the congregation retained some of its powerful community 
leaders, the high turnover and unpredictability has spawned serious financial difficulties. 
It does not help that the congregation forms part of a troubled DRC Presbytery of 
Wynberg. The Presbytery was categorized in 2013 among the most stagnant in the 
region, struggling with finances, membership decline and overall isolation.377 Amidst 
these altering circumstances, the DRC and URCSA Wynberg came closer than any other 
Reformed community in the country to an actual merger.  
 In conversations during my 2012 and 2014 visits about how the near merger had 
come about, members and ministers on both sides marked their commitment to break 
with the churches’ past of segregation. As early as 1991, when the anti-apartheid struggle 
																																																								
376 City of Cape Town - 2011 Census Suburb Wynberg, July 2013. 2. 
377 Frederick Marais, De stand van gemeentes. Sinode van de NG Kerk Wes Kaapland. [The status of 
congregations. Synod of the DRC Western Cape], October 2013. 
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was still in full swing, the DRC and URCSA Wynberg church councils378 agreed to start 
meeting on a regular basis. Their aim according the DRC minister was to “talk 
openheartedly about the estrangement of the past.”379 The councils set out a path towards 
collaboration through a range of small scale and bottom-up initiatives. By the early 
2000s, the two congregations held services together at least once a month, sent their 
youth on joint church camps and had begun to merge the functions of their church 
councils. Members, especially council members, actively participated in many of these 
programs. Commemorating this period, many recounted the joy of getting to know each 
other as well as the powerful experience of interracial worship. “Such contact goes much 
deeper than interaction at work.”380 On the side of the DRC, members indicated their urge 
to “become less white.”381 URCSA members in turn talked about the excitement of 
“being accepted by whites.”382 The notion of bridge building, taking action at the 
forefront of the country’s transformation rather than staying on the backseat, also 
surfaced throughout these conversations. As we saw in Stellenbosch, DRC Wynberg 
congregants highlighted their eagerness for unity with their URCSA neighbors as a way 
to strengthen the church’s position in the community and enhance the effectiveness of 
their social programs. “They [URCSA] know what we in the rich suburbs don’t know and 
they are more active than we are.”383 
																																																								
378 These councils usually comprise of the minister and a small group of active members who take up 
responsibilities as deacons, elderly and treasury of the congregation.  
379 Nel, Die Herenigingsprocess van Wynberg, 10 
380 Double interview, Wynberg members, 1 April 2014. 
381 Double interview, Wynberg members, 1 April 2014. 
382 Interview, Wynberg member, 28 March 2014. 
383 Double interview, Wynberg members, 1 April 2014. 
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 Motivation to end segregation was one thing. Its practical implementation stood, 
and fell, by the Wynberg ministers and their personalities. These included from the 
beginning Reverend Dani Nel at the DRC along with his URCSA colleague and later 
president of Stellenbosch University, the late Reverend Russel Botman. Another 
powerful URCSA leader, Reverend James Buys, succeeded Botman in 1994. Buys also 
served as moderator of URCSA’s General Synodical Committee in these early years and 
became known as a strong, be it critical, proponent of unification with the DRC. Building 
on years of joint meetings and services, Buys and Nel together led their congregations, 
and particularly their respective church councils, into the unification process. They 
encouraged council members to work together, invited each other to their church 
activities, developed a thorough strategy and presented this to their respective 
Presbyteries. A 2007 Statement from Buys to the URCSA Presbytery of Wynberg 
revealed a pragmatic plan for the two congregations to merge their structures, including 
the full integration of Sunday services that would alternately be held at either of the two 
church buildings and led by one of the ministers. 384  The statement made for a 
groundbreaking moment in the national history of the two churches. For the first time an 
URCSA and DRC community committed to a tangible arrangement of church unification. 
An official Agreement of Collaboration expounded the congregations’ “decision to 
combine” with minute details, from the integration of minister responsibilities to a joint 
																																																								
384 J.D.S. Buys, Vertoe aan die Ring van Wynberg [Statement to the Presbytery of Wynberg]. On behalf of 
the URCSA Wynberg Church Council, 22-23 August 2007. 
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financial account.385 According to a closely involved DRC member, the Agreement 
merely constituted “a natural next step.” “We had already done everything else we could 
do in terms of cooperation. Becoming one congregation just made sense.”386 
 To the regional leadership of both churches, the Agreement made far less sense 
however. The URCSA Presbytery of Wynberg rejected it as inconsistent with URCSA’s 
national church order. Objections were also raised on the side of the DRC, particularly 
regarding the fulfillment of pastoral duties. Could DRC members still count on house 
visits by their own minister or enjoy baptisms in their own tradition once the two 
congregations were united?387 In 2009, the DRC and URCSA jointly expressed their 
reservations about the Wynberg Agreement in an official statement by their two Law 
Commissions. The Commissions denounced Wynberg’s proposition to conduct all 
Sunday services together. “This really is not possible.” (…) “Of course there can be joint 
services. Even at a regular basis. But this cannot replace the congregation’s own 
service.”388 Their statement came at a time of deep distress for the two Wynberg 
congregations and particularly for URCSA Wynberg. Its minister, Reverend Buys, had 
committed suicide a year earlier in 2008 and had been replaced by a new minister, Rev. 
Samuels, who appeared far more skeptical about the unity process and lacked the level of 
personal contact Buys had nurtured with the DRC Wynberg minister. With both 
																																																								
385 Ooreenkomst tussen NGK Wynberg en VGK Wynberg [Agreement between DRC Wynberg and 
URCSA Wynberg]. Original version, 2 September 2008. 
386 Double interview, Wynberg members, 1 April 2014. 
387 Kommentaar van die Sinodale Regskommissie (NGK) en die Permanente Regskomissie (VGK) op die 
ooreenkomst tussen die gemeente Wynberg (NGK) en die gemeente Wynberg (VGK) [Commentary of the 
Synodical Law Commission (DRC) and the Permanent Law Commission (URCSA)], 9 March 2009.  
388 Kommentaar van die Sinodale Regskommissie (NGK) en die Permanente Regskomissie (VGK), 9 
March 2009.  
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congregations, their ministers, Presbyteries and Law Commissions haggling over the 
details of the Agreement, Wynberg evolved into a church political quagmire. Its rapidly 
unfolding debacle became the topic of heated debates across the Reformed Church family 
and even in national press. “Wynberg’s dream has shattered.” 389  “Congregations 
‘divorce’.”390 “Church triumph rather becomes tragedy.”391 “Unification process not to 
the honor of God.”392 As Wynberg hit the media headlines, relationships between the two 
congregations and their regional leaders soured. Finally, the URCSA Presbytery of 
Wynberg pulled the plug and in August 2010 issued a moratorium on any further 
collaboration between URCSA and DRC Wynberg.  
 
What caused this sharp turn of events remained at the time of my field research a matter 
of great division inside the church family. Both URCSA and the DRC blamed each other 
for turning a genuine local effort into a battleground about national church unity. Both 
also emphasized the uniqueness of Wynberg. Things would have gone very differently if 
one of the central figures had not passed away early on in the process. Indeed, the tragic 
death of Reverend James Buys severely interrupted the relationships cultivated over time 
between the communities. But it occurred as problems were already unfurling. 
 First among them was the deep attachment between the congregations and the 
specific communities in which they were rooted. The DRC’s and URCSA’s Law 
Commissions hinted at this attachment when they warned Wynberg about undermining 																																																								
389 Die Kerkbode, 3 September 2010 
390 Rapport, 14 August 2010 
391 Die Burger, 6 November 2008 
392 URCSA News, 1 October 2010. 
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the primary responsibility of each congregation to tend to its “own.”393 Services might be 
open to all and joint services were encouraged. But they should according to the law 
experts, never come at the cost of each individual community’s services as prescribed by 
church regulations. At leadership level, this involved a rather bureaucratic if not financial 
argument about the need for a congregation to conduct its own Sunday mass and ensure 
the income from weekly collections. For members at the two Wynberg congregations, the 
Law Commissions’ statement tuned in with deep underlying emotions about “their 
church” and its specific communal identity. Integrating organizational structures did not 
appear to be an issue here. But the prospect of worshipping every other Sunday at a 
different church, with a different minister with his own style, dialect and rituals, offset 
congregants on both sides.  
 This became painfully apparent as the number of DRC members attending joint 
services at URCSA Wynberg began to dwindle after 2008. Interviewees explained that 
their numbers were never big and that resistance to integration had from the beginning 
caused several DRC members to leave for other churches in the area. When a new 
minister took over the URCSA congregation from Rev. Buys, this trend accelerated. “We 
became more aware of our cultural differences when the new priest arrived.”394 During 
the long services, one and a half or even two hours versus the traditional one hour they 
were used to, DRC members said they missed their community, their minister and his 
																																																								
393 The Afrikaans term for one’s own, “eie” returns throughout the Law Commissions’ Commentary in 
reference to church services, community finances, duties, regulations etc. Commentary of the Synodical 
Law Commission and the Permanent Law Commission,. 9 March 2009.  
394 Double interview, Wynberg members, 1 April 2014. 
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calm way of preaching in comparison to the “screaming” of the new URCSA minister.395 
Even the most motivated for unity eventually retreated to their own church, attending 
joint services only when they took place at the DRC congregation. Meanwhile URCSA 
members kept visiting DRC services and continued to participate in activities at the white 
church. The ensuing unevenness reaffirmed what some critics had anticipated all along. 
Rather than integration, the unity process was creating a situation of domination by the 
DRC Wynberg, its overall style and membership. In his report, Rev. Nel quoted one 
URCSA member expecting early on in the process that “a future combined church could 
find certain people alienated or a congregation dominated by intellectuals or affluent or 
eloquent. …I fear that many of our people would join up with the white church on their 
(DRC) terms.”396 
 The concern for domination this URCSA member voiced, points at a second 
major impediment to Wynberg’s unity process regarding the deep contrast between the 
narratives with which the two congregations sought to explain their unfolding difficulties. 
On the part of the URCSA congregation and especially its Presbytery leaders, emphasis 
was put on the persistent racism inside the white DRC that inhibited the church from 
accepting the colored Wynberg community as an equal partner. According to Presbytery 
leaders, Reverend Nel did not share but rather took over the care of the congregation after 
Reverend Buys died. Without prior agreement and before they had appointed a new 
URCSA minister, Rev. Nel was believed to have looked after the funerals of some of its 
members, conducted house visits and continued to work out the details of the unity 																																																								
395 Double interview, Wynberg members, 1 April 2014. 
396 Nel, Die Herenigingsprocess van Wynberg, 12 
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process without consulting URCSA. The new URCSA minister Rev. Samuels lamented 
that at the joint URCSA-DRC Wynberg gatherings “the superiority feelings of the whites 
and the ‘submissiveness,’ if that is the correct word, of the so-called Coloreds” still 
operated.397 During interviews, Presbytery leaders corroborated the deep resentment 
surfacing in Samuels’ remarks towards the DRC and stressed the need to view them in 
the context of their apartheid past. Decades of paternalistic relations they claimed, could 
not be transformed overnight. “I do not trust the white man. We are together in the 
church, but not outside.”398 For these local URCSA leaders, the Wynberg unity process 
did not represent the reconciliation Reverend Nel described in his report, but rather an 
effort to “expand his own congregation and turn ours into a museum.” The baggage 
between the two churches was considered too big to be overcome through a local 
integration effort. “First we need to change our attitudes towards each other.” “We need 
unity from above, along with equal conversations at the bottom, between cleaners and 
their bosses.”399  
 The views inside URCSA’s local leadership sharply contrasted accounts at DRC 
Wynberg, including above all the URCSA members who had transitioned to the DRC. 
This unforeseen transition occurred after the Collaboration Agreement of Wynberg had 
collapsed in 2010 with a growing number of usually well-off URCSA congregants 
leaving their former community for the white church on top of the hill. In 2014 about 
forty of them had become full members at the DRC Wynberg, joining in with its Sunday 																																																								
397 Reaksie van Ds. W.J. Samuels op die samewerking tussen die NGK en VGK Wynberg [Reaction of Ds. 
W.J. Samuels on the cooperation between DRC and URCSA Wynberg], 8 April 2010. Capital for 
“Colored” in original text. 
398 Interview, URCSA Presbytery Wynberg, 27 March 2014. 
399 Interview, URCSA Presbytery Wynberg, 27 March 2014. 
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services, Bible classes, coffee hour and outreach activities. These members along with 
their fellow DRC congregants generally attributed the fissure between their churches to 
social-economic and particularly cultural factors rather than racial domination. Deep 
sorrow was expressed about this fissure as well as motivation to still make work of 
integration by turning DRC Wynberg into a multicultural congregation, with or without a 
partnership with its URCSA neighbors. One former URCSA couple indicated that they 
still sensed the pain of the failed unity process, but that this did not prevent them from 
feeling welcome and at home at their new community. It was their own decision to come 
to the DRC and they never regretted it. “We appreciate the deep intellectual sermons of 
Reverend Nel and the intimacy of our Bible group.”400  
 DRC interviewees across the board underscored the importance of the spiritual 
and personal connections in their new congregation, above politics and history. 
Conversations about apartheid or racial hierarchies were rather shunned so as not to 
obstruct the much valued interaction across color lines. “When Reverend Samuels 
brought up old feelings from the past, it made people close up again.”401 Neither white 
nor colored congregants at DRC Wynberg appeared very concerned with race issues in 
general. URCSA members who switched, referred to their own middle class status and 
higher education as reasons for their transition. Many no longer felt at ease with the 
traditional and collective character of the poorer section of the URCSA community that 
they felt still dominated the congregation. The DRC’s abbreviated services and focus on 
one’s individual relationship with God held more appeal to them than the hierarchal style 																																																								
400 Interview, Wynberg member, 28 March 2014. 
401 Interview, Wynberg member, 28 March 2014. 
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associated with URCSA Reverend Samuels. “He came in as a young minister who still 
had to prove himself.” “He frightened the children and often acted as school teacher 
telling the group what to do.”402 Much frustration was expressed at the complaisance with 
which the remaining URCSA members had followed their new minister in his critique on 
the unity process. The lack of perseverance indicated for new and old DRC members that 
their neighbors had never been truly committed and lacked the mental preparedness for a 
merger of their congregations. “They [URCSA members] sometimes seemed like 
children. They said they wanted to get together but in the end did what the minister said. 
They were in awe of him.”403 
 Issues of personality, class and culture might have mattered more to these 
members than the inequalities mentioned by URCSA Wynberg’s leadership. Imbalances 
in power and resources undoubtedly affected the congregations’ unity process though. 
This third pivotal barrier surfaced primarily in the convoluted debates between the 
various stakeholders in regional and national church bodies and in personal leadership 
reflections on the Wynberg case. Between the lines, the detailed elaborations by either 
church’s Law Commissions revealed a deep concern among leaders for the example 
Wynberg could set to other congregations. Over and again the URCSA Law Committee 
warned of the increasing influence of Wynberg’s zealous DRC minister.404 Reverend Nel 
had come to symbolize a greater threat of well-trained and resourceful white ministers 
drawing members from colored URCSA congregations. Wynberg was not the only case 
																																																								
402 Interview, Wynberg member, 28 March 2014. 
403 Interview, Wynberg member, 1 April 2014. 
404 Uitspraak van die Aktuarius VGKSA [Statement by the Actuary URCSA], 15 September 2009. 
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in point here. Across the country URCSA had in the years of the Wynberg affair seen its 
colored congregants transitioning to nearby white DRC churches where they enjoyed 
services in roughly the same language but from a minister with more time and money on 
his hands than the average underpaid and overworked URCSA minister could provide.  
 On a larger scale, Wynberg according to some key actors involved, met resistance 
from URCSA leaders because it presented a dangerous sidetrack on the course to church 
unification.405  Central in this course for URCSA was the adoption of the Belhar 
Confession by the DRC’s General Synod. When congregations merged before such 
adoption had taken place, it potentially jeopardized the entire process. URCSA feared 
that the DRC would no longer see the need for either Belhar or structural unity when 
communities locally achieved the racial integration the DRC sought to parade towards the 
rest of society. What complicates this account, is the fact that DRC leaders did not seem 
too keen on Wynberg’s unity either. They were ill prepared for the practical implications 
of local integration, despite their often repeated support of such efforts. The prospect of a 
DRC congregation to lose income from or influence over its own community raised all 
sorts of bureaucratic barriers that, along with URCSA’s concerns, drained the Wynberg 
process of its energy. With national unity talks collapsing in September 2008, few 
URCSA or DRC leaders remained willing to move the process ahead. On that point at 
least, the churches agreed. 
 
																																																								
405 Interviews, Wynberg member, 28 March 2014; minister, 6 March 2014; minister, 27 February 2014. 
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In many ways the story of Wynberg’s failed unification is extraordinary. The 
combination of factors facilitating its initial progress, the presence of two communities 
that broadly shared geography, middle class incomes, language and powerful leaders on 
both sides, rarely occurs simultaneously. Its collapse was also unique in the sense that it 
so closely coincided with the collapse of the national unity process. The unfortunate 
suicide of Reverend Buys occurred only a few months before the 2008 decision of 
URCSA’s General Synod to cease all talks. Wynberg nevertheless contains many 
elements characteristic for the churches’ overall unification trajectory. The communities 
both struggled to set aside their specific church identities and grew over time increasingly 
divided in their narratives of what was keeping them apart. On the side of URCSA, 
leaders blamed the unequal distribution of power between their churches in the past and 
the present, where DRC members and the URCSA congregants that ended up joining 
them, rather stressed their different backgrounds and how these had shaped diverging 
needs for worship.  
 The gap between leaders and members is conspicuous here, as well as complex. 
At multiple occasions, members of the two Wynberg congregations took the initiative in 
furthering interaction between their communities, whether through their church councils 
or later as individuals sharing prayers and Bible discussions at DRC Wynberg. By and 
large though, members followed the path their leaders set out, also when that path 
changed. What took URCSA members to drop their support for unity after the arrival of 
the new minister, and to what extent did they? These questions are difficult to answer at 
this time. While visiting Wynberg in 2014, the URCSA congregation was in deep 
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morning over yet another premature death of a minister, this time Reverend Samuels. 
Few knew what the future would bring to their congregation, let alone to their 
relationship with the DRC neighbors. If anything, members in both communities 
indicated they were “moeg,” tired of unity, of disunity and of all the events and attention 
it had generated. Those who still expressed hope, did so quietly and only in modest terms. 
Some joint projects and a spiritual journey of “reconciliation in our hearts” were 
mentioned as potential next steps.406 But not much more.  
 
Bridging the gaps between communities, their leaders and members 
 
For all their frustrations, it is hard to deny that the Reformed churches of the Western 
Cape made at least some progress towards unification. Their regional DRC and URCSA 
synods along with local church leadership bodies jointly established a vast network of 
partnerships and organizational structures that have allowed increased contact between 
their communities. After the Wynberg fiasco, both churches took pain to expand these 
structures and include concrete regulations for congregations that wish to merge. In 
addition, guidelines were developed on how presbyteries elsewhere on the Cape can 
follow the example of the Uniting Presbytery of Stellenbosch. Granted, many of these 
structures were in 2014 still in their early stages, crucially lacking support from the 
churches’ national leadership. They did however offer a basis for communities to foster 																																																								
406 Double interview, Wynberg members, 1 April 2014; Interview, minister, 27 February 2014. See also 
Danie Nel, “Lesse uit die herenigingsproces van Wynberg” [Lessons from the reunification process of 
Wynberg], 2012. 
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inter-church and interracial partnerships. The question remains why so few communities 
utilized these possibilities. 
 
Persistent racial, social-economic and geographic divisions had an obvious role here. But 
they played out quite differently among church leaders and members. Where leaders tried 
to build a narrative of interracial unity through organizational collaboration, members 
struggled with the actual diversity this could bring. Regarding the leaders, the Cape area 
exhibits a rather unique multiracial church establishment, especially since the integration 
of the two Reformed seminaries at Stellenbosch University in 2000. It comprises 
professors and students, newly trained ministers and key organizers in the regional and 
local leadership bodies of both churches. Within this group, all of the above divisions 
remain present, but traditional boundaries are fading. DRC and URCSA Cape elites 
regularly encounter each other at seminars and leadership meetings, in middle class 
neighborhoods or at the outdoor cafes of Stellenbosch. Throughout my conversations 
with both groups, the majority claimed to support a future unity. It formed a crucial 
element of their self-description as progressive church leaders. 
 In these conversations, meeting reports and documents of recent years, the leaders 
often jointly warned of the profuse obstacles in reconciling the churches’ disparate 
financial situation and power imbalances. Amidst these warnings, stories of apartheid 
took a pivotal position. A repetition of past inequalities had to be avoided at all cost. 
Detailed frameworks outlining formal responsibilities and rules in any new partnership 
were thus considered essential to prevent one church from dominating the other and 
 
300	
	
ensure that each could maintain its own constituency as well as authority over this 
constituency. As they cautioned for unity, the church elites raised all sorts of barriers, 
often with strong references to the theology and organization of the church. Local 
URCSA leaders demanded each joint agreement to include clauses about the Belhar 
Confession as expression of the DRC’s remorse over the past and a true change of its 
ideological doctrine. DRC leaders stressed the need for democratic decision making, 
reluctant to agree with anything that could generate a loss of members or resources. Both 
carefully designed their joint projects so as not to upset anyone and to guarantee fair 
treatment. 
Such formalities perhaps responded to the anxieties of theologians and leading 
ministers. However, they undermined the often precarious efforts materializing within 
Cape communities, as happened in Wynberg, or offered scarce opportunity or inspiration 
for members to join in. Similar to their leadership, members of the studied congregations 
in the region tended to convey overall support for unity. They saw fewer impediments in 
its organizational dimension, urging their leaders to simply get on with it. What 
concerned ordinary congregants more, was how to face diversity on their own premises. 
Many found it hard to imagine a Sunday service that attended to the churches’ widely 
diverging race, class and language groups in ways that all understood and appreciated. 
The stories of Stellenbosch and Wynberg showed DRC and URCSA congregants 
struggling to envision themselves in the pews with respectively their cleaning lady, or 
their company director. They agreed that such interaction might be the future goal of the 
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church. Today however, too much luggage from the past and the present set the 
communities apart, and with significantly sharper edges than among their church elites.  
 Part of this luggage constituted memories of the apartheid era. More important in 
the cases of Stellenbosch and Wynberg however appeared the type of narrative identities 
Somers describes and their divergences among URCSA and DRC communities. In both 
communities, these narratives weaved in still predominant views on racial hierarchy and 
white dominance with ideals about post-apartheid unity and changing class identities and 
relationships. The prevalent association between a higher social-economic status and 
whiteness was particularly pointed in Wynberg. Having moved up the social ladder gave 
URCSA members a sense that they were now closer to the worship styles and expressions 
they associated with their DRC neighbors than with the colored church they used to 
identify with. White DRC members meanwhile not only expected the newcomers but also 
the overall integration process to follow their ways. Such expectations parallel Edward’s 
critique of the persistent whiteness of multiracial congregations in the United States. 
Nonetheless, neither URCSA nor DRC members attached much value to the racial 
categories involved here. Emphasis was put on the broad spirituality and social 
engagement that united them as well as their increasing proximity in society as middle 
class families with similar concerns about their children’s education, the failing economy 
and persistent crime and poverty in the country. Any differences were attributed to 
culture or class, not race. 
 In general, Western Cape churchgoers in this study reiterated that race was not the 
problem. Explaining their challenges with integration, congregants rather referred to their 
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discomfort with other cultures that were in turn associated with different social-economic 
positions. A common narrative among DRC and URCSA members comprised the 
predisposed incompatibility between their communities’ values and customs. One would 
be too formal, the other too loose. One involved too much intellectualism, the other too 
much clapping and dancing. Although they outwardly denied the role of race, members 
did not hesitate to relate the supposed cultural differences with distinct groups and places, 
such as the black communities of the townships or the wealthy white suburbs. As we saw 
in the discourse chapter, the term “culture” appeared to function as a euphemism here 
that members employed to avoid accusations of racial prejudice. It covered both class and 
race in a way strikingly reminiscent of the categories of the apartheid era. Besides the 
literal overlap between these past categories and current group divisions, the notion of 
culture was used in a similarly essentialist manner as race used to be.  
 
On neither side of the color line, did members indicate enthusiasm for the prearranged 
moments to cross their supposed cultural differences. Nor did they express eagerness to 
initiate spontaneous activities along the lines of Agape or even Wynberg before clearing 
them with the leadership. The Cape Reformed churches thus arrived at an impasse in 
which leaders hoped to engage members in formal joint projects for which the latter had 
little gusto. Members meanwhile waited for their leaders to guide them towards new 
bottom-up initiatives that leaders however believed should be launched without 
involvement from the top. Few doubted the reasons why their churches should ultimately 
unify. Decades of pro-unity discourse from the national and regional Cape leadership had 
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generated a broad consensus on the spiritual value of unity in the eyes of God, its 
necessity in view of the apartheid past, as well as the opportunity it would create for the 
churches to play a greater role in contemporary South Africa. Without a sense of urgency 
though, it appeared exceedingly difficult to bridge the narrative gaps among 
communities, and between their church leaders and members. 
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5.3. Stuck together in the Free State 
 
A daunting backdrop 
 
“Church is not a therapeutic space in which people can withdraw from a society in which 
they are struggling to adapt. Church is missional, focuses on the greater world, to mediate 
and embody some of the promises of the Trinity God.”407 In an effort to reposition itself, 
the DRC regional synod of the Free State in 2013 touched a raw nerve in the church 
family. The Reformed churches in the Free State, whether affiliated with the DRC, 
URCSA or the dissident black synods of the DRCA, have over the past few decades seen 
their communities diminish and retract in the shadows. Those members who remain, 
tightly hold on to their congregations, suspicious of any effort to change what for many 
constitutes a last bastion of familiarity. Reformed churches, especially DRC 
communities, in the Free State tend to be more conservative in their social values and 
with respect to race relations than their brothers and sisters in the Cape. Unity bears a 
negative connotation here with the perceived failure of the post-apartheid transition to 
bring security and wellbeing for all. Reconciliation has become a dirty word. A small 
group of regional church leaders are trying to change attitudes by advocating for a more 
outward directed church. Against the daunting backdrop of the impoverished Free State, 
few are optimistic about their chance of success.  
 																																																								
407 DRC Free State Regional Synod 2013, Handelinge [Minutes], 31. 
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In contrast to the Western Cape, the central region of the Free State is fairly 
representative of much of South Africa. Its population is majority black African while the 
number of white communities is decreasing. The presence of colored and Indian or Asian 
population groups is almost negligible, respectively 3 and 0.1 percent.408 Poverty rates 
are high, as is unemployment and school failure.409 Once known as the “bread basket” of 
South Africa, the Free State today is urbanizing. Small towns and farms see their youth 
leaving for the cities to look for work outside the dwindling agricultural and mining 
sector. The state is showing some progress in terms of education and income among 
black communities, but generally scores below the national average on both. 
 Beyond its contemporary struggles, the Free State is famous, or more infamous, 
for its contradictory history. Established as one of the two original Boer Republics and a 
major battleground in the South African wars, the Orange Free State long comprised a 
stronghold of Afrikaner politics, culture and language. It symbolizes for many white 
Afrikaans speakers their suffering as well as survival as a people. For black communities, 
the region is rather synonymous with the apartheid era and black resistance. The National 
Party commenced its white supremacist journey in the Free State Capital of Bloemfontein 
in 1914, only two years after the founding of the African National Congress in the same 
city. Besides their conflicting narratives, white and black communities continue to live in 
deeply segregated worlds here. Both experience hardships due to the region’s flawed 
economy and deteriorating government services. As elsewhere in the country, black 
																																																								
408 Census 2011 Municipal Report Free State, 10 
409 Jaana Puukka, Patrick Dubarle, Holly McKiernan, Jairam Reddy and Philip Wade, Higher Education in 
Regional and City Development: The Free State, South Africa (OECD, 2012), 65-83. 
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Africans largely bear the brunt though. Many continue to live in the overpopulated 
townships or homelands created during apartheid, while most of the land remains in 
white hands. 
 
In this context the DRC and URCSA are scrambling to maintain their presence in the 
region. The DRC remains prominent among white Afrikaans speaking communities, but 
suffers from the overall decline of its rural constituency as a result of migration and 
urbanization. In cities like Bloemfontein, DRC congregations encounter stiff competition 
from other churches on top of overall trends of secularization especially among youth. 
They retain a small number of members who often stay primarily because of a sense of 
historic belonging to the old mother church. Grace Davie’s phrase “belonging without 
believing” appears appropriate here.410 During my visits in 2012 and 2014 Free State 
ministers told me about the engrained anxiety they found among congregants for the 
“flooding” of their churches by other communities and cultures.411 Members’ attachment 
to the church, one young minister explained, had less to do with belief than with the 
memory of the former “volkskerk” and a time in which they felt in control of events and 
not, as today, at the mercy of a failing government.412  
 A 2013 DRC Free State synod report pronounced the resistance among its 
congregations to church unification, and specifically to the Belhar Confession, a direct 
																																																								
410 Davie, “From believing without belonging to vicarious religion.” 
411 Interview, DRC minister, 16 April 2014. 
412 Interview, DRC minister, 17 April 2014. 
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consequence of the region’s harsh circumstances.413 Unemployment, farm attacks, land 
reform and deteriorating public services were mentioned as factors severely obstructing 
interracial conversations. They had turned any initiative on collaboration with the other 
churches in the Reformed family into a political debate about South Africa’s post-
apartheid transition. Many DRC congregations had according to the report lost faith in 
this transition and preferred focusing the church’s attention on their own issues. Piet 
Strauss, the former moderator of the DRC, theologian and minister in the Free State, 
referred to such issues as “the mini-morality of problems in the immediate community or 
in their families.”414 They involved marriage and old age, raising children and protecting 
against violence in the neighborhood. Unity talks or any talk of integration appeared 
miles removed from this mini-morality. 
 URCSA confronts similar tribulations in addition to the damaging impact of its 
conflict with the DRCA and internal divisions. The Free State synod of this traditionally 
black African church, was among the few synods that refused to dissolve in 1994 and join 
the newly established Uniting Reformed Church. Its refusal generated more than thirty 
court cases between DRCA and URCSA communities fighting about church properties. 
Millions of Rand have been spent on lawyers while the embattled congregations can 
often barely afford basic amenities. Poverty and its coinciding problems of 
unemployment, drugs and crime, define URCSA communities across the Free State, 
whether or not they are mired in court cases. Particularly challenging has been the 
																																																								
413 DRC Free State 2013, Belydenis van Belhar: Gespreksdokument [Confession of Belhar: Conversation 
Document].  
414 Interview, Piet Strauss, 17 April 2014. 
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situation of its Afrikaans speaking colored congregations. Few can collect enough funds 
to cover a full-time minister and thus depend on so-called tentmakers or consulenten, 
ministers who stretch their time between multiple congregations and other lay 
occupations. 
 In the Free State today, URCSA has 91 congregations served by 43 ministers. 
These ministers not only have to balance their time and attention, but also the languages 
and styles in which they serve the many different population groups inside URCSA. Few 
master the Afrikaans language still predominant in colored communities. They preach in 
English or Sesotho415 or in a mix of both languages, but hardly ever in Afrikaans. 
Colored URCSA congregations have in recent years increasingly voiced their grief about 
this situation. They complain about being ignored by a Sesotho dominated regional synod 
that does not value their language, nor their culture or identity. “We want someone to 
serve us in Afrikaans, and who does not look down on us.”416 “We don’t exist. We are 
not recognized. We are seen as a branch.” Representatives from Afrikaans speaking 
URCSA congregations expressed these sentiments in front of their regional synod leaders 
during a 2014 meeting in Bloemfontein. They admitted, with regret, that many of their 
constituents left for nearby DRC churches that were serving in their language. These 
churches had been welcoming them, but often by creating a separate “section” through 
which the new members received their own space and time for worship, apart from the 
church’s traditional and still mostly white Sunday service.  																																																								
415 Sesotho is the main language spoken in the Free State and the mother tongue of the majority of the 
region’s black African population. 
416 Conversation between the URCSA Management and representatives of Afrikaans speaking 
congregations of URCSA in the Free State, URCSA Heidedal South, 1 May 2014. 
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Not surprisingly, relationships between the DRC and URCSA in the Free State tend to be 
strained. The former has kept close, and invariably one-way, financial ties with the 
dissident black synod as it continues to support DRCA congregations with minister 
salaries and other in-kind services. The rapprochement between colored communities and 
the DRC provides additional ammunition to the claim that the old mother church is trying 
to meddle with URCSA’s internal affairs. The latter has accused the DRC of luring these 
members to leave URCSA and of obstructing efforts towards reconciliation between its 
black and colored constituents. With little motivation on either side, collaboration among 
the Reformed churches of the Free State has been limited to the bare minimum. A pulpit 
exchange, perhaps a joint meeting of the regional synods or two local presbyteries might 
occur every now and then. Such initiatives generally come from individual church actors 
though, a junior minister or an inspired community member. They seldom last beyond the 
individual’s tenure. 
 Since 2011, there appears to be some detente as a DRC brokered settlement 
between the DRCA and URCSA is gradually bearing fruit. With a 1 million Rand fund 
from the DRC, the other two churches have, after almost two decades of dispute, been 
able to negotiate an end to several court cases. A 2013 greeting message from URCSA to 
the DRC described the fund as “a sign for us that the DRC accepts co-responsibility for 
the conflict between the sister churches in the Free State and actually wants to do 
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something about it.”417 Other signs of improvement are emerging at the Theology Faculty 
of the University of the Free State (UFS). Similar to Stellenbosch, this university and 
above all its theology department used to be Afrikaner bastions. The university as a 
whole changed but the faculty remained behind. Today, a majority of the UFS’ students 
are black, except at the Theology Faculty. Nonetheless, the still mostly white DRC 
Faculty has been making efforts to attract academics and students from other churches 
and population groups. While diversity is sparse, the Faculty today boasts a nominally 
integrated student organization and constitutes one of the few platforms in the Free State 
where ministers, students and theologians of both URCSA and the DRC can interact, 
whether through class, seminars or in the common coffee room. Some of them have 
quietly been uttering support for church unity and even for the adoption of Belhar in the 
DRC, often with great skepticism regarding the probability that either will succeed. Many 
are frightful to bring their changing opinions into congregations they believe to remain 
deeply antagonistic towards any effort of integration. What is really happening inside 
these congregations? 
 
City tales: “We are open” 
 
The literal translation of Bloemfontein, “fountain of flowers,” can be quite deceptive. 
Once a year, usually in October, the city indeed prides itself with the abundant flowers 
																																																								
417 Ds Mokone Tswabisi John Letsie. Quoted in: DRC Free State 2013, Handelinge [Actions]. Bothaville, 
14-17 June 2013, 118. 
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and especially roses covering its gardens and green spaces. For much of the year 
however, Bloemfontein is as arid as the countryside surrounding it. Apart from a few 
well-tended parks and the gardens of its wealthier suburbs, the capital of the Free State, 
as well as the seat for the national Supreme Court of Appeal, resembles an urban jungle 
with broken pavement, large pedestrian-unfriendly intersections, fast food restaurants and 
inner city decay. The center offers a contrasting sight of homeless people camping out in 
front of monumental buildings that reflect the city’s history as the sole judicial capital of 
the country during the apartheid era and a legislative center of the earlier Boer Republics. 
Racial and social-economic disparities sharply divide Bloemfontein’s majority 
poor black population from its middle class white and mostly Afrikaans speaking 
community, but with notable deviations. More than Stellenbosch, Bloemfontein is also 
home to impoverished whites as well as upwardly mobile blacks in addition to a small 
lower to middle class colored community. Illustrative of the latter is URCSA 
Heatherdale, a booming church located in the crime and drug-ridden township of 
Heidedal. It tends to a mix of poor and somewhat wealthier congregants who speak 
mostly Afrikaans, but also Sesotho and English. DRC De Bloem in turn represents those 
associated with “the new poverty among Afrikaners” on the edge of the city center.418 
After a long period of decline, De Bloem’s membership today consists of a small 
community of white single parent families, elderly and intellectually disabled inhabitants 
of a lower class neighborhood, in addition to a number of colored and black members 
who have recently joined the once homogeneously white Afrikaans congregation. 
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Heatherdale and De Bloem will serve as case studies in the rest of this section to explore 
the often ambiguous trajectories of inner-city churches as they navigate changing 
neighborhoods and identities.  
 
Both Heatherdale and De Bloem are based in struggling parts of Bloemfontein. Where 
the URCSA congregation presides over a long history of deprivation among its members, 
the DRC community still tries to come to terms with the more recent transition of its 
constituency from middle class to increasingly poor. Neither congregation signaled much 
interest in unity during my field research. Altering circumstances however, and the ways 
in which the two churches tried to tackle these changes, were gradually generating more 
diversity in their midst. Starting with URCSA Heatherdale, it is important to first note its 
history as one of the main colored congregations within the Free State’s Reformed 
Church family. This history is deeply entangled with that of the neighborhood.419 During 
the apartheid era, Heidedal became a designated colored group area, and a stronghold for 
this relatively small population group in the region. Today the area is still largely colored, 
but community boundaries are blurring. Heidedal borders the predominantly black 
township of Bochabela that harbors its own URCSA congregation. While interactions 
between the two communities remain limited, they occasionally cooperate on the vast 
social problems both share. It is also increasingly common for Heidedal’s residents to 
mix some English and Sesotho into their Afrikaans home language. Many have family 
relationships with someone with a Sesotho background. Others have gradually been 																																																								
419 URCSA Heatherdale describes this history at its website: 
http://www.vgkheatherdale.co.za/index.asp?PID=78. Visited at 30 March 2014.   
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moving up the social ladder and work or study in English speaking environments together 
with people from other population groups.  
 When visiting URCSA Heatherdale in April 2014, the congregation appeared at 
the forefront of these developments. At that time, ministers and members alike celebrated 
the outcome of a nine year internal renewal process that was said to have transformed 
Heatherdale from a stagnant and aging community of around five hundred souls, into a 
vibrant church with over a thousand members. Many continued to live on or below the 
poverty threshold. Nonetheless, URCSA Heatherdale claimed to have raised sufficient 
funds to finance a new building with plenty of space for church offices and activities, 
particularly for its newly established charity organization. This organization, the 
Bloemfontein Life Change Center, had just been set up with the specific purpose to help 
Heidedal as well as neighboring communities improve their living standards. Besides the 
provision of basic necessities, the Center was aimed at building youth capacities to have a 
better chance at job opportunities and break vicious cycles of school failure, 
unemployment, drugs and crime. Early 2014, the Center was still in its infancy. But 
according to interviewees, it had already served as a catalyst for members in the 
congregation to become more involved with social projects, from knitting workshops to 
prisoner support or vocational training.420 
 The Life Change Center formed a cornerstone of Heatherdale’s renewed identity 
to be an active player in its community. Under leadership of the charismatic Reverend 
Pienaar, the church adapted to suit the needs of a younger and changing constituency. 
																																																								
420 Interviews, URCSA Heatherdale members, 29 April 2014. 
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Instead of the Afrikaans-only services of the past that members felt mimicked the white 
church’s rather formal style, Rev. Pienaar preached dynamically and often at least partly 
bilingually.421 During a special Good Friday service the Reverend went back and forth 
between English and Afrikaans without translating particular words or phrases. The 
church choir similarly switched from songs in Afrikaans to English to Sesotho. Some 
joined in enthusiastically with the Sesotho songs and clapped and danced in a manner 
reminiscent of the nearby URCSA Bochabela congregation. Others were carried away by 
traditional Afrikaans songs one might also hear in churches like De Bloem. The sermon 
explicitly mentioned the importance of inclusivity. Referencing a Biblical story in which 
Jesus Christ granted paradise to his fellow prisoner at the cross, the Reverend urged the 
congregation to reach out to everyone in their community, also to those “who have gone 
wrong.” “It is never too late to turn to Jesus.”422 The minister team itself exemplified 
another form of inclusivity, involving a female white minister recently ordained in 
URCSA. Heatherdale strongly marketed itself as an outward focused church. An 
elaborate website and large banners on church walls explicated Heatherdale’s mission to 
make a difference in the world, take care of the vulnerable and collaborate with other 
churches, particularly in the Reformed Church family. 
 Notable in URCSA Heatherdale’s renewal process was its emphasis on self-
reliance. It offered a sharp contrast with other colored congregations in the Free State that 
greatly depend on the regional synod or even the DRC for the continuation of their 
church services. URCSA Heatherdale also received financial support from the DRC to 																																																								
421 Interview, URCSA Heatherdale member, 29 April 2014. 
422 Reverend Pienaar during Good Friday service, 18 April 2014. 
 
315	
	
for instance sustain Reverend Pienaar’s salary. But its members and ministers reiterated 
throughout conversations that the congregation worked hard to expand its own resources. 
Outside funds were raised, members grouped together to collect the annual dues or 
encouraged each other to volunteer in the construction of the new building. “We did not 
pay anything when we were still the Mission Church. The DRC was our big daddy…. 
Now we pay ourselves!”423  
 Talks with the DRC about a future merger did not figure particularly high on 
Heatherdale’s agenda. Reverend Pienaar expressed his disappointment with the process 
thus far. Having been involved in local conversations about collaboration between the 
two churches for several years, he said he had lost confidence in the DRC’s commitment 
to unity. “Some [DRC members] still call us ‘kaffir’ ministers.” “It is hard to 
acknowledge for them that their grandpa was heretic.”424 Implied in this last point was 
the 1980’s denouncement by the black Reformed churches of racial segregation as sinful, 
especially through the Belhar Confession. The minister explained that this era still shaped 
his attitudes towards the DRC and that it would take a new younger generation of leaders 
and ministers for the churches to transcend their historic divisions. Until then, the 
Reverend along with his fellow ministers felt they should focus on getting their own 
house in order. The DRC needed to sort out its internal divisions regarding Belhar while 
URCSA still had work to do in settling with the DRCA and gaining financial 
independence. URCSA Heatherdale’s leadership appeared especially reluctant to enter 
																																																								
423 Interview, URCSA Heatherdale member, 29 April 2014. 
424 Interview, Reverend Pienaar, 11 April 2014. - Kaffir is considered a gravely derogative term stemming 
from the apartheid era when it was commonly used to refer to a black person.  
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into any small-scale agreements on pulpit- or other exchanges with the DRC before both 
churches were ready to sign up for the national unity it remained deeply devoted to. Such 
agreements were considered a soothing tool and an excuse to evade tough decisions about 
the Belhar Confession or finances. Past joint projects had only engendered disillusion as 
few from the DRC turned up and the projects had slowly bled to death without any 
tangible results. The one form of viable partnership still valued by the minister, 
constituted concrete cooperation on for instance the Life Change Center. DRC donations 
and other forms of support were welcomed here, even with the recognition that just 
giving money formed yet another easy way to avoid commitment.425  
 The frustrations apparent among Heatherdale’s leaders did not necessarily 
resonate with its members. Among the congregants I spoke with, all expressed high 
appreciation for a chance to interact across racial boundaries through the small-scale 
arrangements their ministers dismissed. At Heatherdale, they said they had experienced 
the importance of engaging with people from different social-economic backgrounds. 
Members who had moved up the social ladder often continued attending the otherwise 
poor congregation and provided significant financial backing for its activities. In the end 
though, “class is an issue, but color is more of an issue.” Members stressed the 
importance of learning from and about the different communities still separated by race. 
Many were deeply concerned about the persistent troubles inside their own 
neighborhood, especially with respect to the youth. They hoped that through 
collaboration with the DRC, their community could gain more expertise in effectively 
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organizing activities at the new Life Change Center. For such contact, structures were 
widely believed to be inevitable. They could according to the various interviewees 
include anything from prearranged mutual church visits to joint youth camps and church 
council meetings.426 An older member and teacher told me he looked back favorably to 
such events that had been organized together in the past with a nearby DRC 
congregation. These would have ceased not because of a lack of interest or racial 
divisions, but rather because “people got busy.” Issues of race, prejudice and apartheid 
traumas were perhaps recognized. In general, URCSA Heatherdale tended to downplay 
them as matters they felt ready to leave behind. One congregant made it explicit that there 
was really no need to talk about the past as it would likely upset white people and cause 
them to stay away.427 He rather focused on having exposure, something he and other 
members agreed, had to be initiated by local church leaders and ministers on either side. 
 
Compared to Heatherdale, De Bloem’s problems seem relatively modest. Its members 
reside in affordable rental apartments in a central part of the city that might have seen 
better days, but that remains far ahead of the destitution found in Heidedal. Some thirty 
families rely on the church for weekly food packages. Many others receive government 
benefits to supplement meager incomes and pensions. The community totals around 730 
confessing and 100 baptized members, about half of the 1600 attending De Bloem in the 
mid-seventies. This decline has for decades been a source of deep disturbance to the 
congregation. A 75 year anniversary publication described the impoverishment and 																																																								
426 Interviews, URCSA Heatherdale members, 29 April 2014. 
427 Interview, URCSA Heatherdale member, 29 April 2014. 
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diminution of De Bloem’s community in close relation to the country’s transition after 
1994. With the arrival of a black majority government, the community was said to have 
experienced the “integration of residential areas” and the “verswarting,” literally 
“blackening,” of neighborhood industries. With this last controversial phrase, the 
publication referred specifically to the increasing numbers of blacks working at the local 
railway services, a long-time major employer of De Bloem’s traditionally white 
congregants. 428  Due to these circumstances, the publication asserted, many of the 
congregation’s Afrikaner membership left the area while those who stayed faced 
increasing poverty. White newcomers tend to stay only short periods of time before 
moving on to a better place to live. A more consistent group of newcomers is made up of 
the black and colored residents who moved in the neighborhood and of whom several 
have in recent years turned to De Bloem as their spiritual home. The arrival of black and 
colored churchgoers forms part of a rather unintentional transition at the once 
homogeneously white church which has everything to do with its decline.  
 The steep drop in membership is far from unique to the De Bloem congregation. 
Across South Africa, city centers have seen vast changes since the end of apartheid as 
white residents moved to the suburbs, taking with them businesses, schools and 
infrastructure. The small city congregation of De Bloem developed a rather singular 
strategy to cope with its new reality though. In the early 2000’s it started to supplement 
the dwindling collections from its members through a catering initiative that offered 
services at events outside the church, from weddings to corporate parties. Instead of, or in 
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addition to paying their dues, members volunteered by cooking or serving food and as 
such helped make money for the congregation. The pragmatic and dedicated Reverend 
Smith professionalized the initiative to the extent that it counted, according to his own 
estimates in 2014, for a good fifty percent of De Bloem’s annual income.429 The catering 
service provided essential funding for social works in the immediate community. It paid 
for the soup kitchen or for an outing for the children to a nearby garden. Above all, the 
catering service was often mentioned during conversations with members and in the 
congregation’s documentation as a source of inspiration for everyone to engage with the 
neighborhood and the church. Deeply engrained was the notion that anyone could 
contribute regardless of their social-economic status or background. At the annual 
fundraising bazaar, elderly ladies prepared pancakes while single mothers helped clean 
up in exchange for a food parcel. The anniversary publication told their story: “[The 
members’] greatest concern would become their greatest blessings. They do not have 
much money, but there is nothing wrong with their hands! (…) Especially the 
‘gatherings’ around the stove often amount to the most profound pastoral 
conversations.”430 
 With the gradually expanding catering service, De Bloem changed its position in 
the neighborhood. Beyond a congregation that merely served its immediate members, the 
church began to reach further outwards. Eager to draw in new clients, members engaged 
people outside the neighborhood and welcomed whoever could contribute to service, 
regardless of their background. One unexpected development in this transition story 																																																								
429 Interview, Reverend Smith, 30 April 2014. 
430 De Bloem 75 Jaar, 1. 
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comprised the arrival of a still very small but nonetheless surprising number of black and 
colored churchgoers. In 2014 around ten non-white families were regularly attending the 
sermons of Reverend Smith and joining in with local congregational events like the 
bazaar or the catering project. Rev. Smith proudly pointed out the spontaneous nature of 
their arrival. “I welcomed black families just like I welcomed white people - no worse, no 
better.”431 According to the minister, most of these newcomers have thus far involved 
residents in De Bloem’s immediate neighborhood with slightly higher incomes than its 
regular members. Some transferred directly from an URCSA congregation, where others 
previously attended different denominations across the city. One woman told her story of 
leaving URCSA Heatherdale for DRC De Bloem five years ago after she moved closer to 
the city center and the car with which she had still been driving to Heidedal broke down. 
“We decided to give Bloem a try.” “I feel welcome here, it is like family.”432 She 
appreciated De Bloem’s community engagement for which she arranged donations 
through her work at a major supermarket chain. Similar comments were made by a mixed 
race couple that visited De Bloem’s annual bazaar with their newborn baby. “We live 
close by and just decided to drop by.” 
 Evaluating the changes in their congregations, members and ministers emphasized 
that De Bloem had in fact stayed the same. It remained a conservative congregation, far 
removed from the transformation processes happening in their larger Reformed family, or 
their country for that matter. Preoccupied with the mere survival of the church as well as 
the direct needs of its members, De Bloem just like Heatherdale, indicated scarce interest 																																																								
431 Interview, Reverend Smith, 30 April 2014. 
432 Interview, DRC De Bloem member, 1 May 2014. 
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in topics of racial integration or church unification processes. Where Heatherdale still 
mentioned the goal of collaboration among the Reformed churches on its banners and 
websites, De Bloem refrained from even nominally supporting such collaboration. 
Congregants mostly conveyed their satisfaction with having gained congregational 
autonomy through the catering project. Few appeared keen to spend their energy on inter-
church partnerships of which they did not see any direct benefit. The main priority, 
members said, constituted their ability to preserve the congregation and to practice their 
faith by helping the vulnerable in their neighborhood. “We do mission work in our own 
community, not outside, as so much happens right here.”433 This woman clarified that she 
did not oppose the idea of unity per se. She felt rather indifferent towards a merger 
between the DRC and URCSA or towards racial integration in the church, especially 
since in her view the congregation was already a place of inclusion. “It is not about the 
DRC. It is about Jesus Christ.” Reverend Smith added to this the overall suspicion among 
his members and himself towards any institutional change or so-called reconciliation 
enforced from the top. “The plan for one united General Synod is being associated with 
the transition of South Africa,” he explained. “The idea back then was that everyone 
could stay themselves. That did not happen and that hurt a lot.”434 People in the 
congregation were according to Rev. Smith unlikely to go along with official unity 
structures, fearing they would be overwhelmed and become a diminished minority just 
like in the rest of society.  
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 The minister’s sermons as well as conversations with members left little doubt 
though as to how they understood ‘themselves.’ The congregation stood firmly for a 
conservative view towards church tradition, moral values as well as national politics. The 
Sunday service comprised for most interviewees a place of quiet and formal worship in 
which the minister did not shy from uttering sharp critique on current affairs, from Belhar 
to corruption or the so-called reverse discrimination against whites. In the week leading 
up to the twentieth anniversary of South Africa’s democracy, Rev. Smith raised the 
question whether, in the past two decades, “the people of the country have truly become 
more free, or have the oppressors rather changed faces? … Have we withdrawn in a dark 
corner, too careful to name the evils of violence, murder, rape, the injustice of restorative 
action, corruption and poverty?”435 Besides Smith, congregants at De Bloem have been 
served by the outspoken theologian and former General Synod moderator Piet Strauss. 
Strauss is not only known for openly voicing his opposition to adopt the Belhar 
Confession in the DRC. He has also led one of the last Afrikaner bulwarks, the youth 
organization of Die Voortrekkers, and enthusiastically shared the organization’s central 
goals to promote Afrikaner culture as well as the “good parts of Afrikaner history.”436 For 
the congregants I interviewed, De Bloem’s Afrikaans character was usually taken for 
granted. No one, not even Piet Strauss, spoke of an Afrikaner ethnicity, nation or “volk.” 
Instead, emphasis was put on the Afrikaans language as prime identity marker. Several 																																																								
435 Reverend Smith. “Aan wie is jy eintlik gehoorsaam?” [To whom are you really obedient?]. Sunday 
Sermon. 20 April 2014. 
436 Die Voortrekkers Strategiese Plan vir 2013-2017 [Die Voortrekkers Strategic Plan for 2013-2017], 2. 
Accessed at 12 August 2015, https://www.houkoers.co.za/Dokumentasie/Literatuur. NB. Die Voortrekkers 
comprises an organization specifically meant to preserve and foster Afrikaner language, culture and history 
among youth.  
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realized though that in the future even De Bloem might switch to English. If that were to 
be the case, they were not sure they would stay with the church.437  
 The presence of black congregants and the increasingly outward focused activities 
of De Bloem had thus done little to change its perceived identity. Conservative values 
and politics in addition to Afrikaans and a sense of inclusive care for the community 
remained persistent markers of the congregation’s self-perception. Congregants 
recognized that some of these traits, especially language, formed reasons for why non-
whites rather stayed away from their church. Why some had decided to make De Bloem 
their church was little accounted for. In general, churchgoers, whether identifying as 
white, black or colored, did not made much of their interaction. Some articulated 
appreciation for the minister and the way he welcomed people regardless of their social-
economic or racial background. The fact that the church had over the past years become a 
home for people with intellectual disabilities also emerged as a factor preparing the 
congregation for diversity and was said to have further enhanced their belief in being a 
church for the entire local community. As long as racial integration, if that word was 
even used, happened locally and spontaneously, without undermining the congregation’s 
core values, congregants claimed to “have no problem with it.”438  
 
Despite their many differences, Heatherdale and De Bloem represent similar dynamics 
occurring on either side of the Reformed Church family. The congregations both 
portrayed themselves as first and foremost a community church. Neither was keen on 																																																								
437 Interview, DRC De Bloem member, 25 April 2014. 
438 Interview, DRC De Bloem member, 25 April 2014. 
 
324	
	
institutional collaboration whether within their own denomination or with others. Instead, 
the two congregations developed strategies to enhance their independence. These 
strategies effectively combined member participation with local projects to expand the 
financial resources necessary for gaining more autonomy. Members who could not pay 
their dues were invited to volunteer and those in wealthier positions were asked to invest 
not merely in the church, but in their community. The focus on the local elucidated the 
congregations’ disinterest in official unification processes. Members nor ministers saw 
how this could advance their own goals and in general exhibited suspicion towards 
initiatives coming from the churches’ national or regional leadership. At De Bloem 
members admitted they had not read the extensive materials from their General Synod 
about the Belhar Confession and its importance to church unity, but that they were 
nonetheless convinced that it amounted to propaganda for a politicized document meant 
to destabilize the DRC. At Heatherdale, congregants had long distanced themselves from 
the regional leadership which they felt did not represent their interests. Copies of URCSA 
News or other national church documents on issues like unification were also scarce if 
made available at all.  
 Such indifference may be little surprising. More remarkable was the lack of 
greater resistance as often presumed by national leaders in both churches. For older 
members at Heatherdale, a merger of the DRC and URCSA constituted something 
inevitable that would happen perhaps not in their lifetime, but in that of their children. 
They realized the impediment their past formed to any reconciliation within the 
Reformed family but claimed to be willing to set this aside for the sake of more contact in 
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the future. De Bloem’s congregants largely dismissed the past as a problem. Their focus 
was on the present. New church structures, including even Belhar, were in the end not 
believed to make much of a difference for De Bloem’s daily struggle to tend to its 
neighborhood. Besides, De Bloem as well as Heatherdale signaled pride in implementing 
on ground level the inclusiveness their national leaders had been advocating, even, or 
especially, without committing to the broader vision of church unity. In both cases, close 
affiliation between the church and its traditional community had not prevented people 
from different backgrounds joining and being welcomed. Diversity was appreciated, if 
not in terms of race, then in terms of class or social status.  
 Here we should note a significant divergence between the two congregations. 
Where Heatherdale sought to accommodate differences among its members, De Bloem 
rather expected new members to adopt its established church culture. Heatherdale turned 
the changes deemed necessary to attract younger members with affinity for Sesotho 
language and culture, into a success story of internal renewal. Its ability to adapt had 
made the congregation stronger and bigger as new members from different 
denominations started to join the church. In the meantime, URCSA Heatherdale 
continued to present itself as the historic home for colored people in the Free State. It 
remained deeply invested in this particular constituency and protective of its language 
and minority position. De Bloem conversely, had been resisting any form of change until 
change literally appeared at its doorsteps. Members almost ignored the presence of black 
and colored families in their midst, claiming they were no different than themselves and 
that their church stayed the same. This perception was facilitated through the fact that 
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most newcomers comprised middle class residents of the neighborhood. They formed less 
of a threat to the lower class white community than poorer blacks from the townships 
perceived to be stealing jobs or bringing crime. Congregants also seemed eager to evade 
references to their own racial or ethnic background and instead stressed other elements of 
their identity, namely conservative morals and Afrikaans language. However limited the 
actual diversity at DRC De Bloem, it tuned in with the congregation’s self-description as 
a nonetheless inclusive community. In this description, the idea of one united and 
multiracial church was not necessarily denounced, but rather dismissed as pointless. As 
one church council member explained, “society wants churches to come together but in 
the meanwhile we are open to other people.”439  
 
In the country: “People can no longer avoid it” 
 
Despite decades of urbanization, a vast segment of the Reformed Church family remains 
based in small agricultural communities. These village congregations, made up of mostly 
farmers, farmworkers and their families, are often idealized as situations in which the 
church is occupying a central position instead of competing with others at the fringes of a 
diverse urban religious landscape. Rural churchgoers are known to be tightly knit and 
deeply committed. During a recent conference on small Reformed congregations, 
URCSA theologian Christina Landman underscored the caring character of such 
congregations as their members jointly seek to stave off problems of poverty and 																																																								
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disease.440 For a growing number of rural congregations, these difficulties mount to a 
sheer struggle for survival though. No longer able to sustain themselves, they are forced 
to find alternative strategies to continue worshipping in the tradition and style they are 
accustomed to. Among these strategies has been collaboration with different Reformed 
churches, across the color line. Throughout the Free State and in other remote parts of the 
country, black, colored and white Reformed congregations increasingly share buildings 
and resources, not because they want to but because they feel they have no choice. 
Cooperation has become the only way towards preservation of one’s church community. 
Interracial contact occurs here as an unintentional side-effect rather than a conscious 
strategy towards unification. We will be looking at two examples. One involves the story 
of Ladybrand in which an URCSA community moved in with a local DRC congregation. 
The other pertains to Philippolis where a DRC congregation called in the help of its 
URCSA neighbor and asked to share the URCSA minister’s time and services. In both 
cases, communities opened up once strictly homogeneous and racially exclusive church 
identities and began unusual partnerships with long-time adversaries. How did these 
transitions, if one can describe them as such, occur?  
 
On the border with the Kingdom of Lesotho, Ladybrand has managed to steer off some of 
the worst effects of rural decline by operating as a hub for local businesses and tourists on 
their way in or out of Lesotho. Still, the roads are filled with potholes, crime is up and 
unemployment high. The town used to have two DRC congregations, a DRCA and an 
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URCSA congregation based in the township of Mauersnek. In 2003, the latter officially 
closed down after years of mismanagement and financial woes. Different narratives have 
been circulating about how and why this closure occurred. Fingers have been pointed at 
the largely absent part-time minister who had to drive two hours from Bloemfontein and 
was scarcely invested in the congregation.441 Poverty played a role as the community 
could not afford a full-time minister nor keep up its building. Above all, former 
congregants blamed the DRC that had owned their building ever since apartheid and 
unilaterally decided to sell it to the American non-profit Hope International Missions. 
This organization turned the URCSA church into a multipurpose building that included 
an Evangelical church and a school.442 Some congregants stayed at the new church, but 
many drifted away. They tried out the nearby DRCA and several other congregations. 
Ultimately, a small group began attending the very DRC congregation, Moedergemeente 
Ladybrand, that had sold their building. By the time of my research in Ladybrand in 
2014, this group had grown to around thirty members who now formed a steady colored 
presence at what had thus far been a homogeneously white church of just around 500 
congregants. 
 When asked about why they made this transition, people in the Mauersnek 
community first of all highlighted motives of faith. “I spiritually grow here,” one woman 
stated.443 She had visited a range of different churches before turning to the DRC and had 
found little resonance there. Especially the DRCA had been a disappointment as she 																																																								
441 Interviews, DRC Ladybrand members / former URCSA Mauersnek members; Reverend Kleynhans, 24 
April 2014. 
442 “Hope Christian Academy,” Lesotho Letters, January-February 2007. Accessed at 15 July 2015, 
http://www.gsgault.com/Newsletter_Archive/20071Jan.pdf.  
443 Interviews, DRC Ladybrand members / former URCSA Mauersnek members, 24 April 2014. 
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could not relate to its charismatic style and constant demand for money to pay for church 
services. The formality and conservatism characterizing the DRC’s services appealed 
more to the Mauersnek community than the DRCA’s “born-again dancing.”444 Many also 
appreciated the fact that they were not compelled to pay their dues and rather received 
support, including a bus service especially arranged by Moedergemeente Ladybrand to 
pick them up at the township each Sunday and drive them to the central location of the 
DRC. They were realistic about the fact that they could not afford their own minister. 
Moving in with the DRC had become the second-best option to allow the Mauersnek 
community to preserve, or rather revive, its Reformed tradition. It moreover presented an 
opportunity to challenge the white community. Interviewees expressed pride of having 
pushed comfort zones. “I’m going to church. I don’t care what people in church think 
about me, whether they like me or not. We sit in the middle of the pews when whites 
move to the corners.” They recalled text messages they had initially sent to DRC 
members, saying that “God loves us all.” These days, Mauersnek members claimed, more 
people, white and colored, were attending the church. “We made a change at DRC 
Moedergemeente.”445 
 This change however occurred far from smoothly. It took churchgoers from 
Mauersnek close to two decades to make the transition and their presence at the DRC has 
remained humble. They initially received a lukewarm welcome, with white congregants 
not merely moving to the corners of the pews, but threatening to leave at the prospect of 
an increasingly diverse congregation. This fed existing suspicions among the Mauersnek 																																																								
444 Interviews, DRC Ladybrand members / former URCSA Mauersnek members, 24 April 2014. 
445 Interviews, DRC Ladybrand members / former URCSA Mauersnek members, 24 April 2014. 
 
330	
	
community that the DRC was prejudiced against them. For years, people preferred to 
attend the Hope Missions Evangelical church, or no church at all, over joining their 
supposed sister congregation. Only recently members said they overcame the grave insult 
caused by the DRC when it sold off their building without consulting any of the former 
URCSA members. After a joint conversation with the DRC minister in 2013, “it was 
forgiven and forgotten.”446 At Moedergemeente congregants meanwhile appeared far less 
eager to forgive and forget the grievances they claim to have experienced in the past and 
present. These included the broadly felt deterioration of their living conditions since 1994 
in addition to a long history of strife to protect their Afrikaner minority identity against 
dominant powers, whether British in the past or black today. “It’s bigger than racism,” a 
theology student familiar with the congregation explained. “It’s in our blood.”447 The 
arrival of people from outside the traditional DRC membership base triggered, according 
to the student as well as the involved minister, deep anxieties inside the congregation. 
Colored people were feared to soon be arriving in bus loads and take over the church just 
as black Africans had taken over the country.  
 In this tensed context, any talk of unity or interracial collaboration seemed futile. 
The deeply committed minister of DRC Moedergemeente, Reverend Kleynhans, stressed 
that he hardly ever addressed either topic explicitly and in general avoided references to 
politics or current affairs. Instead, the minister developed a careful strategy of coaxing 
both sides into sharing their worship space, no more and no less. Towards the Mauersnek 
community he extended throughout the years multiple invitations to visit his 																																																								
446 Interviews, DRC Ladybrand members / former URCSA Mauersnek members, 24 April 2014. 
447 Conversation, DRC member, 24 April 2014. 
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congregation. He arranged the bus service and made sure the children could join the 
Sunday school either in separate Sesotho or in joint Afrikaans classes. Notably, he made 
time for pastoral care for the new members, which several lamented they did not receive 
in the other churches they attended. Simultaneously, Rev. Kleynhans prepared his own 
congregation for the change that he felt was bound to happen. This involved the constant 
repetition of one of his main beliefs that “if we follow Jesus, we must be a warm 
community.”448 Along with his wife, a social worker in Ladybrand and surroundings, the 
minister encouraged the congregation to not only love their neighbors but find out who 
their neighbors were. He showed pictures depicting the shacks of places like Mauersnek, 
collected money and engaged in work development projects for the black community in 
town, always guided by the motto: “I stand up today to make a difference in God’s 
world.”449 Beyond seeking to inspire his constituency on the basis of faith, the minister 
did not shy from addressing their concerns. In a 2013 letter to all members, he 
acknowledged their distress with changes in the congregation, “especially in light of the 
falling apart of the rest of the country and [of the fact] that the church is in reality the 
only place where we can keep things together.” 450  Rev. Kleynhans assured the 
congregation that as soon as the number of newcomers increased significantly, he would 
be looking into possibilities for a separate worship facility in Mauersnek. “Still, I want to 
																																																								
448 Interview, Reverend Kleynhans, 24 April 2014. 
449 Website DRC Moedergemeente Ladybrand. Visited at 10 July 2015, 
http://www.ladybrand.gcehosting.com/www.ladybrand.info/default.html.  
450 Reverend Kleynhans, “Aan die lidmate van NG Moedergemeente Ladybrand” [To the members of DRC 
Moedergemeente Ladybrand],13 November 2013. Important to note here is that the minister began his 
letter by discussing the country’s problems primarily in terms of climate change, high gas prices and 
economic crisis. More contentious issues such as corruption and crime were not mentioned. 
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share with you that these events [the presence of colored members] in many ways 
enhanced the credibility of the congregation as follower of Jesus.”451 
 The DRC minister thus positioned himself at the center of his congregation’s path 
towards change. How much change actually occurred is however dubious. The move of 
the Mauersnek community towards DRC Ladybrand can hardly be seen as a step towards 
integration. As in the case of De Bloem, it rather comprised the adoption of members 
with a different racial and social-economic background into a white congregation and its 
predominantly conservative Afrikaans identity. Little of this identity altered upon or after 
their arrival. Trying to sooth members’ concerns, the Reverend in fact reaffirmed the 
sense that diversity posed a serious threat to Moedergemeente’s historic constituency. 
Installing separate worship services for the white Moedergemeente and colored 
Mauersnek communities was presented as a natural solution to prevent the former from 
losing its position as a “place where we can keep things together.” It should be noted that 
where the term “colored” regularly surfaced, neither the minister nor members made 
much reference to “white” or “Afrikaner.” They rather assumed both characteristics as 
implicit markers of Moedergemeente Ladybrand’s identity that were unlikely to 
disappear anytime soon, whether or not the population of the congregation became more 
heterogeneous. Change for this congregation came down to the acceptance of this new 
reality, and its gradual normalization. These days, the minister was convinced, members 
no longer felt confronted by the presence of people from Mauersnek in their sanctuary. 
They did not talk about it, nor did they resist it. He also believed their presence had 
																																																								
451 Ibidem. 
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crucially helped transform DRC members’ stereotypes about the township community 
from angry poor to joyful worshippers in their midst. For the colored worshippers 
themselves, change meant first and foremost pride. They did not see themselves as 
merely adapting to the DRC. They claimed to symbolize the transition their entire 
country had made after apartheid by praying and singing freely along with people who 
used to dominate them.  
 
Ladybrand illustrates an intriguing development across the country in which small 
numbers of colored and at times black Reformed communities have begun to approach 
nearby DRC congregations for immediate support with their church services. In several 
cases, the former evolved into separate sections of their neighboring DRC, with perhaps 
the same minister, but with their own worship times. The case of Ladybrand is unique in 
the sense that the community actually moved in and, thus far at least, did not evolve into 
a detached section or “wijk” of Moedergemeente Ladybrand. The opposite almost 
happened in Philippolis, a small picturesque village surrounded by vast empty plains and 
farmlands in the south of the Free State. The two Reformed churches of Philippolis, the 
centrally located DRC Philippolis and URCSA Bergmanshoogte in one of the townships 
on the edge of the village, have both at different moments in their recent history endured 
deep crises. The DRC initially helped out Bergmanshoogte by establishing a fund to pay 
for a new minister in the late nineties. Several years later, it was DRC Philippolis that 
could no longer afford a full-time salary. In 2007 it turned to URCSA to request a special 
partnership in which both churches would share the time and services of the minister of 
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Bergmanshoogte. Since then, Reverend Van Schalkwyk has been tending to both 
churches in addition to a third DRC congregation a few miles further south. The three 
congregations continue to function as autonomous entities, tending to their respective 
colored and white communities separately. But they have done so on the basis of a quite 
extraordinary interdependent relationship in which the DRC no longer constitutes the 
dominant player that supports a poor URCSA community, but both need each other to 
keep afloat. 
 Before discussing how this relationship manifested itself, it is important to briefly 
address the circumstances. DRC Philippolis forms the smallest congregation within the 
dwindling Presbytery of Fauresmith. Between 2000 and 2010, the Presbytery lost over 
twenty percent of its members as many moved to the cities, abroad or for other reasons 
no longer felt at home in the DRC. In 2013, DRC Philippolis was estimated to have a 
mere 230 members left.452 The congregation along with the town itself epitomize the 
degeneration of the countryside we see across South Africa. Besides rising 
unemployment, the breakdown of public services and security, Philippolis suffered 
significantly from the HIV AIDS epidemic and the failure of local health services to cope 
with it. The epidemic arrived here in 1998 and lasted throughout the 2000s. It primarily 
hit the townships where at the height of the epidemic an average of 17 funerals per month 
comprised HIV AIDS related deaths, to the extent that the cemeteries could barely cope 
																																																								
452 Kobus Schoeman and Carin van Schalkwyk, “Klein plattelandse gemeentes as ruimtes om brûe na die 
hele gemeenskap te bou: ’n Prakties-teologiese ondersoek” [Small rural congregations as spaces to build 
bridges for the entire community], LitNet Akademies 10(3) (2013): 787. 
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with the number of burials. 453  In a town of just 5000 inhabitants, few remained 
untouched. Orphans roamed the streets and burial grounds became awkward meeting 
points where white farm owners would visit black and colored communities to pay 
respect to a housekeeper or gardener. Both URCSA and the DRC actively responded to 
this crisis.454 The Bergmanshoogte congregation in particular took up a key position as 
the only church in town that from the beginning of the epidemic conducted burials of the 
heavily stigmatized HIV patients within and outside of its own community. It developed 
a training program to raise awareness about HIV AIDS. Congregants openly talked about 
sex and encouraged others in the communities to get themselves tested. The DRC 
community in turn engaged with a so-called teddy bear project in which members knitted 
stuffed animals for orphaned children in the townships. Besides a source of comfort, the 
teddy bears became, according to Rev. Van Schalkwyk, a way for the DRC members to 
actively engage with the township communities.455 Many remained committed to the 
children as they grew up, at times supporting them with money for education or clothes. 
Ultimately, the DRC congregation turned to the township for assistance with its own 
problems and initiated the partnership with URCSA Bergmanshoogte. 
 Upon my visit in 2014, this partnership comprised an arrangement in which 
Reverend Van Schalkwyk dedicated forty percent of her work to URCSA 
Bergmanshoogte, another forty percent to DRC Philippolis and twenty percent to DRC 
Gariepdam. The minister traveled back and forth between these congregations as she 																																																								
453 Kate Groch, Karen E. Gerdes, Elizabeth A. Segal & Maureen Groch, “The Grassroots Londolozi Model 
of African Development: Social Empathy in Action,” Journal of Community Practice 20:1-2, (2012): 168-
169. 
454 Schoeman and Schalkwyk, “Klein plattelandse gemeentes,” 793-796. 
455 Interview, Reverend Van Schalkwyk, 23 April 2014. 
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offered each separate worship and pastoral services. For the times she was serving at one 
of the other communities, Bergmanshoogte hired an assistant while DRC Philippolis and 
Gariepdam relied heavily on lay leaders to help with or even conduct services and other 
church related activities. In the words of Rev. Van Schalkwyk, the congregations thus 
“chose to collaborate…, but always kept their own identities.”456 Each retained its own 
style of worship as well as its traditionally homogenous white or colored membership. 
The minister highlighted during our conversations the various manners in which contact 
between URCSA Bergmanshoogte and DRC Philippolis expanded over the years. Ever 
since the HIV AIDS crisis, the two communities began reaching out to each other 
through spontaneous small-scale initiatives. Farm owners helped out building a daycare 
center for the children of Bergmanshoogte. URCSA members visited elderly DRC 
congregants once a week to help clean the house and keep company. All prayed together 
when the village was without water for five consecutive days. In joint conversations, they 
shared frustrations about the excessive power of the ANC in their region and the need for 
ANC membership to get anything done, even to find a job.457  
 An increased awareness among the two congregations of their common faith had, 
in the eyes of members as well as the minister, facilitated these interactions. They could 
not imagine themselves at integrated Sunday services, but were nonetheless convinced 
that their churches should and would ultimately be together.458 Partaking in the same 
religious tradition was meanwhile considered a crucial factor in building trust between 																																																								
456 Carin van Schalkwyk. “Kerkhereniging in die Suid-Vrystaat - ’n alternatiewe verhaal” [Church 
reunification in the South Free State - an alternative story], Die Kerkbode, 16 May 2008. 15. 
457 Conversation, DRC-URCSA Focus group Philippolis, 28 April 2014. 
458 Conversation, DRC-URCSA Focus group Philippolis, 28 April 2014; Interview DRC member, 28 April 
2014. 
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the colored township and Philippolis’ white population. Rev. Van Schalkwyk said that 
members were aware of the fact that they all heard the same sermon and received similar 
guidance on values and morality. It helped generate a common frame of reference unique 
for two communities whose worlds remained far removed from each other. A DRC 
member gave the example of the increasing fear among white communities of farm 
attacks and the damage this had done to relationships with colored and black farm 
workers. In such situations, she stated, “it helps us trust each other, when we know we are 
all Christians.”459 Above all, members and minister agreed that they did not need to be 
physically together in church on Sunday to be united. “We pray where we feel safe.” 
“Worship does not only happen on Sunday. It occurs when we work together, building a 
daycare or renovating the church building.”460 
 The course of events at Philippolis should not be romanticized. The HIV AIDS 
crisis and subsequent developments between the two churches scarcely altered the 
disparate reality of white farmers owning most of the surrounding lands and black and 
colored communities scraping by in impoverished townships. The minister servicing the 
two congregations had to balance the needs and expectations of two vastly different 
congregations. On both sides, hierarchal patterns, in which whites support and rule over 
the town’s non-white communities, remained embedded. Resistance to break with such 
patterns has continued to run deep, particularly in the DRC congregation. 
Notwithstanding its decrease in numbers and finances, DRC Philippolis maintained in the 
eyes of the other communities as well as its own constituency, an emblem of white 																																																								
459 Conversation, DRC-URCSA Focus group Philippolis, 28 April 2014. 
460 Interview, Reverend Van Schalkwyk, 23 April 2014. 
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dominance. DRC members still held powerful positions in the town, and the church, with 
its high steeple and historic building, continued to symbolize this. Reverend Van 
Schalkwyk is white herself and has been occupying an important position as scribe of the 
DRC Free State regional synod. Her assistant Ms. Vermeulen at Bergmanshoogte is also 
white and studied to become a DRC minister at the Stellenbosch Faculty of Theology. 
Vermeulen remarked that “prejudice, racism and segregation are still facts in 
Philippolis.”461 Members on either side openly conveyed their difficulties with changing 
these attitudes. A colored URCSA member and community worker used to collaborating 
with white colleagues, said she was still afraid to enter the white church she associated 
with the apartheid days. A white woman shared what she believed to be a prevalent 
notion in DRC Philippolis that people from the colored townships worshipped under the 
influence of alcohol and would as such feel uncomfortable in the DRC’s formal church 
environment.462  
 On a personal level though, small changes seemed both feasible and desirable to 
the two congregations. Members from both sides said they interacted on increasingly 
equal terms, taking for granted that each had an obligation, and an opportunity, to help 
out the other in case of need. The symbolism of the DRC requesting help from URCSA 
Bergmanshoogte had made an impact. Rev. Van Schalkwyk believed URCSA members 
had gained confidence as they no longer comprised the only congregation holding out its 
hand for support and in general felt more independent now that they had shown they 
																																																								
461 Interview, Ms. Vermeulen, 28 April 2014. 
462 Conversation, DRC-URCSA Focus group Philippolis, 28 April 2014; Interview, DRC member, 28 April 
2014. 
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could handle a crisis as devastating as the HIV AIDS epidemic. DRC members had 
quietly come to terms with being tied to a colored congregation. Together with URCSA 
Bergmanshoogte, they appeared relatively content with their partnership and the small 
initiatives it had engendered, especially because neither had undermined the 
congregations’ individual identities. Expectations of collaboration remained low, but the 
improvement of personal relationships was valued. The assistant minister at 
Bergmanshoogte presented herself as example of how such relationships helped mitigate 
congregants’ general fear for change. Being openly gay, Vermeulen had been refused an 
official position as minister or even assistant minister at either the DRC or URCSA.463 
Rev. Van Schalkwyk took her on as employee at a small non-profit associated with 
Bergmanshoogte and gradually involved her in more pastoral tasks. Over time, DRC and 
URCSA members became used to her presence.464 I am no longer strange for them.” 
With no resources to pay for someone else, the communities had little choice but to 
accept what had initially appeared a radical departure from their conservative social 
values. Vermeulen perceived a similar development on issues of race. Neither of the 
congregations had been particularly eager to engage across group boundaries. But in face 
of Philippolis’ harsh reality, “people can no longer avoid it.”465 
 
																																																								
463 At its General Synod of 2015 the DRC resolved to allow same-sex marriages and the ordination of 
ministers in a same-sex relationship.  
464 This interestingly affirms the finding of Andrew Whitehead that US congregations with a positive stance 
towards female leadership often also tend to be more positive towards gay or lesbian membership or 
leadership. See: Andrew L. Whitehead, “Gendered Organizations and Inequality Regimes: Gender, 
Homosexuality, and Inequality Within Religious Congregations,” Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion 52.3 (2013): 476-493. 
465 Interview, Ms. Vermeulen, 28 April 2014. 
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The absence of the term church unification in the above discussion on Ladybrand and 
Philippolis is no accident. In neither case, did the communities express interest in 
national conversations about an official merger between their churches, nor did they 
engage with any broader effort towards racial integration. There appears to be some irony 
here. To an extent, the two rural stories epitomize the kind of church unity national 
leaders have long insisted on. Both comprised bottom-up initiatives in which the 
communities themselves chose to collaborate across the color line without being forced 
through official structures. At least in Philippolis, the evolving partnership included the 
often called for preservation of each community’s local character. In Ladybrand white 
and colored congregants managed to actually join in worship, not a small feat in South 
Africa’s deeply segregated church life. The involved churches nevertheless persisted their 
deep historic affiliations with a single racial community as well as their distrust of 
diversity. Their major purpose constituted survival as a community church, just as we 
saw with Heatherdale and De Bloem. Decisions for collaboration in Ladybrand and 
Philippolis were chiefly motivated by pragmatic concerns about local conditions. The 
rural congregations had fewer options for financial autonomy than the two city churches. 
Forging interracial partnerships formed in either case a last resort to ensure their own 
survival rather than an attempt towards reconciliation. Each community retained its own 
carefully constructed comfort zones, with but small cracks for individuals to interact on 
specific occasions, like a new church building or cleaning project. 
 The small-scale partnerships between the two rural DRC and URCSA 
communities might have generated little tangible change. They did offer a chance for 
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these communities to engage on relatively equal terms. On the countryside, such 
interactions have continued to be scarce. Where urban dwellers meet each other at 
nominally integrated businesses, public institutions or facilities, agricultural communities 
often remain embedded in patriarchal patterns of the past with white farm owners on one 
side and black and colored farmworkers on the other. Engaging with each other in church 
or through church related activities constituted for members in Ladybrand and Philippolis 
a rare moment to step out of these traditional roles. Faith helped level the play field. 
Ministers employed terminology from the Reformed churches’ unity discourse to prepare 
congregants on either side for their inevitable contact. They presented diversity as a cause 
for celebration rather than fear, and inclusiveness as an expression of belief in Jesus 
Christ rather than a liability to conservative church identities. Individual congregants 
similarly made an appeal to Christian beliefs and rituals to reason why they should be 
together. The notion of divine unity appeared particularly important among URCSA 
members to help overcome their deep suspicions of the white church. DRC members 
primarily valued the possibility to share worship, literally in church as well as more 
abstractly through joint community works, as an unthreatening way to engage with black 
and colored neighbors on their own turf or on neutral territory. Both signaled strong 
appreciation for spontaneous opportunities to translate their beliefs into practical efforts 
and help improve local living conditions for all villagers.  
 Ultimately, few appeared impressed with these efforts. DRC members struggled 
to disassociate the partnerships with URCSA from the deep sense of loss many still 
experienced. The emerging mutual dependency symbolized the painful transition from a 
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powerful majority, political, religious and social-economic, to a minority that for its own 
survival now had to rely on the people they used to rule. The partnerships furthermore 
triggered fears for reverse domination. The little realistic yet powerful image of 
“busloads of coloreds” knocking at the church doors eclipsed both religious and 
pragmatic motives for cooperation. DRC members in Ladybrand as well as Philippolis 
seemed to rather accept their churches’ decline than being confronted by outsiders. On 
URCSA’s side, members put more emphasis on the gains made through their interaction 
with the old mother church. Expectations remained low however and barely rose above 
the mere fact of sitting next to a white person in the pews and not feeling frowned upon.  
 
Diversity, but only on my turf 
 
The four discussed case studies in many ways exemplify the backlash among Reformed 
communities particularly in the Free State against official efforts towards church unity. In 
the region’s unfriendly conditions, the idea of making the church a more diverse place is 
rather associated with threat than with progress. Communities prioritize internal 
solidarity over integration, survival of their own people over reconciliation with others. 
The churches’ primary function involves for each of the population groups their ability to 
offer refuge from the outside world, something all fear could be undermined through 
official unification arrangements. Amidst this resistance to change, congregations in the 
Free State have however made greater steps towards visible integration than many of 
their church brothers and sisters in the Cape. Willingly or unwillingly, DRC and URCSA 
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congregations across the arid state are sharing buildings, services and ministers. They 
tend to include churchgoers from different backgrounds than their traditional membership 
even while persisting in their historic attachment to one single population group.  
Underlying this paradox appears once again the growing distance between local 
congregations and their national as well as regional leadership. Members in the above 
case studies placed little trust in the institutions of either the DRC or URCSA. Both were 
considered to be too preoccupied with church battles around unity and Belhar to care 
about the daily realities of their constituencies. The antagonism towards these issues 
followed the overall disappointment with the church as a source of tangible support on 
top of a larger sense of disillusion with the country’s failing government. Emphasis was 
thus put on the autonomy of the local congregation from institutional power, whether 
church or political, and its ability to care for the immediate community. At De Bloem and 
Heatherdale, this urge for independence emerged as the congregations’ top priority. In 
their search for greater financial autonomy and a stronger position in the neighborhood, 
both congregations ended up loosening deeply engrained racial affiliations. Perceptions 
of who belonged to the immediate community were widened to include non-whites or 
Sesotho speakers. A similar opening up could be discerned in Ladybrand and Philippolis 
where local partnerships across the color line gained appreciation as strategies to survive 
as a congregation and better care for the entire village.  
 Compared to the Cape, the Free State case studies thus display an alternative and 
quite contradictory route towards overcoming church divisions. Apart from small-scale 
agreements to for instance share a minister’s time, the route seems void of formal 
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structures. It built largely on grassroots initiatives among individuals who tended to pick 
and choose from the various religious discourses available to them. They wholeheartedly 
denounced the Belhar Confession as a politicized document and simultaneously stressed 
the importance of its three major themes, unity, reconciliation and justice. Ministers 
developed entire sermons around values of diversity and inclusiveness, only to reiterate 
the congregation’s key responsibility to safeguard a community’s distinct culture and 
language. The reverends at De Bloem, Heatherdale, Ladybrand and Philippolis each 
employed strong references to the Bible that congregants claimed were influential in 
creating a sense of social cohesion across race and class distinctions. Rarely, did 
ministers couple such language with a call for structural efforts of interracial 
collaboration. It primarily served as inspiration for members to spontaneously reach out 
to one another at the local level. Anything above this level was rather discouraged as at 
best a waste of time, or at worst a risk to the community. Diversity was better considered 
to remain within boundaries that could be controlled. Inside De Bloem’s sanctuary or 
during social works in Philippolis, individual interactions with people from the village or 
the neighborhood presented less of a danger than the idea of greater church integration 
and its anticipated ramifications for the future of the community. 
 This unstructured and largely hesitant approach might have triggered gradual 
processes inside Free State congregations towards more inclusivity. But in each of the 
discussed cases, change remained limited to specific groups of individuals who chose to 
form short-term alliances. These notably involved ministers from the DRC and members 
from URCSA. Both held a pragmatic interest in interracial collaboration as a way to 
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sustain their communities. Both also sought to bolster these interests through strong 
religious motives, but found that their arguments were often insufficient to persuade 
others in the congregation. DRC ministers across the four cases encountered steep 
resistance from their constituencies to alliances that were perceived as but one more 
defeat for the Afrikaner people. On the side of URCSA, members confronted ministers 
and regional leaders profoundly opposed to any arrangements of cooperation that could 
provide the white church a sense of victory over the past. Several of the church actors I 
interviewed in the Free State noted this discrepancy and considered it emblematic for the 
problems within the Reformed Church family. “Just URCSA members and DRC leaders 
together would work well,” one minister in Bloemfontein asserted.466 Terrified to lose 
more members however, many DRC ministers felt powerless without actively involving 
their broader constituency. In URCSA’s hierarchal organization, members conversely 
said they faced greater challenges from leaders who refused to set aside their apartheid 
experiences than from their DRC neighbors. Without backup, neither DRC ministers, nor 
URCSA members stood a chance to expand their efforts beyond the local.  
The limited scope of the discussed cases raises questions about whether the Free State’s 
grassroots approach generates any substantial progress in integrating communities. It 
might further interracial contact on a personal level, whether as a result of sheer 
pragmatism or on the basis of religious principles. In the end, the same problem emerges 
as Becker, Emerson and Smith among others have noted in the United States. Focus is 
given almost exclusively to individuals while structural inequalities are kept in place, if 
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not reinforced. At this personal level diversity is moderately tolerated, but only under the 
condition that it does not interrupt the ways in which the community and larger society 
are organized. The stories of Bloemfontein, Ladybrand and Philippolis appear exemplary 
of this dynamic. Whether black, white or colored, faith communities generally shunned 
tough discussions about institutional discrimination or legacies of the apartheid past as 
these were feared to upset the already precarious balance inside a neighborhood or village 
with multiple identity groups present.  
 The conscious avoidance of structural change however did not prevent the 
unfurling of a different type of transition. Through their emphasis on the local and the 
individual, the churches of the Free State appear frontrunners of the de-
institutionalization scholars of religion have noted worldwide. Particularly, they show the 
evolution of an alternative approach to faith and community. While the churches remain 
cultural bastions of single identity groups, faith is increasingly employed in the secular 
domain to connect across group boundaries. The farmers and farmworkers of Philippolis 
often found more spiritual meaning outside their congregation while working together on 
a social project, than inside their own congregation, just like De Bloem’s congregants 
connected over their stoves and catering services rather than during Sunday service. At 
these informal instances they were able to develop the unlikely alliances Ammerman 
speaks of in her discussion on spiritual tribes. Rather than establishing a new institution 
to express these alliances, congregants preferred to keep things low profile. Broad 
religious values, loosely inspired by their respective church traditions, on top of concern 
for the local environment offered material for a sense of common belonging, or rather a 
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common mission to alleviate disparities in the name of God. The question emerging here 
is what this sense of mission then implies for the cause of unity? 
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5.4. Beyond the church: a social works model of integration? 
 
“Mission in unity and unity in mission” 
 
In the previous two sections we have looked at efforts to integrate local church bodies 
and leadership structures, an attempt towards the bottom-up merger of two congregations 
and strategies of self-sustenance versus interracial partnership to adapt to changing 
circumstances. This last section reaches beyond the experience of specific church 
communities and explores initiatives across the Reformed family to collaborate on social 
programs. These programs involve mission and evangelization work as well as poverty 
relief efforts, orphanages, elderly homes and educational development, in and outside of 
South Africa, within and well beyond the churches’ immediate constituencies. They have 
historically formed a major pillar of the DRC as part of its efforts to consolidate the 
church’s public function in society. Within URCSA, the social programs have in recent 
years been gaining a similarly important position. Notably, the programs constitute a 
unique intermediate level of cooperation that involves regional and national leaders who 
are coordinating the programs, as well as the local congregations with which they are 
often implemented. In both churches, the various stakeholders tend to motivate the social 
programs by referring to a higher goal beyond their individual church agendas. It 
comprises their joint calling to “contribute to the healing of the land, in humility, together 
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with one another – ‘mission in unity and unity in mission.’”467 This sense of calling is 
quite recent though and clashes regularly with prevailing counter-narratives in which the 
white DRC is expected to help out black and colored congregations through short-term 
relief activities rather than partnering together towards broad community development 
objectives.  
 Tensions between the churches’ ambitious unity discourse and a reality of 
paternalism and segregation become highly visible here. Also pertinent is the 
reoccurrence of nationalistic ideals in the churches’ presentation of their joint social 
calling. These dynamics will be discussed on the basis of four social programs through 
which URCSA and the DRC have been seeking to offer relief services at home and 
abroad. The first two programs, the Western Cape based Commission For Witness468 and 
the Free State based Partners in Witness469 illustrate the ongoing transformation of the 
two churches’ long segregated mission policy. Secondly, the local non-profits of Badisa 
and Towers of Hope470 exhibit the increasing distance between the social programs and 
the church institutions of the Reformed family.  
 
Before elaborating these initiatives, it is crucial to address the historic evolution of social 
programs in the Reformed Church family, and particularly inside the DRC. This history 
begins with the mission policy of the mid-nineteenth century, the era in which the DRC 																																																								
467 Dawid Bosch, Transforming Mission, Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission (New York. Orbis, 1991), 
463-467. Quoted in United Ministry for Service and Witness, “Our Calling to Service and Witness. A 
Theological Basis for the DRC Family’s Missional Ministries. Policy Document” (2011): 28. 
468 Afrikaans: Kommissie vir Getuienisaksie (KGA).  
469 Afrikaans: Vennote in Getuienis (Vennote). 
470 Afrikaans: Torings van Hoop. 
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significantly expanded its evangelization efforts in Southern Africa. As indicated in 
chapter three, the DRC mission policy overlapped to a great extent with the church’s 
apartheid policy. Servicing each racial community separately was considered essential to 
answer God’s wish for preserving distinct cultures and nations while disseminating the 
message of Jesus Christ. The Mission Secretary of the Free State even spoke of “our 
mission policy of apartheid.”471 The black Reformed churches formed the primary subject 
of this policy. They embodied the segregation that the DRC claimed to be consistent with 
God’s will and relied on the DRC’s missionary “goodwill” to provide anything, from 
church buildings to ministers. Significantly, the DRC not only offered church services, 
but also general support for the communities served by the black Reformed churches. 
Hospitals, school initiatives and special institutions for the deaf and blind formed an 
intrinsic part of the DRC’s mission policy, thus entangling the goals of evangelization, 
segregation and development.  
 For decades the DRC sharply distinguished between these missionary programs 
and the social works the church organized for its own white Afrikaner constituency. In 
the period immediately after the Anglo-Boer Wars up until the establishment of the 
National Party apartheid regime, the DRC invested tremendously in elevating what it 
called “the poor white problem.”472 It established schools, orphanages, homes for the 
elderly and adult education centers, often supported through volunteering church 																																																								
471 Rev. J.G. Strydom quoted in G. van der Watt, “Recent Developments and Challenges in Understanding 
the Dutch Reformed Family of Churches' Missional Identity and Calling,” Dutch Reformed Theological 
Journal = Nederduitse Gereformeerde Teologiese Tydskrif 51 (2010): 165-6. 
472 Robert Vosloo. “The Dutch Reformed Church and the poor white problem in the wake of the first 
Carnegie Report (1932): some church-historical and theological observations,” Studia Historiae 
Ecclesiasticae Volume 37 Number 2, [14] (September 2011): 67-85. 
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members and government subsidies. Above all, the DRC emerged in this era as the prime 
advocate for the structural improvement of the situation of white communities that were 
struggling to adapt to a rapidly modernizing and urbanizing society. The church 
successfully recommended state welfare programs and collaborated closely with the 
National Party on its social works. Central to these works was the DRC’s notion of 
compassion and the clear distinction between white poverty programs and the DRC’s 
black mission policy.473 Where the latter involved relief programs among non-white 
population groups as a way to help spread the Gospel in Africa, compassion specifically 
referred to the DRC’s duty to care for its own “volk.” It was tied to the perception of the 
DRC as the Afrikaner people’s church and simultaneously tuned in with concerns about 
black Africans threatening the social-economic position of whites in the cities. The 
church’s primary responsibility was to keep its white membership from further harm and 
nourish the Afrikaner identity. 
 Church social programs, from missionary to poverty relief activities, thus formed 
an intrinsic part of the greater apartheid system, and were critiqued as such. Not only did 
they epitomize rigid racial segregation practices by providing separate services to black, 
white, colored and Asian communities. They also reaffirmed and consolidated 
paternalistic thinking patterns in which whites acted as both recipients and active 
participants in their churches’ relief programs whereas non-white communities were seen 
as subjects and dependents of white church charity. These patterns triggered deep 
resentment among the black Reformed churches. The status confessionis and Belhar 
																																																								
473 Watt, “Recent Developments and Challenges,” 177. 
 
352	
	
Confession both emerged partly in protest against the DRC’s mission policy of separation 
and paternalism. In 1986, one of URCSA’s predecessors, the Dutch Reformed Mission 
Church, organized an extensive workshop on redefining mission within the broader 
Reformed family. A small group of progressive representatives from the DRC also 
attended the workshop and joined in its sharp protest against the “sinful division” current 
mission and other poverty relief policies had caused in the Reformed churches.474 The 
workshop concluded by stating that the churches’ duty of service could only be 
conducted in union and not in separation. “The unity of the church is the credibility test 
for the witness about the Kingdom of God.”475 Spreading and living out the Bible’s 
message of peace, justice and reconciliation required the churches to join hands in social 
programs that crossed rather than reaffirmed racial boundaries. 
 
The vision and terminology conveyed at the 1986 workshop remains crucial in the 
current social programs landscape of the Reformed Church family, albeit in confusing 
ways. It forms the basis of a wide range of inter-church organizations and commissions 
that on national, regional and local level have gradually been integrating their services. 
They involve partnerships between the DRC and URCSA to develop a joint Bible 
dissemination project in Mozambique or Zimbabwe. Other organizations have been 
seeking to merge long segregated relief programs into newly established faith-based non-
profits. They encourage local DRC and URCSA congregations to expand their soup 																																																								
474 Phil Robinson and Johan Botha (red.), Wat is sending? ’n Werkswinkel vir die familie van NG kerke 
[What is mission? A workshop for the DRC family] (Swartland Drukpers (Edms) Bpk. Malmsbury, 1986), 
164. 
475 Robinson and Botha, Wat is sending? 164. 
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kitchens to include a broader and more diverse group of recipients, or ask members to 
volunteer together at a church childcare provision or elderly home. Terms such as 
mission, compassion and social works have become increasingly intertwined. Missionary 
activities rarely focus on evangelization alone and may also include local homeless 
shelters as part of a so-called “internal mission project.” Church social workers and 
missionaries alike today speak of their commitment to compassion. It is now associated 
with the diaconate tradition of the Reformed church to care for the vulnerable regardless 
of their racial or ethnic background, rather than the care for “one’s own.”  
 To add to the mix, witness is often employed as another comprehensive term for 
all missionary, relief and development programs within the Reformed family. Understood 
broadly, it refers to the church’s obligation to actively engage with the larger society and 
calls upon congregations to turn outwards rather than inwards. More specifically, the 
notion of witness is used, as we saw earlier, to advocate for an outspoken church agenda 
against racial, economic or other forms of oppression and for the church to act as model 
of God’s Kingdom of justice and reconciliation on earth. Few social programs in the 
Reformed family engage directly with such advocacy though. Their work mostly 
comprises short-term initiatives to provide support for struggling communities, whether 
by handing out Bibles or repairing a village school. Under the motto ‘mission in unity 
and unity in mission,’ URCSA and the DRC officially collaborate on many of these 
initiatives. But as in their worshipping, they continue to implement many of their social 
programs along the divisions of the apartheid past. How can we understand these 
 
354	
	
programs in light of their convoluted history, and what do they have to offer to the 
current unification process? 
 
From daughters to sisters 
 
“Partnerships are meant to purposefully move away from the old mission era of “mother” 
and “daughter” churches which was marked by dependence and prescriptiveness, the 
handing out of money and consequential tensions; they are meant to join hands in a new 
way with our sister churches in a common calling to service and witness in context. 
Partnerships are a purposeful step on the path towards greater visible unity.”476 With 
these words, the DRC of the Free State mission commission explained its name change 
from Synodical Witness Commission to Partners in Witness. The quote is illustrative of 
the broader attempt by the Reformed churches to overcome the connotation of their 
mission policies with the unequal relationships of the apartheid era. The DRC as well as 
URCSA seek to refashion their approach to mission from paternalism towards 
partnership, and from segregated evangelization towards joint and united projects meant 
to improve overall living conditions. Partners in Witness and the integrated Commission 
for Witness on the Western Cape comprise two organizations, also referred to as 
ministries, through which the churches have been phasing in this transition. What do their 																																																								
476 DRC Free State 2014, Vennote in Getuienis - ’n Nuwe Benadering [Partners in Witness - a New 
Approach], March 2014. Original text in Afrikaans: Vennootskappe wil doelbewus wegbeweeg van die ou 
sending-era van “moeder” en “dogterkerke” wat so gekenmerk is deur afhanklikheid, voorskriftelikheid, 
die gee van geld en die gevolglike spanning; dit wil op ʼn nuwe manier hande vat met ons susterkerke in 
ons gesamentlike roeping tot diens en getuienis in ons konteks. Vennootskappe is ʼn doelbewuste stap op 
die pad na groter sigbare eenheid.  
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partnerships in mission consist of today and to what extent do they reach beyond the 
churches’ historic divisions? 
 
The Commission for Witness (CFW) first of all presents one of the earliest examples of a 
joint mission program inside the Reformed Church family. It evolved as a practical 
follow-up to the 1986 workshop. To implement the vision of a united mission, the DRC 
and DRMC decided to merge their regional mission commissions in the Western Cape 
into one new commission. The Commission for Witness was formally established in 1991 
and designated as the main Western Cape church body responsible for organizing 
missionary projects on behalf of the DRC, the RCA and what would later become 
URCSA. Today, these projects range from building new churches in poor parts of South 
Africa and neighboring countries to providing spiritual support for Christians in Western 
Cape work places, prisons and hospitals. They moreover include public dialogue 
initiatives between church actors and local authorities or businesses about burning issues 
such as land reform, restorative justice and reconciliation. 477  Beyond the various 
activities, the Commission occupies a special position inside the Reformed family as a 
regional model of church unity. The three involved churches jointly preside over its 
finances, staff and programming and fully accept the Commission to act on their behalf. 
It has its own office and operates on the basis of a memorandum of agreement by the 
constituting churches with delegated responsibilities and powers, and always in close 
affiliation with the churches’ regional leaderships in the Cape. 																																																								
477 See for instance the website of CWF under the section: Center for Public Witness. Visited at 6 May 
2015, http://www.kga.org.za/wp/taakspan-4-publieke-getuienis/.  
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 A unit within the DRC regional synod of the Free State, Partners in Witness, or 
Partners in short, barely correlates its service programs with any of the other Reformed 
churches in the region. Among the main programs are evangelization activities in Japan, 
hospitals in Zambia as well as general church support and community development for 
DRCA and URCSA congregations in the Free State. In addition, Partners takes up an 
active role as mediator within the church family. It facilitates negotiations between 
congregations struggling with property conflicts and seeks to forge connections between 
local communities across the four Reformed churches to establish joint development 
programs. This mediating role is particularly interesting considering the context in which 
Partners operates. The commission confronts a regional DRC leadership and constituency 
deeply suspicious of any kind of unity or partner initiative on top of profound tensions 
between the antagonist Free State synods of the DRCA and URCSA. Navigating the 
often contrasting expectations these various churches have of the DRC’s regional service 
unit, Partners in Witness is far removed from the organizational integration at CFW. The 
DRC remains firmly in control of the various social programs, while URCSA and the 
DRCA continue to be involved primarily as recipients of aid. 
Despite their many differences, Partners and CFW share a rather unique position 
as social programs inside the church family actively pursuing inter-racial collaboration. 
Demonstrating how such partnerships can be done has become a prime activity for the 
two organizations. With reference to the term witness in their names, both have been 
taking a public stand in their regional contexts to show how (church) communities might 
work together on social issues regardless of their racial, ethnic or class divisions. In the 
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Western Cape, CFW has over the years evolved into a central actor in the Reformed 
churches’ effort to develop joint organizational structures. As an established institution, 
the Commission is in constant conversation with other inter-church partnerships, such as 
the Theology Faculty at Stellenbosch or the various uniting presbyteries in the region, 
about strengthening relationships within the Reformed family and with other 
denominations. It collaborates on an initiative to foster theological training for 
impoverished congregations across the continent and has played a crucial role in the 
consolidation of a national network of service and witness programs for the entire 
Reformed family, called the United Ministry for Service and Witness.478  
 Partners meanwhile seeks to head a different smaller-scale transition within its 
convoluted Free State setting. By involving local communities, government agencies and 
non-profit organizations in its work, the organization seeks to embody a rather 
preliminary phase on the road towards collaboration, namely the building of trust and 
initial contact among the embroiled churches and between congregations and the 
authorities they often distrust. Partners takes every opportunity to stress the sister 
relationships between the churches as substitute for the long prevalent mother-daughter 
ties, and the churches’ interdependence in times of persistent and growing insecurity. An 
April 2014 newsletter elaborated: “Our continent is changing dramatically; we need to 
learn to think differently about being church and about service. That is how we as sisters 
																																																								
478 Further details about the theological training initiative NetAct are found at their website: 
http://www0.sun.ac.za/netact/ to NetAct. The operations of the United Ministry for Service and Witness are 
elaborated at the DRC official website. Visited at 19 May 2015, 
http://www.ngkerkas.co.za/index.php/taakspanne-vir-staande-werk/verenigde-diensgroep-diens-en-
getuienis-vddg/.  
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come together, earnestly and open-hearted.”479 The fact that the churches need each other 
should, according to Partners’ current director, be an incentive for the various churches to 
work with rather than for each other. “[The] church is part of a movement. We need to 
listen to our context and explore how we can get closer together while living in 
inequality.”480  
 Partners regularly facilitates conversations with church and community actors. It 
convenes representatives of the four Reformed churches separately and together to talk 
about their own concerns and gain perspective of problems in other communities. For 
years, the lion share of these meetings focused on finding a settlement for the property 
conflicts between the DRCA and URCSA. Since partially succeeding with a settlement in 
2011, Partners has continued to offer opportunities to “[listen to] each other’s stories - 
heartrending stories of exhaustion, division and expulsion, but also touching stories of 
reconciliation and hope” among the Free State’s Sesotho and Afrikaans speaking 
communities, in the townships and on the farms.481 Listening is considered a crucial 
activity to help build awareness among for instance DRC members that they are not alone 
in their fear for rising unemployment and farm attacks, or understanding among URCSA 
and DRCA members of the interrelated problems of disparity underlying their property 
conflicts. Both churches are encouraged to tell stories of hope and new alliances like the 
minister share in Philippolis or an emerging multicultural student congregation at the 
University of the Free State in Bloemfontein. 
																																																								
479 “As susters saamstap” [Walking together as sisters], Ligdraers [Bearers of light], April 2014, 1. 
480 Interview, Gideon van der Watt, 30 April 2014. 
481 “As susters saamstap,” 2. 
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To bolster their position as models of integration, CFW and Partners both employ 
a strong religiously infused discourse. In an interesting twist of history, it ties the 
churches’ mission not merely to the land of South Africa or the Afrikaner nation, but 
rather to the entire territory of Africa. After decades of segregated policies, the two 
organizations claim to be frontrunners in the transition of the churches and the continent 
at large towards a more inclusive approach of community development and outreach. On 
their website, in newsletters and in conversations, they present themselves as the 
churches’ conscience in the “calling to service and witness in unity.”482 Where leaders 
and congregations struggle to even talk across the color line, CFW and Partners say they 
effectuate practical black-white relationships to serve the Kingdom of God in Africa. 
This calling to service constitutes the leitmotiv throughout their work. “[W]e are called as 
prophets, priests and kings to minister the Gospel of God’s salvation to all people through 
word (kerugma), deed (diaconia) and in a relationship of love and unity (koinonia).”483 
Both organizations point to concrete and often widely varying actions to demonstrate 
how they are implementing God’s will on earth. Their newsletters offer stories of an 
URCSA congregation hosting a DRC supported leadership course for its youth, a joint 
trip by DRC and URCSA representatives to a mission project in Malawi or a job creation 
partnership in Bloemfontein’s city center. Sharing certain beliefs and traditions is often 
mentioned as crucial factor in enabling such activities. The former director of CFW 
attributed the advanced level of integration of its services to the fact that the various 
																																																								
482 CFW Website. Visited at 6 May 2015, http://www.kga.org.za/wp/28-2/. 
483 United Ministry for Service and Witness, “Our Calling to Service and Witness,” 12 
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church stakeholders “concur on ethos and values.”484 This ethos notably comprises the 
Belhar Confession as a core foundational doctrine. Referring to Belhar’s three themes, 
the former director explained that “CFW through its united being really is a mission to 
the heart of the church, a voice for justice, reconciliation, unity.” “We are not [just] 
working together, we are one.”485 Partners similarly underscores the importance of a 
common faith basis throughout its documentation, but avoids any explicit references to 
the controversial Belhar Confession. Instead, it focuses on the broader missional identity 
of the church and its responsibility to engage actively and equally with the many different 
communities of the African continent.486  
 Unity tends to emerge in the organizations’ discourse as a means rather than a 
goal in itself. Especially at Partners, references to unity or church unification are rare. 
The organization instead speaks of collaboration necessary to help the church face the 
vast challenges of African countries today. Considering the persistent poverty and 
violence as well as the weakening position of the Reformed family, Partners presents 
contact between the various churches as an indispensable tactic in the survival struggle of 
contemporary congregations. “Without partners we simply cannot fulfill our calling 
anymore. The challenges are often too big.”487 Whether or not such partnerships occur on 
the basis of an official unity agreement appears beside the point. CFW alternatively pays 
more attention to the greater goal of church unification, but interweaves it with its own 																																																								
484 Conversation, Johan Botha, 27 February 2015. 
485 Conversation, Johan Botha, 27 February 2015. 
486 DRC Free State 2014, Vennote in Getuienis - ’n Nuwe Benadering.  
487 DRC Free State. Klem verskuif na vennootskapsverhoudinge. [Emphasis shifts towards partnership 
relations.]. Document published without date on the Partners in Witness website. Accessed at 22 February 
2015, http://www.ngkerkvrystaat.co.za/documents/wat-doen-
ons/vennote/amptelikedokumente/Klem%20Verskuif%20na%20Vennootskapsverhoudinge.pdf.  
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immediate concerns about the diversity of the communities it seeks to serve. To allow for 
effective and credible programs, the Commission stresses its priority to engage with the 
communities’ cultural and ethnic differences in a way that none dominate the other. Its 
colorful bilingual newsletter reiterates “our confession that Jesus is the Lord of every 
human being in his or her world.”488 Churches are urged to act as “models of the Bible’s 
message about interculturality and multiculturality in our context.”489 Although unity and 
integration may constitute praiseworthy ideals of the future, CFW concentrates on the 
present and on demonstrating the sheer ability of black and white to serve God together, 
without threatening each other’s identities but rather mutually enriching them.  
 
Neither Partners nor CFW has escaped the intricacies troubling the church family’s 
process to overcome its historic divisions. Prime among them is first of all the persistent 
financial disparity between the DRC and the other Reformed churches. It cost the CFW 
partners almost ten years, difficult debates and tensed relationships to reach a somewhat 
equal salary distribution for the Commission’s staff. The DRC easily contributes sixty 
times the amount URCSA does to sustain its daily operations. The RCA contributes 
barely anything. Operations are based at and organized from an office in the Bellville 
suburb of Cape Town, just a few doors away from the DRC Western Cape regional 
headquarters. They are overseen and coordinated through an inter-church management 
team and are usually implemented as joint projects. The former director nonetheless 																																																								
488 “KGA se drie taakspan-fokusse” [The focus areas of CFW’s three task groups], Getuie / Witness 
Semester 2 (2013): 2. 
489 “Verskillend maar saam in Christus, gee ons hoop vir die wereld” [Different but together in Christ, gives 
us hope for the world], Getuie / Witness Semester 2 (2014): 2. 
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illuminated: “We have to be taking into account that there are traditional relationships 
that we also have to manage through CFW.”490 Inside the DRC, the Commission is still 
expected to continue some of the original mission projects that used to be conducted by 
its Evangelization Commission before it dissolved into the partnership. URCSA also 
looks to ensure through CFW the preservation of specific relief programs for 
impoverished URCSA congregations in for instance the KwaZulu Natal region. With 
each church prioritizing its own separate agendas it is the CFW’s constant challenge to 
carry out its activities in greater visible and credible unity. 
 The discrepancy between words and deeds forms a second major difficulty for the 
two mission organizations. It becomes palpable when looking at Partners in Witness’ 
actual list of programs. A 2011 Organizational Audit document shows a majority of its 
activities involving traditional forms of DRC aid to black and colored church 
communities and barely any of the inter-church partnerships that Partners pleads for in its 
discourse.491 Many of the activities in the 2011 report, primarily the funds to support 
DRCA and URCSA minister salaries, were still in place during my visit in 2014. The 
director admitted that money continued to play a key role among the churches. “Black 
expects money from white, white expects control.” 492  Persisting these uneven 
relationships has appeared for all parties easier than developing new structures of 
partnership. Ministers involved in such structures indicated they often lacked energy to 
put in the hard work necessary to collaborate across the color line or reflect on more 																																																								
490 Conversation, Johan Botha, 27 February 2015. 
491 DRC Free State 2011, Organisatie-Oudit Sinodale Getuieniskommissie [Organizational Audit Synodic 
Witness Commission], October 2011. 
492 Interview, Gideon van der Watt, 18 April 2014. 
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creative ways to help each other rather than through charity.493 Decades of one-way 
charity programs have made DRCA and URCSA congregations greatly reliant on 
Partners’ support for their minister salaries and buildings, creating, in the view of one 
DRCA minister, “a dependency syndrome,” in which “some black churches will not pay 
for their minister even if they have the money.”494  
 The case of Botshabelo offers a snapshot example of the obstinacy of traditional 
aid relationships in the church family. For many years Partners in Witness provided 
essential support to pay for a minister at the DRCA congregation in this mostly black 
impoverished township a few miles outside of Bloemfontein. The Reverend Hoffman, 
with his missionary background, had long been viewed as a key person in the community. 
“He maintains the organizational structures of the congregation, educates assistant 
ministers and church council members, helps with the youth service, guides the Sunday 
school staff, leads the social service program….”495 In addition to the financial support 
for the minister, Partners facilitated multiple conversations between the DRCA in 
question and the nearby URCSA congregation. Both claimed rights to the same church 
building. In 2011 a settlement was reached that allowed URSCA to take the building 
whereas the DRCA congregation could make use of a special settlement fund the DRC 
had set up to pay for a new building. While the DRCA congregation felt it had “sacrificed 
for reconciliation,” actors on both sides said they generally appreciated Partner’s role in 
the mediation and took the settlement as a starting point for improving relationships 
																																																								
493 Interviews, DRC minister, 14 April 2014; and URCSA minister, 30 April 2014. 
494 Interview, DRCA minister, 23 April. 2014 
495 DRC Free State 2011, Organizational Audit Synodic Witness Commission, 9. 
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between the two congregations.496 Some joined in an inter-church project of public 
dialogue with police authorities about township crime, while others collaborated in small 
community development projects. Ultimately though, neither of the involved 
congregations appeared remotely interested in further unification or even a more 
formalized partnership at local level. They counted on the continued support from the 
DRC and meanwhile preferred to remain separate. “We enjoy our own culture.”497 
 
Botshabelo’s story is but one of many. Across the Free State as well as the Western Cape, 
CFW and Partners in Witness and other mission initiatives are primarily known for time-
honored services in which the white church offers support to black and colored 
congregations. Few outside the churches’ establishment appear aware of the joint 
activities these organizations also conduct. Partners has through the years become 
associated with relatively neutral mediation services that enjoy appreciation across the 
Reformed family. These services are still initiated by the DRC though and carry little 
weight as an inter-church effort. CFW might present a model of organizational 
integration, but the involved black and colored partners remain primarily on the receiving 
end of this model. In both cases the images of the organizations’ bright newsletters are 
telling. They show white missionaries or social workers amidst poor black and colored 
communities. The former are quoted in saying they welcome the rare moments of 
exposure, whereas the latter state their gratitude for the help their government has failed 
to provide.  																																																								
496 Conversation, DRCA Botshabelo member, 23 April 2014. 
497 Conversation, DRCA Botshabelo member, 23 April 2014. 
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 As such, the churches’ partnerships seem to persist rather than break patterns of 
paternalism. The key difference with the past is that they increasingly do so on the 
premise of integration and inclusivity rather than segregation and exclusivity. At CFW, a 
joint DRC-URCSA staff decides about the relief activities. Partners builds its programs 
on the conversations it is facilitating with the various communities on the ground. In 
another departure from decades of mission work, both organizations are careful to avoid 
any association with the once deeply felt Afrikaner duty to evangelize Southern Africa. 
The attachment to the African continent however appears stronger than ever before. 
Rather than reinforcing the DRC’s Christian-nationalist heritage, the territorial 
connection is now used to indicate the churches’ broadened commitment to all peoples of 
Africa, with equal respect for their cultures, languages and ethnicities. It forms a crucial 
line of argumentation CFW as well as Partners use to demonstrate their acceptance of the 
new South Africa, the rainbow nation and its predominantly black African rather than 
white Afrikaner population. The territorial connection is moreover, once again, used as a 
unifying motive. Transcending class and racial divisions, it would tie the various 
communities to one overarching mission of implementing God’s word on their land. It 
appears a revisited form of nationalism, or rather continentalism, both the DRC and 
URCSA stakeholders can contend with, allowing them to concentrate on their own needs 
while remaining committed to the common good. 
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From church to non-profit 
  
One peculiar side-effect of the Reformed churches’ effort to disassociate their social 
programs from the loaded past is the simultaneous separation of such programs from their 
church origins. Over the past years they have increasingly evolved into autonomous non-
profits that collaborate more with local authorities and other non-governmental 
organizations than with the DRC or URCSA. Some maintain members from the two 
churches on their boards and stress their faith-based mission and values. Many others 
seem to avoid overt affiliations with the Reformed church family even while the latter 
strains to keep the non-profits under its wings. The organizations Badisa and Towers of 
Hope illuminate these rather contrasting developments. Both were initially established to 
implement church social services on behalf of respectively the Cape regional synods of 
URCSA and the DRC, and the DRC Free State regional synod. Today, they are registered 
as non-profit organizations under South African public law, raise their own funds for 
immediate relief programs that cut across racial, ethnic, social and denominational 
divisions.498 Notably, they do so largely independent from the Reformed churches. The 
latter nonetheless continue to presume ownership and claim the organizations’ interracial 
achievements as their own.  
 
																																																								
498 The South African law allows for faith-based organizations to apply for state funding once they are 
officially registered as non-profit organizations. Especially important is to obtain approval as Public 
Benefit Organization. Out of the two organizations discussed here, Badisa has achieved this so-called PBO 
status and has subsequently been able to apply for and receive significant government subsidies. 
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Badisa is well known in the Cape for its vast and inclusive network of services, primarily 
directed at children and elderly. An integrated team of representatives from both the DRC 
and URCSA coordinates day care and health care services, food and cloths distribution 
and centers for drug addiction treatment. Programs move beyond the former apartheid 
categories, reaching black and white, colored and Asian communities.499 In many ways, 
Badisa bears resemblance to CFW. Where the latter fused the two churches’ mission 
organizations, Badisa comprises an amalgamation of the regional poverty relief 
commissions of the DRC and URCSA in the Cape. It was established in 2003 with the 
expectation that the two would soon merge into one new church. When they did not, 
Badisa continued its services with and for both churches under the heading “joint 
projects.” Unlike the Commission for Witness, Badisa today is set up as an organization 
outside of official church structures and with an independent legal status. Core funding 
comes from government subsidies that require Badisa to adhere to state rather than 
church legislation. It offers direct aid to local communities, whether or not related to one 
of the churches, and generally refrains from evangelization or foreign mission projects. 
 The Free State community service organization Towers of Hope is far removed 
from the level of integration at Badisa. Founded as a DRC initiative to reach out to 
Bloemfontein’s city poor, the non-profit nonetheless displays a rare story of black and 
white communities jointly reshaping church social programs. At first sight, Towers of 
Hope appears yet another faith inspired organization that offers support to the needy in 
																																																								
499 Badisa explicates the communities it reaches and involves in its projects by these four officially 
recognized population categories. See for instance. Badisa Jaarverslag / Annual Report 2012/2013, 13. 
Accessed at 14 March 2015, http://www.badisa.org.za/downloads. 
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South Africa. It hosts soup kitchens and needle workshops, helps homeless people in 
finding work and engages with prostitutes to “make it possible for them to exit this 
lifestyle.” 500  Distinguishing the organization is the fact that all its programs are 
implemented at what used to be one of the most powerful DRC congregations in the Free 
State. The Tweetoring, literally “two towers,” church with its impressive building in the 
center of town long symbolized the deep intertwining of the DRC with Afrikaner 
nationalist and political power. Three presidents of the Orange Free State were 
inaugurated here. The Afrikaner pro-Nazi organization Ossewabrandwag came into being 
in the Tweetoring consistory on the eve of the Second World War.501  
 As many other city churches, Tweetoring lost the vast majority of its members in 
the late nineties and early 2000s due to inner-city decay and the white flight to the 
suburbs. Instead of fully closing its doors, the DRC regional leadership in 2010 handed 
over the keys to the director of the newly established Towers of Hope organization. It 
was initially hoped that the organization could help revive the church by reaching out to 
the poor black residents that had come to dominate the neighborhood in addition to what 
was left of its historic white membership. In the end, few if any of the old members 
stayed. Towers of Hope instead consolidated its status as an autonomous non-profit 
organization. A mixed group of black volunteers and homeless people, white social 
workers and a small number of white newcomers now use the church chiefly to host 
social programs and conduct their own worship with barely any noticeable connection to 																																																								
500 Towers of Hope website. Visited at 15 May 2015, 
http://www.towersofhope.org/ministries/embracing.php.  
501 Christoph Marx, Im Zeichen Des Ochsenwagens: Der Radikale Afrikaaner-Nationalismus in Südafrika 
Und Die Geschichte Der Ossewabrandwag [Oxwagon Sentinel : radical Afrikaner Nationalism and the 
history of the ‘Ossewabrandwag’] (Münster: Lit, 1998), 273-274. 
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traditional sober DRC services. They instead draw from a wide range of religious 
experiences, from the African Independent to the Pentecostal churches, which tend to 
include significantly more free-style dancing and improvised singing than is common in 
the average DRC church.  
Both Badisa and Towers of Hope take pains to emphasize the inclusive nature of 
their organizations, often at the cost of their original affiliations with the Reformed 
churches. References to these churches, let alone their unification process, have been 
minimized or removed from websites and newsletters if they were ever mentioned in the 
first place. The two non-profits rather indicate an overarching Christian foundation as 
source of inspiration. Badisa speaks of Jesus Christ as its role model, where Towers of 
Hope vaguely expounds its vision to empower the vulnerable “in obedience to the Triune 
God.”502 Both are also eager to emphasize the racial as well as religious diversity of the 
staff and recipients of their programs, or at least their effort to ensure that services reach 
“ALL in need, irrespective of their age, gender, nationality or religion.”503 The emphasis 
on diversity appears mostly an effort to demonstrate website visitors that their 
organizations do not discriminate. Allusions to a larger cause of church unity or national 
reconciliation tend to be avoided. Badisa’s website briefly explains its origins in the 
merger of the two churches’ service organizations, but refrains from any references to 
current unity talks between URCSA and the DRC. Towers of Hope barely relates its 
activities to either church, let alone to their efforts to come together.  
																																																								
502 Towers of Hope website. Visited at 15 May 2015, http://www.towersofhope.org/missionvision.php.  
503 Badisa website. Visited at 15 May 2015, http://www.badisa.org.za/index.php/en/who-we-are/core-
business-a-values.  
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 In general, the organizations evade discourse and rather prioritize the practical 
implementation of service projects for what is claimed to be an ever growing number of 
vulnerable people, black and white, in their immediate environment. Inclusivity in this 
respect does not so much comprise a high-minded ideal, but rather a condition necessary 
for the organizations to do their work. Not only the target group is diverse, but so are the 
potential donors. Funding from the Reformed churches has been insufficient, forcing 
Badisa and Towers of Hope to look elsewhere for support. In a 2014 interview, Badisa’s 
director acknowledged the key role financial factors have played in the remodeling of his 
organization’s identity, even beyond its Christian affiliation. To be able to apply for more 
and different sources of funding compelled Badisa to take a broader approach than 
signaled by its existing tagline of “Christian compassion.”504 Adding the phrase “a 
neighbor to anyone in need,” the organization today highlights its image as primarily a 
non-profit that might still be driven by religious values but that is not directly church-
based.  
 At Towers of Hope, similar emphasis is put on the pivotal role of the non-profit to 
broaden its base and attract external support from for instance government agencies or 
non-religious foundations. Donations are used towards the social programs as well as 
worship services at the small Tweetorings congregation. One consequence has been the 
de facto merging of this congregation with the Towers of Hope non-profit. Its Reverend 
De la Harpe le Roux simultaneously serves as the organization’s director. When the 
drastically diminished Afrikaner congregation closed down in 2009, the DRC Free State 
																																																								
504 Interview, Rev. Rust, 28 March 2014. 
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Synod gave Reverend De la Harpe le Roux an opportunity to plant a new church in the 
old congregation for the vulnerable people of the inner city, and meanwhile develop a 
non-profit organization focusing on the same target group. One year later, this 
organization was then formally established and named Towers of Hope. In a special 
arrangement with the DRC, Towers of Hope has been functioning as a fully independent 
NGO that is responsible for the director De la Harpe le Roux’ salary while using the 
facilities and building of the new Tweetorings congregation also under his leadership. For 
the Reverend-director, the lines between the church and the non-profit have and should 
be completely blurred for practical and principled reasons. Both benefit from each other 
in terms of finances and resources. Notably, they complement each other according to the 
Reverend-director in a symbiotic relationship and as spaces where everyone can 
experience God in their own way and through practical service. “[Church] should not just 
be a Sunday event… It should be a place where marginalized people feel safe… where 
rich and poor can be together without feeling guilty or humiliated.”505 
 Increasingly removed from the Reformed Church family and its unity debates, the 
two organizations exhibit at times unexpected forms of the interracial engagement the 
DRC and URCSA claim to pursue. For Badisa this is chiefly manifested through its 
management. On ground level, programs remain as segregated as elsewhere in the 
churches’ service landscape. Each run their own child support centers, elderly homes and 
education programs. Ultimately however, the program officers running these programs 
have to coordinate their services with each other and align them with the organization’s 
																																																								
505 Interview, Rev. De la Harpe le Roux, 14 April 2014. 
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common budget. Working out finances, managing volunteers and staff, liaising with other 
non-profits and government subsidies compels the various church representatives to be in 
constant conversation with each other and accept their interdependency. As the director 
explained: “we always talk together about everything, and do so on equal footing.”506 
 Such equal footing is largely absent at Towers of Hope where a white staff 
supervises overall operations, including a variable group of black volunteers carefully 
selected from the dispossessed participants in its social programs. The presence of these 
participants during worship moments at the Tweetoring congregation has significantly 
altered its character though. Services currently tend to involve singing, clapping and 
dancing as lay leaders freely interpret Bible texts and homeless men play the piano. 
White members constitute a minority in a church that once boasted an Afrikaner 
membership of at least 3000. Some attend out of curiosity to see what happened with the 
old mother church. Others told me they made a conscious choice to help out and attend 
one of the few places where the “church has changed its structures to adapt to the 
community, rather than doing something separate for each group.”507 Employees insisted 
that while the soup kitchen continued to be Towers of Hope’s primary function for the 
moment, it was “not just like any other NGO. Because it is happening inside the church, 
we bring in the spiritual side.”508 “We engage with people here, listen to their stories 
without judging.”509 
 																																																								
506 Interview, Rev. Rust, 28 March 2014. 
507 Conversations, Towers of Hope staff, 17 April 2014. 
508 Interviews, Towers of Hope staff, 17 April 2014. 
509 Interviews, Towers of Hope staff, 16 April 2014. 
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While Towers of Hope and Badisa are turning away from the Reformed family, they have 
been receiving extensive appraisal from the churches that launched the two organizations, 
especially from the DRC. Both were often mentioned during my visit in 2014 as models 
of how the church can truly open its doors to all South Africans. A Kerkbode reporter 
described Towers of Hope as an essential “we say thank you to the Lord” project in the 
DRC Presbytery of Bloemfontein: “Here there are no Afrikaners or Sothos, rich or poor, 
black or white, homeless or homeowners. But here Christ is all and in all!”510 An URCSA 
Cape synod report expressed its “deep gratitude” for Badisa and its “tireless work to help 
people in need.”511 During interviews in the Cape, church leaders and members referred 
to the two organizations as rare examples of how unity can work, because the 
organizations “have focus” and “prioritize principles.”512 Rarely did such affirmative 
stories note the increasing distance between the organizations and the Reformed 
churches. Nor did they address the all too familiar intricacies Badisa and Towers of Hope 
encounter as they pursue greater inclusivity. The departure of Tweetorings’ traditional 
white membership was rarely mentioned outside Bloemfontein. The de facto segregation 
of most of Badisa’s service programs was either ignored or dismissed as something only 
certain people in the church were not prepared to let go of yet. “Some people in the DRC 
just don’t want to change.”513 
																																																								
510 “Ons-se-dankie-projekte” [We say thank you projects], Die Kerkbode, 17 January 2014, 15. 
511 Verslag van Diens en Getuienis (D&G) aan die 6e gewone vergadering van die VGK streeksinode 
Kaapland [Report of the Service and Witness (S&W) of the 6th ordinary meeting of the URC Cape synod.] 
14-17 October 2014, 14. 
512 Interviews, DRC minister, 3 April 2014, and DRC Welgelegen member, 10 March 2014. See also 
Partners in Witness website. Middestadsbediening. [Inner city service]. Visited at 12 May 2015, 
http://www.ngkerkvrystaat.co.za/documents/wat-doen-ons/vennote/ons-vennote/Middestadbediening.pdf.  
513 Interviews, Towers of Hope staff, 16 April 2014. 
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 Another often dismissed challenge comprises the prevalence of narratives of 
white charity in the non-profits. The supposed responsibility of white churches and their 
affiliated organizations to aid powerless black communities still greatly shape the service 
operations of Badisa and Towers of Hope. At the former, controversies regarding who is 
in control emerge regularly. URCSA representatives complain about the DRC presuming 
an automatic position of dominance over programs aligned with the former black mission 
churches. Since these churches historically lack support structures of their own, the DRC 
has through Badisa continued to step in as major initiator of local relief programs. The 
name Badisa provides according to some interviewees rather a politically correct cover 
for the same old condescending programs the white church has always conducted in 
black and colored communities.514 Even when a previously segregated DRC elderly home 
is forced to fuse with an URCSA home, the former often expects to remain in charge and 
takes over the URCSA home rather than integrate on equal terms. “Cooperating is one 
thing,” Badisa’s director elaborated, “but shared ownership is hard when you confront 
different capacities.”515 
 Diverging capacities, also an all too familiar problem in the church family, appear 
even more starkly in the case of Towers of Hope. The presence of a predominantly black 
membership might have altered the outlook of the church, but not its leadership and 
overall organization. Most of the non-profit’s permanent employees have a white DRC 
background. The building itself is still officially part of the DRC Tweetoring 
congregation, even while the non-profit covers most of its maintenance costs. A 																																																								
514 Interview, URCSA Presbytery Wynberg, 27 March 2014. 
515 Interview, Rev. Rust, 28 March 2014. 
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committee of the DRC Free State synod helps coordinate the affairs of the Tweetoring 
congregation, so far without much involvement of the majority black churchgoers.516 
Employees stress the problem of class rather than race in Towers of Hope’s ongoing 
transformation.517 The majority of today’s roughly 100 churchgoers peddle between the 
city center and the townships in which their families live and stay away from the church 
for months at the time. Towers of Hope has tried various strategies to foster a more 
structural relationship with the churchgoers by temporarily employing them for instance 
as parking guards, cooks or cleaners. The worship services are also meant to engage them 
more deeply with the life of the community. During a visit at one of the weekly combined 
worship and lunch services, most participants signaled little fervor for the spiritual 
element of the service though. They enjoyed the ability to sing and play music and in 
some cases talk with Towers of Hope staff at the end of worship about their search for 
jobs or difficulties in their families. Most however immediately migrated to the kitchen to 
receive their one meal for the day, promised to them in return for their attendance.  
 
As the church family struggles to place non-profits like Towers of Hope and Badisa, it 
overlooks their perhaps most interesting contribution to the churches’ transformation 
process. Engaging a diverse group of volunteers in their social programs, both 
organizations allow for the emergence of alternative religious experiences that escape the 
family’s historic patterns. At Badisa, URCSA and DRC representatives jointly pray about 
																																																								
516 DRC Free State 2013, Regional Synod Agenda. Ooreenkoms met NG gemeente Bloemfontein 
(Tweetoringkerk) [Agreement with DRC congregation Bloemfontein (Tweetoring church)], 24. 
517 Interviews, Towers of Hope staff, 16 April 2014. 
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how to keep their organization afloat during the country’s harsh economic recession. For 
staff and participants in the Towers of Hope programs, worship is intricately interwoven 
with social services. In the old Afrikaner congregation, they form a new community that 
is neither church nor non-profit, but rather a mixture of both. Away from church 
traditions, unity talks and past legacies, the various population groups engage with each 
other in a practical manner. They draw on a variety of religious discourses and rituals 
loosely based on Protestant Christianity to build trustful relationships. Contrary to the 
Reformed church unity efforts, the non-profits have few expectations of finding 
commonalities beyond the broad belief in Jesus Christ. Their programs may do little 
concrete to further the unification process nor are they likely to change the structural 
inequalities between the population groups they work with. In their limited capacity 
though, the service organizations provide rare instances in which faith does not impede 
but rather facilitates connections among people from sharply different backgrounds. As 
such they also offer a rather unwelcome message for the churches that the type of 
interracial prayers they hope for are most likely to occur outside their own institutional 
and congregational context. 
 
Between model and symbol 
 
The Reformed churches’ social programs take up a pivotal position in the search for 
unity. They constitute singular manifestations of cooperation between URCSA and the 
DRC and as such amount to powerful emblems of the churches’ potential to overcome 
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the divisions that keep their communities apart. Two factors facilitate this unique 
position. One involves the presence of the strong common goal the programs assert in 
serving God on earth through serving the vulnerable of South Africa, or rather the 
African continent. A second factor comprises the level at which the programs operate 
between leadership and communities on the ground. This intermediate level has shielded 
service commissions and organizations from the convoluted debates occurring in the 
churches’ national leadership, as well as from the tendency of congregations to withdraw 
within their own identity group. Significant problems however occur with both these 
conditions, hampering the ability of social programs to move their partnerships beyond 
their so-called “in-between” level.  
 First of all there is the discourse of the churches’ shared goals of service and 
witness about the Kingdom of God in Africa. As a recycled version of the old Christian-
nationalist narrative, the discourse claims a similarly faith-inspired commitment to the 
land but this time with a strong focus on involving all of its inhabitants equally. Notions 
of diversity, unity and inclusion reoccur throughout the documentation of the churches’ 
service organizations, particularly among those with roots in the mission policy. They 
present Christianity as an overarching identity that ties the various communities of South 
Africa together regardless of their race or ethnicity, and simultaneously present a 
Christian duty to help heal the nation. The social programs thus reiterate, and sanctify, 
the type of rainbow nation discourse Habib criticizes. It presumes a nationalist resolution 
of South Africa’s racial conflict while ignoring the class divisions that continue to 
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undermine its democratic transition. 518  Concentrating their efforts on inter-racial 
partnerships, the social programs overlook the disparate reality of the communities they 
try to involve. The vast social-economic distance between black and white makes any 
collaboration bound to end up in paternalistic relationships. Failing to mention this reality 
in their extensive language about partnering and joint services, the programs allow for the 
opposite to happen. Jubilant stories of inter-church relief activities primarily show white 
DRC charity for black and colored communities without acknowledging the apparent 
consistency of such programs with the racial hierarchy of the apartheid era. The revised 
narrative of a common Christian African identity does little to change this appearance 
and rather reaffirms perceptions of white power and black powerlessness. 
 Exacerbating this situation is the convoluted position of social programs within 
the organizational structures of the Reformed family. They might function as increasingly 
autonomous commissions and non-profits with their own budgets and staff. In many 
cases, organizations like CFW and Partners, still answer to official church rules and 
traditions. Prime among them is the tradition to provide services to the immediate 
membership of the church. Orphanages, mission projects and elderly homes that were 
long ago established to serve either DRC or black Reformed church communities are still 
expected to be maintained in their traditional context. They remain for members on either 
side the embodiment of the church’s function to safeguard its own people first. 
Organizations that have been able to break with these perceptions, Badisa to some extent 
and Towers of Hope, tend to break with the church in general as they seek a broader base 
																																																								
518 Habib, “South Africa – The Rainbow Nation and Prospects for Consolidating Democracy.” 
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of recipients and, notably, donors to work with. Engaging with the Reformed family’s 
extensive bureaucracy has not been worth the limited funding the organizations receive 
from the churches. They might be developing alternative programs in which black and 
white engage at slightly more equal footing than through the old church relief services, 
but they do so with little involvement of local church communities. The latter hence 
barely see the progress made by the non-profits towards a more integrated approach of 
development through partnership. 
 An additional problem here comprises the limited concrete value church leaders 
attach to the social programs. They celebrate the programs’ presumed achievements of 
interracial cooperation, but are reluctant to translate the emerging regional partnerships 
into formal unity arrangements at national level. Neither are they very effective in 
involving congregations at local level. Both the DRC and URCSA pride themselves with 
allowing the service programs to experiment with unity practices. For the DRC, they 
show its progress in becoming a more inclusive institution, ready to cooperate with others 
on some of its core services. At URCSA, initiatives like CFW and Badisa present prime 
examples of how the church seeks to practice the principles of Belhar to promote justice, 
unity and reconciliation for everyone. Meanwhile both churches appear content to retain 
a status quo of relative inequality. Despite an often angry discourse about DRC 
domination, URCSA refuses to ask its congregations to share in the financial and 
administrative burdens of the social development efforts that benefit them, whereas the 
DRC quietly continues to pay for most of these efforts in exchange for a taken for granted 
dominance in decision making. 
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 The social programs hence offer rather a symbol of hope for future church unity 
than the tangible models they seek to be. Still, as symbols and through their discourse, 
they are playing an important role in reshaping church practice. Especially the mission 
organizations of CFW and Partners have been fostering an extensive faith inspired 
attitude of public engagement that pushes church actors out of their comfort zones. Their 
programs invite disparate congregations to interact, perhaps in paternalistic relationships, 
but with a growing sense of interdependence. Above all, they allow for different forms of 
religious experience. Seeking to move away from the divisions represented by the still 
segregated churches, the social programs tune in with global dynamics of religious 
change. They increasingly avoid references to the institutions of the DRC and URCSA 
and their dogged association with particular racial or ethnic communities. Instead, focus 
is given to a broader sense of faith that can be practiced individually, outside the 
sanctuary and during practical works that benefit the larger society or even continent. The 
organizations thus relate to a broader development in religious life in South Africa and 
elsewhere in the world towards more personal and fluid relationships with the divine. It is 
a development many inside the Reformed churches both fear and admire. Above all, it is 
a development that is likely to continue and bring about more change than the various 
unity initiatives might generate all together.  
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Conclusion 
 
Throughout this chapter we saw both URCSA and the DRC touting the importance of a 
bottom-up approach to enable the transition of their long segregated churches towards a 
new multiracial institution. It emerged in my conversations as one of the main strategies 
all church actors could agree on, with the notable exception of a few top leaders who 
preferred an official unity arrangement before any local intervention. A major difficulty 
with the otherwise highly popular grassroots approach involves the misconceptions about 
its impact. Rarely did local efforts culminate in the anticipated changes such as the 
integration of racially different congregations or a greater sense of unity within the 
Reformed Church family. The changes that did emerge meanwhile received little 
recognition. 
A first misconception the accounts from the Western Cape and the Free State 
display, concerns the reach of local unity efforts. Not only did ground initiatives to 
transcend the family’s racial divisions remain few and far between here. The sparse 
initiatives that did occur in places like Stellenbosch and Wynberg also gained little 
foothold in the communities at stake, if they did not collapse entirely. In the Free State 
and in the churches’ social programs we saw perhaps more tangible cases of interracial 
partnerships. Without much connection to structural processes of change or the churches’ 
national leadership, these cases appeared drops in the ocean though. They often relied on 
a single minister or an inspired group of church actors with little sustainability built in if 
the individuals would leave. Overall, member involvement in inter-church partnerships in 
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either the Western Cape or the Free State tended to be limited to but a few mostly white 
and colored congregants already at ease with each other due to a proximity in residence 
or social-economic position. The almost negligible presence of black Reformed 
communities is emblematic of the churches’ struggle to stretch further across their 
embedded boundaries. Members were unwilling to step out of their comfort zones and 
into a poor township accept perhaps under the guise of a poverty relief program. Local 
leaders raised bureaucratic barriers to any collaboration they feared could undermine 
their influence in the community or harm supposedly distinct church traditions.  
 Another notable misconception pertains to the presumed virtue of contact between 
the various racial communities inside the Reformed family. The idea that more 
interaction would automatically propel positive and equal relationships receives little 
backing from the discussed cases. In the Western Cape, DRC and URCSA members as 
well as ministers often ended up more frustrated with their differences after an arranged 
meeting than prior. Congregations in the Free State dreaded moments of contact as the 
beginning of the end of their own church identity. Even the celebrated social programs 
appeared to produce more rather than less unevenness as they persisted one-sided white 
to black charity.  
 The experience of local Reformed communities seeking integration thus 
corresponds with the critique Tranby, Hartman and Edwards among others have 
expressed towards multiracial congregations in the United States and their lack of deep 
change. Few efforts allowed for an actual confrontation with diversity. Instead of 
narrowing the gaps between different groups of people, integration processes in South 
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Africa’s Reformed Church family often reconfirmed them by keeping in place 
paternalistic patterns and prioritizing one particular church culture, usually that of the 
white community, over others. Outside the safety of the sanctuary, these patterns did 
show cracks however. In the neighborhoods and villages surrounding the congregations, 
members employed their faith to build improbable alliances with people they would 
otherwise shun or barely encounter. In the Western Cape these alliances emerged through 
for instance the friendship groups of Agape or the academic establishment at the 
Stellenbosch Theology Faculty. They continued in Wynberg between DRC and former 
URCSA members even after the dramatic disintegration of their unity process. In the Free 
State unexpected connections appeared in the form of joint social projects to improve 
local living conditions. Without the pretension of elevating inequalities, congregants from 
vastly different backgrounds appreciated such connections as rare moments in which they 
could interact informally and on a deeper level than they might experience at work or 
through school. Faith in these instances provided crucial, be it not sufficient, bonding 
material. It worked as Durkheim’s social glue along with other social-economic factors. 
The upward mobility of black and colored elites in addition to the increasing sense of 
despair among white rural and inner city congregations created an enabling environment. 
Communities realized their growing interdependency, looked for ways to relate and 
found support in their joint faith. 
 The Reformed tradition formed a point of recognition among these usually far 
removed population groups. Above all, it offered a line of justification. To explain what 
for many remained a big step into the unknown, congregations developed narratives of 
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inclusivity they claimed were inspired broadly by the life of Jesus Christ. Ministers 
building such narratives consciously avoided the churches’ official integration 
terminology and referred to the need for spiritual bonding with different communities in 
the public domain rather than through church institutional channels. It allowed for the 
involvement of even those congregants who expressed deep suspicion towards any 
process they negatively associated with transformation or reconciliation. It also allowed 
for the evasion of the Reformed churches’ often toxic unity debates, particularly with 
respect to the Belhar Confession. It is remarkable how little attention was paid to this 
Confession in the studied cases. Belhar emerged during interviews as a source of 
inspiration to some or frustration to others. Rarely did church actors indicate the 
Confession as an impediment to their contact with other communities in the church 
family, nor to any partnerships they had formed. Apartheid and restorative justice were 
also generally avoided as topics that would only undermine the precarious relationships. 
The dismissal of race as stumbling block and the disregard of economic disparities fit in 
this picture of conciliation, though not reconciliation. The latter term carried too much 
weight. 
 
The circumvention of delicate issues not merely characterizes the few interracial alliances 
that can be discerned among the congregations of the Reformed Church family. It 
constitutes a crucial condition for these alliances to function. Staying away from 
institutional religion, politics and contentious reconciliation debates allowed for 
diverging communities within the church family to build trust and collaborate. Doing so 
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in a secular public space was equally essential. Here, people expected less adherence to 
particular communal traditions than inside the church. Moreover, the secular space 
offered a common enemy against which the various Reformed communities could gather 
in their mission to spread the word of God among their fellow countrymen. Finally, a 
revised form of nationalism, focused on the new rainbow nation and the larger African 
continent, provided the perhaps most controversial platform on which the church 
communities were able to build alliances as a new and yet all too familiar sense of shared 
national belonging. A question that remains is how much such alliances are worth for 
South Africa’s ongoing post-apartheid transition when they appear so consciously 
removed from its harsh reality.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
“Why study a church that is dying?” “What could the Dutch Reformed Church, of all 
churches, tell about matters of reconciliation?” Such questions were not uncommon 
among South Africans hearing of this dissertation research. Especially those not directly 
involved with any of the Reformed churches, and even those who were, tended to express 
doubts about the value of studying an institution still deeply associated with apartheid, 
and pretty much expired. They have a point. The DRC or any of the other Reformed 
churches can barely be seen as grand success stories. For the last two decades, the 
churches each walked their own paths, taking them away from apartheid, yet also keeping 
them closer to patterns of segregation than most other sectors of society, or even most 
other churches. It is the apparent failure here that makes the Reformed churches so 
interesting though. First of all, this dissertation has tackled questions of how to 
understand such failure, and of how to then define success. Secondly, the admittedly 
distinct church trajectories discussed in the above chapters offer valuable insights into 
challenges that reach far past the context of South Africa’s Reformed Church family. Its 
convoluted responses to diversity reveal deep internal discrepancies between religious 
leaders and individual believers as both pursue diverging tracks to reach outwards and 
withdraw inwards. They exhibit the simultaneous need for and insufficiency of religious 
beliefs to handle complex pluralizing realities on the ground. Most of all, the church 
family appears emblematic of the persistent entanglements of religious, ethnic and racial 
identities, albeit in constant tension with the now equally persistent idea of unity in the 
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name of God. The rest of this conclusion expounds this tension and what it signifies for 
religious capacities in overcoming social divisions in South Africa, and beyond. 
 
The power of preaching 
 
For all the debate about religion as an increasingly individual “lived” affair, it is 
intriguing to note the pertinence of official doctrine and texts in the Reformed churches’ 
unification trajectory. It not only confirms the persistent influence of religious institutions 
that scholars like Davie and Ammerman have noted. The infinite flood of documents, 
Bible texts and referrals to specific Reformed traditions also signal the struggle of the 
institutions to adapt to their individualizing membership base and join the pace of 
religious change. A single doctrine ordaining certain practices and behavior no longer 
suffices. Instead, the DRC and URCSA leaderships are scrambling to inform their 
constituencies with often highly subjective arguments to explain why they propose 
certain measures, and request members’ consent, preferably through personal votes. This 
tailored approach is not entirely new in churches that share a long Protestant tradition of 
placing high value on congregational autonomy and local church distinctions. Quite 
different is the emphasis on members rather than congregations. Congregants’ opinions 
as expressed through the abundant formal and informal church media, consultations and 
meetings, have gained significance at the cost of leaders’ authority. The latter’s discourse 
appears in constant exchange with that of believers on the ground. These believers may 
reside in remote villages once disconnected from the rest of the country, and with at times 
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equally isolated opinions. Through Facebook, Twitter and blogs, they now help forge 
national church discourse. Conversely, leaders employ these members’ heated debates 
towards their own agendas and defend their call either for restraint or urgency in church 
unification. 
 Key is then to see what church members do with the discourse flowing from their 
institutions, and from amongst themselves. Considering the case studies of chapter five, it 
would appear that the change in ideas is in fact one of the biggest shifts the Reformed 
churches can take some credit for. They are clearly not alone in facilitating this shift. The 
majority of church actors I spoke with did acknowledge the core idea of unity as 
disseminated by URCSA and the DRC through their official discourse for over twenty 
years now. The fundamental belief in interracial contact and collaboration as something 
good and desired by God received overall acceptance. This in itself constitutes a major 
contrast with the long prevalent focus on divine divisions as propagated by the Afrikaner 
civil religion. The discursive transition discernable here occurred on the one hand at a 
profound spiritual level. From Reverend Kleynhans and the congregants of Mauersnek to 
the two churches of Wynberg, members and ministers indicated the sense of a unique 
bond that connected them across racial and class divides and that built on their common 
roots in the Reformed church as well as the Biblical imperative for inclusivity. It 
motivated the people from Philippolis to venture into intimidating environments, whether 
the black township or the white church, and helped De Bloem’s Afrikaner community 
accept and join in once unthinkable interracial worshipping. The principles laid out in the 
Belhar Confession, of justice, reconciliation and unity, returned throughout these 
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instances as core spiritual guidance, regardless of whether the communities involved had 
accepted the Confession. The principles signified a deep commitment among them to 
ultimately realize the visible unity of what had long been, sinfully, segregated.  
 On a more worldly level though, this unity mindset often remained 
problematically shallow. The acquired beliefs in inclusivity did little to alter the structural 
paternalism or mutual prejudices still prevalent across the church family. Rather, it 
emerged at times as an excuse to refrain from any more substantial change, especially 
among DRC communities. Having recognized their common spiritual connection, 
members felt they had done enough for their fellow black or colored Christians. The 
latter alternatively spoke of unity in terms of a faraway future ideal that God urged them 
to strive for. It would in the meantime allow for better relationships on immediate 
personal terms without risking any further cultural or material losses for one’s own 
community. What we see here is not just the persistence of white dominance in church 
tradition and leadership despite multiracial symbolism, as critics have noted in the United 
States. The Reformed congregations, whether or not engaging in fleeting interactions, 
applied their own unity discourse to justify ultimately segregated lives.  
 
This brings us to an important point regarding the potential of religious discourse to 
instigate processes of integration. Seldom do ordinary believers act directly upon their 
faith, at least not in the context of South Africa’s Reformed church members. Their 
religious ideas and doctrines came in when a situation called for explanation, and then 
helped shape responses. Faced with a changing neighborhood composition in Heatherdale 
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and rising poverty inside De Bloem congregation, members turned to some of the 
available Christian unity talk to legitimate what appeared an appropriate survival strategy 
in these specific settings: open up the church doors. In other settings, like Stellenbosch, 
with far less urgency to change manners, the unity talk often remained without tangible 
consequences. Here it was rather used to explain the need to reform attitudes, from 
patriarchal to collaborative, fitting with the city’s emergent multiracial academic 
establishment.  
 The power of preaching unity among the Reformed churches thus depended 
greatly on the social circumstances that called for such preaching. It furthermore had little 
effect unless aligned with secular arguments concerning the immediate benefits for the 
communities at stake. Grand words about a unification covenant with God crashed into 
the quickly apparent improbability of materializing such a vision in the near future. 
Church leaders, members and ministers preferred working with concrete proposals for 
collaboration that, while always linked to the gospel, concentrated on the tangible 
realities of church structures and congregations on the ground. In the effort to adapt 
religious language to mundane realities, the former often lost much of its original 
message though, or even ended up with contradictory narratives. Eager to convince 
members of the value of unity in their local settings, leaders highlighted the richness of 
diverse traditions and cultures, subsequently reinforcing perceptions of communal 
distinctiveness that should be protected. Church actors on all sides meanwhile employed 
a religious unity rationale to draw other boundaries amongst themselves, between 
conservative and liberal, rural and urban, apartheid and post-apartheid. This is where the 
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unity discourse appeared perhaps at its most powerful. It served to create and reinforce 
constantly evolving forms of exclusion as religious actors tried to position themselves in 
deeply convoluted debates about belonging, to the church, and to South Africa. 
 
From preaching to prayer 
 
Church worship constitutes by far the most contested space over which unity battles have 
been fought these past two decades. As Riesebrodt and many fellow scholars of religion 
have noted, liturgy remains the center around which much religious life continues to 
evolve. It is therefore in the sanctuary, during Sunday service, singing and praying, that 
unification proponents perceived a particularly visible, and problematic, lack of 
integration. Critics meanwhile pointed at the paramount importance of preserving the 
various communities’ distinct church liturgies, and at the improbability and above all 
undesirability of trying to merge them. At first sight, the latter appear to be on the 
winning side, with the Reformed churches’ sites of prayer indeed as segregated as ever. 
What tends to be dismissed here, is the pertinence of liturgy outside the pulpit. It is often 
employed in gatherings about rather mundane issues to tie together people with divergent 
backgrounds and ideas, if only for one moment of joint prayer.  
 Among the Reformed churches, this use of liturgy emerged frequently as a key 
strategy to help deal with their past and present divisions. It surfaced in organizational 
meetings where leaders tried to find consensus on the practical aspects of their 
collaboration, or during community get-togethers in which ordinary members discussed 
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concerns about what was happening in their immediate surroundings, their cities or 
country at large. Religious rituals, loosely based on the Reformed tradition, played a 
pivotal role in both cases to create a common starting point. Simple words of prayer that 
everyone knew functioned as a reminder that participants shared a broad basis in beliefs, 
values and principles regardless of the diverse racial or ethnic communities of their roots. 
Familiar Christian traditions of breaking of the bread and drinking from a shared cup 
constituted acts that people could perform together and that were remembered afterwards 
as key moments of communion. They were valued as rare instances in which people 
could set aside their racial divisions, apartheid traumas and current disparities as they 
experienced, at least briefly, a sense of unity in Christ. 
Interestingly, such liturgy appeared quite a bit more malleable once conducted 
outside the church. It would involve Dutch Reformed lay ministers saying a prayer in 
English, with perhaps an isiXhosa proverb alongside songs in Afrikaans and references to 
the Belhar Confession. Notable here are also the stories of church related organizations 
like Badisa and Towers of Hope. As their staff members sought to forge cross-
community collaborations, they often turned to a broad lingua franca of religiously 
motivated social engagement. Worshipping in these contexts pragmatically merged 
customs, languages and rituals depending on the people the organizations hoped to reach 
and with little attention to, or rather evasion of, any specific church identity. 
 
This last finding sheds a different light on discussions about the intertwining of religion 
with ethnic, national or racial identities. Attachments between a particular church and 
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single population group indeed still characterize South Africa’s religious landscape and 
larger society. This intertwining however takes place predominantly inside the church 
institutions in question. As individuals increasingly situate their religious experiences 
away from these institutions, once entrenched religious-ethnic bonds have also begun to 
shift. Especially the younger generations in this study appeared comfortable in exploring 
different traditions and putting together their own belief system that was not exclusively 
Afrikaans or tied to for instance the colored community. Certainly, as the previous 
paragraph indicated, religious institutions held significant sway over the choices these 
individuals made. But the churches’ presence in people’s lives has undeniably diminished 
and become more reliant on the ability to adapt to members’ demands for change, or for 
no change at all.   
 An enigmatic situation emerges here, in which religious leaders and members 
interchangeably push each other towards more or less inclusive worshipping, integration 
or further segregation. Across the discussed case studies, we discern elites stuck in 
paternalistic church relationships and patterns of separateness. Their constituents 
meanwhile seek new alliances across their church’s ethnic group boundaries, though not 
necessarily inside the congregation. Here we can think for instance about the dinners of 
Agape, the youth exchanges in Wynberg or the catering services at De Bloem. Still, the 
reverse also happens. Stellenbosch, Ladybrand and Philippolis each showed progressive 
leadership to promote interracial interaction that encountered resistance from members. 
The latter tightly held on to the racial or ethnic composition of their church communities 
as if there never had, or should have been an end to apartheid. 
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Underlying such apparent clashes is an intricate discrepancy between the interests 
of communities on the one hand, and leaders on the other hand when it comes to matters 
of social change and greater diversity. Among the former, deep apprehension existed 
about any modification in the format of their church services. These services comprised 
above all spaces of communal solidarity and familiarity. Sharing or even merging liturgy 
was not a problem in itself. Difficulties rather lay in altering the one place communities 
sought to protect against the influx of different cultures, viewpoints and lifestyles. Black 
congregants willing to adopt parts of the traditional white Afrikaans church style were 
hence welcome in what might at best be called diversity-lite, or at worst a continuation of 
white hegemony. In a similar manner, communities found little trouble in joining 
temporary church exchanges or even asked leaders to facilitate joint prayers at a town 
hall meeting, as long as that did not affect the distinctness of their own congregation. The 
attitudes at play here drew to a great extent from sentiments of threat and the fear of any 
further losses of group identity as a consequence of South Africa’s ongoing transition. 
Equally if not more important however was a growing anxiety about the future of the 
churches amidst processes of religious change. Many congregants were perhaps church 
hopping themselves or requesting changes in the service to suit their individual needs. 
They nonetheless stressed the importance of continuity in the overall identity of the 
churches of their childhood. Significant elements of this identity, like apartheid theology 
or a close affiliation with the state, had already changed. A distinct racial, ethnic, or as 
many preferred to say, “cultural” affiliation constituted all that was left. Without such an 
affiliation, the various Reformed churches could just as well close their doors. The 
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churches hence not only reinforced ethnic and racial boundaries, but were also believed 
to depend on them for their own survival.  
Much of the anxieties for community survival found an outlet in upheaval about 
top-down efforts to practically integrate and alter church liturgy. Leaders contrarily 
tended to consider such efforts in more symbolic terms. They looked for ways to claim 
for themselves, the nation and God, that the churches had finally broken with the sinful 
segregation of apartheid. Focus was given to structurally merging what still comprised 
the most visible aspect of church life: the liturgy conducted inside the congregations. 
Leaders and the more change-oriented ministers developed alternative services meant for 
integrated worship, but struggled to do so without eliciting the anger of their 
constituencies. Rather than subsequently addressing the dreaded changes in church 
character, they concentrated on how to work out the finances, official doctrines or 
decision-making powers. Leaders thus often ended up in a double bind with ordinary 
churchgoers. Preoccupied with bureaucracy and the urge to generate perceptible change, 
they dismissed if not actively discouraged members’ spontaneously formed alliances 
beyond the church. Simultaneously, elite endeavors to institutionalize such interracial 
contact aroused the deepest fear of these members: to lose the home base that had been 
offering them the minimum sense of safety necessary to engage with diversity outside. 
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From prayer to change? 
 
The question we are left with is to what extent the Reformed churches have made an 
actual break with their past as pillars of apartheid. Clearly, a full answer to this question 
requires more time to see if any of the discussed unity efforts will bear fruit on the long 
term. At this stage, several observations can be made though, not only about these efforts 
but also about what they tell us regarding the broader role of religious actors in rebuilding 
societies after prolonged communal tensions and strife.  
In general terms, this dissertation exhibits the importance of distinguishing 
between different religious actors and functions in order to better understand their bearing 
on societies in transition. Religious leaders, ministers and ordinary believers in this 
research held widely divergent perceptions about the potential threats or rather benefits of 
the social changes they were confronted with, and took on often contrasting strategies to 
cope with and generate their own change. Besides debates about structural versus 
spontaneous processes of racial integration, they differed in their perceptions of what 
such processes could accomplish. Where elites spoke of mutually beneficial partnerships, 
elevating inequalities and bridging cultural differences, communities kept their 
expectations low to the ground. If they endorsed any modifications in the way they were 
interacting with other communities, members chiefly sought exposure, better 
understanding or, more importantly, awareness of each other’s struggles. Local ministers 
often found themselves in between, pursuing better relationships without perceiving, or 
intending, larger alterations to congregational life. The perhaps greatest misunderstanding 
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between religious leaders and members concerned the motivation for change. Throughout 
the Reformed family, the first have sought to convince their constituents through deeply 
faith induced rationale about the Biblical call for unity. This might have contributed to a 
not insignificant normative shift. Ultimately, constituents did not change practical 
behavior or relationships unless pushed by quite earthly matters. At the end of apartheid, 
business interests, an urge to connect with global markets and cultures, and fear for the 
total loss of identity and language crucially undermined Afrikaner support for the regime. 
Similarly, church communities today are far more likely to change their ways due to 
social-economic and demographic factors than as a result of religious discourse.  
This is not to say that beliefs in the transcendent do not matter for processes of 
social change. As we have seen, notions of God-willed reconciliation can crucially 
motivate people to step out of their comfort zones and engage with the perceived other. 
Such religious motivations however remain isolated if they are not connected with other 
functions of religion, such as the strengthening of an internal sense of belonging through 
communal gatherings with singing, praying and worship, as well as social works and 
exchanges to reach the broader society and address everyday realities. In the Reformed 
churches, leaders and members operated on all these levels, but in often disconnected 
ways. Few knew of each other’s efforts towards integration or of the alternative routes 
that were being developed on the spot to not so much bring different racial communities 
closer together, but at least create opportunities for individuals to cross boundaries on 
their own accord. The detached ways in which church unification was often approached 
has significantly undermined an already convoluted transition. It has allowed the 
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churches’ prolonged journey out of apartheid to become hostage to heated debates about 
diversity in general, from issues of homosexuality and gender to race and apartheid, the 
country’s disarray, and the broader future of the church in a changing religious landscape. 
Amidst such controversy, the limited changes the churches have achieved, as well 
as their effects, often appear lost. This is unfortunate, as they offer distinct insights into 
how a former religious-nationalist movement seeks to address its community’s dilemmas 
of belonging. Beyond a shift in ideas, this has involved among the Reformed churches a 
little recognized revision of the old civil religion to fit with current paradigms of unity 
and inclusivity. Rather than throwing away the apartheid doctrine in its entirety, the 
Reformed churches, especially the DRC, have kept some core elements that still resonate 
with their membership base. These involve a deep spiritual commitment to the nation of 
South Africa and larger African continent, combined with close attachments to distinct 
local cultures and languages and a sense of responsibility to care for all the various 
communities of Africa. The central element of mission here makes an especially 
intriguing example of the refashioning of ideas. Still infused with paternalistic notions of 
white charity, it now also entails a belief in interdependency and partnership. To care for 
the nation means to act as instruments of God on earth, which can only occur through 
active cooperation across the color line.  
The impact of this religious nationalism revisited is ambiguous. At face value, it 
appears an effective midway between communal withdrawal, global visions and social 
outreach. It is from their embeddedness in distinct localities that religious actors step into 
the world and engage with other localities, whether through joint relief efforts, church 
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exchanges or informal prayers. In practice, this often amounts to a small group of 
individual ministers, congregants and volunteers representing the outreach part most 
others prefer to refrain from. The diversity they encounter also remains limited to 
individuals from different communities who are either on the aid recipient side, or 
already in closer proximity due to upward social-economic mobility. Meanwhile, 
essentialist notions of group identity are kept in place, as are entrenched social 
hierarchies and disparities.  
 This research has nonetheless revealed an intriguing dynamic in the spread of the 
churches’ revised paradigm. It has not only found resonance among the usual suspects, 
the mentioned small group of clergy and congregants in favor of change, but also among 
what we could call the unusual suspects. Churchgoers who described themselves as 
conservative and in often exclusive ethnic terms conveyed surprising support for the 
basic premises of the Reformed family’s unity discourse. The idea of a common 
Reformed South African identity expressed through community partnerships found 
appreciation among those who had turned their back to South Africa’s post-apartheid 
transformation, especially within the country’s designated white and colored population 
groups. It offered them tools to deal with the difficult realities transpiring from this 
transformation and provided a sense of engagement with society, on their own terms. By 
gradually recycling and reshaping the old doctrines, the DRC critically slowed down its 
own break with apartheid. It has however presented an alternative to those who refuse to 
let go of past ideas or practices, especially in view of a challenging present and uncertain 
future. The midway between local identities and national responsibilities poses an option 
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for change without the associated sense of loss. More notable perhaps, it presents an 
option against further withdrawal or a potential turn to religious-nationalist extremism. 
The limitations of this option have been well covered throughout this study. Prime among 
them is the backlash we have also seen among congregants across the church family 
against anything to do with unification. It leaves little doubt about the persistent divisions 
that run through the churches and that are continuously reinforced in sites of worship, 
whether or not they aspire to the current vision of unity.  
 
The conclusion emerging from the unfinished story of South Africa’s Reformed churches 
might then point at an inherent inaptitude of religious actors, especially those embedded 
in religious-nationalist belief frameworks, to truly transform and contribute to greater 
social cohesion. If this story shows anything however, it is the subjectivity of change. 
From the perspective of most faith communities involved in this study, they have made 
tremendous strides. Many of their leaders, ministers and members have committed their 
lives to the cause of reconciliation that reaches far beyond the local struggles covered 
here. Twenty years after apartheid it is considered no small feat that white, colored, black 
and Indian communities can, and increasingly do, come together in what remains a very 
intimate place for a majority of South Africans. The churches here not only represent 
distinct communities and their ethnic identities, culture and solidarity. They often 
comprise an extension of people’s family, where they gather in tightly knit groups for 
moments of suffering and joy, for professional networking and for the children’s 
education. To share these worship spaces with the perceived other almost constitutes the 
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maximum to be achieved in terms of national unity. Considering the deeply divided 
nature of South Africa’s broader society, it is of little surprise that the churches are far 
removed from this maximum. It should not be an excuse though to keep it that way.  
 
Reflections towards the future 
 
Spending quite some years studying a controversial case of churches in transition has led 
me several times to change my mind about the extent of this transition. Participants in the 
research regularly asked if I would share these personal opinions. With this last section, I 
seek to offer some general thoughts, not as clear-cut recommendations, but rather as 
points for further reflection towards the future of the Reformed churches and South 
Africa’s transition, as well as the broader role of religion in post-conflict reconstruction. 
 
On the Reformed churches’ unification process 
This dissertation has in many ways been critical about the unification processes of the 
Reformed churches in South Africa. That does not take away the pertinence of these 
processes for the church family as institution, its diverse congregations, and for the 
country at large. Simply put, the Reformed church institutions appear to have little choice 
but to continue their unity efforts if they wish to retain some position in contemporary 
South Africa. The weight of the past is too heavy to ignore. The rising competition with 
the country’s wide variety of religious traditions moreover leaves the churches few other 
options than pursuing at least some collaboration to salvage what is left of the Reformed 
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identity. For all its faults, the attempt to implement an actual merger of the four churches 
has elicited vital conversations about what this identity entails in a post-apartheid reality, 
among leaders and ordinary members. Their sharp debates might have been hijacked by 
concerns regarding South Africa’s broader transition. One could also perceive them as a 
crucial vehicle for communities to address these concerns. Throughout my research, 
participants often took discussions about unification as valued opportunities to talk about 
the difficulties in their neighborhoods and towns, reflect on personal struggles with racial 
prejudice or share thoughts about what the churches could do to make things better.  
 Important then is to think about how to further unity without doing more harm. 
Building on the above analyses, it appears that this can only be done by recognizing the 
distinctiveness of its three equally important dimensions: the leadership and community 
level, as well as the intermediate role of church social programs. The first inevitably 
requires some arrangement on the Belhar Confession. It might constitute little more than 
an agreement to disagree, as long as leaders jointly provide clarity. The already 
prolonged confusion about Belhar will otherwise likely continue to offer ammunition for 
the many animosities within and among the churches. Clarity is also needed towards what 
local congregations can do within institutional parameters. Primarily, they need concrete 
support. Many more communities than indicated in this study have over the past decades 
explored ways to connect with their neighbors across the color line. Too often these 
initiatives falter on lack of resources, knowledge or sustainable leadership. With their 
extensive social and professional networks, community works and reach into people’s 
everyday lives, the churches have abundant capacities to bolster grassroots initiatives. 
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These capacities move far beyond the financial aspects on which many efforts tend to 
concentrate and get stuck. Key is for the churches to leave plenty space for local 
members and ministers to find their own paths while offering unambiguous directions as 
to where they are heading. 
 The perhaps most difficult decision facing the Reformed churches, pertains to 
whom they might lose on the way. It should be clear by now that not everyone is equally 
ready to engage with unity efforts. Some people might never be. The DRC in particular 
faces the task of making unpopular decisions if it wishes to implement its discourse. 
Notably, these decisions might turn out to receive more approval than is often thought. 
Surveys and popular debates about Belhar or unification are misleading in that they bring 
out antagonistic voices while the many quiet supporters or rather indifferent members 
remain unnoticed. Either way, the churches, DRC and URCSA, will have to do a better 
job in grounding their unity vision in practical benefits for the communities at stake, and 
accept that some will make more of such benefits than others. Segregation, despised as it 
is, offers advantages most people know in terms of group solidarity and familiarity. 
Integration implies many unknowns. It requires the kind of mutual trust that is lacking 
exactly because of the long separated structures. To build trust, much more attention is 
required for local collaborations than is currently offered through the churches’ social 
programs or rather vague and paternalistic “joint projects.” It is in tangible actions to help 
employ young people, enhance neighborhood safety, or keep hydraulic fracturing plans in 
check, that communities often come to value each other’s varied contributions. United or 
apart, the leading principle here must be first and foremost, interdependency. 
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On South Africa’s dealing with the past 
In the years spanning this research, South Africa faced two particular events marking a 
new phase in the country’s post-apartheid transition. One involved the killings at the 
Marikana mine in 2012 where 44 people died after police violently cracked down a 
months’ long strike. The other comprised the death of Nelson Mandela in December 2013 
that spurred the entire nation into mourning, and into further reflection about what the 
achieved freedom from apartheid had brought to the country. Reactions to these events 
epitomize the trend mentioned in chapter one regarding South Africa’s shift from 
reconciling with the past towards seeking economic justice in the present.  
 Themes of income disparity are obviously not new and are intricately connected 
with the country’s tortuous history. What this research demonstrated is the difficulty of 
aligning concerns of the past with those of today. Over the last two decades, South 
Africans have developed an impressive set of discourses about restoration, forgiveness 
and Ubuntu, along with a range of initiatives to improve interracial relationships among 
communities on the ground. The Reformed family, especially URCSA, has played its 
own part in national reconciliation efforts by promoting theologies of social justice and 
unity, or facilitating dialogues about the churches’ role in apartheid. Notwithstanding 
their intrinsic value, many of these efforts now appear out of touch. Their focus was long 
on the divisions between black and white, and on healing the traumas inflicted by the 
National Party regime. Now they need to add attention to the divisions between disparate 
black communities, or the violent police actions conducted this time by the ANC.  
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 This new phase is still unfolding and remains therefore hard to foresee. It does 
offer food for thought about what it takes to deal with a history as convoluted as South 
Africa’s. The country appears in desperate need for alternative vocabulary. Notions such 
as reconciliation and rainbow unity are perhaps considered obsolete. Their old surrogates 
of segregation and autocracy remain very much alive. What comes after the rainbow? 
Some say revolution, others call for realism. The story of the Reformed churches exhibits 
the need for a bit of both. The next step in their, as well as South Africa’s, transition 
demands a radical effort to stem the rampant inequalities, as well as a good dose of 
pragmatism to prevent a new wave of disillusion when change will not materialize 
immediately. Above all, South Africa continues to need ideas to help further a common 
sense of belonging. The churches preside over a powerful package of symbols, beliefs 
and practices that could be used towards such common belonging. It is unfortunate that 
so much of this package remains clouded by narratives of the past and by essentialized 
identities ill suited for South Africa’s shifting realities. 
 
On religion and post-conflict reconstruction 
The last point takes us back to the factor of religion in post-conflict reconstruction. This 
study has given ample material for substantiating the commonly made claim that religion 
feeds into social divisions and as such exacerbates tensions between different identity 
groups. It has also become apparent that the role of religious actors is rather elusive, 
though certainly not absent. Their most notable impact in society relies on their ability to 
consolidate certain patterns, perceptions and behavior into people’s everyday lives. In 
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polarized societies and situations of conflict, these patterns tend to be ones of separation. 
They linger long after immediate frictions dissipate and can easily resurface when 
conditions again deteriorate. The case of South Africa’s Reformed churches has allowed 
for at once a greater comprehension of how these structures are kept in place, and of how 
they might be undone. 
 Among the most obvious factors sustaining separateness we have discerned the 
search for internal group cohesion, autonomy and security as well as the various distinct 
resources, ideas and ceremonies that religion has to offer towards these needs. The 
Reformed Church family however exhibits increasing ambiguity in the preservation of its 
group affiliations. The churches show a sharpening of racial boundaries, and their 
simultaneous blurring, through for instance the incorporation of alternative traditions, 
languages or people from different backgrounds. These developments might occur 
gradually and unintentionally. Making them appear as such is often part of an explicit 
strategy that has everything to do with how religious actors are navigating their strained 
social and political environments. Persisting exclusivity, or at least keeping up the 
appearance of exclusivity, in this context has become a pivotal form of resistance against 
top-down change. It expresses dissatisfaction with religious, political and community 
leaders that have not brought the improvements promised to come with peace. 
Authorities would have sold out the idea of national unity and engaged, to employ a 
common South African expression, in cheap reconciliation. 
 This intransigence still does not have to imply a rigid persistence of the status 
quo. Religious communities not only confront social-political tensions, but also and often 
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much more so, the challenge to compete with other religious and non-religious 
worldviews. Amidst such survival struggles, inconceivable changes become conceivable. 
Alternate worship services are developed along with discourses that justify engagement 
with the diversity that can no longer be avoided. Believers form new connections with 
people who share the conservative religious morale they stand for, or at least broad 
principles of faith they now feel they have to defend together against pluralization or 
secularization. The unexpected inter-communal alliances occurring here raise questions 
about the solidity of the religious-ethnic affiliations visible on the surface. It also points 
at the need for creativity in engaging ostensibly defiant religious actors in transformation 
processes. Prime focus is often given to the moderates within a certain faith tradition, or 
to religious actors already in favor of dialogue. In this dissertation we have however seen 
fervent supporters of unity wedged in separate structures, where proclaimed reactionaries 
quietly dismantled them. Which responses ultimately contribute to greater social 
cohesion remains a question for many more studies to come.  
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APPENDIX 	
Data analysis fieldwork 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The overview presents the outcomes of the data exercise conducted towards analysis of 
the fieldwork data gathered in South Africa in 2014. These involved conversations and 
interviews with 62 participants in the two main Reformed churches, the DRC and 
URCSA, on various themes in relation to unification processes among these churches 
over the past two decades, and particularly since 2006. For each theme, I looked for the 
extent to which respondents considered it important for unification and distinguished 
between positive, negative and ambiguous responses. The table below shows the 
percentage of respondents that responded positively. Respondents included actors with 
different functions in the churches, supportive of and skeptical towards the prospect of a 
structural church merger. With conditional formatting, a color scheme was applied to 
show the level of positive responses for one particular theme across different functions in 
the two churches, with the darker colors indicating a higher level of positive responses.  
 
 
Total DRC URCSA Academics Leaders Members Ministers 
Structural 
national church 
unification 
46.2 31.6 60.0 60.0 77.8 46.7 10.0 
Bottom-up unity 
efforts 84.8 90.0 76.9 100.0 50.0 92.9 100.0 
Local exchanges 67.6 68.8 66.7 100.0 100.0 75.0 78.6 
Integration 
regional synods 
and social works 
76.5 80.0 71.4 80.0 75.0 75.0 … 
Joint social 
works 91.2 100.0 83.3 83.3 75.0 100.0 100.0 
Poverty relief 79.2 75.0 83.3 50.0 75.0 81.8 85.7 
Belhar 
Confession 56.7 33.3 80.0 60.0 77.8 55.6 28.6 
Resource 
inequalities 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Spirituality: God 
wants unity 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Nation: South 
Africa needs 
church unity 
94.1 100.0 83.3 100.0 100.0 90.9 100.0 
Reconciliation  80.0 69.2 88.2 100.0 100.0 69.2 66.7 
Number of 
participants 62 31 31 9 13 24 16 
^ None of the interviewed ministers mentioned the in-between level of church 
organizations and regional leadership structures as important to unification processes. 
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“Confining What Can No Longer Be Confined: Religious Tolerance in the Netherlands 
from 1945 until Now.” Presented at the American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting, 
Chicago, IL, November 2012 
 
“All for One, or One for All? Liberation Theology and the Quest for Self-Determination 
in Latin America, Israel, Palestine and the United States.” Presented at the First Annual 
Union Seminary Quarterly Review Graduate Student Conference, New York, NY, 
February 2012 
 
 
Seminars and Trainings (selection) 
 
“Black Europe: Race in European History and Current Affairs,” National Institute for 
Study of Slavery and its Legacy, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, June 2011- Participant 
 
“Emotions in Conflict Transformation and Youth,” Umbruch –Bildungswirk, German 
Community Education Initiative, Istanbul, Turkey, July 2008 - Lecturer 
 
“Applicability of Peacebuilding in Youth Work,” Council of Europe / United Network of 
Young Peacebuilders, Budapest, Hungary, March 2008 - Coordinator / Trainer 
 
“Building Peace Skills Training Seminar,” Schoorl, the Netherlands, June 2007 - 
Coordinator / Trainer 
 
“Youth Energy for Peace: A Training Course on Intercultural Project Management,” 
Conyoungtion / Youth in Action Programme, Ransdaal, the Netherlands, August 2007 - 
Trainer 
 
 
Languages 
 
Dutch: Native       
English: Fluent       
German: Good 
Afrikaans: Good 
French: Functional 
 
